R. BALIA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner challenges through this petition the re-grant of land in question in favour of respondent No. 4 by the Order of State Government dated 3-7-1997 in pursuance of which the Collector, Bharuch, had made the order dated 27/28-11-1997. The case of the petitioner is that their predecessor deceased nathubhai Amaidas was tenant of Survey No. 290/1 admeasuring 1 acre 16 gunthas at village Gadkhol, Taluka Ankleshwar. As on 1-4-1957 the tillers day he was in occupation of the land and cultivating the same as protected tenant. He is deemed to have purchased the land under the Bombay Tenancy Act. Proceedings under Sec. 32g of the Act was initiated. While these proceedings were pending, the land in question was acquired by the State Government under the provisions of the Land acquisition Act vide Notification under Sec. 4 dated 1-4-1972 and Declaration under sec. 6 dated 22-8-1972. The possession of the same was also taken in pursuance of such acquisition and the land vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The petitioner who was a tenant and predecessor of the respondent no. 4 the landlord, both have been awarded compensation with respect to their interest in the land in question. Thus, the acquisition proceedings were completed long before the present controversy arose. On acquisition of the land being complete and it having vested in the State Government, the proceeding under Sec. 32g became infructuous and same were dropped. The petitioner also states that he has applied for de-acquisition of his lands. However, the de-acquisition of the completed acquisition was not possible. As the land which was originally acquired for the public purpose was no more required for that purpose, vide impugned order dated 27/28- 11-1997 land has been allotted by way of re-grant to the original land holder, i. e. , respondent No. 4. The petitioner feels aggrieved by grant of land in favour of respondent No. 4. ( 2 ) THE case of the petitioner is that under the Scheme of Bombay Tenancy Act, said Nathubhai being a tenant. On 1/04/1957, the tillers day, became deemed purchaser of the land free from all encumbrances subsisting thereon the said day as per Sec. 32 of the Act. ( 2 ) THE case of the petitioner is that under the Scheme of Bombay Tenancy Act, said Nathubhai being a tenant. On 1/04/1957, the tillers day, became deemed purchaser of the land free from all encumbrances subsisting thereon the said day as per Sec. 32 of the Act. As a result of the said provision, right, title and interest of original land owner, if any, in the land, were extinguished and he became entitled only to the purchase price determined under the provisions of the said Act. The proceedings under Sec. 32g of the Act calling upon deemed purchasers, landlords of the land and other persons interested in land for the purpose of enquiring the willingness of the deemed purchaser to purchase the land held by him as a tenant and determination of purchase price payable by him. If the tenant shows his willingness to purchase on prospective determination of purchase price, an inquiry into that question takes place. In case the tenant fails to appear on the date or that he is not willing to purchase the land, the purchase becomes ineffective. In that event, right, title and interest of the land owner does not survive. Under Sec. 32p of the act as applicable in the State of Gujarat, where the deemed purchase by the tenant becomes ineffective, whether on account of tenants unwillingness to purchase or on account of failure to make good the purchase price determined by the Collector, it comes available for disposal by the Collector to be disposed of amongst persons narrated in order of priority under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 32p of the Act. Original landlord does not find a place therein. On this anvil, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as on the tillers day, right of landlord in the land is extinguished. The land either becomes the property of the tenant as a result of purchase becoming effective, or becomes available for disposal amongst persons other than land owner in order of priority under Sec. 32p (2) and the tenant becomes liable to be evicted. But in no case any interest of landlord in land survives. His right is confined to receive purchase price. But in no case any interest of landlord in land survives. His right is confined to receive purchase price. This being the position, on failure of acquisition proceedings, which commenced after 1-4-1957, the land must revert back to the petitioner who was deemed purchaser on the tillers day under Sec. 32 and not to the original landlord. For the proposition that the interest of the landlord extinguishes as on the tillers day in case the land is in possession of a tenant, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Amrit bhikaji v. Kashinath Janardhan, reported in AIR 1983 SC 643 . ( 3 ) LEARNED Addl. Government Pleader as well as learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 justified the order of re-grant to the original landlord. The case on behalf of the Government is that if the Government did not require the land under clause 328 of the Land Acquisition Manual, after recovering the market value of the land, the Government can re-grant the said land to the original owner or his heirs. Reliance was placed on Government Resolution No. 7940 of 1949 dated 22-11-1950 also for re-granting in favour of the original landlord in preference to the petitioner. It was also urged that after the acquisition of the land, it became Government land and the tenant has no right, whatsoever, on that particular land. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 also urged that on acquisition of land vested in the State government free from all encumbrances and there being no de-acquisition of the property, alluding to rights as existed prior to its acquisition are wholly irrelevant. The land in question continues to be a Government land and the Government has necessary authority for disposing of the land in question. The land has been disposed of in accordance with clause 328 of the Land Acquisition Manual. The petitioner has no right to challenge the grant made in favour of the respondent with reference to his claim to tenancy right as existed prior to the acquisition. The land has been disposed of in accordance with clause 328 of the Land Acquisition Manual. The petitioner has no right to challenge the grant made in favour of the respondent with reference to his claim to tenancy right as existed prior to the acquisition. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner reiterating his main contention urged in alternative that if the land continues to vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances and all rights and interest prior to its acquisition stand extinguished, then the land could be disposed of only in accordance with the statutory provisions governing the disposal of the Government land depending upon agricultural or nonagricultural land. But, the same could not have been allotted to respondent No. 4 either on a preferential basis without considering the claims of the other persons to get that land on fulfilment of conditions for such allotment. ( 5 ) THERE cannot be any doubt about the position that once land has been acquired under Land Acquisition Act, possession of which has been taken and it is vested in the State free from all encumbrances all pre-existing interests in land of whatever nature stands extinguished. Land once vested in the State Government on possession having been taken, cannot be subjected to withdrawal from acquisition under Sec. 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 48 permits withdrawal of the acquisition proceedings only at a stage anterior to securing possession of the land under acquisition and before completion of acquisition proceedings. Once acquisition proceedings are complete, withdrawal of proceedings under Sec. 48 is not envisaged. In case recourse to Sec. 48 is permissible and it has been so resorted to, the question may arise about restoration of status quo ante as it existed immediately prior to acquisition proceedings and revival of such interest and their determination. However, once the land vested in the State Government, extinguishing all interests outstanding, the question of such revival, the doors of de-acquisition being closed, is not contemplated under any provision of law. Thereafter, the land vesting in the State government if not used for the public purpose for which it has been acquired is available for the Government to be used in any other manner. Thereafter, the land vesting in the State government if not used for the public purpose for which it has been acquired is available for the Government to be used in any other manner. It can either be used for any other public purpose or if it wants to dispose of that land it can do so within the provision of law governing disposal of the Government land. ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid position, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the land is not utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired and is free for allotment, he must be restored the possession of it in preference to anyone else and in recognition of his right as deemed purchaser is not acceptable. The fact that the Collector has mentioned in his impugned order on delivery of possession of land to respondent No. 4 by way of re-grant on payment of purchase price, the proceedings under the Tenancy Act under Sec. 32g, which were earlier dropped as having become infructuous, shall stand revived, in my opinion, is wholly unwarranted and contrary to the acquisition law itself. There was no interest outstanding in the land which could be investigated and determined for the purpose of restoring status quo ante. The petitioner can lay claim to land in question, if it is made available for grant only under precincts of relevant provisions of law governing disposal of Government land. ( 7 ) HOWEVER, it must be held in favour of petitioner that if any attempt is made to determine priority in allotment of such land on the basis of rights existing as on the date of acquisition, the original landlord cannot be preferred to tenant becoming a deemed purchaser as on tillers day. The clock cannot be set back to reach times crossing the intervening period governed by statutory provisions. The proposition is unassailable that as on tillers day a tenant protected, or cultivating the land who become a deemed purchaser, under Sec. 32 relegating the land owner to a person entitled only to receive purchase price as per law, and not entitled to continue to hold his interest as land owner even in case purchase becomes ineffective. In an attempt to restore status quo on recognising right existing prior to acquisition, the rights of such tenant cannot be ignored. In an attempt to restore status quo on recognising right existing prior to acquisition, the rights of such tenant cannot be ignored. For this reason, restoration of possession can also be to the person from whom possession has been taken. It cannot be handed on a platter to a person who has already lost his interest in land by operation of law in 1957 on the ostensible ground of extant administrative instructions of 1950, that must give way to statutory provisions. Right of tenant cannot be ignored on the basis that such right extinguished on acquisition, while recognising the right of land owner whose right has been extinguished even prior to that. If the rights of tenant had extinguished, also the rights of land owner stood extinguished. If for any reason revival takes place, rights of both interests, viz. , of landlord as well as tenant will resurrect, with right of tenant to restoration of possession and its protection. State cannot adopt a policy contrary to statutory provision, which had extinguished rights of landlord in favour of cultivating tenant in possession as a measure of agrarian reform to indirectly get over the consequence of such enactment. It will not only amount contrary to statute but will offend equality clause of Art. 14, the decision being arbitrary and unreasonable. In the matter of a policy to restore status quo ante, the right to possess and entitlement to purchase cannot be ignored in favour of a person entitled only to price. ( 8 ) CLAUSE 328 of the Land Acquisition Manual only postulates that land which is not required for the purpose for which acquisition has been made whether by other agency for which land has been acquired or by State itself, it is not necessary to grant the land to the original holders or cultivators excepting in case where such persons are landless or the members of economically backward class having their income less than Rs. 1,800. 00 per annum. Otherwise land has to be dealt with as uncultivated Government lands at the disposal of the Government for allotment. One guidelines is that it must ensure recovery of price and market rate subject to minimum price as compensation paid. In this connection, my attention was invited to Secs. 1,800. 00 per annum. Otherwise land has to be dealt with as uncultivated Government lands at the disposal of the Government for allotment. One guidelines is that it must ensure recovery of price and market rate subject to minimum price as compensation paid. In this connection, my attention was invited to Secs. 60 and 62 of the Land Revenue Code which, inter alia, provide that any person who is desirous of occupying unalienated Government land, he can apply to the Collector. However, he cannot occupy the land until he seeks prior permission to that regard and on such terms and conditions which the Collector may impose in accordance with rules. Section 62 envisages that the Collector can allot the land either on application under Sec. 60 or by public auction. The scheme of the Land Revenue code by reading the two sections together makes it abundantly clear that the Collector has every power to grant land to an applicant in respect of unalienated land available with the State on such terms and conditions as envisaged under the rules or he has discretion to dispose of land by public auction. Obviously, it envisages that where there are competing claims for the allotment of the same land or looking to the nature of the land, it is so desirable, he can put the same for sale by public auction to fetch the best available price. ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Patel Parshottamdas chaturbhai v. Harijan Shakarbhai Lakhabhai, reported in 1978 (XIX) GLR 341, for the purpose of showing that Sec. 62 of the Land Revenue Code for grant of government waste land, it is not obligatory that the land should be sold by auction and it can be granted in pursuance of the policy decision contained in the Government resolution as well. ( 10 ) BY reading Sec. 62, the Court held in the aforesaid case that Sec. 62 is only one of the modes in which a grant can be made. It does not exhaust the powers of government to make grant otherwise than under Sec. 62. Besides, Sec. 62 merely provides that the Collector may require payment of price for unalienated land or to sell the same by auction and to annex such conditions to the grant as he may deem fit. It does not exhaust the powers of government to make grant otherwise than under Sec. 62. Besides, Sec. 62 merely provides that the Collector may require payment of price for unalienated land or to sell the same by auction and to annex such conditions to the grant as he may deem fit. It is, therefore, not obligatory that the land should be sold by auction. It can be granted provided it does not infringe any provision of law and does not violate any statutory provisions. Therefore, even if it were to be assumed for the sake of argument that Sec. 62 is the only provision under which a grant can be made, the grant in favour of respondent No. 1 cannot be invalidated merely because instead of selling it by auction, it has been granted to respondent No. 1 in pursuance of the policy decision contained in the Government Resolution dated 1/03/1960. ( 11 ) IT has been noticed above that Sec. 60 postulates grant of unalienated land in favour of a person desiring to occupy for which permission can be granted, for that purpose auction is not the procedure. Section 62 enables Government to either require the payment of a price for unalienated land before furnishing the occupancy permission under Sec. 60 or before resorting to that it may opt to sell the same by auction on such conditions to the grant as it may deem fit. Thus, Sec. 62 does not take away of the option of the grant of occupancy right on unalienated land on payment of price under Sec. 60. For operating Sec. 60 for permitting a person to occupy the unalienated land on payment of price, Government may lay down the policy decision for exercise of such power generally or with specific reference to the specific land. The decision does not run counter to conclusion to which I reached above. It rather supports the conclusion that grant ought not to infringe any provision of law and not violate any statutory provision. Within these province, the Government can frame a policy for the grant of waste land and allotment made in accordance therewith may be justified and cannot be invalidated. ( 12 ) FROM the facts of this case, it is apparent, the grant is not in accordance with the policy decision as well. Within these province, the Government can frame a policy for the grant of waste land and allotment made in accordance therewith may be justified and cannot be invalidated. ( 12 ) FROM the facts of this case, it is apparent, the grant is not in accordance with the policy decision as well. The policy decision in respect of allotment of land which has vested in the Government under acquisition proceedings and has not been utilised for the purpose for which the same has been acquired is stated in Clause 328 of the Land Acquisition Manual. The said clause does not envisage the land is to be re-granted to the land owner or the tenant from whom the said land has been acquired excepting in cases where the person who was to provide by acquisition is landless person or is economically backward having annual income which is not more than Rs. 1,800. 00. The respondent No. 4 land owner or the petitioner has not claimed their right under that category. It is also not the case that respondent No. 4 had applied for occupying unalienated Government waste land. In fact he never applied for allotment. He has been offered land at a price as a reversal of acquisition proceedings, which as discussed above also could not result in restoration to respondent No. 4. The other policy decision is, it should be given to any person in accordance with the general provisions subject to condition that purchase price should be recovered from such an allottee which is higher of the two, namely, the compensation paid for such land or the market price. In the aforesaid circumstances, in the absence of any policy decision laying down the preference in the matter of allotment at market price, the only provision to which attention has been drawn is to sell the land by auction which ensures recovery of market price or compensation price whichever is higher by disposal of such land. This also ensures that every prospective buyer has right to be considered for such allotment on offering the best price for the Government land. This also ensures that every prospective buyer has right to be considered for such allotment on offering the best price for the Government land. ( 13 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, though the petitioner is not entitled to restoration of land to him on the basis of his supposed right under Sec. 32 of the Tenancy Act, which extinguished on the acquisition of land in question, he is entitled to relief for setting aside of transfer made in favour of the respondent No. 4 on payment of fixed price without following the procedure for allotment of land as envisaged under the Land Revenue Code or under any other law governing disposal of such land. The State Government wants to dispose of waste land, is bound to follow the procedure laid down in law and to act within the precincts of policy decided by it within the permissible limits of the law relating to the allotment of such lands and cannot adopt a pick and choose policy for transferring land without affording opportunity to others to be considered to such allotment. Moreover, the order of the Collector in reconsideration under Sec. 32g itself makes the allotment under question incongruous. The order of the Collector, in fact, reflects that he was considering the case to be of de-acquisition of the land and return to the status quo as it existed prior to acquisition. In that event, he could not have delivered the possession to the landlord on the supposed extinguishment of tenancy rights. If the tenancy rights were extinguished how the landlords rights could survive acquisition, is difficult to understand. It further goes to show that the respondents have acted on wholly wrong perception of the availability of land as a result of its non-utilisation for restoration of the status quo ante. ( 14 ) IN the result, this petition partly succeeds. The order of re-granting the land in favour of the landlord by the Collector as affirmed by State Government in revision is quashed. However, the State Government is free to dispose of the land in accordance with the provision for allotment of such land under any law for time-being in force. There shall be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute as above. .