M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a back stabbing case in the literal sense of the term because the appellant before us is alleged to have inflicted four stab injuries on the back of the deceased with a knife at about 1. 30 p. m. on 17-12-1993. The prosecution alleges that the deceased is supposed to have informed the wife of the accused some time earlier that the deceased and his wife had seen the accused and his unmarried sister-in-law standing near Shantala talkies at Honnali. There is no serious motive that is attributed or for that matter established and it is alleged that on the date in question, the village market was taking place and that P. W. 8-Basappa who is a coconut vendor was doing his business near one of the shops. The accused purchased a coconut from Basappa and consumed it at which time the deceased arrived there and similarly bought a coconut and drank it. When the deceased was leaving, the accused is alleged to have stabbed him four times on the back as a result of which the deceased fell down. An attempt was made by P. W. 7-Krishnamurthy to give him some water but the deceased died on the spot. The medical evidence indicates that injury Nos. 1, 3 and 4 were relatively superficial whereas injury No. 2 had pierced the thoracic cavity and punctured the lung which caused the immediate death of the deceased. The accused was apprehended on the following day and it is alleged that pursuant to a statement madevby him, that the weapon in question was recovered which is M. O. 14. The accused was charged with having committed an offence punishable under section 302, IPC and was tried by the learned Prl. District and sessions Judge, Shimoga, in S. C. No. 25 of 1994. At the conclusion of the trial, by judgment and order dated 20-9-1995 the Trial Court convicted the accused for the offence under section 302, IPC and imposed on him a sentence of R. I. for life and a fine of Rs. 500/- in default R. I. for three months. The present appeal is directed against this conviction and sentence. ( 2 ) AT the hearing of the appeal, Mr. 500/- in default R. I. for three months. The present appeal is directed against this conviction and sentence. ( 2 ) AT the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Pasha, learned Counsel who represents the appellant has seriously assailed the conviction which is to a large extent based on the evidence of the solitary eye witness P. W. 8-Basappa. He has taken us through the evidence in question and his contention is that even though basappa may have been doing business at that spot, that he could not have seen the actual incident and that it is the Police who have virtually put words into his mouth. Also, the submission canvassed is that the quality of the evidence is weak because Basappa is not very precise with regard to material particulars and it is therefore submitted that it would be highly dangerous to rely on the evidence of a solitary witness of this caliber for purposes of sustaining the conviction. We need to record here that Basappa is admittedly a coconut vendor coming from the same village as the accused and the deceased. He knows both of them and therefore, there is no difficulty of identification. His presence cannot really be disputed and since the body was found in the immediate vicinity of where he was doing business, and more so since both the accused and the deceased had purchased coconuts from him virtually minutes before the incident, it would be impossible to discredit his evidence. Nothing has been brought on record to substantiate the plea that he would falsely implicate the accused and on an overall view of his evidence, we find that it is quite reliable and trustworthy and furthermore that it is fully supported by the other evidence on record particularly P. Ws. 1 and 7 and most importantly the medical evidence. The learned Additional State public Prosecutor submitted that this is one more case where the principle that has to be applied is that the quality of the evidence is what matters and not the quantity. It may be that in certain instances the rule of prudence would dictate that the court would not base a conviction on a solitary piece of evidence but this trial is one where we do have sufficient material to support the evidence of P. W. 8-Basappa. This comes in the form of P. Ws. It may be that in certain instances the rule of prudence would dictate that the court would not base a conviction on a solitary piece of evidence but this trial is one where we do have sufficient material to support the evidence of P. W. 8-Basappa. This comes in the form of P. Ws. 1 and 8 both of whom came to the scene almost immediately after the incident and their evidence completely falls in line with that of Basappa. Also, the name of the assailant i. e. , the accused has emerged at that very point of time and is reflected in the FIR that was lodged by the PC-P. W. 1. It is in this background that we are of the view that the findings recorded by the Trial Court are liable to be upheld in so far as the prosecution has fully established that it was the accused who wielded a knife and was responsible for the death of the deceased. ( 3 ) THE main thrust of Mr. Pasha's argument then shifted to his alternate submission which was to the effect that there are certain aspects of the case which would justify a conviction on a lesser charge of Section 304, Part II, IPC. In this regard, Mr. Pasha submitted that the prosecution case taken at its highest would indicate that the accused and the deceased happened to land at the same place i. e. , the coconut stall of Basappa and even if it was by coincidence, for a short while, during which time both of them were standing there, there was no quarrel or fight either verbal or physical nor did they even talk to each other. Mr. Pasha vehemently contended that this is a circumstance in favour of the accused because even assuming that he did attack the deceased shortly thereafter that he still inflicted the injuries on the rear part of the body and not on the front of the body. Mr. Pasha's entire effort was to submit before us that the accused at the highest wanted to cause the deceased an injury and Mr. Pasha was at pains to emphasise that this was all that the accused had intended to do. Mr. Pasha's entire effort was to submit before us that the accused at the highest wanted to cause the deceased an injury and Mr. Pasha was at pains to emphasise that this was all that the accused had intended to do. He submitted that in this background, even if injury No. 2 proved to be a fatal one that the court will have to accept the position that there was no intention to cause death. The learned State Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed this submission and he relied heavily on the fact that the accused had come armed withan a knife which indicates premeditation. He also submitted that there was no need or justification for the accused who is a Tailor by profession to be carrying a knife at the village market and that this clearly indicates that he was after the accused with an intention of using that knife and he submitted. that if one were to consider the type of weapon that was used, that there could be no doubt about the fact that the intention was to kill and nothing less than that. Another factor on which the learned Additional State public Prosecutor placed heavy reliance was the fact that the accused dealt as many as four blows and he took us very carefully through the medical evidence and the evidence of the doctor and he submitted that where a 6" deep injury has been inflicted, that the force of the injury alone is sufficient to clearly indicate intention to kill and that Section 302, IPC would clearly be attracted. ( 4 ) MR. Pasha relied on a decision in Rup Singh v State of Punjab, wherein the Supreme Court has held out the usual caution in cases where enemity is pleaded between the parties and he submitted that having regard to the hostile background, that this Court must reject the prosecution evidence on this ground. The law with regard to this aspect is well defined and a court is only put on guard in cases where enmity is either pleaded or established, and we have observed the necessary degree of caution while scrutinising the evidence but we need to point out that the principle hardly applies in the present case because no hostility or enmity vis-a-vis the witnesses and the accused has really been seriously pleaded or established. Mr. Mr. Pasha also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gokul parashram Patil v State of Maharashtra , wherein the Supreme court was dealing with a situation where a single stab injury had been inflicted on the clavicle and he submitted that where the injury is directed towards the non-vital part of the body that the accused must be given the benefit of the lesser offence. Lastly, on the question of intention, Mr. Pasha relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Harjinder Singh v Delhi administration , wherein a third party who intervened in the fight sustained a fatal injury, and the Supreme Court gave the benefit of the lesser conviction principally because of the fact that it could not be held that the accused intended to kill that person. The added reason was because the injury in question was on the thigh in that case. ( 5 ) AS against this position, Mr. Koti, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor drew our attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR 1981 SC 768 (sic) and Ramesh vithalrao Thakre and Another v State of Maharashtra and he submitted that in both of these cases the proposition laid down was that if the intention could be gathered that the injury was intended to cause death or that the accused had the knowledge that the injury in question is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death that Section 302, IPC would clearly apply. We need to clarify that in both these cases after laying down the law, the Supreme Court itself reduced the conviction to one under Section 304, Part II, IPC. ( 6 ) IN deciding the short question before us as to whether the conviction under Section 302, IPC should be upheld or whether it should be reduced to one under Section 304, Part II, IPC, we would be guided by certain aspects of the matter which are on record. The first of them is the fact that both the accused and the deceased spent a little time consuming the coconut water at basappa's store. Obviously, the accused was armed with a knife and nothing happened during that period of time to provoke the accused into attacking the deceased. The first of them is the fact that both the accused and the deceased spent a little time consuming the coconut water at basappa's store. Obviously, the accused was armed with a knife and nothing happened during that period of time to provoke the accused into attacking the deceased. If the intention was to kill the deceased, the accused would have most certainly attacked him with the knife then and there as the deceased was unarmed and there was no need for the accused who had arrived earlier and who had finished his coconut to have waited. This vital aspect of the matter does not seem to have been sufficiently considered by the learned Trial Judge as also the next important factor namely that when the deceased was leaving, though the accused still had the option of attacking him on any of the most vital areas of the body by stabbing him from the front, that he still chose to inflict the injuries on the back. It is true that as many as four stab injuries were inflicted but this again is a factor which goes in favour of the accused rather than the prosecution because three of these injuries are minor ones and it is therefore very clear that the whole object was to attack and injure rather than to kill. Had the intention been otherwise, since the deceased was absolutely defenceless one would have expected all the four injuries to be of sufficient depth as to cause fatal injuries. That injury No. 2 was landed more towards the centre of the back and therefore went into the thoracic cavity is more accidental than intentional and having regard to these aspects of the case, in our considered view the accused would be liable under Section 304, Part II, IPC and not under Section 302, ipc. We are fortified in this view by the fact that even as far as the law on the point goes, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish the most important ingredient before securing a conviction under Section 302, IPC namely the intention to kill. We are fortified in this view by the fact that even as far as the law on the point goes, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish the most important ingredient before securing a conviction under Section 302, IPC namely the intention to kill. This aspect of the law cannot be overlooked because even if the accused was either hurt or provoked or had decided to take revenge on the deceased, it has still got to be established that he harboured the intention to commit the ultimate offence of taking life and not merely of attacking and injuring the deceased. This is a subtle but very clear cut distinction between the two offences and we are of the view that the record of the present case unmistakably supports the conclusion that a conviction under Section 302, IPC is not sustainable whereas one under section 304, Part II, IPC is the appropriate one. On the question of sentence, we have considered the facts and all possible angles and circumstances and we are of the view that this is a case in which a fairly moderate sentence would meet the ends of justice. ( 7 ) THE appeal partially succeeds. The conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant under Section 302, IPC is set aside. The accused is convicted of the offence punishable under section 304, Part II, IPC and it is directed that he shall undergo r. I. for five years. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the accused shall also be directed to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default to undergo 3 months R. I. The appellant shall be entitled to set off for the period undergone by him. --- *** --- .