Judgment M.Y.Eqbal, J. 1. The petitioners have moved this Court under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: and prayed for quashing the order dated 27-2-1998 passed by the Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan, in Sessions. Trial No. G5 of 1996 by which the prayer of the petitioners for discharge has been rejected. 2. The aforesaid Sessions Trial No. 65 of 1996 arises out of Barhariya P.S. case No. 92 of 1995 under Secs. 448, 323, 354, 379/34 of the Indian Penal Code. It appears that the first information report was lodged on the basis of fardbeyan of one Asha Gaddi son of Nathuni Gaddi of Barhariya in the district of Siwan. 3. The prosecution case, in brief. is that on the alleged date of occurrence, the informant was tilling his land, in the meantime his son came running and informed him that all the accused petitioner had come to their house and they are assaulting his mother and trying to take forcible possession of the room in which they were previously a tenant. The informant further alleged that at this information he rushed to his house along with his son and saw that the petitioners were assaulting his wife and they also torn the blouse of his wife. It is alleged that when the informant protested, he was also assaulted by them. The petitioners also snatched silver chain from the neck of his wife. On the basis of that FIR a criminal case was instituted under the aforesaid sections. During investigation the Investigating Officer did not find any material for prosecuting the petitioners under Sec. 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioners case is that petitioner No.2 also filed a complaint case against the I.O. of the present case and the other police officials of Barhariya Police Station along with the informant and his family members. However after investigation charge under Sec. 376, I.P.C. was also added against the petitioners. When the case was fixed for framing charge, the petitioner filed an application for their discharge from the alleged offence punishable under Sec. 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The complainant was heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan, who in terms of the impugned order dated 27-2-1998 rejected the application of the petitioners holding that the prosecution has brought sufficient materials to frame charge under Sec. 376. I.P.C. 4. I have heard Mr. The complainant was heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan, who in terms of the impugned order dated 27-2-1998 rejected the application of the petitioners holding that the prosecution has brought sufficient materials to frame charge under Sec. 376. I.P.C. 4. I have heard Mr. Y.V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and learned Counsel for the Informant-Opposite party No.2. I have also gone through the affidavit and the documents annexed with the complaint. 5. From perusal of the FIR, it appears that there are allegations against the petitioners of entering into the house of the informant and trying to remove all the articles and dispossess him from the house. There are also allegation about assault to the wife of the informant and toeing of the blouse and snatching of silver chain. However there is no allegation of committing rape or attempting to commit rape with the wife of the informant. At best from the allegation, it may be inferred that the petitioners assaulted or used criminal force to the wife of the informant in tending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty and not more. The learned Court below in his order observed that accused persons not only torn the blouse of the victim lady but also insulted her. The Court below referred para 11 of the case-diary to notice the statement of the victim lady who was examined by the Investigating Officer and observed that the victim lady supported the version of the prosecution and said that the accused persons not only torn the blouse but also molested her by forcibly snatching her entire clothes from her body and. thereafter insulted her. On the basis of the statement learned Court below observed that the petitioners are liable to be prosecuted for committing offence punishable under Sec. 376. I.P.C. 6. The scope of Sec. 227 of the Code and the duty of the Court while framing charge has been wellsettled by the Supreme Court in series of decisions. thereafter insulted her. On the basis of the statement learned Court below observed that the petitioners are liable to be prosecuted for committing offence punishable under Sec. 376. I.P.C. 6. The scope of Sec. 227 of the Code and the duty of the Court while framing charge has been wellsettled by the Supreme Court in series of decisions. In Union of India V/s. Prafulla Kumar the Apex Court observed that "the words not such sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere pass office to frame charge at the behest of the prosecution but he has to exercise his judicial mind to the fact of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. But he may evaluate the material as to find out as to whether the facts emerges from very root taken at their face value established ingredients constituting the said offence. It is well settled that test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a Rule of universal application. By and large however, if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. In the case of State of Bihar V/s. Ramesh Singh, the Apex Court observed that at the initial stage of framing charge if there is strong suspicion and evidence which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then if is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused has committed the offence then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 7. Coming back to the instant case, as noticed above, in the fardbeyan on the basis of which the first information report was drawn up, there is no whisper from the side of the informant that the accused persons had committed rape or attempted to commit rape with the wife of the informant. That was the reason the petitioners were prosecuted under different sections other than Sec. 376, I.P.C., yet the learned Sessions Judge completely overlooked the very important aspect of the matter which is evident from the FIR itself. These accused persons are father, son and grandson. The allegation if accepted as true, is that all the accused persons have committed offence of rape. It cannot be believed that father, son and grandson will jointly try to commit rape or outrage the modesty of a lady, particularly when there is no specific allegation of commission of that offence by particular accused persons. This leads to strong suspicion about the fallacy of the allegation made by the informant or statement of the victim lady subsequently recorded by the Investigating Officer. Even in the statement, the victim lady had not clearly stated that the accused persons have tried to commit rape rather she has said that the accused persons torn the blouse and snatched the silver chain and insulted her. The word "insult" does not mean committing rape. The lady may be insulted by different ways and it does not and cannot mean commission of that offence. The learned Court below, therefore, committed serious illegality in holding that the petitioners are liable to be prosecuted under Sec. 376, I.P.C. 8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this application is allowed and impugned order so far as prosecution of the petitioners under Sec. 376, I.P.C. is concerned is quashed.