( 1 ) (PER :j ) this Special Civil Application is filed by the Gujarat Housing Board against the order dated 31st May, 1997, passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer who has arrived at re-assessment under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as `the Act) in respect of the lands situated in village Kansad, Taluka-Choryasi,. The proceedings regarding acquisition of the land by the Gujarat Housing Board commenced in June, 1981 for the construction of residential houses. The Awards under section 11 of the Act in respect of certain lands situated in village Kansad, Taluka-Choryasi, District-Surat were passed. The lands were acquired on 21st March 1986 and possession thereof was taken on 9th April 1986. Certain land owners preferred References under section 18 of the Act for getting enhanced compensation in the District Court, Surat, they were registered as Land Reference Cases Nos. 148/86 to 173/86, and the District Court, Surat, by its judgment and order dated 3rd July, 1991, fixed the amount of compensation for the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 25. 00 per Sq. Mt. and the same was later on modified by the order dated 10th October, 1991. The respondents nos. 3 to 19 herein were also the persons whose lands had been acquired, but they did not move for any Reference under section 18 of the Act. Those who preferred such References Nos. 148/86 to 173/86, were paid the additional amount of compensation, however, on behalf of the respondents nos. 3 to 19 the applications under section 28-A were filed on 19th August, 1992 i. e. after expiry of three months period prescribed for the purpose so as to commence from the date on which the order is passed under section 18 in the main land reference cases. These applications under section 28-A were initially filed without annexing any certified copy and the respondents nos. 3 to 19 rest contended by filing only Xerox copy of the order dated 3rd July, 1991, and later on a certified copy is said to have been filed. Only one certified copy was filed for all the applications which had been moved by the respondents nos. 3 to 19 under section 28a of the Act. 3 to 19 rest contended by filing only Xerox copy of the order dated 3rd July, 1991, and later on a certified copy is said to have been filed. Only one certified copy was filed for all the applications which had been moved by the respondents nos. 3 to 19 under section 28a of the Act. For the purpose of taking the benefit of the proviso under section 28-A (1) and computing the period of three months, this certified copy was sought to be made use of so as to bring the applications within the period of limitation of three months by saying that the application for obtaining certified copy had been made on 25th July, 1991, through an advocate namely Shri K. C. Desai, and that the certified copy was made available on 23rd July, 1992 and therefore according to the said proviso under section 28-A (1) of the Act, all these applications moved under section 28-A by the respondents nos. 3 to 19 should be treated to be within the period of three months from the date of the order passed by the District court in the land references i. e. 3rd July, 1991. Thus, the applications which were filed under section 28-A of the Act were decided on 30th July, 1993 by the concerned Land Acquisition Officer granting the additional amount of compensation to the respondents nos. 3 to 19 herein. Against this order dated 30th July, 1993, passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the Gujarat Housing Board preferred Special Civil Application No. 8046/94, to which the respondents nos. 3 to 19 were parties. This court decided the aforesaid Special Civil Application and allowed it on 14th November, 1995, on the ground that the Gujarat Housing Board had not been heard before passing the order dated 30th July, 1993, by the Land Acquisition Officer while the question of limitation was left open to be considered and the matter was remanded back to the concerned Land Acquisition Officer. By way of narration and to complete the chain of facts, it may be mentioned that the respondents nos. 3 to 19 had also filed writ petitions for modification of the Award dated 30th July, 1993 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer and these Special Civil Applications Nos. 4873/94 to 4883/86 were rejected on the same date i. e. 14th November, 1995. 3 to 19 had also filed writ petitions for modification of the Award dated 30th July, 1993 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer and these Special Civil Applications Nos. 4873/94 to 4883/86 were rejected on the same date i. e. 14th November, 1995. The Land Acquisition Officer has passed the order dated 31st May, 1997, in the remanded proceedings granting compensation as per the details given in the order dated 31st May, 1997 in respect of the lands, the details of which have been given in Annexure-A to the order dated 31st May, 1997. It is this order dated 31st May, 1997, which is the subject matter of challenge in this Special Civil Application at the instance of the Gujarat Housing Board. ( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents nos. 3 to 19, at the very threshold has raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of this Special Civil Application against the impugned order dated 31st May, 1997 at the instance of the Gujarat Housing Board. He has raised a contention that the order has been passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Gujarat Housing Board, Ahmedabad, and that the Gujarat Housing Board being an instrumentality of the State has no right to challenge the impugned order dated 31st May, 1997, passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, and it has no locus-standi to file and maintain this petition. The learned counsel for the respondents placed strong reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of SANTOSH KUMAR and ORS VS CENTRAL WAREHOUSING CORPORATION and Ors. (AIR 1986, SC, 1164 ). In this case before the Supreme Court, the principal submission was that the High Court was wholly in error in entertaining writ petition to challenge awards made by the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act on the ground that the amount awarded was excessive and that too not at the instance of the Government but at the instance of the Corporation on whose request the acquisition was made. In the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, the Collector had made the Awards under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act determining the compensation proposed to be paid. The References were sought under section 18 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation and the References were awaiting adjudication by the civil Court. In the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, the Collector had made the Awards under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act determining the compensation proposed to be paid. The References were sought under section 18 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation and the References were awaiting adjudication by the civil Court. The Central Ware Housing Corporation also being aggrieved by the amount of compensation determined by the Collector, had sought reference to the Civil Court under section 18 of the Act for reducing the amount, but all the applications seeking References by the Central Ware Housing Corporation were rejected by the Collector by saying that the same were barred under proviso to section 50 (2) of the Act. It is clear from the case before the Supreme Court that no order such as an order passed in the proceedings under section 28-A was under challenge and what was challenged in that case was the basic order which had been passed by the Collector. It is settled that such an Award which is passed by the Collector is made as an offer on behalf of the Government in lieu of the acquisition and therefore the Corporation, for which the land was acquired, could not challenge such an Award which was made in offer. The orders which are passed under section 28-A of the Act at the instance of those parties which failed to seek the Reference under section 18 are not comparable with the Award which is passed as an offer on behalf of the Government under section 11 and it goes without saying that only because of such Awards passed under section 11 treated as an offer, the scheme of the Act provides for seeking a Reference where such offer can be challenged and the same is adjudicated by a civil court in accordance with law. Under such circumstances, the Government or the Corporation or the functionary for whose benefit the land is acquired was not allowed to challenge the Award in the form of an offer made by the concerned Collector. Such principle, in our opinion, can not be made applicable against the orders passed under section 28-A. The order passed under section 28-A is not at all at par with the Award passed under section 11. Such principle, in our opinion, can not be made applicable against the orders passed under section 28-A. The order passed under section 28-A is not at all at par with the Award passed under section 11. The order under section 28-A is an order passed against the acquiring authority on an application being made by a party which did not seek the Reference under section 18. The question of passing order under section 28-A arises only after the Reference made under section 18 is adjudicated by the civil court and this section 28-A is meant to be availed only by such parties which did not seek Reference and yet want to take the benefit of the adjudication made by the civil court in Reference under section 18 and only after the civil court allows to the claimant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11. The language of section 28-A itself makes it clear that the persons interested in the other land covered by the same Notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the Award of the Collector, may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18 within three months from the date of the Award of the court may ask that the amount of compensable payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court. Thus, we find that the basis of the application under section 28-A is the order passed by the civil court while allowing the applications of the claimants against the Award determined by the concerned Collector as an offer, thereafter the order passed under section 28-A is not in the nature of an offer, but an order passed by the concerned Land Acquisition Officer on the basis of an order passed by the civil court while deciding Reference under section 18 in favour of the claimants. The order under section 28-A is essentially an order with regard to re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the Award of the court. The order under section 28-A is essentially an order with regard to re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the Award of the court. Thus, it is very clear from the scheme of the Act that the order passed under section 11 is an offer which is voluntary by the Land Acquisition Officer on behalf of the Government or the Corporation or functionary for whose benefit the land is sought to be acquired and such voluntary offer may be a subject matter of Reference before the Civil Court while the order which is passed under section 28-A has an element of compulsion. The order passed under section 28-A is therefore an order not as a voluntary offer, but an order passed by way of re-determination after an inquiry, after notice to the persons interested and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard. If the concerned authority or the Corporation for whose benefit the land is sought to be acquired, is entitled to be heard before any such re-determination of amount of compensation is made, it is certainly an order against which such body or Corporation may be aggrieved. In this background, and for the aforesaid reasons, the Supreme Court decision in the case of Santosh Kumar (Supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents is of no avail to them for the simple reason that what was under challenge in the case of Santosh Kumar (Supra) before the Supreme Court was the order in the form of a voluntary offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer as against the order under section 28-A of the Act, which is under challenge in this Special Civil Application at the instance of the Gujarat Housing Board. If the Gujarat Housing Board had a right to be heard in the matter under section 28-A before the Land Acquisition Officer, it certainly has a right to challenge the said order in case it goes against it. Santosh Kumars case is therefore distinguishable. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents has next relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of UNION OF INDIA and ANR VS THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER and ORS, in SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 16514/96, decided on 2nd September, 1996, reported in 1996, LACC, 614. Santosh Kumars case is therefore distinguishable. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents has next relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of UNION OF INDIA and ANR VS THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER and ORS, in SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 16514/96, decided on 2nd September, 1996, reported in 1996, LACC, 614. In this case also, the challenge before the Supreme Court was to the Award and the Supreme Court held that the Award is binding on the State. The Supreme Court has also considered that the State can not make a Reference under section 18 and the order made by the Collector is only an offer under law and the State can not question the correctness of the order made by the Land Acquisition Officer. The distinguishing feature pointed out above with regard to the case of Santosh Kumar (supra) apply with equal force for this case also and therefore we find that this decision is of no help to the respondents so as to challenge either the maintainability of this Special Civil Application at the instance of the Gujarat Housing Board or the locus-standi of the Gujarat Housing Board so as to challenge the order passed against it for re-determination of the amount of compensation against it. ( 4 ) AS against it, Mrs. Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision in the case of BABUA RAM and ORS VS STATE OF U. P. and ANR. ( (1995) 2 SCC 689 . In paragraph-42, the Supreme Court, while considering the provisions of section 28-A in detail and even while expressing that , "the order of the Collector under sub-section (2) of section 28-A though as (sic at), a post section 11 stage, nonetheless the award under section 28-A (2) is award and partakes the same character as an offer and not a decision". The Supreme Court, has concluded in the end of the very same paragraph-42 as under :"however, the Collector being an authority under the Act, the award of the Collector made under section 28-A is not totally immune from jurisdiction of the High court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, if required to be challenged by the State or the beneficiary, who have no other legal remedy in the matter ". Thus, the conclusion arrived in para-42 by the Supreme Court leaves no room of doubt that the beneficiary or the authority of the Corporation for whose benefit the land is acquired, is entitled to a right of hearing under section 28-A (2) and although such beneficiary or the authority or the State has no remedy under the Act, the order under section 28-A is not totally immune from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution at the instance either of the State or the beneficiary. ( 5 ) ON the basis of the law laid down in the cases as aforesaid, it is clearly discernible that the State or the beneficiary for whose benefit the land is acquired has locus-standi to challenge the order passed under section 28-A of the Act and the writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution is also maintainable at the instance of the State or the beneficiary as the case may be and therefore the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents opposing this Special Civil Application can not be sustained and the same is hereby rejected. ( 6 ) THE ancillary arguments raised on behalf of the respondents that this Special Civil Application was essentially a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and therefore it was not maintainable, also stands answered by the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Babua Ram (supra), wherein the reference is made to Article 226 as well as Article 227, by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the question with regard to the maintainability is entirely different and this is the question which can be raised with regard to the merits of the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as distinct from Article 226. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically argued that in the facts of the present case, the application under section 28-A as had been moved on behalf of the respondents nos. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically argued that in the facts of the present case, the application under section 28-A as had been moved on behalf of the respondents nos. 3 to 19 should not have been entertained because it had been admittedly moved after the period of three months from the date on which the District Court had passed the order in Reference under section 18 and that the only certified copy which had been filed with the application under section 28-A was not a certified copy applied for and on behalf of any of the respondents nos. 3 to 19 and therefore they were not entitled to the benefit of time taken for obtaining the aforesaid certified copy. This certified copy had been applied for and obtained by and on behalf of some party other than respondents no. 3 to 19. ( 8 ) ON this aspect of the matter, there is lot of factual controversy. Mr. Amin has submitted that in fact Mr. K. C. Desai, the learned advocate who has been appearing in such matters and who was appointed counsel in three References had applied for four certified copies. Three of such certified copies were used for the purpose of preferring the appeals on behalf of the claimants, who had made the References and that the fourth copy had been applied for, under instructions of the respondents nos. 3 to 19 so as to be used for the purpose of filing the application under section 28-A on their behalf. Although no affidavit has been filed by said Shri K. C. Desai, Advocate himself, an affidavit of his clerk dated 23rd June 1998 has been filed before this court stating therein that Shri K. C. Desai had appeared in the main Acquisition References Nos. 148/86, 164/86 and 170/86; that some of the respondents had come to the office of K. C. Desai for obtaining certified copy as they wanted to produce the said copy in their case and therefore under the instructions of Shri K. C. Desai, by common application, the certified copies were applied for. Three copies were applied for their clients in the Land Acquisition Reference, and one copy for respondents nos. 3 to 19. The deponent-clerk of Shri K. C. Desai has declared that what is stated in his affidavit is true to his knowledge and belief. Mr. Three copies were applied for their clients in the Land Acquisition Reference, and one copy for respondents nos. 3 to 19. The deponent-clerk of Shri K. C. Desai has declared that what is stated in his affidavit is true to his knowledge and belief. Mr. Amin led stress that in view of the affidavit of the clerk of Shri K. C. Desai, Advocate, it is clear that the certified copy had been applied for through an application signed by Shri K. C. Desai and that one of the four copies applied for was to be utilised for the respondents nos. 3 to 19 and therefore his clients were duly entitled to the benefit of the period taken for obtaining the certified copy and if the time taken in obtaining the aforesaid certified copies is excluded, the applications under section 28-A were within the period of three months. He has also argued that the present respondents were not parties to the Reference under section 18 and therefore they came to know about the order passed in the Reference at a later stage. The factual aspects of this submission have been made a subject matter of serious controversy on behalf of the petitioner-Gujarat Housing Board. Mrs. Mehta submits that a Xerox copy of the application which was moved for obtaining the certified copy under the signature of Shri K. C. Desai does not disclose that it had been moved on behalf of the present respondents nos. 3 to 19, and there is nothing on the record to show that any application had been moved for obtaining the certified copy by or on behalf of any of the respondents nos. 3 to 19. She has submitted that under proviso to section 28-A (1) only such party is entitled to the benefit of the period taken for obtaining certified copy which had infact applied for certified copy and for that purpose any certified copy which is obtained by any other party even if it is annexed with the application, would not enure to the benefit of the period for obtaining copy in favour of such a party. Besides this, she has also submitted that in fact the application for certified copy which had been moved by Shri K. C. Desai , a copy of which has been placed at Annexure-II, shows that it was on behalf of the claimants who had made Reference for whom Shri K. C. Desai was appearing in the main References. She has also submitted that along with this application for obtaining the certified copy, there was no Vakalatnama on behalf of any of the respondents nos. 3 to 19 and therefore except the bald averments made by the clerk of Shri K. C. Desai, and Shri Mahmad Suleman Gharda, there is nothing on the record to show that infact the application for obtaining certified copies was made by Shri K. C. Desai under the instructions from the respondents nos. 3 to 19. She has submitted that this is besides the other objections that each of the applications under section 28-A should have been accompanied by a separate certified copy if at all they wanted to take benefit of period taken in obtaining copies as per the requirement of section 28-A (1) of the Act. Whereas, there is a serious controversy between the parties and it is a seriously disputed question of fact as to whether the application (Annexure-II) for obtaining certified copy had been moved on behalf of the respondents nos. 3 to 19 or not, and it is not possible for this court to decide this factual controversy on the basis of the bald averments made in the affidavit, we find it safe to decide this aspect of the matter with reference to the contemporaneous document itself i. e. the application which had been made for obtaining the certified copy. This application shows that it had been moved in Reference No. 171/86 - the claimant being Ishvarbhai Bapubhai and others. This document also shows that this application has been moved on behalf of the claimants in the Reference, the number of which has been given in the application itself which had been moved on behalf of the claimants and four copies had been applied for. It is not in dispute that there were four claimants in this very Reference No. 171/86. The application does not specify the name of any applicant/claimant. It is not in dispute that there were four claimants in this very Reference No. 171/86. The application does not specify the name of any applicant/claimant. This document which is the only contemporaneous documentary evidence does not indicate that it had been moved on behalf of the respondents nos. 3 to 19 and the certified copy was to be issued by the District Court. Rule 504 of the Civil Manual, Vol-I provides that the application for obtaining certified copy shall state whether the copy applied for is for private use or otherwise and sub-rule (2) requires that the application for copies by persons other than parties to the proceeding shall be supported by an affidavit stating the purpose for which the copies are sought. Rule 504 (1) and (2) are reproduced hereunder :504. The following are the rules under which copies of papers may be granted under section 41 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act (Act XIV of 1869) - (1) A party to any proceeding may, on application on the prescribed court fee, made to the court having the custody of the record, obtain a certified copy of any judgment, order, deposition, memorandum of evidence, or any document filed in the said proceeding. The application shall state whether the copy applied for is required for private use or otherwise. (2) Applications for copies by persons other than parties to the proceeding shall be supported by an affidavit stating the purpose for which the copies are sought. ( 9 ) IF we examine the application which had been made for obtaining the certified copy, in the instant case, we find that it does not mention that it has been moved for and on behalf of any such person who was not a party to the Reference. It is also not supported by any affidavit and it also does not show the purpose for which it was applied for such as to be annexed with the application under section 28-A. Thus, the submissions which have been made by Mr. Amin to show that one of the certified copies was applied for on behalf of the respondents nos. . 3 to 19 also is not in conformity with the requirements of the Rules. There is no affidavit in support of this application as required under sub-rule (2) of Rule-504. The only answer given by Mr. Amin to show that one of the certified copies was applied for on behalf of the respondents nos. . 3 to 19 also is not in conformity with the requirements of the Rules. There is no affidavit in support of this application as required under sub-rule (2) of Rule-504. The only answer given by Mr. Amin is that since Shri K. C. Desai was lawyer in the Reference which had been decided by a common order, the affidavit was not filed. That may be so but in any case, the application itself should show that it was made on behalf of a person who was not a party and that it was required for a stranger who was not a party, and that it was required for the purpose of filing along with the application under section 28-A. Therefore on the basis of the contemporaneous record, as aforesaid, read in the light of the rules, we find that as a question of fact, it can not be said that the application was filed on behalf of any of the respondents nos. 3 to 19. ( 10 ) NOW the question arises as to whether any certified copy which is annexed with the application under section 28-A moved on behalf of the respondents nos. 3 to 19 could be made use of for the purpose of giving the benefit of period which was taken for obtaining such certified copy. 3 to 19. ( 10 ) NOW the question arises as to whether any certified copy which is annexed with the application under section 28-A moved on behalf of the respondents nos. 3 to 19 could be made use of for the purpose of giving the benefit of period which was taken for obtaining such certified copy. Section 28-A (1) including the proviso is reproduced as under :28-A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the court : (1) Where in an award under this part, the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court : Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. ( 11 ) IT is obvious from the language of this proviso that the period of three months has to be computed by excluding the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the Award. Under sub-section (1) any interested person who is aggrieved by the Award, may notwithstanding that he made an application for Reference under section 18 or not, may by written application within three months from the date of the Award of the court require that the amount of compensation payable to him may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court. Thus, the limitation of three months is against such aggrieved party who had not moved the application for Reference under section 18 and it is desirous of filing application under section 28-A. If this limitation of three months is against such aggrieved party, as aforesaid, the time spent in obtaining the certified copy as provided in the proviso is also meant only for such party who moves under section 28-A. The intention of the Legislature is, therefore, very clear by the terms in which the proviso has been couched under section 28-A that if the party has not applied at all for obtaining the certified copy, such a party can not claim the benefit of the time taken for obtaining the certified copy by somebody else. The idea for laying down such a provision in the Act is that a party who wants to approach under section 28-A within three months from the date of the order of the court in Reference, should not be made to suffer for the period which is taken by the office of the court in supplying the certified copy. On this aspect of the matter, Mr. Amin has relied upon several cases and certain cases have also been cited by Mrs. Mehta. The decisions cited on behalf of both the sides also include the decision under section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act itself which is said to be in para-materia with the proviso under section 28-A (1 ). Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act is reproduced as under :12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings : (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reversed or reviewed shall be excluded. ( 12 ) BESIDES the reported decisions relied upon by the learned counsel which we will be dealing with hereinafter, Mr. Amin has also relied upon an unreported common order passed by the Division Bench of this court rendered on 10th September 1997 in Special Civil Application No. 5036/97 and others. ( 13 ) MRS. Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioners argued with reference to the following decisions :13. Amin has also relied upon an unreported common order passed by the Division Bench of this court rendered on 10th September 1997 in Special Civil Application No. 5036/97 and others. ( 13 ) MRS. Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioners argued with reference to the following decisions :13. 1 in DAISY BOAZ Vs. SOCIAL TAHSILDAR (LA), AIR 1983, Madras, 274, the Division Bench of Madras High court while dealing with the question of benefit of the period taken for obtaining the certified copy for the purpose of limitation, after considering the provisions of section 12 (2) and (3) of the Limitation Act and the earlier decisions of Madras High Court, reported in AIR 1970 Madras 353 (FB) Skiten Mathurethiram and AIR 1920, Mad. 159, Amirudeen v. Pyari Bi and Ors. has clearly held that where different applications are preferred by different parties and either on the same day or on different dates against a common judgment, the rule of availing the time taken for obtaining the certified copy as per the endorsement found on the certified copy of the judgment for the purpose of taking the benefit in the matter of limitation can not be extended so as to bring the time barred appeals within limitation. The reasoning given by the Division Bench of Madras High court is that there is no common nexus between the appeals as well as the copies filed. It has been further held that even if the party or parties are the same in the different appeals and if the appeals are not preferred simultaneously on the same day, but on different dates, some after the expiry of the period of limitation, the rule with regard to the period spent for obtaining certified copy can not be availed of to get over the law of limitation. The earlier Full Bench decision of Madras High Court reported in AIR 1970, Mad 353 has been explained and it has been held that the Full Bench was concerned with a case where several appeals were preferred from a common judgment simultaneously on the same day. The earlier Full Bench decision of Madras High Court reported in AIR 1970, Mad 353 has been explained and it has been held that the Full Bench was concerned with a case where several appeals were preferred from a common judgment simultaneously on the same day. In this context while considering the provisions of Order 41, Rule 1 of Civil P. C. as well as S. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, and by taking a liberal and practical view on the contingencies existing in that case, the ratio laid down is that the deduction of time taken for obtaining the copy of the judgment and decree may be considered for computation of time. The Division Bench of Madras High Court in the case of Daisy Boaz (Supra), therefore, declined to extend the aforesaid ratio laid down by the Full Bench. It was also conceded before the Division Bench of Madras High court in this case that the question which was raised before the Division Bench was not at all decided by the Full Bench earlier. The Division Bench has then expressed the view as aforesaid after considering the earlier Full Bench decision as also the decision reported in AIR 1920, Mad. 159 [supra]. 13. 2 a similar question arose before Himachal Pradesh High court in the case of THE STATE VS KAIDIA, reported in AIR 1952 HP , 6. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in this case, was concerned with an appeal filed by the Government against acquittal along with a copy of the judgment which had been obtained by the father of the person who had been murdered and the question arose as to whether Government could take the advantage of section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act in an appeal under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the acquittal. The court held that the Government was not entitled to the benefit of section 12 (2) and the appeal was dismissed as time barred and the order of acquittal was maintained. In para-6, the court has considered the reasons in as much as it is particular partys disability to file the application/appeal within time and not anybody elses disability to entitle him to the benefit of the period spent in obtaining the certified copy. In para-6, the court has considered the reasons in as much as it is particular partys disability to file the application/appeal within time and not anybody elses disability to entitle him to the benefit of the period spent in obtaining the certified copy. If there is a stumbling block in the way of "a" but the path lies clear before "b", the latter has no excuse for not arriving at his destination. The matter is so plain on the face of it that it need hardly be pursued any further. To lend strength to this view, certain observations made by the Privy Council in the case of Pramatha Nath Roy Vs. W. A Lee, reported in AIR 1922 PC 352, which was also a case where the provisions of section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act were under consideration has been quoted as under :"now the learned Judges in the Appeal Court have held that in determining what is the requisite time referred to in S. 12 , sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act the conduct of the appellant must be considered and their Lordships think that in so determining they have rightly regarded the statutory provision. In their Lordships opinion, no period can be regarded as requisite under the Act, which need not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain a copy of the decree or order. In the present case, he took none ". 13. 3 himachal Pradesh High Court also considered the case of Pyari Bi and Ors. , reported in AIR 1920, Mad. 159 (2) [supra], and observed in para-8 that in Madras ruling the appellants who were defendants in the trial court had filed the criminal appeal with the copy of the decree obtained by some other defendants against whom the suit had been dismissed. The Himachal Pradesh High court has observed that the conclusion arrived at in Madras ruling is a "non-sequitur" it does not follow from the ruling it is based upon. Not only that, the Allahabad ruling, [ramkishen Shashtri vs. Koshi Bai (1907) I. L. R 29 Allh. The Himachal Pradesh High court has observed that the conclusion arrived at in Madras ruling is a "non-sequitur" it does not follow from the ruling it is based upon. Not only that, the Allahabad ruling, [ramkishen Shashtri vs. Koshi Bai (1907) I. L. R 29 Allh. P-264 which was relied upon by Madras High Court] did not lay down that a party would be entitled to the benefit of the said provision even if the act of obtaining the copy could not in any way be attributable to him but to quite a different party who had nothing to do with the filing of the appeal. It was therefore found to be manifest that the Allahabad ruling did not apply to the facts of the Madras case and that the latter is in conflict with the Privy Council ruling mentioned above. 13. 4 full Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of STATE VS HARI SHANKAR, reported in 1972 CRI. LJ, (ALLAHABAD) ,60 considered the very interesting situation, wherein Government had filed an appeal under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code along with the copy of the judgment obtained by the opposite party and sent to the Government for the purpose other than filing appeal, the Full Bench held that the time spent by the opposite party for obtaining that copy can not be excluded in favour of Government. The Full Bench has also considered the earlier decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Kishan Shastri VS Kashi Bai, reported in ( 1907) ILR, 29, All. 264, and relied upon the decision rendered by Privy Council in the case of Pramatha Nath Roy VS. W. A. Lee, reported in AIR 1922, PC, 352. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court has observed that while applying the provisions of section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, it is the conduct of the appellant which is relevant and not that of other party. In the case before Allahabad High Court, State had never applied for certified copy of the order appealed against, but utilised the judgment obtained by the other party, and the same was held to be impermissible. ( 14 ) COMING to the authorities cited on behalf of the respondents, it may be straightway observed that no doubt the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of PURSHATTAM NARAYAN VS. ( 14 ) COMING to the authorities cited on behalf of the respondents, it may be straightway observed that no doubt the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of PURSHATTAM NARAYAN VS. SUGAN CHAND PANNALAL, reported in AIR 1964, MP, 27, and UNION OF INDIA VS. I. G. TOBACCO MERCHANT, reported in AIR 1966, MP, 52, has taken a view that the contention that the words " obtained by the appellant" are implicit after the word "copy" in section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, can not be accepted as it was not the interpretation of law and it would amount to enacting the law which is beyond the powers of the courts but time requisite for obtaining a copy has relation only to the certified copy filed with the appeal. Section 12 (2) was intended to exclude the time spent in obtaining the particular copy which is filed with the memorandum of appeal, and it was held that a was entitled to exclusion of time required for obtaining the copy by `b and not the time required for obtaining As copy. Similar view has been expressed by Allahabad High Court in the case of Union of India VS I. G. Tobacco Merchant (supra) holding that where the appeal was presented with a certified copy of the judgment and a certified copy of the decree appealed against the requirements of Order 41 RUle 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure were fulfilled. Only those copies which are actually filed with the appeal are to be taken into account for the purposes of section 12 of the Limitation Act (1906 ). It is immaterial who obtained those copies. The earlier decision in the case of Purshattam Narayan (supra) has been relied upon. No doubt, the Madhya Pradesh High court in the case of Purshattam Narayan (supra) has also referred to the Privy Council decision reported in AIR 1922, PC 352, as also the view taken by Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of State Vs Kaidia (supra), however, we find that the principles on this aspect of the matter as laid down in these two decisions have not been considered and the court has only referred to the factual aspects and has held that it was decided only in the context of facts of those cases. In para-6 of the said judgment, the contention that the words "obtained by the appellant" are implicit after the term copy in section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, has been rejected by saying that it would amount to enacting the law rather than interpreting the same and that is beyond the power of the courts. An illustration has been given that - a party obtains a certified copy but it is lost or destroyed - he then obtains another copy. Having given this illustration, a question has been posed by the court that can it be said that the period to be excluded should be that which was spent in obtaining the first, but not the second copy which is actually filed with the memorandum of appeal. Having given this illustration, the court has held that the question must be answered in the negative because the appellant can not be asked to produce the first copy which is lost and destroyed, nor can he be debarred from filing an appeal or from obtaining another copy. It has been then concluded that section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act intends to exclude the time spent in obtaining the particular copy which is filed with the memorandum of appeal. In our considered opinion, this conclusion is not at all applicable to the cases in which the certified copy is a copy which had never been applied for by the concerned party. This conclusion may be applicable to those cases where the same party files more than one applications and thereafter if one of the copies obtained is lost, or destroyed, the party seeks to utilise the other copy obtained by different ways. This conclusion (arrived at based on an illustrative argument and reasoning is not compatible with the fact situation under consideration wherein the party who has not at all applied for the certified copy) does not appeal or impress us at all and we do not find ourselves pursuaded to agree with the view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the aforesaid two decisions. 14. 1 in the case of STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH VS SADHU RAM ETC. 14. 1 in the case of STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH VS SADHU RAM ETC. reported in 1972 LAB I. C. 1234, the single Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court has taken the view that if the appellant files a copy obtained by somebody else, that should be considered sufficient and whatever time has been spent in obtaining such a copy would be accounted for, for holding the appeal to be within limitation. Thus, copy of judgment filed with the appeal by the defendant although obtained by the plaintiff, could be availed of and the period spent in obtaining such copy could be counted for purposes of limitation. To our great pedictament, we find that though Himachal Pradesh High court has considered certain decisions of Madhya Pradesh High Court, and Punjab High Court on this point, it has not considered its own decision reported in AIR 1952, Himachal Pradesh, P-6, to which we have already made a detailed reference in the earlier part of this judgment. We find that the reasoning given in the earlier judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1952 H. P p-6 is more appealing and convincing and therefore we are inclined to take the view which has been expressed by the Himachal Pradesh High court in 1952. 14. 2 mr. Amin has also placed before us a copy of the common order dated 10th September 1997 passed by a Division Bench of this court, whereby certain Special Civil Applications including Special Civil Application No. 5036/97 was decided. A copy of the common order which has been placed before us shows that the Land Acquisition Officer has held that when the applications were made, certified copies had not been produced and the applications were beyond time and therefore the same were dismissed. The Division Bench found that the certified copy had been produced before the Land Acquisition Officer and looking to the dates of the application of certified copies and the time taken for obtaining certified copies, it was found that the applications were within time under the proviso. In this case, the question was neither considered by the Division Bench, nor raised that the certified copy on the basis of which the benefit of the period for obtaining copy were given by the concerned authority or that these copies had been applied for by some other parties. In this case, the question was neither considered by the Division Bench, nor raised that the certified copy on the basis of which the benefit of the period for obtaining copy were given by the concerned authority or that these copies had been applied for by some other parties. In this view of the matter, we find that this common order passed by the Division Bench on 10th September 1997 is no authority for the purpose of the question under consideration. 14. 4 reliance was also placed by Mr. Amin on a decision of Andhra Pradesh High court reported in ILR, 1976, (AP) 1079 in the case of B. NARASOJI VS THE SPECIAL DY. COLLECTOR LAND ACQUISITION (GENERAL) HYDERABAD wherein it is held that the provisions of section 12 (2) and (3) of the Limitation Act are irrespective of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and they contain a positive direction to exclude the time taken for obtaining a copy of the judgment and decree appealed from. They have no bearing on the fact that a copy of the decree or judgment should be filed or need not be filed along with the memorandum of appeal according to the rules relating to presentation of appeals. It was further held that the appellant in the said appeal was entitled to rely upon the endorsement on the printed copies of judgment filed in the connected appeals and contend that his appeals are not barred by limitation. 14. 4 in the decision rendered by Andhra Pradesh High court, the learned Judge relied upon a Supreme Court decision in the case of Additional Collector of Customs VS M/s Best and Co. (3), reported in AIR 1968, SC, 1713. The Supreme Court considered the two views : (i) the right of exclusion of time is qualified by the numbers and time requisite for obtaining a copy to be decree, sentence or order in sub-section 2 of Section 12; (ii) Sub-section (2) and (3) of Sec. 12 enact the rule of exclusion as a positive direction. The Supreme Court considered the two views : (i) the right of exclusion of time is qualified by the numbers and time requisite for obtaining a copy to be decree, sentence or order in sub-section 2 of Section 12; (ii) Sub-section (2) and (3) of Sec. 12 enact the rule of exclusion as a positive direction. The Supreme Court held that in cases where the rule does not require that a certified copy of the judgment and/or decree or order need be annexed, it enables a party not to file the same, but that does not mean a mandatory direction that a copy either of the judgment and/or decree or order shall not be annexed. The Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the provision for exclusion of time in Sec. 12 (2) is dependent upon the rules of a court permitting petitioner to file an application for leave with or without the copy of the judgment or order or decree and also where the rules so permit, whether he has annexed such a copy to his application and ultimately, it has been held that the provisions of Sec. 12 (2) and (3) are a positive direction excluding the time taken in obtaining a copy of the judgment and decree or order as the case may be and those provisions are irrespective of the C. P. C or the rules made by the court u/s. 122 of the Code. Such rules, if they permit a memorandum of appeal to be filed without annexing thereto a copy of the judgment or decree or order confer a privilege on a would be appellant, but do not give the positive direction contained in Sec. 12. In view of this Supreme Court judgment, it is transparently clear that the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the case opf Narorajs case [supra] cannot be said to be an authority so as to support the proposition that the certified copy enclosed with the memorandum of appeal for the purpose of getting the benefit of period taken in obtainig the certified copy may be the certified copy obtained by any other party and therefore this decision does not help the respondent in any manner. This decision is relevant only to the extent that the application under section 28-A is not required to be accompanied by certified copy of the award of the court. This decision is relevant only to the extent that the application under section 28-A is not required to be accompanied by certified copy of the award of the court. That may not be necessary in case no benefit under proviso to section 28 -A (1) is sought to be taken. However, in case where the application is moved after the aforesaid period of three months and any party wants to take advantage of the period spent in obtaining the certified copy, it must be a certified copy obtained by the concerned party and therefore this decision is not at all relevant for the purpose of question under consideration before us. 14. 5 in the case of Sahid and Ors. VS District Collector, Kollam and Ors reported in AIR 1997 Kerala, 216, the application under section 28-A had been filed within the period of three months and the court held that it was not necessary that certified copy of the award should have been produced along with the same. We, therefore, do not find anything in this judgment to show that certified copy filed along with the application under section 28-A for the purpose of taking the benefit of limitation, may be an application filed by any party other than the one which moves the application under section 28-A of the Act. 14. 6 in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of SMT. BHAGTI (DECEASED) THROUGH HER L. RS. JAGDISH RAM SHARMA VS. THE STATE OF HARYANA , reported in JT 1997 (2) 291 it has not been considered that the certified copy enclosed with an application under section 28-A is required to be obtained by the party concerned or not for the purpose of taking the benefit of limitation. The right and remedy of redetermination would be available only when the reference court under section 18 has enhanced the compensation in an award and decree under section 26. 14. 7 mewa RAM (DECEASED) BY HIS LRS and ORS VS STATE OF HARYANA reported in (1986) 4, SCC, 151, and UNION OF INDIA and ANR. VS PRADEEP KUMARI and ORS. reported in AIR 1995, SC, 2259, relied upon by Mr. Amin are not at all relevant for the purpose of the controversy with which we are concerned in the facts of the present case. VS PRADEEP KUMARI and ORS. reported in AIR 1995, SC, 2259, relied upon by Mr. Amin are not at all relevant for the purpose of the controversy with which we are concerned in the facts of the present case. In Mewa Ram (supra) case, all that has been said is that section 28-A is intended and meant for the poor people who by the reason of their poverty and ignorance have failed to take advantage of rights of reference to the civil court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and that such right is restricted to persons who had not applied for reference under section 18. In Union of India VS Pradeep Kumari (supra), it has been held that limitation for the purpose of section 28-A does not necessarily start from date of first award made after enforcement of section 28-A and the word first can not be read in section 28-A so it would amount to restricting scope of benevolent provision. Thus in the case of Union of India Vs. Pradeep Kumari (supra) there is nothing on the point of benefit of period taken in obtaining the certified copy at the instance of any party other than the one who moves application under section 28-A and therefore this decision also does not throw any light on the question involved with which we are concerned in this case. 14. 8 manager , NORTH CHANDAMETA COLLIERY PARASIA VS BASANTI BAI , reported in 1986, Current Civil Cases, P-9, is a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and this has been decided on the basis of AIR 1964, SC 27 i. e. Purshattam Narayan VS Sugan Chand Pannalal, which has already been discussed in the earlier part of this judgment. ( 15 ) WE have considered the view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the other High Courts and on an analysis of the aforesaid cases, in the light of the Supreme Court cases, we find that so far as the proviso under section 28-A and section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act are concerned, the same are paramateria and what we find is that only that party which has been handicapped from filing the application/appeal etc. within time on account of the period which is taken in obtaining the certified copy is entitled to the benefit of such time for the purpose of limitation. within time on account of the period which is taken in obtaining the certified copy is entitled to the benefit of such time for the purpose of limitation. The party which has not spent such time can never be entitled to claim benefit under this provision and the party which had never applied for certified copy and which has not suffered any handicap on that account, can not take the benefit of the disability of some other party in obtaining the certified copy. Even otherwise, it does not stand to the reason that a party which never applied for the certified copy should be given the benefit of the period taken in obtaining the certified copy by some other party. The argument raised on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents that the respondents nos. 3 to 19 were not parties to the Reference which had been decided by the court and therefore they did not come to know about the Award, is no answer to the question of limitation for two reasons, firstly, in the facts of this case, it is not found that they came to know about the passing of the Award after the expiry of the period of three months. On the contrary, their case is that they had approached the learned advocate Mr. K. C. Desai for obtaining the certified copy within three months in as much as the date of the application itself is 25th July 1991 i. e. only 22 days after the date of the order passed in reference and therefore the ground with regard to the knowledge of the order of the reference is of no avail. Secondly, it has been found as a question of fact on the basis of the documents in the nature of contemporaneous evidence that none of the respondents nos. 3 to 19 had infact applied for obtaining the certified copy and as such it can not be said that it is on account of the availability of the certified copy at a later point of time that they were prevented from filing the application under section 28-A within the period of three months. 3 to 19 had infact applied for obtaining the certified copy and as such it can not be said that it is on account of the availability of the certified copy at a later point of time that they were prevented from filing the application under section 28-A within the period of three months. In case their version that they had come to know about passing of the order in Reference on 25th July 1991 is beleived, they could have preferred the application under section 28-A even without the copy of the order passed in the Reference and then they could have easily approached within the period of three months and they ought not to have waited for the availability of the certified copy because it is the case of the present respondents themselves that it is not necessary to file the certified copy along with the application under section 28-A in case the same is filed within the prescribed period of three months from the date of order in Reference. The learned counsel for the respondents nos. 3 to 19 also submitted that the provisions contained in section 28-A are in the nature of benevolent provisions for those who can not avail remedy of Reference under section 18 and therefore in any case two views are possible, and therefore, that view may be countenanced which is in their favour. We find that on a proper construction of the proviso to section 28-A, and in the light of various decisions, it can not be said that this provision is reasonably capable of two interpretations. Only one conclusion is possible that only such party is entitled to the benefit of the period spent for obtaining the certified copy which had infact applied for obtaining the certified copy. The benevolence, as was intended by the Legislature was only limited to the extent that such party which fails to avail the remedy of Reference under section 18 may also approach the concerned Land Acquisition Officer under section 28-A for the purpose of re-determination of the compensation on the lines on which it has been granted by the civil court under section 18. That part of the benevolence can not be accepted for the purpose of extending the scope of the benefit with regard to the period of limitation and it will be stretching the provisions too far to say that whether any party applies for obtaining certified copy or not, it should be entitled to get the benefit of the period spent for obtaining the certified copy by some other party. ( 16 ) LASTLY Mr. Amin has argued while citing AIR 1979, SC 1144, in the case of THE MADRAS PORT TRUST, VS. HYMANSHU INTERNATIONAL, that the Government should not take the plea of limitation. No doubt, in this judgment, the Supreme Court has observed that the plea of limitation based on section 110 of the Madras Ports Trusts Act is one which the court always looks upon with disfavour and that it is unfortunate that a Public Trust like the Port Trust should, in all morality and justice, take up such a plea to defeat the just claim of the citizen and further that it is high time that the Government and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical plea for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. Here we find that in the case at hand, strictly speaking, the question involved is about the interpretation of statutory provision as to whether this provision entitles any party to take the benefit of the period spent in obtaining the certified copy and therefore the reasons as have been expressed by the Supreme Court, the responsibility of the State and public authorities may not be applied on the question of interpretation. Nonetheless the Supreme court itself has said, in very same para-2 of this judgment that if the Government or a public authority takes up a technical plea, the court has to decide it and if the plea is well founded, it has to be upheld by the court. Mrs. Mehta appearing for the Gujarat Housing Board has argued with reference to proviso under section 28-A with vehemence and has assailed the impugned order on this basis with support of more than one authorities and judicial pronouncements, and we find that plea is well founded on facts as well as law. We accordingly hold that the applications filed on behalf of the respondents nos. We accordingly hold that the applications filed on behalf of the respondents nos. 3 to 19 under section 28-A could not and should not have been entertained by the Special Land Acquisition Officer by giving the benefit of the period spent for obtaining the certified copy on the basis of the certified copy which had been annexed with the application under section 28-A and in absence of entitlement for such benefit under proviso to section 28-A, the applications were, on the face of it, time barred. The impugned order dated 31st May 1997 (Annexure-D) passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, therefore, can not be sustained in the eye of law and the same is hereby quashed and set aside. ( 17 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents nos. 3 to 19 also submitted that the matter may be remanded back to the Special Land Acquisition Officer for the purpose of deciding the question of benefit under section 28-A on the basis of the evidence to be recorded on the question as to whether the application for obtaining the certified coy had been moved on behalf of any of the respondents nos. 3 to 19 or not. Apart from the fact that this submission is opposed on behalf of the petitioner-Gujarat Housing Board, we also find that in such matters when the application moved for certified copy itself is the basic document, the matters can not be resolved or decided on the basis of the subsequent explanations in the form of the affidavit or otherwise, and in view of the application which had been moved for obtaining the certified copy, the Xerox of which is available on the record as a piece of contemporaneous evidence read with the rules to which the reference has been made in the earlier part of the order, it would be an exercise in futility to remand the matter at this stage and therefore no remand of the case is warranted in the facts of this case. THIS Special Civil Application is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 31st May, 1997 passed by the Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Gujarat Housing Board, Ahmedabad in L. A. Q Case No. 3/23/80 is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute in terms as aforesaid. No order as to costs. .