D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two revisions under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 (for short "rent Act") preferred by same revisionist, can be disposed of by a common judgment. ( 2 ) BRIEF facts giving rise to these two revisions are as under : the plaintiff landlord, who is respondent of this revision, filed two Suits bearing Nos. 283 of 1972 and 284 of 1972 seeking eviction of the tenant revisionist from the two houses bearing Nos. 3040 and 2229. The allegation in Suit No 283 of 1972 in brief was that the property bearing No. 3040 was not a residential house, but it was a cattle shed. House No. 2229 was let out to the revisionist on 1. 6. 1961 on monthly rent of Rs. 35/- whereas newly constructed house No. 3040 was let out on 1. 7. 1970 on monthly rent of Rs. 50/ -. In respect of newly constructed house No. 3040 the tenant fell in arrears of rent since 1. 7. 1990, viz. since the date of letting and in respect of house No. 2229 the revisionist fell in arrears of rent from 8. 6. 1970. Notice of demand dated 28. 8. 1972 was served on the revisionist, but he failed to comply with the notice. It was also alleged that the revisionist caused material damage and waste in the suit premises by raising permanent construction. The landlord further pleaded that he wanted house No. 2229 for his reasonable and bonafide personal requirement. For the newly constructed house also notice dated 28. 8. 1972 was served, but the defendant revisionist was not ready and willing to pay the rent which was also standard rent. ( 3 ) SUIT No. 283 of 1972 was contested by the revisionist on the ground that the property No. 304 was not residential house, but was cattle shed, which was in his occupation since 6. 1961 and that there was agreement between the parties for exchange of open land. Plaintiffs house No. 2230 is adjoining house No. 2229. There was a can It shed attached to house No. 2230. Initially the rent for house No. 2229 was Rs. 21/- p. m. and that of the cattle shed was Rs. 1961 and that there was agreement between the parties for exchange of open land. Plaintiffs house No. 2230 is adjoining house No. 2229. There was a can It shed attached to house No. 2230. Initially the rent for house No. 2229 was Rs. 21/- p. m. and that of the cattle shed was Rs. 7/- p. m. Subsequently it was agreed that the plaintiff would gel vacant possession of open vada land and cattle shed from the defendant for making new construction and the plaintiff will give to the tenant constructed portion at the back of house No. 2229 for tethering cattle. In view this exchange it was pleaded that the plaintiff is not entitled to separate rent of the two portions. In the other Suit the defendant pleaded that for the entire portion the rent was Rs. 35/- p. m. which was not the standard rent. The dispute of standard rent was raised. The defendant revisionist denied that he was not ready and willing to pay the standard rent. He also denied that the premises was required for reasonable and bonafide personal requirement of the landlord. It was also denied that any permanent construction was made in the suit premises. In view of the exchange agreement set up by the defendant revisionist it was pleaded that the suit is liable to be dismissed. ( 4 ) THE Trial Court found that the dispute of standard rent raised by the revisionist was not bonafide and that two separate portions were let out to him, one on monthly rent of Rs. 35/- and the other on monthly rent of Rs. 50/ -. It was further found that the tenant was not ready and willing to pay the rent and that he was irregular in making deposit in court. It was further held by the Trial Court that the defendant was in arrears of more than six months rent and he neglected to pay the same within one month of service of notice hence he was liable to be evicted. The story of exchange set up by the defendant was disbelieved. However, the plaintiffs averment of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the suit accommodation was also disbelieved by the Trial Court. On comparative hardship the Trial Court found that the tenant would not suffer greater hardship. He further found that no permanent construction was raised by the revisionist. The story of exchange set up by the defendant was disbelieved. However, the plaintiffs averment of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the suit accommodation was also disbelieved by the Trial Court. On comparative hardship the Trial Court found that the tenant would not suffer greater hardship. He further found that no permanent construction was raised by the revisionist. With these findings the two suits for eviction were decreed by the Trial Court. The two suits were disposed of by a common Judgment. ( 5 ) TWO Appeals were preferred against the common judgment rendered by the Trial court and both the Appeals were dismissed. Hence these two revisions. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the parties were heard at length. Material on record was examined. ( 7 ) IN the instant case certain concurrent finding of facts have been recorded by the two Courts below. The first concurrent finding is that two separate tenancies of two disputed portions were created on two different dates and that it was not a case of single tenancy. The question whether two separate tenancies were created or not is a question of fact which after examining the material on record has been correctly decided by the concurrent findings of the two Courts below that two separate tenancies were created, one at the rate of Rs. 35/- p. m. and the other at the rate of Rs. 50/- p. m. This concurrent finding does not require any interference in this revision. Upon testing this finding from the material on record it can not be said that such finding is perverse. ( 8 ) THE rent note was relied upon by the revisionist. However, the lower Appellate court has given categorical finding that the manager of the landlord and the revisionist were in collusion and that the said manager of the landlord developed strained relationship with the landlord hence on account of such collusion, collusive and forged rent note was created. Other reasons have also been given for such finding by holding that the rent note was collusive and forged. Consequently on the basis of such rent note it could not be held that only one tenancy for two portions was created. ( 9 ) THE second concurrent finding is that the theory of exchange set up by the defendant revisionist was false and unbelievable. Consequently on the basis of such rent note it could not be held that only one tenancy for two portions was created. ( 9 ) THE second concurrent finding is that the theory of exchange set up by the defendant revisionist was false and unbelievable. This is also a concurrent finding of facts based upon proper appreciation of evidence on record, hence it requires no interference in. this revision. ( 10 ) THE next question for consideration is whether the decree for eviction on the facts and circumstances of the case could be passed under Sec. 12 (3) (a) or under Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act. Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the decree should have been passed under Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act and if the landlord succeeded in establishing the ingredients of Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act the Courts below had no option but to pass decree of eviction under this section. It was further contended that in that case the tenant could not save his eviction by pleading that he was ready and willing to pay the rent and he could riot pay the rent because dispute of the standard rent was resolved only in the Judgment delivered by the Trial Court and not earlier. He further contended that in any event deposits made by the tenant were irregular in the appellate Court and no deposit was made on the first date of hearing in the Trial Court nor regular deposit was made in the Trial Court till final decision of the Suit. He also argued that the costs of the suits were also not deposited by the revisionist. Hence he is not entitled to the protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act. ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel for the revisionist on the other hand contended that since dispute of standard rent was raised by the tenant in composit reply to the two notices Ex. 17 and 18 through reply notice Ex. 19 and since this dispute was not resolved by the court prior to the final disposal of the suit the revisionist was prevented from making deposit on the first date of hearing. Likewise he would not make regular deposit inasmuch as bonafide dispute of standard rent was subsisting. 17 and 18 through reply notice Ex. 19 and since this dispute was not resolved by the court prior to the final disposal of the suit the revisionist was prevented from making deposit on the first date of hearing. Likewise he would not make regular deposit inasmuch as bonafide dispute of standard rent was subsisting. It was further argued by him that the entire amount was deposited before disposal of the suit and the rent was also deposited in appeal and if there was some default it cannot be said that the revisionist was irregular in making deposit in Court. It was also contended by him that if the landlords case of two tenancies is not accepted then since rent remitted by Money order amounting to Rs. 1300/- was refused by the landlord, eviction from one of the accommodations can be saved inasmuch as the tenant was not in arrears of more than six months on the date of the notice as well as on the date of the Suit. ( 12 ) THESE contentions have been carefully considered. No force is found in these contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the revisionist. ( 13 ) IN view of the findings of the two Courts below that two separate tenancies were created, one at the rate of Rs. 35/- p. m. and the other at the rate of Rs. 50/- p. m. the landlord was justified in refusing the Money Order which was not covering the entire arrears of rent for the two tenaments. It could not be shown before me that in any of the money orders it was mentioned by the tenant that the rent should be appropriated and be treated as payment towards one of the tenanted accommodation. On the other hand in the composite reply, notice vide Ex. 19 the stand of the revisionist was that it was composite tenancy of one unit. After receiving this reply and knowing the stand of the tenant the landlord was justified in refusing the Money Order. Consequently it cannot be accepted that the tenant was not in arrears of more than six months on the date of notice. 19 the stand of the revisionist was that it was composite tenancy of one unit. After receiving this reply and knowing the stand of the tenant the landlord was justified in refusing the Money Order. Consequently it cannot be accepted that the tenant was not in arrears of more than six months on the date of notice. ( 14 ) SO far as the dispute regarding standard rent is concerned learned Counsel for the revisionist contended that bonafide dispute of a standard rent was raised by the respondent hance the case is not covered under Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act. The lower Appellate court as well as the Trial Court found that the dispute of standard rent was not bonafide. This is also a concurrent finding of fact which hardly requires interference in this revision. ( 15 ) IT may be mentioned that every dispute raised by the tenant in reply notice regarding standard rent is not to be considered as bonafide dispute of standard rent. The word "bonafide" means that which is not malafide dispute of standard rent. The dispute of standard rent is said to be bonafide when the tenant bonafide believes that the rent claimed by the landlord is excessive and is much beyond the standard rent. Merely by denying the agreed rate of rent the tenant cannot be heard to say that there existed bonafide dispute of standard rent. It is not every denial by the tenant of agreed rent which constitutes bonafide dispute of standard rent. On the other hand the dispute in the mind of the tenant should be reasonable and bonafide. The dispute is said to be reasonable and bonafide if such dispute could be raised in the mind of a man of ordinary prudence. If a reasonable man would think that the rent claimed by the landlord is excessive and exorbitant it can be said that the dispute is bonafide. However, the dispute of standard rent, in the instant case, can be said to be malaftde as it has no legs to stand. The tenant has made false allegations and false assertions of facts. In the instant case the tenant placed reliance upon the rent note Ex. 113 to show that the dispute of standard rent in his mind was bonafide. The two Courts below found that the rent note Ex. The tenant has made false allegations and false assertions of facts. In the instant case the tenant placed reliance upon the rent note Ex. 113 to show that the dispute of standard rent in his mind was bonafide. The two Courts below found that the rent note Ex. 113 was forged and fabricated document and it was the result of collusion between the revisionist and the manager of the landlord. Person raising dispute of standard rent on the basis of forged and fabricated document can certainly be said to have raised malafide dispute of standard rent. It cannot be said that the dispute so raised was genuine and bonafide. ( 16 ) AVERMENTS of the tenant that only one tenancy was created and that too at the rate of Rs. 35/- p. m. was also disbelieved by the two Courts below. Thus, a tenant who conceals that he was let out two seperate houses, one at the rate of Rs. 35/- p. m. and the other at the rate of Rs. 50/- p. m. can be said to have entertained malafide dispute in his mind with a view to save his eviction. Such material concealment of fact and false assertion by the tenant that only one tenancy was created can not constitute genuine and bonafide dispute of standard rent. If the tenant alleged that only one tenancy at the rate of rs. 35/- p. m. was created, it is certainly a false assertion and on the basis of such false assertion the tenant can not be heard to say that he was to pay Rs. 35/- p. m. only as rent for the two portions. ( 17 ) FOR the reasons given above in addition to the reasons given by the two Courts below it can be held without hesitation that the dispute of standard rent raised by the tenant was malafide and not bonafide. If dispute of standard rent raised by the tenant was malafide he was bound to pay or tender the rent to the landlord within one month of service of notice of demand. Obviously this was not done. As such the tenant cannot be permitted to say that if the standard rent dispute would have been resolved before decision of the suit he could have deposited the same in due course within the prescribed period. Obviously this was not done. As such the tenant cannot be permitted to say that if the standard rent dispute would have been resolved before decision of the suit he could have deposited the same in due course within the prescribed period. Such malafide dispute of standard rent need not have been decided by the Trial Court at an earlier stage inasmuch as the tenant did not move any application under Sec. 11 of the rent Act for resolving the dispute of standard rent and for fixing the standard rent. This also reflects malafide on the part of the tenant. ( 18 ) FURTHER malafide on the part of the tenant is reflected from his conduct in not requesting the Trial Court to fix interim standard rent and to permit him some time for making deposit in compliance of the order fixing the interim standard rent. Thus, initially the revisionist came out with a false dispute of standard rent and subsequently he remained silent by not moving application under Sec. 11 of the Rent Act and for fixing the standard rent and also in not requesting the Trial Court for fixing interim standard rent. I, therefore, do not find any force in the argument of the learned Counsel for the revisionist that time should have been granted by the Trial Court after passing of the decree to enable the tenant to deposit the standard rent in Court. Once the Trial Court found that the dispute of standard rent raised by the tenant was neither genuine nor bonafide, no statutory duty was caste upon the Trial Court to allow the tenant revisionist some time for depositing the standard rent. ( 19 ) NOTICE of demand and eviction was found to be valid. Service of notice of demand is admitted by the revisionist. Non-compliance of notice of demand is also admitted by the revisionist. His plea that because of dispute of standard rent he could not pay the rent cannot be accepted. The alleged tender of part of rent by Money Order being insufficient the landlord was justified in refusing to accept a portion of the arrears of rent remitted by the tenant by Money Order. ( 20 ) THUS, the case was fully covered under Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act and the decree could be passed under this section. ( 20 ) THUS, the case was fully covered under Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act and the decree could be passed under this section. If this is so then tenant could not save his eviction by taking shelter behind Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act. Even under this section the tenant could not save his eviction for the obvious reason that he did not make any deposit or rent in the Trial Court on the first date of hearing nor he made regular deposit of rent in the Trial Court till the suit was finally decided. The cost of the suit was also not deposited in the Trial Court. The learned Counsel for the revisionist further contended that in absence of the order of the Trial Court the tenant could not deposit the cost hence he cannot be said to be defaulter. I am again not impressed with this submission. The reason is that the cost of the suit is calculated in the decree passed by the Trial Court hence the revisionist knew how much cost was calculated in the decree passed by the Trial Court. He did not attempt to deposit the cost of the suit, in Trial Court. Thus, failure of the tenant revisionist in depositing the cost is also a ground for not affording him statutory protection under Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act. . ( 21 ) THE chart of deposits made in the two appeals by the revisionist filed in these revisions at the time of argument also shows that frequent irregularities were committed by the revisionist in making deposit in Court. Regarding Suit No. 283 of 1972, out of which. Civil Revision Application No. 840 of 1980 was filed, in the month of November, 1977 there was default. Likewise in February, May and November, 1978 there was default and the deposits were irregular. Likewise, in subsequent months deposits were irreguiar. ( 22 ) THE chart relating to Suit No. 284 of 1972, out of which Civil Revision application No. 839 of 1980 arose also shows similar irregularities in making deposits in the months of December, 1977, February, 1978, June, 1978, November, 1978, April, 1979, June 1979, August 1979 and November 1979. These irregularities were not liable to be ignored by the Appellate Court. These irregularities were not liable to be ignored by the Appellate Court. ( 23 ) LEARNED Counsel for the revisionist relied upon the case of Somabhai Kalidas patel vs. Bachubhai, reported in 1986 (6) GLH (UJ) 22 in support of his contention that since the tenant has deposited entire arrears of rent before delivery of judgment by the trial Court hence he is entitled to protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act. In this case the facts were that the tenant did not deposit all the arrears of rent on the date of the judgment in the Trial Court, but deposited the same before the Judgment in Appeal. It was held that the requirements of Sec. 12 (3) (b) are made out. It also took note of the fact that the word "regular" was deleted by Legislative Amendment in Sec. 12 (3) (b) hence such deposit in appeal was sufficient compliance of the aforesaid section. However, a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Application No. 2015 of 1980 with connected Civil Revision applications, decided on 6. 5. 1994, held that deletion of the word "regular" in sec. l2 (3) (b) has prospective operation and not retrospective operation. This decision was based upon the Apex Courts pronouncement. Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment has retrospective operation. The revisionist was therefore to make strict compliance of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act. ( 24 ) IN M. B. Shah vs. B. M. Shah, reported in 19 GLR 1060 the Supreme Court has held that the expression regularly in Sec. 12 (3) (b) is mandatory and not directory. It was further held that if payment is to be made monthly it must be done regularly and payment made at intervals of 2, 3 or 4 months cannot be considered regularly and no discretion is with the Court if the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) are not complied with. It was further held that if the tenant does not fulfil the conditions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) he cannot claim protection of that section and in that event there being no other protection available to him the decree for eviction would have to go against him. It is difficult to see how any judicial valour discretion exercisable in favour of the tenant can be found in sec. It is difficult to see how any judicial valour discretion exercisable in favour of the tenant can be found in sec. 12 (3) (b) even where the condition laid down by it are satisfied to be strictly confined within the limits prescribed for their operation. ( 25 ) IN the case of ML. Hede vs. Noormohmad Adam Shaikh, reported in AIR 1988 sc 1111 , the Supreme Court held that in order to take advantage of protection from eviction under Sec. 12 (3) (b) it cannot be said that exact or methamatical precision was required in the deposit of rent by the tenant. However, in this case facts were that only few defaults were committed by the tenant and that too for 2 or 3 days and maximum upto 23 days. In the case before me, however, the default in making deposit in the appellate court was of months together and the default in the Trial Court was also there inasmuch as no deposit was made on the first date of hearing and thereafter till delivery of judgment. Hence, this case is distinguishable on facts. ( 26 ) IN view of aforesaid discussions it is obvious that the revisionist could not save his eviction taking shelter behind Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act. The decree was liable to be passed under Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act. The Judgments and decrees of the two courts below in these circumstances directing eviction of the revisionist from the two accommodations do not require any interference. No merit is found in these two revisions which are liable to be dismissed. ( 27 ) THE two revisions are therefore dismissed. No order as to costs. The revisionists are permitted to vacate the accommodation and hand over vacant possession on or before 31. 12. 1998. .