Judgment :- Janarthanam, J. The parties in these actions are different. The question of law, however, involved in these actions is one and the same. Desirable it is, therefore, to dispose them of, by a common order, though, of course, after stating the minimal facts required for arriving at a just decision. 2. In the tax case (reference), the assessee Appavu Chettiar Sons, Madurai, is a registered firm, which derives income from jewellery business. The firm consists of eight partners, in their capacity as the kartas of an HUF. 3. The partners, in the capacity of kartas of an HUF, it is said, deposited certain amounts in the firm. Interest payments were made to them in respect of the deposits they have made in the firm. During t e assessment year 1982-83, the question that arose for consideration was as to whether the interest payments made to them can qualify for deduction in computation of the income under section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act'). 4. The Assessing Officer disallowed the total interest payments aggregating to Rs. 14, 528 under section 40(b). 5. The assessee appealed to the Commissioner (Appeals)-IV, Madras, who dismissed the appeal, confirming the view taken by the Assessing Officer. 6. The assessee appealed to the Tribunal. 7. The Tribunal also dismissed the appeal, confirming the view expressed by the Assessing Officer and laterly approved by the Commissioner. 8. On these facts, the Tribunal, at the instance of the assessee under section 256(1) referred for the opinion of this Court, the question as below, "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in upholding the disallowance of interest admittedly paid to the partners in respect of the funds deposited by them in their individual capacity with the firm of R. M. Appavu Chettiar Sons, Madurai, while they were partners in the said firm representing their respective HUFs under section 40 of the Act for the assessment year 1982-83 ?'. 9. We may now advert to the factual matrix of the writ petition. (i) Thangam Industries - Petitioner, having their place of business at door No. 112/5, Madurai Road, Virudhunagar, is a registered partnership firm, consisting of five partners, who are the kartas representing their respective - HUFs. 9. We may now advert to the factual matrix of the writ petition. (i) Thangam Industries - Petitioner, having their place of business at door No. 112/5, Madurai Road, Virudhunagar, is a registered partnership firm, consisting of five partners, who are the kartas representing their respective - HUFs. (ii) The Fourth ITO, Virudliunagar, in framing the assessment for the year 1984-85 under section 143(3) of the Act disallowed the interest claimed to the tune of Rs. 2, 35, 185 paid to five partners. The interest payments are relatable to the deposits made by the five partners, in their capacity as the kartas representing their respective HUFs. (iii) The order so passed was challenged by way of revision under section 264 of the Act, before the Commissioner, Madurai, who, in turn, dismissed the revision, by order dated 25-9-1987 and confirmed the assessment order made by the Assessing Officer. (iv) The assessee-petitioner challenged the order of the Commissioner in writ proceedings before this Court. 10. The said writ petition was pending before a learned Single Judge of this Court. It appears a representation had been made to the said learned Single Judge that the question', of law involved for consideration therein is identical to the one arising for consideration in the Tax Case (Reference) No. 1683 of 1986 and, consequently, the said learned Judge, by his order, directed the writ petition to be posted before the Bench, before which the said Tax Case (Reference) No. 1683 of 1986 is posted for hearing. 11. The Registry, in turn, placed the order of the learned Single Judge, before the Hon'ble Chief Justice, who, in turn, passed an order directing the Registry to place this writ petition". @before the Bench, before which Tax Case (Reference) No. 1683 of 1986 had been posted and that is how the writ petition is before us. 12. In the tax case (reference), eight partners are kartas representing their individual HUFs. The deposits were made in the firm by them not in their capacity representing their respective HUFs, but what they did say was that the deposits were made in the firm in their individual capacity and the interest amounts in respect of the deposits were paid to them in their individual capacity. 13. In the writ petition, of course, five partners of the registered firm are also kartas representing their respective HUFs. 13. In the writ petition, of course, five partners of the registered firm are also kartas representing their respective HUFs. But the deposits were, however, made by them in the firm in their capacity as kartas representing their respective HUFs. This is the crux of the data in the factual matrix of the two actions, which are now before us. 14. It is not as if the point involved for consideration in these actions did not at all arise at any anterior point of time before the Apex Court of this country and the plain fact is that such a question arose for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Brij Mohan Das Laxman Das v. CIT. (i) In that case, the question, which arose for consideration, by way of a reference, was as below, "Whether the Tribunal was correct in allowing the assessee's claim for interest paid in the credit balance in the individual account of Shri Rajendra Kumar ?' (ii) The factual matrix necessary to understand the question so posed is as below. (a) The assessee, Brij Mohan Das Laxman Das is a partnership firm having three partners. One of them is Raj endra Kumar. He was a partner as the karta of and representing his HUF. The partnership firm maintained two accounts in the name of Rajendra Kumar, a capital account and a deposit account. The share of profit of Rajendra Kumar was credited to the capital account, while the interest paid to him on the deposits made by him was credited to his deposit amount. In. other words, the deposits were said to have been made by Rajendra Kumar in his individual capacity and, accordingly, interest was paid to him in his individual capacity. Rajendra Kumar was assessed in the status of individual and also in the status of an HUF(b) For the assessment year 1974-75, the ITO called upon the assessee to show cause why the interest amount in a sum of Rs. 7, 925 paid to Rajendra Kumar be not added back to the income of the partnership firm since it was a payment made to a partner. (c) The assessee contended that since the amount was paid to Rajendra Kumar in his individual capacity and not in his capacity as a partner, the said payment cannot be disallowed under clause (b) of section 40. (c) The assessee contended that since the amount was paid to Rajendra Kumar in his individual capacity and not in his capacity as a partner, the said payment cannot be disallowed under clause (b) of section 40. (a) The said plea was rejected by the ITO and his view was affirmed in appeal by the AAC. (e) On further appeal, however, the Tribunal agreed with the assessee and deleted the said addition. On a reference, the High Court held, following its earlier decision in CIT v. London Machinery Co., that the amount was rightly disallowed by the ITO and that the Tribunal was not right in allowing the assessee's appeal. The High Court has, however, certified the case under section 261. (iii) The Supreme Court, after taking into consideration Explanations 1 to 3, subsequently added to the said section and the various hues of views expressed by various High Courts relatable to the Explanations so added, ultimately held that the interest paid to Rajendra Kumar could not be disallowed in the firm's assessment for the assessment year 1974-75, by recourse to section 40(b). (iv) The sum and substance of the rationale for arriving at such a conclusion is reflected in the relevant paragraph which reads as under". This Court also quoted with approval the passage from Lindley on the Law of Partnership to the effect : 'In point of law, a partner may be the debtor or the creditor of his copartners, but he cannot be either debtor or creditor of the firm of which he is himself a member, nor can be reemployed by his firm, for, a man cannot be his own employer'. The provisions in Chapters IH and IV of the Partnership Act amply define and delineate the duties, obligations and rights of the partners vis-a-vis the firm. The question yet remains where an individual is a partner in one capacity, e.g., as a representative of 'another person, can he have no other capacity vis-a-vis the firm. To be more precise, does the above position of law preclude an individual, who is a partner representing a Hindu undivided family, from depositing his personal funds with the partnership and receiving interest thereon ? Explanation 2 says in clear terms that there is no such bar. To be more precise, does the above position of law preclude an individual, who is a partner representing a Hindu undivided family, from depositing his personal funds with the partnership and receiving interest thereon ? Explanation 2 says in clear terms that there is no such bar. There is the legislative recognition of the theory of different capacities an individual may hold - no doubt confined to clause (b) of section 40. Once this is so, we see no reason to hold that this theory of different capacities is not valid or available for the period anterior to April 1, 1985. Accordingly, we hold that even for the period anterior to April 1, 1985, any interest paid to a partner, who is a partner representing his Hindu undivided family, on the deposit of his personal/individual funds, does not fall within the mischief of clause (b) of section 40. In this view of the matter, we agree with the view taken by the Rajasthan High Courtin Gajanand Poonam Chand & Bros. case that Explanation 2, in the context of clause (b) of section 40, is declarato in nature. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and answer the question referred under section 256 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.' (p. 830). 15. On the face of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Brij Mohan Das Laxman Das (supra), it goes without saying that the question under reference in the tax case (reference) has to be necessarily answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue and we, accordingly, answer the same. 16. So far as the challenge made in the writ petition is concerned, the petitioner-assessee therein has to face dismal failure, inasmuch as the interest payments were made to the partners, in their capacity as kartas representing their respective HUFs in relation to the deposits made by them in the firm in such capacity. 17. For the reasons as above, the tax case (reference) and the writ petition are, thus, disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs, in both these actions, on the facts and circumstances of these cases.