Judgment :- This C.R.P. is filed challenging the order of the District Court, Thodupuzha in R.C.R.P. 3/98. The petitioner is a tenant and the respondent is the landlord. The landlord filed an application for eviction of the tenant under S.11 (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act. The need alleged was for the purpose of conducting a business for the son-in-law of the landlord. The tenant filed a written statement denying the need alleged. He further contended that he is entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to S.11 (3) of the Act namely, that he was depending for his livelihood on the business which was conducted in the building and that there was no other alternate building available. When the R.C.P. came up for trial, the parties filed a compromise petition. The tenant admitted the bonafide need and the landlord admitted the non-availability of the alternate building and also the hardship of the tenant. As per the compromise petition, the tenant was given five years' time to vacate the premises. On the basis of the compromise petition, the Rent Control Court passed an order of eviction. 2. After the period fixed in the compromise was over, the landlord filed an execution petition namely, E.P. 3/98 before the Munsiff s Court, Thodupuzha for execution of the order of the Rent Control Court. The tenant then contended that the order passed in the compromise petition is a nullity and hence the order cannot be executed. Before the executing court the certified copy of the compromise petition and the certified copy of the order in R.C.P. were produced as Exts. Al and A2. The respondent produced Exts. B1 to B10, out of which Ext. B1 the notice issued to the tenant for eviction and Ext. B 2 is the reply notice. The executing court came to the conclusion that the order of eviction was passed after the court was satisfied that the landlord needs the building for his own need. It also took the view that the tenant also admitted the bonafide need of the landlord. Hence rejecting the contention of the tenant, E.P. was allowed. Against the order in the E.P. the tenant preferred R.C.R.P. under S.14 of the Rent Control Act before the District Court. Learned District Judge confirmed the order of the executing court. It also took the view that the tenant also admitted the bonafide need of the landlord. Hence rejecting the contention of the tenant, E.P. was allowed. Against the order in the E.P. the tenant preferred R.C.R.P. under S.14 of the Rent Control Act before the District Court. Learned District Judge confirmed the order of the executing court. It is against the above order that the present C.R.P. is filed under S.115 C.P.C. 3. Sri. K. Ravindranathan Nair, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that both the authorities have not properly understood the contents of the compromise petition and both the authorities erred in coming to the conclusion that the ground for eviction existed. Learned counsel highlighted the clause in the compromise wherein it has been admitted that no other alternate building is available and that if the tenant was evicted at that time it will affect his business. According to counsel, this aspect has not been looked into by the courts below. What the courts below considered is only the fact that the tenant had admitted the need of the landlord. But that is not enough. Under S.11(3) of the Act, the Court can order eviction only if it is satisfied that the tenant has an alternate building- and that he does not depend on the income derived from the business conducted. Hence learned counsel submitted that the decree is not executable. 4. Sri. S. Venkitasubramania Iyer, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, submitted that in the first paragraph of the compromise petition, the tenant had admitted that the landlord bonafide needed the building. But the tenant wanted only time to vacate. As per the agreement five years time was granted. Learned counsel submits that the tenant admitted the claim of the landlord and what he wanted was only some time for vacating the building. Learned counsel submitted that the mere fact that there are statements in the compromise petition regarding the non-availability of the alternate building or the hardship of the tenant does not take away the right of the landlord to get eviction as per the order passed by the Rent Control Court. Ext. Al is the compromise petition filed by both the parties. Ext. Al is the compromise petition filed by both the parties. The first paragraph no doubt states that the land lord requires the building for his dependent, Prasad Thariyan, and that the tenant agreed to vacate the building within the term specified. The second paragraph states as follows: Then it is stated that the tenant shall vacate the building before 25.1.98. On the basis of Ext. Al, Ext. A2 order was passed by the Rent Control Court. The order is as follows: "Compromise filed. I am satisfied that the existence of one of the conditions mentioned in S.11 of B.R.C. Act i.e., own occupation and bonafide need of the landlord to made out in the compromise. Compromise found lawful and recorded. Petition allowed in terms of the compromise. Parties will bear respective cost." It is not disputed that the tenant in the objections filed denied the bonafide need of the landlord and also claimed the benefit of the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act Ext. B1 is the copy of the notice dated 4.1.91 sent on behalf of the landlord to the tenant. Ext. B2 is the reply notice. In Ext. B2 the need alleged is denied. He has also stated that there is no other building available and is depending for livelihood on the business conducted in the building. Thus the pleadings of the case show that the tenant had denied the need set up by the landlord and has also claimed the benefit of the second proviso to S.11 (3). When we examine the compromise petition, it is found that the tenant has admitted that landlord bonafide needed the building. But when we read paragraph 2 of the compromise petition, it is also clear that the tenant has no other building available and that it will cause hardship to him if he is vacated immediately. But the tenant had agreed to vacate after five years. In the order of eviction passed what the Rent Control Court has stated is that it was satisfied that the existence of one of the conditions in S.11 of B.R.C. Act i.e., own occupation and bonafide need of the landlord is made out in the compromise. Hence compromise petition is found lawful and recorded. In the order of eviction passed what the Rent Control Court has stated is that it was satisfied that the existence of one of the conditions in S.11 of B.R.C. Act i.e., own occupation and bonafide need of the landlord is made out in the compromise. Hence compromise petition is found lawful and recorded. If the compromise petition merely contains the admission regarding the bonafide need and nothing else there was no difficulty in holding that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court was in accordance with law. Now let us examines. 11 (3) of the Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act. It is stated as follows: 11(3). If the compromise petition merely contains the admission regarding the bonafide need and nothing else there was no difficulty in holding that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court was in accordance with law. Now let us examines. 11 (3) of the Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act. It is stated as follows: 11(3). A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him: Provided further that the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so: Provided further that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business: Provided further than no landlord whose right to recover possession arises under the instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of the instrument: Provided further that if a landlord after obtaining an order to be put in possession transfers his rights in respect of the building to another person, the transferee shall not be entitled to be put in possession unless he proves that he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family depending on him." The main part of S.11(3) states that a landlord can apply to the Rent Control Court to direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the property, if he bonafide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him. But sub-S. (3) is covered by four provisos. But sub-S. (3) is covered by four provisos. In this case, we are concerned with the second proviso. According to second proviso, the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. Thus on a reading of the second proviso, even if the court satisfied that the landlord requires the building for his own purpose, an order of eviction will not be passed, if it is proved that the tenant depends for his livelihood on the income derived from the business and there is no alternate building available. In paragraph two of the compromise petition, it is made clear that there is no alternate building available and that if he vacates, it will cause great hardship to the tenant's business. The court passed an order on the compromise petition stating that ground of eviction was proved because the tenant had admitted that the landlord needs the building for his own occupation. But the perusal of the order will show that the Court has not applied its mind to the statements in paragraph 2 of the compromise petition. If the statements in paragraph 2 of the compromise petition are taken into consideration, the court could not have granted the eviction order because such an order will go against the proviso to S.11 (3). It cannot be assumed from the statements in paragraph 1 of the compromise petition that the tenant had withdrawn his contention regarding the benefits of the second proviso. This is because of two reasons. One is the tenant had not withdrawn his contentions taken in the objections and the other is in paragraph 2 it has been clearly stated that regarding the existence of the conditions mentioned in proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. Hence according to me, when the order of eviction is passed without reference to the proviso, the order of eviction is against the Act and such an order cannot be executed. The question regarding a consent order passed under the Rent Control Act can be executed or not had come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in various decisions. Hence according to me, when the order of eviction is passed without reference to the proviso, the order of eviction is against the Act and such an order cannot be executed. The question regarding a consent order passed under the Rent Control Act can be executed or not had come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in various decisions. In Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass (1969) 2 SCR 432, a decree for eviction passed on the basis of a compromise between the parties was held by the Court to be nullity contravening S.13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. There it was found that the decree for eviction was passed according to an award, in a proceeding to which the landlord was not a party, and without the court satisfying itself that a statutory ground of eviction existed. The question again came up for consideration in Kaushalya Devi v. K.N. Bonsai (1969) 2 SCR 1048. In that case also, the compromise was held to be a nullity because the order was passed without Rent Control Court being satisfied the grounds. The Supreme Court in K. K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri, AIR 1973 SC 1311 had considered the same question again. Vaidailingam, J. speaking for the Bench held as follows: "An order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in S.10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the consent order. Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a prerequisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial findings. If at some stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. Before making an order for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim, if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. Before making an order for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim, if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry." Suleman Norrmohammed v. Umarbhai Janubhai, AIR 1978 SC 952 was another case with regard to the same matter. There it was held that an order of eviction passed under the Rent Control Act will be valid if there is abundant intrinsic material in the compromise itself to indicate that the decree passed upon its basis was not in violation of the Act but was in accordance with it. 5. In Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2130, it was held as follows: "If, however, parties choose to enter into a compromise due to any reason such as to avoid the risk of protracted litigating expenses, it is open to them to do so. The Court can pass a decree on the basis of the compromise. In such a situation, the only thing to be seen is whether the compromise is in violation of the requirement of the law. The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord, in the circumstances, is entitled to have such a decree under the law." From the above decisions, it is clear that if the ground for eviction exists in the compromise petition and on the basis of that the order is passed, that order cannot be said to be nullity. The Courts have taken the view that in order to satisfy this Court can take into account the documents produced in the case. In most of the cases, when the compromise petition is filed, the defendant withdraw his objection which means that there is no objection on the part of the defendant. Further in the compromise there will be an admission admitting that the ground for eviction exists. In most of the cases, when the compromise petition is filed, the defendant withdraw his objection which means that there is no objection on the part of the defendant. Further in the compromise there will be an admission admitting that the ground for eviction exists. This is taken as an item of evidence for coming to the conclusion that the order of eviction is justified. 6. When we examine the facts of the case on the above basis, the following circumstances exist. 1) The tenant admits that the landlord requires the building bonafide for his dependent. 2) The tenant has no objection in vacating the building within a stipulated time. 3) The tenant's business will suffer and no other alternative building is available. Counsel for the respondent wants me to read the contents in paragraph (1) of the compromise petition alone. If that is read alone, it is shown that the bonafide need is admitted and the tenant only wanted some time to vacate. But paragraph (1) cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read in conjunction with paragraph (2) of the compromise petition. Paragraph (2) shows that there is no alternate building available and that if the tenant is evicted at that time, it will cause great hardship to him. The later clause shows that it will affect his business on which he depends. Thus there is evidence to show that the need of the landlord is bonafide and also there is evidence to show that the tenant is entitled to the benefit of the proviso. In those circumstances, the Rent Control Court was not be justified in ordering eviction. Hence I am of the view that the order of eviction passed is not in conformity with the provisions of the Rent Control Act. There has been no satisfaction as the question whether the tenant is liable to be evicted. In other words, the order is nullity. In the above view of the facts, the orders of the court below are set aside. C.R.P. is allowed and the E.P. is dismissed.