JUDGMENT Shrivastava, J. -- 1. The petitioner/appellant had filed a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India praying for quashing of the order passed by the Board of Revenue dated 1st June, 1983, whereunder the revision application of Asraf Khan, the respondent had been allowed, and for quashing o{ the order passed by the Board of Revenue (hereinafter referred to as Board) rejecting the application of the petitioner seeking review of the aforesaid order which was dismissed on 2nd September, 1983. Besides the aforesaid reliefs, the petitioner/appellant had also prayed for appropriate directions for maintaining the order passed by the Additional Commissioner dated 5th of July, 1982, restoring the decree passed in favour of the appellant providing for the ejectment of the contesting respondent, Asraf Khan from the agricultural holdings in dispute ordering for the restoring of the possession thereof in favour of the petitioner/ appellant. 2. A learned Single Judge of this Court vide the judgment and order dated 12th May, 1994, dismissed the aforesaid writ petition observing that from the facts as brought out on the record, the case did not call for any interference by this Court, and there was no substance in the petition. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner/appellant preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal seeking setting aside of the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the others passed by the Board, and further prayed that the order passed by the Additional Commissioner dated 5th July, 1982, which had been passed in appeal be revived. 4. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent has raised a preliminary objection in regard to the maintainability of the present appeal asserting that since the impugned order of the learned Single Judge had been passed in exercise of jurisdiction as envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as Constitution), no appeal as contemplated under Clause X of the Letters Patent of Nagpur High Court was maintainable or entertainable, and therefore, this appeal is liable to be dismissed as such. 5. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant has however urged that taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case as brought on the record, and the reliefs claimed by the petitioner, the impugned order of the learned Single Judge has to be taken as having been passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, and therefore, Clause X of the Letters Patent, cannot be deemed to have been attracted at all. It has been further urged that the petitioner had approached this Court seeking relief invoking its original jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution, and the mere fact that besides mentioning Article 226, the petitioner had also referred to Article 227, of the Constitution ought not be taken to limit the scope of the writ petition confining it to the jurisdiction contemplated under Article 227 of the Constitution asserting that mere mentioning of the provision of the Constitution under which relief is sought is not conclusive of the source of authority of this Court to grant appropriate relief which has to depend on the facts and circumstances of the case brought on the record which in the present case clearly indicate that the petitioner had invoked the jurisdiction of this Court clearly under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length, and have carefully perused the record, and have given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions urged by the reamed counsel for the parties. 7. The petitioner had initiated proceedings seeking eviction of Asraf Khan from the agricultural holdings in dispute on various grounds praying that he be put in possession after the ejectment of the defendant, Asraf Khan. A decree as prayed by the plaintiff/petitioner was passed by the trial Court but later on, pursuant to the order passed by the Board on 14th of August, 1974, the trial Court decided the case de novo after amendment of the pleadings, and again granted a decree in favour of the petitioner/appellant as prayed for on 25th January, 1980. This decree was however set aside in appeal on 18th March, 1981. The order dated 18th March, 1981, was reversed by the next appellate authority on 5th July, 1982, which restored the order dated 25th January, 1980. This order was challenged by the defendant in a revision before the Board. This decree was however set aside in appeal on 18th March, 1981. The order dated 18th March, 1981, was reversed by the next appellate authority on 5th July, 1982, which restored the order dated 25th January, 1980. This order was challenged by the defendant in a revision before the Board. This revision was allowed by order dated Ist of June, 1983. While allowing the revision, the Board set aside the order dated 5th July, 1982, and restored the order dated 18th March, 1981, with the result that the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner stood set aside. The plaintiff/petitioner moved an application seeking review of the order passed by the Board dated 1st June, 1983, but without any success as the said application was dismissed on 2nd September, 1983. 8. The plaintiff/petitioner had come up with the allegations that the status of the contesting defendant, Asraf Khna was that of a sub-tenant without any security of tenure as the plaintiff/petitioner was a disabled person as contemplated under section 38 (e) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, and that he was a disabled person on the relevant dates. The other ground for eviction was default on the part of the sub-tenant in payment of rent. 9. The claim of the petitioner/plaintiff was contested raising various pleas - including the plea in regard to res judicata and measuring of permanent tenural rights under the provisions of Zamindari Abolition Act, denying the claim in regard to the disability as set up by the petitioner/appellant. 10. The provisions contained in Clause X of the Letters Patent under consideration are to the following effect: "10. 10. The provisions contained in Clause X of the Letters Patent under consideration are to the following effect: "10. Appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Courts.-- And We do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Nagpur from the judgment not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of the powers of superintendence under the provision of section one hundred and seven of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction of one judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section one hundred and eight of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court pursuant to section one hundred and eight of the Government of India Act, made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgment of Judge of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us. Our Heirs and Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided." A perusal of the aforesaid provision indicates that the order passed or made in the exercise of the powers of superintendence contemplated under the provisions of section 107 of the Government of India Act, which is now envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not appealable. 11. The question which therefore, arises for consideration is as to whether the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court had been passed in a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution only or in the proceedings envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. 11. The question which therefore, arises for consideration is as to whether the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court had been passed in a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution only or in the proceedings envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. It may be noticed that as pointed out by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Waryam Singh and another v. Amarnath and another, AIR 1954 SC 215 , Article 227 of the Constitution restored to the High Courts power of judicial superintendence contemplated under section 107 of the Government of India Act. 13. In fact, it seems to us that the provisions contained in Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution are supplementary to each other. The provisions contained in Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 227 of the Constitution clearly indicate that the emphasis under that Article is in regard to the administrative control and the limited judicial powers contemplated by that Article are intended as ancillary to such administrative control. It may be noticed in this connection that Article 227 of Constitution, which for all practical purposes is a revival of section 107 of the Government of India Act has not expressly provided for issuance of writs as are specifically provided for under Article 226 of the Constitution alone. 14. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and others, AIR 1955 SC 233 , had clarified that 'it may also be noted that while in a Certiorari' under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can only annul the decision of the tribunal, it can, under Article 227 do that, and also issue further directions in the matter. It was further held that the application of the appellant which was for the quashing of the order of the tribunal in that case by a writ of certiorari and for other reliefs was maintainable under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 15. In its decision in the case of Mangalbhai and others v. Dr. It was further held that the application of the appellant which was for the quashing of the order of the tribunal in that case by a writ of certiorari and for other reliefs was maintainable under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 15. In its decision in the case of Mangalbhai and others v. Dr. Radhyshyam, AIR 1993 SC 806 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court after noticing its decision in the case of Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Smt. Radhikabai, AIR 1986 SC 1272 , had clarified that if the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both of these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal, the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226. In the aforesaid decision it was also noticed that the High Court in the impugned judgment had nowhere mentioned that the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, were only being exercised. 16. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the pleadings of the parties in the writ petition and the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Apex Court had found that the impugned order was an order under Article 226 of the Constitution, and in that view of the matter, the Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable before the High Court. 17. In yet another decision, die Hon' ble Supreme Court in the case of Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathankhan and others, AIR 1971 SC 315 , had pointed out that the powers of the High Court as envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution are not greater than those under Article 226 of the Constitution, pointing out further that the power of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution was limited to seeing that the tribunals function within the limits of their authority and that High Courts cannot sit in appeal against the order of _ tribunal under Article 227. 18. 18. A Division Bench of this Court in its decision reported as Shafiullah v. M.P.S.R.T. Corporation, Gwalior and others, 1990 MPLJ 515 , had rejected a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in a writ petition challenging the decision of the industrial Court holding that the order had to be taken to be passed in the exercise of jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution. 19. The provisions indicated by the petitioner under which the petition is filed is not quite relevant and that does not debar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise it possesses, unless there is a special procedure prescribed, which procedure is mandatory, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case to secure the ends of justice correcting the grave and palpable errors. 20. As pointed out by the Apex Court in the case of Waryam Singh (supra) as well as in the case of Babhutmal Raichand v. Laxmibai, AIR 1975 SC 1297 , the High Court has not only administrative superintendence over the subordinate Courts and tribunals, but it has also the power of judicial superintendence to be exercised to keep the subordinate Court and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting their mere errors. Obviously, therefore, judicial superintendence envisaged under Article 227, of the Constitution has a limited scope of interference confined to those cases where the tribunal's orders sought to be impugned has been passed in excess of the jurisdiction vested in it or stands vitiated on account of any such procedural irregularity which goes to the root of the matter. 21. There may be a case where in view of statutory provision made in exercise of power under Article 323A of the Constitution, the applicability of Article 226 thereof may be absolutely ruled out in which case the writ petition directed against the order of the tribunal has to be treated as one invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution only. The Letters Patent Appeal in such cases cannot be maintained or entertained. 22. Our Constitution is structured with a wealth of influential and choice words, measured phrases and expressions, the real meaning and message of which sometimes missed or on many occasions are hidden or unforeseen. The Letters Patent Appeal in such cases cannot be maintained or entertained. 22. Our Constitution is structured with a wealth of influential and choice words, measured phrases and expressions, the real meaning and message of which sometimes missed or on many occasions are hidden or unforeseen. As has already been noticed hereinabove, Article 227 of the Constitution does not in terms provide for the issuance of writs which is provided expressly under Article 226 of the Constitution alone. Further, Article 227, sub-clause (1) and (2) when read together clearly indicate the nature and extent of the jurisdiction envisaged under that Article. The fields of operation of both these Articles of Constitution appear to be overlapping to some extent. However, considering the implications, relevance and significance as well as the spirit and core of the expressions used in the aforesaid Articles, the inescapable conclusion is that the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution must be deemed to relate to administrative matters with ancillary judicial powers. The power of superintendence is in fact, in addition to the powers conferred or secured in favour of the High Court by Article 226 of the Constitution. 23. It should not be lost sight of that the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution, cannot be interchanged even if occasionally the ultimate result to be achieved may be the same or similar in nature. We must, however, hasten to add that on the facts and circumstances of a case, if the grievance can be suitably and adequately redressed under Article 227 of the Constitution, the filing of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution will be improper. 24. There is yet another aspect which should not go unnoticed. In a case where there is plurality of the remedies, they continue to be available till elected. The petitioner in the present case had elected to approach this Court invoking its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The fact that the impugned order had been passed by a tribunal functioning under the superintendence of the High Court is not by itself a decisive factor conclusively indicating that the writ petition was a petition under Article 227 of the constitution, and the jurisdiction envisaged therein alone was invoked. The fact that the impugned order had been passed by a tribunal functioning under the superintendence of the High Court is not by itself a decisive factor conclusively indicating that the writ petition was a petition under Article 227 of the constitution, and the jurisdiction envisaged therein alone was invoked. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case which may be of varied nature where the interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction contemplated under Article 226 of the Constitution mayor may not be warranted. If a case is made out warranting an interference while exercising the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution expressly providing for the issuance of writs etc., the High Court cannot shirk its responsibility on the ground that the petition is one which has been filed invoking the jurisdiction contemplated under Article 227 of the Constitution. The source of authority to pass the appropriate orders does not depend upon the provision which has been disclosed by the petitioner in the writ petition but has to be traced to the relevant statutory provision which' stands attracted to the facts and circumstances proved and established on record. 25. In our view the power of superintendence granted to the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution not only administrative but also judicial power; but the extent of that judicial power is ancillary to the administrative power. The field of operation of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution are sometimes overlapping, and therefore, the question as to whether in a particular case the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution has to be found out from the facts and circumstances brought on record, and the nature of relief claimed by the petitioner or ultimately granted by the Court. 26. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on the record, and the pleadings of the parties as well as the nature of relief claimed by the petitioner, we have no doubt in our mind that the petitioner had invoked the jurisdiction of this Court as envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution. 27. 26. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on the record, and the pleadings of the parties as well as the nature of relief claimed by the petitioner, we have no doubt in our mind that the petitioner had invoked the jurisdiction of this Court as envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution. 27. In any view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the facts and circumstances brought on the record justified the filing of application either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution, and it would not be justifiable to deprive the petitioner of the valuable right of appeal. The application of the petitioner, therefore, ought to be treated as an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. 28 If the matter is viewed from the angle indicated above that being the only view, we find no difficulty whatsoever in rejecting the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. 29. In view of our conclusions indicated hereinabove the preliminary objection is duly devoid of merits, and is hereby rejected.