Dalveer Bhandari, J. ( 1 ) BY this order, I propose to decide these three aforesaid applications. The basic facts involved in all these applications are identical in nature and they are recapitulated in the succeeding paragraphs. ( 2 ) THE following two suits were filed before this court - (1) Suit No. 1216/98 by (AEC Enterprises Ltd.) and (2) Suit No. 1218/98 by AEC (India) Ltd. , against M/s Peacock Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. and others. Both AEC Enterprises Ltd. and AEC (India) Ltd. , are in the management of Aptes. Both the plaintiff-companies are joint stock companies registered under the Companies Act, 1956. Mr. R. D. Apte and Sanjeev Apte are promoter directors in these companies. Defendants 1, 6 and 7 are for all practical purposes sister companies under the same management and being fully managed and controlled by defendant no. 2 Mr. S. C. Goel. ( 3 ) IT is stated in the plaintiffs suits that Mr. Sanjeev Apte came in contact with Mr. S. C. Goel a few years ago. Acquaintances slowly led to close social contact, and Mr. Goel gained personal confidence and trust of the Aptes and consequently in the year 1995, when the plaintiff companies were in need of funds, inter corporate deposits (for short ICD) were offered and provided by the Goels to Aptes, for a period of 90 days or more. ( 4 ) ON 16. 4. 1998, again there was an agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant company M/s Peacock Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. and defendant no. 1 agreed to provide an ICD facility to the plaintiffs aggregating upto Rs. 1 crore. The loan (ICD) was to carry an interest at the rate of 40 per cent per annum. As a collateral security for the loan facility, the plaintiff companies also pledged with the defendants 96,82,559 shares of the face value of Rs. 10. 00 of the plaintiff companies and 223132 shares of AEC (India) Ltd. The shares of the plaintiff companies were non-transferable being promoters shares i. e. the same were in locked period and could not be transferred by any of the promoters of the plaintiff companies for a period of 5 years from the date of issue (March, 1995 ). ( 5 ) THE plaintiff companies had executed the following documents in favour of defendant no. ( 5 ) THE plaintiff companies had executed the following documents in favour of defendant no. 1:- (I) Inter Corporate Deposit receipt dated 16/4/98 acknowledging the receipt of Rs. 1. 00 crore vide cheque No. 914392 dated 17/4/98 for Rs. 70 lacs and cheque no. 914393 dated 17/4/98 for Rs. 30 lacs both drawn on Punjab National Bank, Chander Nagar Branch, Ghaziabad. This amount along with interest was repayable at demand to defendant no. 1. (II) Demand promissory note for Rs. 1. 00 crore thereby undertaking to repay this amount on demand with interest at the rate mentioned therein payable at monthly rests. (III) Letter of continuity in respect of amount of Rs. 1. 00 crore (IV) Inter Corporate Deposit Agreement (V) Resolution passed by board of directors of the plaintiff company in the meeting held on 31/3/98 thereby authorising Shri R. D. Apte, Chairman and Managing Director to discuss and finalise the terms and conditions for availing of ICD facility to the extent of Rs. 1. 00 crore. (VI) With the letter dated 16/4/98 in pursuance to ICD agreement dated 16/4/98 two cheques No. 015175 dated 16. 4. 98 for Rs. 25 lacs as liquidated damages and cheque No. 015174 dated 16. 4. 98 for Rs. 1. 00 crore towards repayment of this amount were enclosed. (VII) Resolution dated 31/3/98 of AEC (India) Ltd. authorising Shri Sanjiv R. Apte, Vice Chairman and Director of the company to execute the Corporate guarantee in favour of defendant no. 1. (VIII) Deed of Corporate Guarantee by M/s AEC (India) Ltd. in favour of defendant no. 1 (IX) Deed of personal guarantee by Shri R. D. Apte (X) Deed of personal guarantee by Shri Sanjeev R. Apte. (XI) Board Resolutions all dated 30. 03. 98 of M/s AEC Capital Market Ltd. , AEC Investments Ltd. , and AEC Holdings Pvt. Ltd. passing the resolutions regarding pledge of sufficient number of shares of plaintiff and of AEC Leasing and Finance Pvt. Ltd. , regarding pledge of sufficient number of shares of AEC (India) Ltd. (XII) Letters of Pledge all dated 16. 04. 98 of AEC Capital Market Ltd. , AEC Investments Ltd. and AEC Holdings Pvt. Ltd. pledging 27,39,950, 27,50,000 and 41,92,600 equity shares respectively of the plaintiff in favour of defendant no. 1 being the owner (shareholder) of the shares along with annexures giving the distinctive no. of these shares pledged. 04. 98 of AEC Capital Market Ltd. , AEC Investments Ltd. and AEC Holdings Pvt. Ltd. pledging 27,39,950, 27,50,000 and 41,92,600 equity shares respectively of the plaintiff in favour of defendant no. 1 being the owner (shareholder) of the shares along with annexures giving the distinctive no. of these shares pledged. Letter of Pledge dated 16. 04. 98 of AEC Leasing and Finance Ltd. pledging 22,03,132 equity shares of AEC (India) Ltd. in favour of defendant no. 1 being the owner (shareholder of the shares along with annexure giving the distinctive no. of these shares pledged. (XIII) Letters dated 16. 4. 98 from the plaintiff to defendant no. 1 confirming the following: (A) That the AEC Capital Market Ltd. , AEC Investments Ltd and AEC Holdings Pvt. Ltd. are the registered shareholders of the plaintiff in respect of 27,39,950, 27,50,000 and 41,92,600 equity shares respectively and are being pledged to the defendant no. 1. (B) Signature on the transfer deed attached with the share certificates pledge are as per specimen registered with plaintiff. (C) That the above shares have no lock-in period and are freely transferable. (D) That the plaintiff shall register without any delay, demur and protest all transfer (s) of the shares in favour of defendant no. 1 and/or its nominee (s) whenever so required as stated in the Letters of Pledge. (XIV) Letter dated 16. 04. 98 from AEC (India) Ltd. to the defendant no. 1 confirming the following: (A) That the AEC Leasing and Finance Pvt. Ltd. is the registered shareholder in respect of 22,03,132 equity shares of AEC (India) Ltd. (B) Signature on the transfer deeds attached with the share certificates pledged are as per specimen registered with AEC (India) Ltd. (C) That the above shares have no lock-in period and are freely transferable. (D) That AEC (India) Ltd. shall register without any delay, demur and protest all transfer (s) of the above shares in favour of defendant no. l and/or its nominee (s) whenever so required as stated in the Letter of Pledge. " ( 6 ) AT the time of signing of the ICD Agreement, defendant no. 1 and 2 got signed and obtained from the plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 5 multiple documents, mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, inter alia, an undated cheque for rupees one crore, another undated cheque for Rs. " ( 6 ) AT the time of signing of the ICD Agreement, defendant no. 1 and 2 got signed and obtained from the plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 5 multiple documents, mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, inter alia, an undated cheque for rupees one crore, another undated cheque for Rs. 25 lacs projected to be for the liquidated damages in case of default, undated endorsements on share certificates of ostensible transfer in favour of defendants 1, 6 and 7, copies of the alleged Board Resolutions etc. on the letterheads of the plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 5 and AEC (India) Ltd. It is mentioned in the plaint that only when the liability of the plaintiffs to repay had arisen, only then defendant no. 1 could proceed against the aforesaid shares held by defendants 3 to 5 and AEC (India) Ltd. ( 7 ) IT may be pertinent to mention that only after a few days of execution of the deeds of pledge, the plaintiffs received an envelope by spe post. On opening the same, the plaintiffs found only a duplicate copy of the receipt dated 16. 4. 1998 and according to defendant no. 1, it contained a notice to repay the amount within two days. In pursuance to the agreement, the plaintiffs were under an obligation to repay the ICDs only on a two days notice. Admittedly, the date of the speed post cover sent by the defendants to the plaintiffs is dated 26. 4. 1998. ( 8 ) IT is further mentioned by the plaintiffs that after sending the speed-post cover, defendant no. 1 in utter disregard to the understanding and without any intimation to the plaintiffs, had filled up the date in the cheque and wrongly and illegally presented it to its bankers on 28. 4. 98. The cheque was dishonoured because of insufficient funds. The date of sending the notice is 26. 4. 98 and the date for submitting the cheque for encashment is 28. 4. 98. There is no dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants on these dates. ( 9 ) IT is further alleged that the plaintiffs got in touch with the defendants and the defendants mentioned that a duplicate receipt was sent to ascertain the correct addresses of all the Directors. Even at that juncture, the plaintiffs could not comprehend the entire game-plan of the defendants. ( 9 ) IT is further alleged that the plaintiffs got in touch with the defendants and the defendants mentioned that a duplicate receipt was sent to ascertain the correct addresses of all the Directors. Even at that juncture, the plaintiffs could not comprehend the entire game-plan of the defendants. Thereafter, a notice under section 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was sent by the defendants to the plaintiffs on 13. 5. 1998. The notice was received on 19. 5. 1998. In the notice, it was mentioned that the amount had to be repaid within 2 weeks, meaning thereby around 3rd or 4th of June, 1998. According to the plaintiffs at this point of time, they comprehended the game plan of the defendants and to safeguard and protect their interests, the plaintiffs rushed to the court. The plaintiffs filed these suits in this court. This court on 12. 6. 1998 while issuing the summons and notices in suit no. 1216/98 also granted ex parte ad interim injunction to the plaintiff company. ( 10 ) ON 5th June, 1998, the plaintiffs were shocked and surprised to learn that an advertisement had been caused to be published by defendant no. 1 in `navbharat Times, New Delhi a leading daily Hindi newspaper, as well as in other newspapers which have circulation in Delhi and Madhya Pradesh by defendant no. 1 purporting to be under Security and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations Act, 1997. According to regulation 10 of the said Regulations, "no acquirer shall acquire shares or voting rights which taken together with the share or voting rights, if any, held by him or by a person acting in consort with him, entitles such acquirer to exercise 10 per cent or more of the voting rights of a company, unless such acquirer makes a public announcement of acquiring shares of such companies in accordance with the regulation". In this public announcement, defendants no. 1, 6 and 7 claimed to have acquired over 32. 04 per cent of the paid-up equity capital of the plaintiff companies. According to the plaintiffs, this public announcement was totally mala fide. The said defendants were not only lenders of money, but they had an evil eye from the very inception over both the plaintiff companies. 1, 6 and 7 claimed to have acquired over 32. 04 per cent of the paid-up equity capital of the plaintiff companies. According to the plaintiffs, this public announcement was totally mala fide. The said defendants were not only lenders of money, but they had an evil eye from the very inception over both the plaintiff companies. It is also mentioned in the plaint that it was a well planned and engineered conspiracy and game-plan with mala fide intentions to take over the plaintiff companies for a song. It is also mentioned that all their endeavour and wrongful acts, illegalities and fraud were committed towards achieving the said objectives. ( 11 ) THE plaintiffs mentioned that the present loan cheque was given on 16. 4. 98, and the cheque was presented for encashment on 17. 4. 98. The defendants only after 9 days i. e. on 26. 4. 98 demanded the amount and on 28. 4. 98 deposited the blank cheque (taken by the defendants) in the bank without any intimation to the plaintiffs and the same was dishonoured. According to the plaintiffs, it was agreed and understood between the parties that the loan was for a period of 90 days which could be rolled over for another period of 90 days on mutual agreement. ( 12 ) ON behalf of the plaintiffs, it was submitted that it would be ridiculous that a company in need of funds to obtain a loan of Rs. 1 crore, would be expected to repay the same on a notice of only 9 days. It is also mentioned that the copy of the ICD agreement dated 16. 4. 98 was not supplied to the plaintiffs by the defendants. It is further mentioned in the plaint that amongst the papers got signed by defendants 1 and 2 on or about 16. 4. 98 also included a purported copy of the alleged resolution of the Board of Directors of the plaintiff companies dated 30. 5. 98 and a letter dated 1. 6. 98 stating that with reference to the notice of demand dated 26. 4. 98 regarding repayment of the inter corporate deposit and subsequent letter dated 28. 5. 4. 98 also included a purported copy of the alleged resolution of the Board of Directors of the plaintiff companies dated 30. 5. 98 and a letter dated 1. 6. 98 stating that with reference to the notice of demand dated 26. 4. 98 regarding repayment of the inter corporate deposit and subsequent letter dated 28. 5. 98 seeking transfer of the shares in favour of M/s Yield Securities and Credit Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Virgin Securities and Credit Pvt. Ltd. , the Board of Directors had approved the transfers and recorded the same in the Register of the Members of the Company. ( 13 ) IT is specifically mentioned that no Board meeting in fact was held either on 30. 5. 1998 or any other date approving any such alleged transfer nor were the same recorded in the Register of Members, nor was any notice of demand or letter seeking transfer of shares ever received. As a matter of fact, the documents and blank papers obtained from the plaintiffs were used by defendants 1 and 2 in accomplishing the mischievous game plan of taking over both the companies. ( 14 ) IT is further submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that the acts of the defendants were wrong, illegal and highhanded and were designed to take over the plaintiff companies. It is mentioned that the present suit is confined to the guarantees/pledge given by defendants 3 and 4, while AEC Enterprises Ltd. and AEC (India) Ltd. are filing separate suits to protect their respective rights. In fact a suit has also been filed on behalf of A. E. C. (India) Ltd. ( 15 ) IT is also mentioned that charging of interest of 40 per cent was highly exorbitant particularly when the loan given by the defendants was fully secured by the shares of much higher value. The interest is usurious under the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, and is liable to be reduced to 18 per cent simple interest. It is mentioned that wrongful and illegal contract of defendant no. 1 and 2 has resulted in great injury and prejudice to the plaintiffs and has damaged the reputation and has considerably reduced its credit in the market. ( 16 ) IT is mentioned that the cheque of Rs. 1 crore was dishonoured because it was wrongfully presented without any notice of demand to the plaintiffs. 1 and 2 has resulted in great injury and prejudice to the plaintiffs and has damaged the reputation and has considerably reduced its credit in the market. ( 16 ) IT is mentioned that the cheque of Rs. 1 crore was dishonoured because it was wrongfully presented without any notice of demand to the plaintiffs. The object of presenting the cheque by defendant no. 1 was fraudulent and collateral. Defendant no. 1 and 2 have used arm-twisting tactics to subjugate directors of the companies with the object of taking over the companies. It is mentioned in the plaint that the plaintiff companies are in a position to make the payment of Rs. 1 crore and are ready and willing to make the payment forthwith of any amount which the court may determine to be due and payable to defendant no. 1 having regard to the provisions of Usurious Loans Act, 1918. This suit again came up for consideration before this court on 12. 6. 98. In the order, it is mentioned that counsel for the plaintiffs submit that the plaintiffs are willing to return the sum of Rs. 1 crore to defendant no. 1 along with interest forthwith provided that the shares pledged with defendant no. 1 and the corporate guarantees submitted are returned. The court continued the injunction already granted in terms of prayer (a) of I. A. 5174/98. ( 17 ) A comprehensive reply to this application and the written statements have been filed on behalf of the defendants. The defendants have submitted that the plaintiffs having transferred the shares in favour of defendants 1 to 4 vide letter dated 1. 6. 98 after passing the Board Resolution on 29. 5. 98 and also furnishing a true copy of the said Resolution to defendant no. 1 is estopped from filing this suit and making such allegations. It is mentioned that the `inter Corporate Deposit was given to the plaintiffs subject to the condition that the repayment of the sum will be made to defendant no. 1 on demand though no duration was fixed for the repayment of the said amount. It is mentioned by the defendants that on 26. 4. 98, a letter was sent by a speedpost recalling the amount. The plaintiffs failed to repay the amount. Therefore, a cheque dated 16. 4. 98 given by the plaintiffs was presented on 28. 4. 1 on demand though no duration was fixed for the repayment of the said amount. It is mentioned by the defendants that on 26. 4. 98, a letter was sent by a speedpost recalling the amount. The plaintiffs failed to repay the amount. Therefore, a cheque dated 16. 4. 98 given by the plaintiffs was presented on 28. 4. 98 which was dishonoured on 29. 4. 98. Again, a notice under section 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was sent by the defendants to the plaintiffs. Even then the plaintiffs had failed to pay the amount. ( 18 ) THE defendants also submitted that it was a commercial transaction and the defendants did not get the documents executed under coercion or undue influence. The defendants denied that the net worth of the company as on 31. 3. 1998 is Rs. 45. 63 crores. ( 19 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs and the defendants argued the case at length. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiffs submitted that the defendants instead of accepting the repayment of loan with interest, str really interested in grabing the companies. He submitted that the defendants by their evil design and game plan were trying to acquire the plaintiff companies for a song. According to Mr. Rohtagi, this is quite evident from the entire conduct of the defendants. He submitted that by an agreement dated 16. 4. 1998, a loan of Rs. 1 crore was given which was credited in the account of the plaintiffs on 17. 4. 98 Even if the case of the defendants is accepted then also admittedly on 26. 4. 98, i. e. after 9 days, the defendants demanded the amount and on 28. 4. 98, admittedly, the blank cheque given by the plaintiffs was deposited in the bank which was dishonoured on 29th April, 1998. ( 20 ) MR. Rohtagi, submitted that though all the terms and conditions of the agreement are totally one sided but because of the urgent need of loan and because of trust and faith which the plaintiffs had reposed in the defendants, the plaintiffs literally signed on the dotted lines. It was the plaintiffs understanding that these documents would never be misused by the defendants. It was the plaintiffs understanding that these documents would never be misused by the defendants. There was a clear understanding that the loan was given for a period of 90 days (as given on earlier occasions) which could be rolled over for another period of 90 days by mutual agreement. Mr. Rohtagi submitted, how could the defendants expect the plaintiffs to return the entire amount within 9 days, though the clear stand of the plaintiffs is that no demand notice was received by the plaintiffs? The plaintiffs in fact received only a duplicate copy of the receipt. ( 21 ) IT was further submitted that if this aspect of the case of the defendants is presumed to be correct that the notice of demand was sent on 26. 4. 98 by speed post, and admittedly on 28. 4. 98, defendant no. 1 deposited the blank cheque which was duly filled in by the defendants for encashment on 28th April, 1998. Even the two days minimum notice as envisaged in the agreement was also not given. ( 22 ) MR. Rohtagi submitted that even before this court the plaintiffs offered to pay the amount with entire interest forthwith first on June 12, 1998, and again on June 26, 1998, the plaintiffs in fact brought the cheques in court but the defendants refused to accept the amount. Mr. Rohtagi also submitted that the defendants in fact do not want to get the repayment of the loan paid by them with interest but in the garb of repayment of the loan, the defendants are only keen to acquire both the companies of the plaintiffs. The relevant portion of the order dated 26. 6. 98 in Suit no. 1216/98 is reproduced as under:- "mr. P. C. Khanna, submits that as per the observations made by this Court on the 12th of June, 1998, the plaintiff is offering Rs. 1,08,55,219. 00 by way of two cheques; one is bearing No. 793931 dated 26. 6. 1998 for Rs. 1,00,00,000. 00 and another is bearing no. 793932 dated 26. 6. 1998 for Rs. 8,55,219. 00 issued by the plaintiff on the United Western Bank Limited, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, but Mr. D. P. Sharma, the learned counsel for defendants 1, 2, 6 and 7 refused to accept the same. " ( 23 ) IN support of his arguments, Mr. 1,00,00,000. 00 and another is bearing no. 793932 dated 26. 6. 1998 for Rs. 8,55,219. 00 issued by the plaintiff on the United Western Bank Limited, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, but Mr. D. P. Sharma, the learned counsel for defendants 1, 2, 6 and 7 refused to accept the same. " ( 23 ) IN support of his arguments, Mr. Rohtagi placed reliance on a judgment of Orissa High Court, M/s Tapanga Light Foundary and others v. State Bank of India, Khurda and others, AIR 1987 Orissa, 174. In this case, the court came to the conclusion that under section 176 of the Indian Contract Act, the pawner is entitled to reasonable notice before the sale of pawned goods. He also placed reliance on M/s Ratna Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others AIR 1966 Allahabad, 34, to buttress his arguments that the plaintiffs are not only entitled to a notice, but to a reasonable notice. ( 24 ) MR. Rohtagi submitted that in case where there is a breach of contract, the defendants would be entitled to compensation but not to take over the two companies of the plaintiffs on such flimsy excuses. Mr. Rohtagi also submitted that according to the provisions of section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, the party complaining of breach of contract is entitled to only reasonable compensation. Section 74 reads as under:- "s. 74. Compensation for breach of contract where penalty stipulated for.--When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, penalty stipulated for. " ( 25 ) MR. Rohtagi had particularly drawn attention of the court to the illustration (d) given along with the section. A gives B a bond for the repayment of Rs. 100 with interest at 12 per cent at the end of six months, with a stipulation that, in case of default, the interest shall become payable at the rate of 75 per cent, from the date of default. A gives B a bond for the repayment of Rs. 100 with interest at 12 per cent at the end of six months, with a stipulation that, in case of default, the interest shall become payable at the rate of 75 per cent, from the date of default. This is a stipulation by way of penalty, and B is only entitled to recover from A such compensation as the Court considers reasonable. He submitted that the plaintiffs on earlier occasion, on 12th June, 1998 offered before the court that he is willing to pay the entire amount with interest forthwith and even now he is prepared to pay the entire loan amount with interest which the court may consider reasonable. ( 26 ) MR. Arun Jaitley, the learned Senior Advocate appeared on behalf of the defendants repudiated the arguments advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs and submitted that it was a purely commercial contract which was not executed under coercion, undue influence or duress. He also submitted that according to the terms of the agreement, the loan amount had to be paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants on demand. The defendants demanded the amount on 26. 4. 98 and when the plaintiffs failed to pay the amount, then on 28. 4. 98, the defendants deposited the cheque for encashment. ( 27 ) MR. Jaitley further submitted that again when a notice under section 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was given on 14. 5. 98 which was admittedly received by the plaintiffs on 19. 5. 98, even then the amount was not paid within two days. Therefore, according to the terms of the agreement, the plaintiffs failed to repay the loan and in these circumstances, pledged the shares of the companies with the defendant company. Now, the plaintiffs cannot make any grievance at this stage. ( 28 ) MR. Jaitley submitted that ICD receipt clearly provided that the amount is payable on demand and it does not provide even two days s notice. Mr. Jaitley also submitted that when the loan was given, the defendants were under the impression that the plaintiffs had a temporary liquidity problem but later on, the defendants learnt that their financial condition was disastrous and that is why the demand was made on 26th April 1998 to secure their amount?. ( 29 ) MR. Mr. Jaitley also submitted that when the loan was given, the defendants were under the impression that the plaintiffs had a temporary liquidity problem but later on, the defendants learnt that their financial condition was disastrous and that is why the demand was made on 26th April 1998 to secure their amount?. ( 29 ) MR. Jaitley, learned counsel for the defendants submitted that it is settled position of law that a person who signs a document containing contractual terms is bound by them even though he is ignorant to their precise legal effect. He placed reliance on L estrange v. F. Graucob, Ltd. , [1934] All E. R. 16. In this case, it was held that "the contract having been signed by the buyer, the implied warranty was excluded by the express condition in the contract, notwithstanding that the buyer did not know that the contract contained such a condition. " ( 30 ) MR. Jaitley placed reliance on Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna and others v. M/s Green rubber Industries and others, (1990) 1 SCC 731 . In this case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that it is settled law that a person who signs a document which contains contractual terms is normally bound by them even though he has not read them, or he is ignorant of the precise legal effect. ( 31 ) MR. Jaitley also placed reliance on Bharathi Knitting Company v. DHL Worldwide Express, JT 1996 (6) S. C. 254. In this case, the Court relied on Anson s Law of Contract (26th Edn.), 152, in which it is mentioned that a person who signs a document containing contractual terms is normally bound by them even though he has not read them and even though he is ignorant of the precise legal effect. These judgments have been followed in the case of Classic Motors Ltd. vs. Maruti Udyog Ltd. , 65 (1997) DLT 166. ( 32 ) MR. Jaitley further submitted that the court should not set aside the contract merely on the ground that the consideration for the same is inadequate. Consideration need not be adequate to the promise but it must be of some value in the eye of law. He placed reliance on Ram Chandra Singh v. Basdeo Singh and another, AIR 1982 Allahabad, AIR 1982 All 437, Gaumont-British Picture Corporation Ltd. v. Alexander, [1936] vol. Consideration need not be adequate to the promise but it must be of some value in the eye of law. He placed reliance on Ram Chandra Singh v. Basdeo Singh and another, AIR 1982 Allahabad, AIR 1982 All 437, Gaumont-British Picture Corporation Ltd. v. Alexander, [1936] vol. 2, All E. R. 1686, and Midland Bank Trust Co. v. Green [1979] 3 All E. R. ( 33 ) MR. Jaitley also argued submitted that it is well settled position of law that plea of unconscionability of contract is not available where both parties are businessmen and the transaction is a commercial transaction. ( 34 ) THE learned counsel for the defendants placed reliance on the following judgments, buttress his arguments: 1949 (1) ALL ER 980 (986), Eric Gnapp, Ltd. v. Petroleum Board; 1994 (28) DRJ 483 (497) M/s Unikol Bottlers Ltd. vs. M/s Dhillon Kool Drinks; 1983 (1) ALL ER 944 (Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. and others v. Total Oil GB Ltd. (960) ( 35 ) MR. Jaitley, the learned counsel for the defendants also referred to and relied upon Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another, AIR 1986 SC 1571 , to hammer the point that the principle of uneven bargaining power of employer and employee would not be applicable in commercial transaction. In order to comprehend the ratio laid down by the said judgment, the judgment in toto has to be considered in proper perspective. The relevant observations of the court are reproduced as under:- "this principal is that the courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all bargains of this type. No court can visualize the different situations which can arise in the affairs of men. One can only attempt to give some illustrations. For instance, the above principle will apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. One can only attempt to give some illustrations. For instance, the above principle will apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however, unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules may be. This principle, however, will not apply where the bargaining power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal. This principle may not apply where both parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial transaction. In today s complex world of giant corporations with their vast infra-structural organizations and with the State through its instrumentalities and agencies entering into almost every branch of industry and commerce, there can be myriad situations which result in unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither be enumerated nor fully illustrated. The court must judge each case on its own facts and circumstances. " ( 36 ) THE Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that no hard and fast rules or universal principles can be laid down. The diverse variety of facts, circumstances, situation of cases cannot be comprehended or visualised. Therefore, the facts and circumstances of each case have to be examined whether the agreement is unfair or unreasonable because of unequal bargaining power between the parties. The diverse variety of facts, circumstances, situation of cases cannot be comprehended or visualised. Therefore, the facts and circumstances of each case have to be examined whether the agreement is unfair or unreasonable because of unequal bargaining power between the parties. ( 37 ) ON scrutiny of the relevant documents on record and on careful consideration of the submissions urged on behalf of the parties, the Court prima facie comes to the following conclusions:- (A) The plaintiffs are not guilty of breach of agreement between the parties; (B) The documents on record clearly reveal that the loan by the defendants was not given to the plaintiff companies for a period of 9 days only. Apart from the agreement, even according to the provisions of Section 176 of the Contract Act, 1872, the plaintiffs were entitled to a reasonable notice. The bona fides of the plaintiffs were clearly established when on 12. 6. 98 before the court, the plaintiffs were willing to return the sum of Rs. 1 crore to defendant no. 1 along with interest forthwith. On subsequent date of hearing on 26. 6. 98, the plaintiffs had even brought the cheques of the entire amount in court but the defendants refused to accept the same. (C) According to the terms of the agreement between the parties at least a two days clear notice is envisaged. In the instant case, even according to the defendants, the demand notice itself was sent on 26. 4. 98 by speed-post and on 28. 4. 98 the cheque of Rs. 1 crore was presented to the bank. Though the plaintiffs submitted that the plaintiffs never received any demand notice, prima facie the court is of the opinion that in presenting the cheque defendants no. 1 and 2 had used arm-twisting tactics to subjugate the directors of the companies with the object of taking over the companies. (D) The plaintiff companies were in urgent need of some loan and because of the long association and relationship with the defendants, the plaintiffs had executed some blank documents, and gave a blank signed cheque of Rs. 1 crore for providing total security to the defendants. The documents and cheque were subsequently utilized by the defendants with a view to acquire the plaintiff companies. 1 crore for providing total security to the defendants. The documents and cheque were subsequently utilized by the defendants with a view to acquire the plaintiff companies. (E) The defendants are really not interested in getting the repayment of the outstanding amount with interest but they are only keen to acquire the plaintiff companies in lieu of the loan amount. (F) The rates of interest of 40 per cent per annum is highly exorbitant, particularly, when the loan given by the defendants to the plaintiffs was fully secured by giving a large number of shares of the plaintiff companies. This clause clearly demonstrates the financial and economic duress was exercised by the defendants on the plaintiffs. (G) In view of the aforesaid prima facie conclusions of this court even without giving finding on the said clause of interest, the defendants at the most are entitled to the entire amount of Rs. 1 crore with interest according to the agreement from the date of payment i. e. 16. 4. 1998 till 26. 6. 1998, (when in fact the plaintiffs had brought the cheque of the entire amount in court but was not accepted by the defendants), and thereafter i. e. from 27. 6. 98 till payment, the defendants are also entitled to 18 per cent simple interest per annum. ( 38 ) ALL these three applications are accordingly disposed of in the aforementioned terms. ( 39 ) THE case be listed for further proceedings on 7. 12. 1998.