G. P. MATHUR, J. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed for quashing the F. I. R. under sections 3/7, Essential Commodities Act (for short B. C. Act) lodged on 4-1-97 at P. S. Gobhana District Aligarh, on the basis of which case crime No. 2 of 1997 has been registered and also the seizure memo of the same date. 2. The allegations in the F. I. R. is that the premises of Aligarh Roller Hour Mills Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as mills) were inspected on 4-1-97 and the stock register showed that 8,804. 09 qtls. of wheat had been stored in the godown of the Mills and 14,644. 63 qtls. of wheat had been stored by it in the godowns of State Warehousing Corporation. Besides above, 1,566. 60 qtls. wheat was under processing and thus the total stock of wheat with the Mills was 25,015. 32 oils. According to the records of Regional Food Controller, the milling capacity of the Mills was 11,340 qtls. per week and thus the Mills was havingastockofl3,675. 32qtls. ofwheatin excess of one weeks milling capacity. The Mills had, thereby, contravened the provisions of U. P. Food grains (Procure ment and Regulation of Trade) Order, 1982 as amended by Fifteenth Amend ment which came into force on 10-12- 96 and U. P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1989 as amended by Twenty ninth Amendment. 3. In order to appreciate the conten tions raised, it is necessary to notice the provisions of the Control Orders. In exer cise of powers conferred by section 3 of E. C. Act, the Government made the U. P. Food grains (Procurement and Regulation of Trade) Order, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Control Order 1982 ). Clause 2 (1) of the Control Order defines a "manufacturer and it means a person engaged in the business of milling or processing of food grains or manufacturing food-stuff from there. The relevant part of clause. 4 of the Control Order, as it originally stood, which has bearing on the controversy in dispute is reproduced below: Clause 4 (1) "no retailer, whole-seller, commission agent, or manufacturer shall at a time have in his stock food-grains in excess of the limits specified below: (One) Wheat- (a) Retailer-50qtls. (b) Whole-seller-150qtls. (c) Commission agent-150qtls. (d) Manufacturer-A quantity correspond ing to the thirty days of manufacturing capacity. (b) Whole-seller-150qtls. (c) Commission agent-150qtls. (d) Manufacturer-A quantity correspond ing to the thirty days of manufacturing capacity. " The Control Order was amended on 7-5-88 and the period of thirty days for a manufacturer as provided in sub-clause (d) was substituted by seven days. In exer cise of powers conferred by section 3 of the E. C. Act the Government made U. P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licens ing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1989 on 31-8-89. Clause 11 of this Control Order provides that no dealer either by himself or any person on his behalf store or have in possession at any time any scheduled commodity in excess of the quantity specified therein. With regard to wheat the quantity specified is-stock limit according to provisions of clause 4 (a) (i) of the U. P. Food grains (Procurement and Regulation of Trade) Order, 1982 as amended from time to time. The Control Order, 1982 was amended by Fourteenth Amendment Order, 1993 which came into force on 26-6-93 by which clause 4 (1) relat ing to stock limit was amended and the item relating to wheat was altogether omitted. The result of this amendment was that with effect from 26-6-93 there ceased to be any limit for holding a stock of wheat and thus a dealer or manufacturer could have unlimited quantity of wheat in his stock. U. P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1989 was also amended by Twenty-sixth Amendment Order on 31-1-95 and from clause 11 wheat was omitted. Consequently the dealers were not required to have any licence in order to carry on business of sale or purchase of wheat with effect from31-l- 95. 4. The Government issued U. P. Food grains (Procurement and Regulation of Trade) (Fifteenth Amendment) Order, 1996on 10-12-96 whereby sub-clause (i) of clause 4 (i) of the U. P Food grains (Procurement and Regulation of Trade) Order, 1982 was amended and a stock limit for wheat was reintroduced which for a manufacturer became "a quantity cor responding to seven days manufacturing capacity". U. P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1989 was also amended by Twenty ninth Amendment Order, 1996 on 16-12-96 and in clause 11 with regard to wheat the words "no limit" were sub stituted by--"stock limit according to the provisions of clause 4 (1) of U. P. Food grains (Procurement and Regulation of Trade) Order, 1982 as amended from time to time. " 5. The position of the Control Orders described above would show that after 26-6-93 a manufacturer could have ah un limited quantity of wheat in his stock and the law did not impose any kind of restric tion at all for keeping only a limited stock. The position completely changed with the promulgation of Fifteenth Amendment Orderonlo-12-96anda limit of seven days manufacturing capacity was imposed with regard to a manufacturer. 6. Sub-section (2) of section 5 of the U. P General Clauses Act provides that unless the contrary is expressed, an Uttar Pradesh Act shall be construed as coming into operating immediately on the expira tion of the day preceding its commence ment. This provision is similar to section 5 (3) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In Income tax Commissioner, Punjab v. Jhodamal, AIR 1966 SC 1433 , it has been held that Amending Act which was brought into force on April 1,1939 must be deemed to have come into operation at a point of time immediately on the expira tion of March 31,1939. By virtue of section 6 of E. G. Act a Control Order has an overriding effect and, therefore, its posi tion is similar to that of an enactment made by the legislature. The U. P Food grains (Procurement and Regulation of Trade) Fifteenth Amendment) Order, 1996 by which the Control Order, 1982 was amended was issued on 10-12-96 and therefore it shall be deemed to have come into operation at a point of time immedi ately on the expiration of 9- 12-96. The moment the day 9th, December ended, the day 10th, December started as the time does not stop running. There is no inter regnum, not even a millionth or a billionth of a second between the expiration of 9th December and commencement of 10th December. The moment the day 9th, December ended, the day 10th, December started as the time does not stop running. There is no inter regnum, not even a millionth or a billionth of a second between the expiration of 9th December and commencement of 10th December. If a manufacturer had wheat in his stock in excess of seven days manufac turing capacity on 9th December, 1996 he was not contravening provision of the Control Order and it was perfectly lawful. But the moment 10th December, 1996 commenced it amounted to contravention of the Control Order and became an of fence not on account of any act or omission on his part but by operation of law. The Control Order has the effect of making a wholly lawful act or state of affairs, unlaw ful. On a practical plain, all such manufac turers who had a stock of wheat in excess of seven days manufacturing capacity at the close of business hours on 9-12-96 were landed in situation where they became guilty of an offence under the E. C. Act when they reopened their unit at the com mencement of the business hours on 10-12-96. A manufacturer may have been ad mitted in a hospital with a serious ailment fighting for life or may have gone to a place for away from his manufacturing unit in connection with some work or pilgrimage but by operation of a law made by the Government he became a criminal on 10-12-96. 7. It may be noticed that for making an enactment by the Parliament the proce dure is contained in Articles 107 to 111 of the Constitution. A bill has to be intro duced in either houses of Parliament (ex cept for money and financial bills) and after it has been passed by both the houses it has to be presented to the President who has to give his assent thereon. Similar provision is contained in Articles 196 to 200 with regard to enactments made by State Legislature. The whole process take some time and therefore a person may get advance notice of an enactment which is in the offing and he may adjust his affairs accordingly. Similar provision is contained in Articles 196 to 200 with regard to enactments made by State Legislature. The whole process take some time and therefore a person may get advance notice of an enactment which is in the offing and he may adjust his affairs accordingly. But a Control Order is issued in no time as it is not presented in either houses of Parliament or legislatures of the State and thus a person who is likely to be affected by such Control Order can get absolutely no advance notice of the same. 8- Sri S. P. Gupta learned Senior coun sel and Sri Ramendra Asthana have sub mitted that the provisions of the Control Order violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 20 (1) of the Constitution and, therefore, they are liable to be struck down. Sri Yatindra Singh learned Addl. Advocate General and Sri Mahendra Pratap learned AG. A have, on the other hand, submitted that Article 20 (1) can have no application at this stage as the petitioners have neither been convicted nor have been subjected to any penalty. In order to examine the contentions ad vanced, it is necessary to understand the nature of the conditions imposed by the Control Order, contravention of which amounts to an offence under section 7 of the E. C. Act. Clause 4 of the Control Order after its amendment on 10-12-96 provides that no manufacturer shall at a time have in his stock wheat in excess of a quantity corresponding to seven days manufacturing capacity. 9. The dictionary meaning of the word "stock" is as under: The New Lexicon Websters Diction ary: An accumulation of things which is main tained as a constant source of supply esp. as the basis of a store keepers or manufacturers busi ness. Blacks Law Dictionary: The goods and wares of a merchant or tradesman, kept for sale and traffic. Oxford English Reference Dictionary: A store of goods etc. ready for sale or distribution etc. a supply or quantity of anything for use; equipment or raw material for manufacture or trade etc. Web Third New International Dic tionary : Used or employed for constant service or application as if constituting. " portion of a stock or supply, kept regularly in stock or ready for sale or for immediate use; suggesting some thing regularly kept in as if in stock or ready for use. Web Third New International Dic tionary : Used or employed for constant service or application as if constituting. " portion of a stock or supply, kept regularly in stock or ready for sale or for immediate use; suggesting some thing regularly kept in as if in stock or ready for use. "stock" therefore signifies some quantity of goods which is kept in readi ness for business or use. In reality it is a state of affairs which comes into being by some positive act or acts of acquisition. Unless some act of physically acquiring goods is performed, there can be no ac cumulation of goods and consequently there can be to stock. In order to have a stock, it is also necessary that there should be an omission to part with the goods after they have been acquired. If the goods are acquired and simultaneously or sub sequent there to they are parted with, there can be no building of stock. A stock is therefore, built up by some positive acts of acquisition and omission to part with the same. No stock can be made or created without some positive acts of acquisition. 10. Sub-clause (1) of Article 20, which finds place in Chapter III of the Constitution, provides that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of commission of the Act charged as an of fence. While drafting Chapter III relating to fundamental rights, the framers of our Constitution borrowed heavily from the American Constitution. Section 9 Article 1 of U. S. Constitution, as adopted on July 4,1776, provides that no Bill of attainder or ex-post facto law shall be passed and section 10 of the same Article lays down that no State shall pass any Bill of attainder or ex- post facto law. As early as 1798, the U. S. Supreme Court explained different facets of this constitutional guarantee in Caldar v. Bull, I L. Ed. 648 and one of the important facet is that a statute which punishes as a crime a previous act that was innocent when committed violates the constitutional proscription against ex-post facto law. This view has been reiterated in Fletcher versus Peck3l. Ed. 162, Beazell v. Ohio; 269 U. S. 167 and Dobbert v. Florida, (1977) 432 US 282. 648 and one of the important facet is that a statute which punishes as a crime a previous act that was innocent when committed violates the constitutional proscription against ex-post facto law. This view has been reiterated in Fletcher versus Peck3l. Ed. 162, Beazell v. Ohio; 269 U. S. 167 and Dobbert v. Florida, (1977) 432 US 282. Recognising that the constitutional prohibition of ex-post facto laws and the judicial interpretation of it, rest upon the notion that laws which pur port to make innocent acts criminal after the event, are harsh and oppressive, the U. S. Supreme Court in Beazellv. Ohio has stated that the criminal quality at tributable to an act, either by the legal definition of the offence or by the nature or amount of the punishment imposed for its commission, cannot be altered by legisla tive enactment, after the fact, to the disad vantage of the accused. This legal posit; in has also been stated in 16 American Jurisprudence 2d para 396 and 16-A Cor pus Juris Secundum para 435. 11. The Courts in England also lean against the retrospective operation of laws. In Philips v. Eyre, (1870) L. R. 6q. B. 1 at 28 it was held as under: "retrospective laws are no doubt, prima facie of questionable policy, and contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought, when introduced for the first time deal with future acts, and ought not to change the charac ter of past transaction carried on upon faith of the then existing law. " In R. v. Kirk, (1985) 1 All E. R. 453, the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community observed as fol lows: "the principle that penal provisions may not have retrospective effect is one which is common to all the legal orders of the member states and is enshrined in Art. 7 of the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 Novem ber 1950; TS 71 (1953); Cmd (8969) as a fun damental right; it takes its place among the general principles of law whose observance is ensured by the Court of Justice. " This doctrine was recognised even in ancient times will be clear from the fol lowing passage on the topic of legislation in "jurisprudence-The Philosophy and Method of the Law by Edger Boden-heimer (First Indian Reprint 1996) at page 327: "another typical feature of a legisla tive act, as distinguished from a judicial pronouncement, was brought out in Mr. Justice Helmess opinion in Prentis v. Atlantic, Coastline Co. , 211 U. S. 210, at 226. As he pointed out in this opinion, while a "judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist," it is an important characteristic of legislation that it "looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power. " These passages must be understood as elucidating certain normal and typical aspects of legislation rather than stating a condition sine qua non, as essential condition, of all legisla tive activity. The large majority of enact ments passed by legislatures take effect that is, they are applied to situations and controversies that arise subsequent to the promulgation of the enactment. It is a fundamental requirement of fairness and justice that the relevant facts underlying a legal dispute should be judged by the law which was in existence when these facts arose and not by a law which was made post factum (after the fact) and was therefore, necessarily unknown to the parties when the transactions or events giving rise to the dispute occurred. The Greeks frowned upon ex. post facto laws, laws which are applied retrospectively to past- fact situa tions. See Paul Vinograd off, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence, II, 139-140; of Elmer E. Smead, "the Rule Against Retrospective Legislation". A Basic Prin ciple of Jurisprudence, "20 Minnesota Law Review 775 (1936 ). The Corpus Civil is of Justinian Proclaimed a strong presump tion against the retrospective application of laws. Code 1,14,7: "it is certain that the laws and constitutions regulate further matters, and have no reference to such as are past, unless express provision is made for past time, and for matters which are pending. " S. P. Scott, The Civil Laws (Cin cinnati, 1932 ). Braction introduced the principle into English law. Henry de Brae-ton, De Legibus- et Consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. G. E. Woodbine. " S. P. Scott, The Civil Laws (Cin cinnati, 1932 ). Braction introduced the principle into English law. Henry de Brae-ton, De Legibus- et Consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. G. E. Woodbine. Coke and Blackstone gave currency to it; Edward Coke, The Institutes, 4th ed. (London, 1671), p. 292; William Black-stone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ed. W. C. Jones (San Francisco, 1916), Vol. I, Section 46. and the principle is recognized today in England as a basic rule of statutory construction. In the United States, ex post facto laws in criminal cases and retrospective state laws impair ing the obligation of contracts are express ly forbidden by the terms of the federal Constitution; in other types of situations a retrospective legislative infringement of vested rights may present a problem of constitutional validity under the due process clause of the Constitution. " Ar ticle 11 (2) of the Declaration Human Rights of the United Nations lays down that no one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law at a time when it was committed. Similarly Ar ticle 7 of the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms lays down that no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on ac count of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under na tional or international law at a time when it was committed. India is a member of the United Nations Organization and is also signatory to the aforesaid Conventions. In Keshwanand Bharti (1973) 4 SCC 225 (at page 333) Sikri C. J. held that in view of Article 51 of the directive principles, the Court must interpret the language of the Constitution, if not intractable, in the light of the United Nation Charter and Solemn declaration subscribed to by India. Follow ing this in Peoples Union for Civil Liberty -. Union of India (1977) 1 SCC 301 the court held that it is almost accepted proposition of law that rules of customary Internation al Law shall be deemed to be incorporated in the domestic law. Applying the said principle sub-clause (1) of Article 20 should also be interpreted in conformity with the United Nations Charter and Con ventions and a liberal construction has to be given to the language used therein. Applying the said principle sub-clause (1) of Article 20 should also be interpreted in conformity with the United Nations Charter and Con ventions and a liberal construction has to be given to the language used therein. We have taken similar view in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 359 of 1997 (Phoolen Devi v. State of U. P decided on 31-3-97 and it is not necessary to reiterate the different aspects of constitutional guarantee enshrined in sub-clause (1) of Article 20 considered there. 12. Offence has not been defined in the Constitution but it has been defined in section 3 (38) of the General Clauses Act and it means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being force. By virtue of Article 367 the same definition will apply for interpreting clause (1) of Article 20. It is only certain type of acts or omissions by a person which may amount to an offence if the law so enjoins. In absence of any positive act or omission, there can be no offence. The real import of sub-clause (1) of Article 20 is that those acts or omissions which were not punishable under law when they were committed can not be made punishable by law made subsequent to those acts or omis sions. The protection afforded is against converting innocent acts or omissions into a criminal act by operation of law. As shown earlier, a stock is created or main tained by some positive acts of acquisition and omission to part with the same. These are the necessary ingredients for creation of a stock sad they are antecedent to a point of time when a stock comes into existence. The effect of the Control Order is that the acts and omissions done prior to the date of its issuance, which resulted in building up the stock, have been rendered culpable. The Control Order, therefore, clearly violates the quarantee enshrined in clause (1) of Article 20. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance on Mohd. Safique v. State, AIR 1956 All 108 in sup port of their submission that the Control Order violates Article 20 (1 ). The case required interpretation of Influx from West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance (No. 17) of 1948 which was enacted by the Central Government on 19-7-48 and sub sequent legislation on the subject. Safique v. State, AIR 1956 All 108 in sup port of their submission that the Control Order violates Article 20 (1 ). The case required interpretation of Influx from West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance (No. 17) of 1948 which was enacted by the Central Government on 19-7-48 and sub sequent legislation on the subject. The accused was granted temporary permit by the High Commissioner for India in Pakis tan authorising him to stay in India from 25-7-48 to 25-9-48 However, even after expiry of the permit the accused continued to stay on. On 10-11-48 the influx from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance (No. 34) of 1948 was made and on 23-4-49 influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949 was enacted. The accused was charged with committing an offence punishable under section 4 of the Ordinance No. 17 read with Rule 12 of the Permit System Rules, 1948, section 9 (2) of Ordinance No. 34 and section 9 (2) of Act No. 1949 for not returning to Pakis tan on or before 25-9-48 and was convicted under section 5 of the Act No. 1949. The Court ruled as follows: ". . . . the applicant over staying in India did not commit an offence against Ordinance No. 17, that Ordinance No. 34 was prospective and not retrospective and applied to persons who entered into India after its enactment, that the act of over staying was not a continuous act, that Art. 20 of the Constitution prevented retrospec tive effect being given to Cl. (5) of Ordinance No. 34 and that the position was not altered by the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949 and that the applicant was not guilty. . . . " The learned Addl Advocate General Has however referred to State v. Hyderali, AIR 1955 Hyderabad 128 where a contrary view was taken while considering the same provisions. The Full Bench by a majority held that Article 20 (1) had not been vio lated as the accused was not charged for any act committed by him before Amend ing Ordinance No. 22 of 1950 came into force and that after the Ordinance was introduced, any stay after the period fixed in the permit came within the mischief of Rule 19 and the omission to leave India constituted an offence. These decisions have been considered by Shri H. M. Seervai in his book constitutional Law of India and the eminent author has expressed his view as under- ". . . . . . That the view taken by Allahabad High Court is correct on the ground that when the permit was granted, it was not an offence to over stay on the expiry of the permit and the over staying was complete as soon as permit expired. If it was not punishable at that time, it could not, without violating Article 20 (1), be made punishable by a law or a rule subsequently enacted. " It may be pointed out here that the case in hand stands on better footing as th e accused in the above cited cases were for eigners who had come to India under a permit granted for a fixed period and, therefore, at least they knew before hand that after expiry of the permit their stay in India would be un- authorised and conse quently illegal. 14. Learned Addl. Advocate General has referred to some English and American cases which may now be con sidered. In Waddington v. Miah, (1974) 2 All. E. R. 377, while examining the provisions of section 34 (1) (a) of the Im migration Act 1971 which lays down that the Act, as from its coming into force, shall apply in relation to entrants or other arriv ing in the U. K. at whatever date before or after it comes into force, Lord Reid with whom all other Law Lords agreed, ob served as follows: "i can not see how section 34 (1) (a) can be construed as having any reference to what any entrant may have done in this country before the Act came into force. All that it does is to subject to the provisions of the Act for the future, any one who entered in the past. " (Emphasis supplied) We do in of see how the observation "what any entrant may have done in this country before the Act came into force" be of any assistance to the State. The view taken in this case rather than supporting the content/ion of the learned Addl. Advocate General supports the petitioners. Strong reliance is also placed on Chicago anda. R. Co. v. Tranbarger,23s (m4)U. S. 66. The view taken in this case rather than supporting the content/ion of the learned Addl. Advocate General supports the petitioners. Strong reliance is also placed on Chicago anda. R. Co. v. Tranbarger,23s (m4)U. S. 66. It is necessary to quote the relevant part of judgment which is as under- ". . . . . . I "he argument that in respect of its penalty feature the statute is invalid as annex post facto law is, sufficiently answered by pointing out that plaint if in error is subjected to a penalty not because of the manner in which it originally construct ed its railroad embankment, nor for anything else done or omitted before the pas sage of the Act of. 1907, but because after that time it maintained the embankment in a man ner prohibited by that Act. The argument to the contrary is based upon a reading of the section that applies the limiting clause "within three months after the completion of the same" to railroads already in existence as well as to those to be constructed thereafter. The result is, ac cording to the argument, that as the road of plaintiff in error was constructed upon a solid embankment at least as early as the year 1895, the act was violated as soon as enacted. This construction is so unreasonable that we should flout adopt it unless required to do so by a decision of the state court of last resort. The language of the section as it now stands: "it shall be the duty of every corporation. . . . . owning or operating any railroad or branch thereof in this state, and of any corporation. . . . . constructing any railroad in this state, within three months after the completion of the same through any country in this state, to cause to be constructed and maintained suitable openings. " etc. , seems to us to be more reasonably construed as prescribing the express limit of three months only with respect to railroads afterwards constructed, and as allowing to railroads already in existence a reasonable time after the passage of the enact ment within which to construct the openings. In adopting this meaning, we have regard not merely to the phrases employed, but to the previous course of legislation, which is set forth in the briefs, but need not be here repeated. In adopting this meaning, we have regard not merely to the phrases employed, but to the previous course of legislation, which is set forth in the briefs, but need not be here repeated. Whether we are right or wrong about this, the duty to construct transverse outlets having originated with the act of 1907, the statute is of course to be construed as allowing some time-either three months, or a reasonable time more or less than that period-for their construction by railroads already in existence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " It is important to note that the statute was interpreted in a manner which allowed three months time to already existing rail roads to construct the opening. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 US. 580 relates to deportation of an alien and has no bearing on the controversy in hand. In Samuels v. Mogurdy 267 U. S. 188 the majority no doubt held that a statute, making posses sion of liquor lawfully acquired unlawful, is not ex post facto so far as it affects con tinued possession in the future. But the case arose out of a plea of injunction for restraining the destruction of seized liquor and did not relate to criminal prosecution. Even here Justice Butler in his minority opinion held that the law was arbitrary and oppressive. 15. Learned Addl. Advocate General has raised an alternative submission that even if the petitioners are protected by the constitutional guarantee under clause (1) of Article 20 for their hoarding a stock in excess of the prescribed limit on 10-12-96, the said provision can not afford any im munity to the petitioners on 4-1-97 when the F. I. R. was lodged. It is urged that it is a continuing offence which was recurring every day and as the petitioners had not taken any steps to reduce the stock and continued to hold excess stock even on 4-1-97, they are clearly guilty of having contravened the provision of law. The con tention raised has no substance. What is a continuing offence has been explained in Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Suresh Seth, AIR 1981 SCI 106 ". . . . . . . . Section 18 of the Act however, does not require the assesses to file a return during every month after the last day to file it is over. What is a continuing offence has been explained in Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Suresh Seth, AIR 1981 SCI 106 ". . . . . . . . Section 18 of the Act however, does not require the assesses to file a return during every month after the last day to file it is over. Non-performance of any of the acts mentioned in S. 18 (l) (a) of the Act gives rise to a single default and to a single penalty, the measure of which, however, is geared up to the time lag between the last date on which the return has to be filed and the date on which it is filed. The default, if any committed, is committed on the last date allowed to file the return. The default cannot be one committed every month there after. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ordinarily a wrongful act or failure to perform an act required by law to be done becomes a complete act of commission or of omission, as the case may be, as soon as the wrongful act is committed in the former case and when the time prescribed by law to perform an act expires in the latter case and the liability arising there from gets fastened as soon as the act of commission or of omission is completed. The offence was complete at a point of time when the day 10th December, 1996 com menced and it cannot be said to be a continuing offence. Even if the petitioner had reduced their stock and brought it within the prescribed limit subsequently, it could not mitigate or wipe out the offence committed at the time of commen cement of the day 10th December. The Control Order makes no provision for reducing the stock within a time limit and consequently the inaction on the part of the petitioners in not bringing the stock within the prescribed limit by 4-1-97 can be of no consequence. 16. A formidable challenge to the maintainability of the writ petition has been raised by the learned Addl. Advocate General. The Control Order makes no provision for reducing the stock within a time limit and consequently the inaction on the part of the petitioners in not bringing the stock within the prescribed limit by 4-1-97 can be of no consequence. 16. A formidable challenge to the maintainability of the writ petition has been raised by the learned Addl. Advocate General. The Aligarh Roller Hour Mill had filed writ petition No. 41981 of 1996 through its Managing Director Ram Pal Juneja on 27-12-96 praying that a writ of mandamus be issued directing the respon dents not to prosecute the petitioner under section 7 of E. C. Act and not to interfere with the working of the Flour Mill for sixty days or for such time which the court thought fit so as to enable the petitioner to adjust its stock in conformity with the prescribed limits contained in clause 4 of the Control Order as amended by Fifteen Amendment Order, 1996 and the writ petition was dismissed on 17-1-97. It is urged that the present writ petition is barred by the doctrine of constructive res judicata as held in Sharad Chandra Ganesh Muley v. State of Maharastra andothers, JT 1995 (7) SC 317. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the prin ciples of constructive resjudicata would not apply where the constitutional validity of an enactment has been challenged in a subsequent petition and has placed reliance on Nand Kishore v. State oj Pun jab, JT 1995 (7) SC 69. In this case the appellant was compulsorily retired from service in January, 1961 under Rule 5. 32 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules and the retirement order was challenged by filing the writ petition which was dismissed in February, 1962. Subsequent thereto Rule 148 (3) of the Railway Rules which was identical to Rule 5. 32 of Punjab Civil Ser vices Rules was held to be unconstitutional in Motiram Deka s AIR 1964 SC 600 . The appellant thereafter filed a civil suit for declaration that the order of compulsorily retirement was invalid. A Full Bench of the Punjab High Court held that the suit was barred. In appeal the Apex Court held that the principles of constructive res judicata could not apply as the writ petition had been filed on the footing that the rule was valid and its vires had not been challenged. 17. A Full Bench of the Punjab High Court held that the suit was barred. In appeal the Apex Court held that the principles of constructive res judicata could not apply as the writ petition had been filed on the footing that the rule was valid and its vires had not been challenged. 17. In writ petition No. 41981 of 1996 it was held that power had been delegated to the State Government under Section 5 of E. C. Act to make a Control Order, therefore, it was neither invalid nor violate of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitu tion. The judgment shows that the ques tion that the Control Order violated the provisions of Articles 14 and 20 (1) of the Constitution was neither raised nor con sidered. We feel that there is a stronger reason for holding that present petition is not barred. This petition has been filed by four persons namely, Bankey Lal Agarwal, Hazari Lal Vijai, Smt. Sunita Juneja and Tajwant Kalra and they have described themselves as Directors of M/s. Aligarh Roller Hour Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. They them selves in their own capacity had not filed any writ petition earlier and it is a first writ petition at their instance. There is a dif ference between a company and its shareholders. It has been held in Charan-jeet Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 (Para 7) that a company and the shareholders are in law separate entities. In para 43 it has been held that a corpora-lion has a distinct legal personality of its own with rights and capacities, duties and obligation separate from those of its in dividual members. Therefore the earlier writ petition filed by Aligarh Roller Flour Mills can not be said to have been filed by the petitioners. Apart from this, the Sarmister v. Superintendent, District Jail, Muzaffarnagar & Ors. No petitioners seek quashing of the F. I. R. and in a criminal case principles of construc tive resjudicata as contained in section 11, C. P. C. have no application. The doctrine applicable there is that of issue estoppel which, can not be pressed here as the writ petitioners were not before the Court in the earlier case. Therefore, the present writ petition is not barred in so far as it seeks quashing of the F. I. R. which was lodged on 4-1-97. The doctrine applicable there is that of issue estoppel which, can not be pressed here as the writ petitioners were not before the Court in the earlier case. Therefore, the present writ petition is not barred in so far as it seeks quashing of the F. I. R. which was lodged on 4-1-97. However the second relief claimed in the present writ petition regarding quashing of the seizure of wheat can not be granted as the same belonged to the company which had filed the earlier petition. 18. It is averred in paras 32 to 34 of the writ petition that the company had not purchased any wheat after the amendment of the Control Order and in the counter affidavit no specific reply to the same has been given. However, it is not possible to record a definite finding on this point in present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution and this factual aspect can only be examined by the authorities. 19. The writ petition is, accordingly, partly allowed. A writ of mandamus is issued to the respondents not to prosecute the petitioners under sections 3/7, E. C. Act in connection with the F. I. R. lodged on 4-1-97 on the basis of which case crime No. 2 of 1997 has been registered at P. S. Gabhana District Aligarh, if the Mills have not acquired any further stock after the enforcement of U. P. Foodgrains (Procure ment and Regulation of Trade) (Fifteenth Amendment), Order, 1996 which came into force on 10-12-96. W. P. partly allowed. .