V. P. MOHAN KUMAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner challenges Annexure-A order dated November 7, 1994 of the Appellate authority constituted under Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946 and Rule 7-A of the Rules framed thereunder. The petitioner applied for incorporating the following clause in the bye-law; "18. 9-- "if a workman remains absent for more than 10 days and/or absents himself beyond the period of leave originally granted, or subsequently extended, he shall lose his lien on his appointment, unless he returns within 10 days of the expiry of the notice of termination and explains to the satisfaction of the management the reasons for his inability to return before the expiry of the leave. " ( 2 ) WHEN this application came up for consideration the Certifying officer heard the contentions and passed Annexure - E order certifying the bye-law in the following manner: "if a workman remains absent unauthorisedly for more than 10 days or absents for more than 10 days beyond the period of leave originally granted/ subsequently extended, he/she shall lose his/her lien on his/her appointment unless he/she returns within 15 days from the date of issue of notice of termination and explains to the satisfaction of the management the reason for his/her unauthorised absence or his/her inability to report for duty after the expiry of the leave originally granted/extended. In the event of workman explaining to the satisfaction of the management the reasons for his absence the workman may be reinstated in service by the management provided such explanation is given within 15 days from the date of losing his lien on his appointment. " ( 3 ) THIS was not exactly the request made by the petitioner. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the appellate authority, the 1st respondent herein. The 1st respondent, by the impugned order Annexure-A, modified the clause still further in the following manner; "clause 18. " ( 3 ) THIS was not exactly the request made by the petitioner. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the appellate authority, the 1st respondent herein. The 1st respondent, by the impugned order Annexure-A, modified the clause still further in the following manner; "clause 18. 9: If a workman remains absent unauthorisedly for more than 10 days or absents for more than ten days beyond the period of leave ordinarily granted/ subsequently extended he/she is deemed to have retired from his/her job voluntarily and left the services of the company on his/her own and stands relieved by the management from the date of commencement of unauthorised absence: provided where such absence is due to circumstances beyond the control of the workmen concerned like involvement in a serious accident resulting in treatment in Intensive Care Unit, imprisonment by law enforcement authorities, insanity or madness of employee, death of parent/spouse/or own child and where such fact is brought to the notice of the management by the next kith and kin of the employee or any other person (concerned with such circumstance) within a reasonable time after occurrence of such circumstance, this clause will not operate. " ( 4 ) THIS is challenged in this Court. ( 5 ) I have heard Mr. M. C. Narasimhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, as also Smt. Subha ananthi, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 employer. ( 6 ) THE main objection raised by Mr. Narasimhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that there cannot be a clause as such which would entitle the management to declare unilaterally that the worker has lost the lien due to overstaying the leave. This according to the learned counsel is a settled law by virtue of the decisions of the Supreme Court in D. K. Yadav v. J. M. A. Industries ltd. 1993-II-LLJ-696 (SC) and Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan, 1998-I-LLJ-1165 (SC) and other cases. ( 7 ) ALL that is contemplated under D. K. Yadav's case is that a removal of an employee on the ground of loss of lien without anything more is a retrenchment and infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution. D. K. Yadav's case indicated that in all these cases unless an opportunity is given to the employee, this would be nugatory of the right of employment conferred on the worker. Mr. D. K. Yadav's case indicated that in all these cases unless an opportunity is given to the employee, this would be nugatory of the right of employment conferred on the worker. Mr. Narasimhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, points out that there is a specific misconduct covering identical situation contained at Clause 21. 20, namely: "habitual absence without leave or with out permission, or absence without leave for more than 10 consecutive days. " In such a situation it admits of no doubt then, the worker can be given a reasonable opportunity to contest his case and put in his defence and only after an adjudication of the charges framed against the worker, a punishment is imposed. He complains that the existence of the clause as now impugned herein would clothe the employer with the further right to terminate the services of the worker without anything more. ( 8 ) I do not think any serious objection can be raised in this manner. When D. K. Yadav's case has recognised the right of the employer to treat the employee as having lost his lien provided an option is given, there is nothing wrong in the Standing Orders which would empower the employer to invoke the rule as to loss of lien after giving a reasonable opportunity to the employee to be heard in the matter. The complication, as I see, was brought about by virtue of the decision of the Certifying officer and that of the Appellate Authority. ( 9 ) SMT. Subha Ananthi, learned counsel for the employer, submitted that in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Buckingham and Carnatic Co. v. Venkatayya 1963-II-LLJ-638 (SC), an inference of abandonment can be drawn by the employer when there was long absence. From other surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can be legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the employee intended to abandon service, In such a situation it involves a finding and such an inference can be drawn only after a reasonable opportunity is given to the worker. When it is a misconduct, it is possible to proceed against the worker for the said misconduct. It is for this purpose, Clause 21. 20 has been included in the Standing Orders. When it is a misconduct, it is possible to proceed against the worker for the said misconduct. It is for this purpose, Clause 21. 20 has been included in the Standing Orders. ( 10 ) I am of the view that the Appellate Authority has not bestowed its attention to the various decisions of this Court and the propositions of law, while dealing with the appeal. In the circumstances, the impugned order is set aside. I direct the Appellate Authority to take back the appeal and pass a fresh order after hearing the respective sides. The writ petition is disposed of.