M. B. VISHWANATH, J. ( 1 ) IN this H. R. C. revision petition filed by the petitioner-tenant under Section 50 (1) of the karnataka Rent Control Act against the first respondent landlord and the second respondent rent collector, the petitioner tenant has prayed that the order dated 25. 7. 1992 passed by the H. R. C. judge in H. R. C. No. 1460/1988 stopping further proceedings and holding that the cause shown by the tenant was unsatisfactory and directing the tenant to handover possession of the petition schedule premises to the landlord be set aside. ( 2 ) COMING to the order challenged dated 25. 7. 1992, it is necessary to state some developments in this case. The impugned order was challenged by the tenant before this Court in C. R. P. No. 3818/1992. This Court by its order dated 23. 9. 1992 dismissed the revision petition filed by the tenant. The tenant filed Civil Appeal No. 5406/1993 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 2479/1993 ). The hon'ble Supreme Court, by its order dated 11. 10. 1993, set aside the order passed by this Court on 23. 9. 1992 and remitted the matter back to this Court for reconsideration and for passing appropriate order. This is how we come back to the impugned order dated 25. 7. 1992. ( 3 ) TO repeat, the order passed by the H. R. C. judge on 25. 7. 1992 was confirmed by this Court on 23. 9. 1992 in C. R. P. No. 3818/1992. The tenant took up the matter to the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by its order dated 11. 10. 1993, was pleased to set aside the order passed by this Court and remanded the matter for reconsideration and to pass appropriate order. ( 4 ) BEFORE dealing with the impugned order, as per the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is absolutely necessary to state how the impugned order came to be passed by the H. R. C. judge. ( 5 ) THE landlord filed. A. VIII under Section 29 of the K. R. C. Act which was contested by the tenant. The H. R. C. judge, by his order dated 10. 4. 1992, held that the tenant had caused delay in making payment of rents and the tenant's explanation was unsatisfactory. ( 5 ) THE landlord filed. A. VIII under Section 29 of the K. R. C. Act which was contested by the tenant. The H. R. C. judge, by his order dated 10. 4. 1992, held that the tenant had caused delay in making payment of rents and the tenant's explanation was unsatisfactory. So the H. R. C. judge directed the tenant to show cause why further proceedings should not be stopped and why he should not be directed to put the landlord in possession of the petition schedule property. ( 6 ) THIS order dated 10. 4. 1992 passed by the H. R. C. judge was challenged by the tenant before this Court in C. R. P. No. 1840/1992. ( 7 ) THIS Court, by its order dated 15. 6. 1992, dismissed the C. R. P. filed by the tenant observing:" it is open for the petitioner to show cause against the proposed action and if he is aggrieved by the order that may be passed thereon, he may approach this Court at that point of time. " ( 8 ) IN view of the observations made by this Court in C. R. P. No. 1840/1992, the H. R. C. judge, after hearing the parties, passed the impugned order dated 25. 7. 1992. ( 9 ) NOW we have to see whether the impugned order passed by the H. R. C. judge holding that the cause shown by the tenant was unsatisfactory and therefore the tenant should be directed to put the landlord in possession 29 (4) of the K. R. C. Act is correct or not. ( 10 ) THE rate of rent for the petition schedule premises is Rs. 350/ - per month. The tenant has paid rents to the landlord as follows:14. 8. 1989 - Rs. 6,650/10. 4. 1990 - Rs. 3,150/15. 6. 1990 - Rs. 700/16. 1. 1991 - Rs. 2,100/total - Rs. 12,600/ ther sum of Rs. 4,900/-, admitted arrears, was paid by the tenant to the landlord on 21. 3. 1992. It is clear from the nature of the payments made by the tenant to the landlord that the tenant was highly irregular in making payment towards rents. The tenant, in his explanation by way of show-cause, has stated that during 1991, almost the whole year, the court was not sitting since the Presiding Officer was on leave. 3. 1992. It is clear from the nature of the payments made by the tenant to the landlord that the tenant was highly irregular in making payment towards rents. The tenant, in his explanation by way of show-cause, has stated that during 1991, almost the whole year, the court was not sitting since the Presiding Officer was on leave. This is patently wrong, if not false. Even granting for a moment that the Court was not sitting for the whole year, the tenant could have deposited the rent in Court as contemplated under the Rules and taken out notice to the landlord or his advocate. There is material on record to show that the Presiding Officer was not sitting for about four months, not for one year. The tenant is the next door neighbour of the landlord. The tenant could have paid rents to the landlord in person. If the landlord did not accept the rents when tendered, the tenant could have paid the amount through cheque or by registered post or M. O. In the explanation by way of show cause, the tenant has stated that the landlord has received the rents without any protest. This also is patently false. It is clear from the entries in the order sheet in the original records that the landlord has received rents without prejudice to his rights. It is clear from the material on record that the tenant has made payments as and when he chose. Section 29, which is mandatory, contemplates regular payment of rents. ( 11 ) IT has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of MRANALINI B. SHAH v. BAPALAL MOHANLAL SHAH AIR1980 SC 954 , (1978 )0 GLR90 , (1980 )4 SCC251 that the term "regularly" is mandatory and not directory. In the case of monthly tenancy, the Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down that the court has no discretion to treat the payments made at irregular intervals as sufficient compliance of the provision. ( 12 ) IT is argued by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the tenant had paid rents upto to date and he was not in arrears. ( 12 ) IT is argued by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the tenant had paid rents upto to date and he was not in arrears. This Court has laid down in the case of SUDHAKAR v. LAXMAMMA ILR1990 KAR 2269 , 1991 (1 )Karlj90 that it is not correct to say that Section 29 (4) does not apply because the rents have been already paid on the date of the application. This Court has further laid down that the K. R. C. Act nowhere contemplates the tenant to take his own time to pay the rents and plead that he has discharged his obligation. ( 13 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court holding that the tenant had not shown sufficient cause is eminently reasonable and cannot be interfered with. ( 14 ) THE learned Counsel for the tenant relied on the decision in the case of RASHIK LAL v. SHAH GOKULDAS AIR1989 SC 920 , JT1989 (1 )SC 207 , 1989 (1 )SCALE245 , (1989 )1 SCC542 , [1989 ]1 SCR439 , 1989 (1 )UJ549 (SC ) which deals with a tenant who was a habitual defaulter. This was a case in which the landlord has accepted the rent without any objection. In the instant case, the landlord has received rents without prejudice to his rights. The learned Counsel for the tenant placed strong reliance on the rulings of this Court in the cases of ABDUL RASHEED v. SYEP MOHAMED 1983 (2) Kar. L. J. 525 and AYESHA biddiqua BEGUM v. V. V. SHEIK KUTTY 1968 (2) Mys. L. J. 5. In these two decisions, this Court has laid down that Section 29 of the K. R. C. Act speaks of four different stages, (1) determination of arrears, (2) giving time to the tenant to pay, (3) giving opportunity to show cause in default, and (4) in the event of the tenant failing to show cause, ordering stopping of proceedings and direct him to put the landlord in possession. It is further laid down in the case of Ayesha Biddiqua Begum v. V. V. Sheik Kutty that if the tenant has complied with the provisions requiring payment of rent under the first part of Section 29, then there would be no default. It is further laid down in the case of Ayesha Biddiqua Begum v. V. V. Sheik Kutty that if the tenant has complied with the provisions requiring payment of rent under the first part of Section 29, then there would be no default. Relying on the above said two decisions, the Learned Counsel for the tenant attacked the order passed by the H. R. C. Court on 10. 4. 1992 on. A. No. 8 under Section 29 (1) of the K. R. C. Act. ( 15 ) SO far as the order dated 10. 4. 1992 is concerned, the tenant challenged the order before this court in C. R. P. No. 1840/1992 and this Court dismissed the revision petition filed by the tenant and confirmed the order passed by the H. R. C. Court. This order passed by this Court, extracted above, has become final. ( 16 ) THE authorities pressed into service by the Learned Counsel for the tenant might have been relevant at the time the H. R. C. Court passed the order on 10. 4. 92 and not when the H. R. C. Court passed the impugned order dated 25. 7. 1992. The tenant cannot be permitted to resurrect the forgotten grievances and attack the order dated 10. 4. 1992 since it has been confirmed by this court in C. R. RNo. 1840/ 1992. ( 17 ) IT is argued by the Learned Counsel for the tenant that in the order dated 10. 4. 1992 there was no direction to pay the subsequent rents regularly. This argument cannot be accepted because the order dated 10. 4. 1992 has been confirmed by this Court (extracted above ). ( 18 ) I have gone into the admitted payments, as has been done by the H. R. C. Court, made highly irregularly by the tenant. ( 19 ) MASTER the facts and marshal them is the usual expression used. Lord Hewart, who was Lord chief Justice, has put it more tersely and metaphorically. He says, "claw the facts and law follows automatically". The two learned young advocates Sri S. G. Prabhakara and Sri S. Srishaila, appearing for the tenant and the landlord respectively, were thorough with the brief. Their preparation was of the first water. ( 20 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion, the impugned order passed by the H. R. C. Court on 25. 7. The two learned young advocates Sri S. G. Prabhakara and Sri S. Srishaila, appearing for the tenant and the landlord respectively, were thorough with the brief. Their preparation was of the first water. ( 20 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion, the impugned order passed by the H. R. C. Court on 25. 7. 1992 is unexceptionable. Accordingly the revision petition is dismissed. In the objections filed by the tenant to the main petition on 15. 12. 1988, he (tenant) has stated that he has been a tenant for more than 15 years. Thus the tenant has been in possession for almost 25 years. He is granted one year's time from today to vacate and hand over possession to the landlord.