Mehdibai Foujdar Education v. State Of M. P. — 1998 DIGILAW 564 (MP)

ORDER R.S. Garg, J. 1. This order shall dispose of W.P. No. 3351/96 (Mehdibai v. State of M.P. and Ors.) and W.P. No. 4072/97 (Mohd. Ibrahim Khan v. State of M. P. and Ors.). 2. Facts necessary for the disposal of the petition are that the petitioner is a registered society under the Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, known as Mehdibai Fouzdar Education Society. The petitioner is engaged in running a school and imparts education through Urdu medium. The petitioner claims to be belonging to minority. The petitioner submits that respondent No. 3, Joint Director, Public Instructions, Narmada Division, Hoshangabad, has entertained appeals of certain employees whose services were terminated from the school by the petitioner society under the provisions of Section 6(a)(iii) and (iv), (b) and (c) of the M. P. Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha (Adhyapakon Tatha Anya Karmachariyon Ka Sandaya), Adhiniyam, 1978, (hereinafter referred to as the 1978 Adhiniyam). According to the petitioner, the Joint Director has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeals as the scope of the appellate power has already been explained by this Court in a Division Bench judgment in Sidhi Bala Bose Library Association v. State of M. P. and Ors., 1979 MPLJ 379 . The petitioner submits that the provisions of appeal have been prescribed in the rules framed Under Section 6(a)(iii) of the Adhiniyam of 1978, known as M. P. Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha (Adhyapkon Tatha Anya Karmachariyon) Appeal Rules, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as appeal rules). The petitioner submits that the petitioner has received certain memo dated 10-7-1996 and has learnt that certain teachers have filed appeals and the Joint Director is proceeding with the same. By the memo (Annexure P-2), the petitioner was informed that till such appeals were decided, new appointments should not be made. On 22-7-1996, a telegram was sent by the Secretary of the petitioner society and confirmation copy (Annexure P-3) was sent on 25-7-1996. The petitioner society informed the Joint Director that in view of the judgment of this Court in the matter of Sidhi Bala Bose Library Association v. State of M. P. and Ors. (supra), the Joint Director has no jurisdiction. According to the petitioner one set of respondents were pursuing the appeal and, on the other hand, the Joint Director was proceeding with the matter. (supra), the Joint Director has no jurisdiction. According to the petitioner one set of respondents were pursuing the appeal and, on the other hand, the Joint Director was proceeding with the matter. The petitioners submit that the provisions of Section 6(a)(iii) were held to be destroying the right of the management and as such the High Court held that the provisions contained Under Section 6(a)(iii) and 6(a)(iv), (b) and (c), violates the rights guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. The petitioners submit that these provisions cannot be made applicable to the educational institutions established and administered by the religious and linguistic minorities. The petitioner submits that the Joint Director has issued certain memo on 20-5-1996 asking the petitioner to show cause as to why recognition of the school be not withdrawn. The petitioner submits that without any authority of law, the respondents are trying to get the orders implemented under coercive measures. The petitioner submits that they have filed reply to the said memo under Annexure P-5. By this petition, the petitioner submits that it be declared that the proceedings conducted by the respondent Joint Director of Public Instructions Under Section 6(a)(iii), (iv), (b) and (c) of the 1978 Adhiniyam are void, illegal and opposed to the decision of the High Court. They have prayed that the appellate proceedings be quashed and respondent Joint Director be further directed to withdraw the show cause notice. On notice, respondents Nos. 6, 7 and 8 appeared in the Court and filed their returns. The said respondents submit that after the judgment was pronounced by this Court in the matter of Sidhi Bala Bose Library Assn. the law has been amended and in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Frank Anthony Public School v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 311 , the rules framed for regulating service conditions of teachers would not be taken to be in contravention of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. These respondents further submit that neither the rules are contrary to law nor the respondent Joint Director is acting without jurisdiction and authority. These respondents further submit that neither the rules are contrary to law nor the respondent Joint Director is acting without jurisdiction and authority. The respondent further submit that after the decision of the Supreme Court the department of the School Education of the State of M. P. vide circular No. 5/73/6/87/8-5/20, Bhopal, dated 23-9-1991 directed the Commissioner Public Instructions, M. P. Bhopal that the service conditions laid down in the section/rules relating to teachers and other employees of private institutions be strictly followed. The respondents submit that the petition has no force, it has no merit and deserves to be dismissed. 3. In W. P. No. 4072/97, the petitioner Mohammed Ibrahim Khan has sought relief that the Joint Director of Public Instructions be asked to decide the appeal irrespective of the pendency of W. P. No. 3351/96. He submits that the Joint Director has no jurisdiction to adjourn the matter unnecessarily. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (Society and its Secretary) have filed their returns and have submitted that the appeal was rightly not heard in view of the pendency of W.P. No. 3351/96 and in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Tribal Education Agriculture and Medical Society v. State of M. P. and Ors. (1996) 7 SCC 103 . 4. Shri Aditya Adhikari learned counsel appeared for the petitioner in W. P. No. 3351/96. Shri J. P. Agrawal learned counsel appeared for the respondents Nos. 1 to 5. Shri Vivek Rusia appeared for respondent Nos. 6 to 8. Shri Riyaz Mohammed appeared for respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in W. P. No. 4072/97. I have heard the parties at length. 5. The 1978 Adhiniyam was brought in force to make provision for regulating payment of salary to the teachers and other employees of non-government schools receiving grant-in-aid from the State Government and non-government educational institutions for higher education receiving grants from the M. P. Uchcha Shiksha Anudan Ayog, and other matters ancillary thereto. A challenge was thrown to the constitutional validity of the 1978 Adhiniyam. A challenge was thrown to the constitutional validity of the 1978 Adhiniyam. This Court in the matter of Sidhi Bala Bose Library (supra), after giving its anxious consideration, held that Sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) of Clause (a) and Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 6 of the 1978 Adhiniyam were violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, and, therefore, they would have no application to the educational institutions established and administered by religious and linguistic minorities. Section 6 as it originally stood read as under : "6. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or any other regulations, byelaws, statute or regulations made thereunder : (a) On and from the appointed date, (i) no post of a teacher or other employee shall be created except in such scale of pay as the State Government may, from time to time determine and no teacher or other employee shall be recruited without following the procedure prescribed in this behalf. (ii) the teachers or employees shall have such qualifications and experience as may be prescribed; and (iii) no teacher or other employee shall be dismissed or removed from service or his services terminated without prior approval of the competent authority. Provided that a teacher or other employee may prefer an appeal against his dismissal, removal or termination from service to an appellate authority as the State Government may, by notification, specify within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order by him and such authority may after holding such enquiry as it may deem fit in the manner prescribed may either set aside or confirm or modify the said order and pending the disposal of the appeal, the appellate authority may also stay the operation of order on such grounds as it thinks fit. (iv) no teacher or other employee shall be placed under suspension for more than ninety days without prior approval of the competent authority. Provided that the competent authority shall give its approval only after holding such enquiry and within such time as may be prescribed. (iv) no teacher or other employee shall be placed under suspension for more than ninety days without prior approval of the competent authority. Provided that the competent authority shall give its approval only after holding such enquiry and within such time as may be prescribed. (b) the competent authority may on an application made within thirty days from the appointed date by a teacher or an employee of an institution, who has been dismissed or removed from service or whose service has been terminated by the management or an institution at any time on or after the 18th November, 1977, after giving the management of the institution and the persons affected by such dismissal, removal or termination a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after conducting such enquiry as it may deem fit declare the dismissal, removal or termination as the case may be, to be void and direct the management of the institution to reinstate such teacher or employee in service. (c) the competent authority shall review all the cases of appointment of teachers and other employees made during the period commencing from 17th November and ending on the date of commencement of this Act and, if it, after giving the management of the institution and the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard, finds that the appointments were made in anticipation of the Act, it may by an order in writing for reasons to be stated therein disapprove such appointment." 6. Clause (iii) of Section 6(a), as it stood directed that no teacher or other employee shall be dismissed or removed from service or his services terminated without prior approval of the competent authority. A ban was put on the right of the management that without prior approval of the competent authority a teacher or other employee should not be dismissed nor would be removed without prior approval of the competent authority. The proviso appended to the said Clause (iii) provided a right of appeal in favour of the teacher or other employee. A ban was put on the right of the management that without prior approval of the competent authority a teacher or other employee should not be dismissed nor would be removed without prior approval of the competent authority. The proviso appended to the said Clause (iii) provided a right of appeal in favour of the teacher or other employee. In the matter of Sidhi Bala Bose Library (supra), the High Court considering Clause (iii) has stated and observed that the management's action in terminating the services of an employee would be ineffective, unless approved by the competent authority and even if the competent authority approves the management's action, the aggrieved employee could prefer an appeal against the said order and the appellate authority could set it aside. The High Court also observed that no appeal was provided to the management against refusal of approval by the competent authority. The High Court held that from the language of Clause (iii) it became obvious that with respect to removal or termination, the ultimate power was not with the management of the institution but with outside authority which was given power to veto the action of the management. The High Court observed that the management's power of putting a person under suspension or disciplinary control were also taken away or annihilated. The High Court further observed that the cumulative effect of the provisions contained in Clause (iii) and (iv) of Clause (a) and Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 6 was that after commencement of the 1978 Adhiniyam, no teacher or employee could be suspended by the management for more than 90 days without prior approval of the competent authority, or removed from service without prior approval of the competent authority; a teacher or an employee could prefer an appeal before the appellate authority constituted by the State. The High Court observed that in respect of choice of such personnel and their removal from service, by the said provisions, right of the management was destroyed by conferring the power of veto on the competent authority or the appellate authority, as the case may be, therefore, the provisions contained in Sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) of Clause (a), and Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 6 of the main Act violated the rights guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. A perusal of the judgment in the matter of Sidhi Bala Bose Library (supra) would show that the High Court held that the unamended Clause (iii) of Section 6(a) is violative of the rights of the minority communities institutions guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India because no choice or management control was left with the society. If the judgment of this Court is read in true perspective, then it would appear that the High Court was of the opinion that at least at some point of time, the management control ought to have been given to the society running the institution. It would clearly appear from the judgment of the High Court that if power of suspension, removal or termination was given to the management then the High Court would not have held the provisions of Clause (iii) were violating the rights of the minority institutions. 7. The judgment nowhere states that if the management control was given to the society, then too the provisions of appeal or of Clause (iii) would offend Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. The ratio of the case simply is that absolute management control cannot be destroyed by conferring power of veto on outside agency. 8. After the said judgment, in the matter of Sidhi Bala Bose (supra), the State Government in its wisdom substituted Clause (iii) of Section 6(a) by Act No. 24/81. It did not choose to amend the proviso as according to the Government, it was not required to be deleted or amended. The substituted Clause (iii) of Section 6(a) reads as under: "No teacher or other employee shall be dismissed or removed from service or his services terminated except by an order passed after following such procedure as may be prescribed." It would clearly appear from the substituted Clause (iii) that the power which earlier vested in the competent authority was now been withdrawn and complete control was given to the society to manage its affairs in relation to dismissal, removal or termination in relation to teachers and other employees. It is only expected from the management that they have to pass order after following such procedure as is prescribed. It is only expected from the management that they have to pass order after following such procedure as is prescribed. It would not be out of place to note that under notification No. 73-31-78-1-9-XX dated 17-10-1978, in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (e) of Section 10(2) read with the proviso to Sub-clause (iii) of Section 6(a) of the 1978 Adhiniyam, the State Government has made rules known as Madhya Pradesh Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha (Adhyapak Tatha Anya Karmachari) Appeal Rules, 1978. 8A. After substitution of Clause (iii) by Act 24 of 1981, the State Government vide Notification No. F-73-69-82-E-5-XX dated 22-12-83, has framed rules known as M. P. Ashashkiya Shikshan Sanstha (Adhiyapakon Tatha Anya Karmachariyon Ko Padachyut Karne Sewa Se Hatane Sambandhi Prakriya) Niyam, 1983. According to these rules, a show cause notice is to be given to the incumbent before imposing penalty, grounds on which action1 is proposed shall be reduced in the form of a definite charge, the same shall be communicated to the teacher or other employee as the case may be, together with the statement of allegations on which each charge is based; the teacher or other employee shall be required to submit his written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person and produce witnesses; the teacher or other employee may seek permission for inspection of relevant record and documents for the purpose of preparing his defense. Ordinarily permission may be granted but it may be refused on the ground that the said records are not strictly relevant to the case or it is considered not desirable in the interest of the institution to allow inspection of records or the documents for reasons of secrecy or privileged nature of contents. After written statement is received, an enquiry officer has to be appointed who shall enquire into the charges framed against the teacher or other employee, as provided under Rule 8. If the teacher or other employee desires to be heard in person, he shall be so heard and if he desires that oral enquiry be held, such enquiry shall be held by the enquiry officer; in such enquiry, evidence as may be adduced by either side shall be taken on points arising for determination. At the conclusion of the enquiry, the authority has to prepare his report. The record of the enquiry is required to be maintained. At the conclusion of the enquiry, the authority has to prepare his report. The record of the enquiry is required to be maintained. The management would be competent and authorised to consider the records of the enquiry and determine which of the finding of the enquiry' authority is worthy of acceptance. According to Rule 12, if the management disagrees with the finding of the enquiry officer, it shall record its reasons for disagreement and may record its own findings. Having recorded the finding if the management is of the opinion that the teacher or other employee should be dismissed or removed from service or his services should be terminated, the management shall furnish to the teacher or other employee a copy of the report of the enquiry officer together with brief reasons for its disagreement, if any, and given the teacher or other employee a notice stating the action proposed to be taken by the management and call upon him to submit within 15 days such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed action. After considering the representation, the management shall decide what action should be taken against such person and make proposal for order which it intends to pass. The management shall thereupon forward the whole case along with its proposals of order intended to be passed to the competent authority for its approval and the authority shall not refuse to grant such approval except on the grounds mentioned in Rule 22(b) that there has not been' proper or sufficient compliance of the procedure laid down in the rules; that the provisions of the Act are likely to be defeated by the said order; and that the said order on the face of it is perverse. If the authority finds that the proposal sent to it suffers with some defect, it shall return the case to the management with such directions as it thinks fit for proceeding with the case in a manner free from the said defect. 8B. These rules would show that the management has been given fullest control over the teachers and other employees for taking a disciplinary action but they have to proceed in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the rules. 9. 8B. These rules would show that the management has been given fullest control over the teachers and other employees for taking a disciplinary action but they have to proceed in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the rules. 9. Relying upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of Sidhi Bala Bose (supra) Shri Adhikari learned counsel contends that if this Court has held that Clause (iii) of Section 6(a) is not applicable to minority institutions, then it must be held that the High Court also considered appeal provisions and held it to be inapplicable to minority institutions. 9A Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Frank Anthony Public School v. the Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 311 he contends that the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India is two-fold, to establish and to administer educational institutions of their own choice. According to him, the words 'of their own choice' indicate that the extent of right is to be determined not with reference to any concept of State necessity and general social interest but with reference to educational institutions themselves, i. e. with reference to the goal of making the institutions effective vehicles of education for minority community or other persons who resort to them. Learned counsel submits that even after amendment, Clause (iii) with its proviso would not be applicable to a minority institution. Counsel for the State Government and the private respondents, placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Rajasthan v. Mrs. Leela Jain. AIR 1965 SC 1296 , contend that the proviso is to be read in its true spirit because a proviso in a matter like the present, may not be a proviso but in fact confers a right of appeal to the aggrieved party. Placing their further reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of S. Sunderam v. V. R. Patthbhiraman AIR 1985 SC 582 , it was contended that normally a proviso is meant to be an exception to some thing but a proviso can have an intention and purpose. Placing their further reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of S. Sunderam v. V. R. Patthbhiraman AIR 1985 SC 582 , it was contended that normally a proviso is meant to be an exception to some thing but a proviso can have an intention and purpose. Placing further reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of S. B. K. Oil Mills v. Subhash Chandra Yograj, AIR 1961 SC 1596 it was contended that a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. Provisos are often added not as exceptions but as saving clauses in which cases they will not be construed as controlled by the section. Referring to Tribal Education Apiculture and Medical Society v. State of M. P., (1996) 7 SCC103, it was contended that the judgment of this Court in the matter of Sidhi Bala Bose has been approved by the Supreme Court that the M. P. Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha (Adhyapakon Tatha Anya Karmachiriyon Ke Bharti) Niyam, 1979, was constitutionally valid. The Supreme Court held the Rules 4 and 5 of the Bharti Niyam have been framed with a view to give effect to the provisions contained in Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 6 of the Adhiniyam. 10. The moot question for consideration now is whether the amended Clause (iii) of Section 6(a) of the 1978 Adhiniyam would still not be applicable to the minority institutions. 11. As observed above, in the matter of Sidhi Bala Bose (supra) the High Court held that Clauses (iii) and (iv) of Sections 6(a) and 6(b) and 6(c) Would not be applicable to minority institutions as the total management control was given to outside agency. The High Court did not hold that even if the management control is given to the institution or an appeal is provided to the management, then too, the provisions would be ultra vires Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 12. In the matter of S. K. B. Oil Mills (supra) the Supreme Court observed in para 9 as under : "The law with regard to provisos is well settled and well understood. 12. In the matter of S. K. B. Oil Mills (supra) the Supreme Court observed in para 9 as under : "The law with regard to provisos is well settled and well understood. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. But provisos are often added not as exceptions or qualifications to the main enactment but as saving clauses in which cases they will not be construed as controlled by the section. The proviso which has been added to Section 50 of the Act deals with the effect of appeal. The substantive part of the section repealed two Acts which were in force in the State of Bombay. If nothing more had been said, Section 7^~BOMBAY GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1904~^ of the Bombay General Clauses Act would have applied and all pending suits and proceedings would have continued under the old law, as if the repealing Act had not been passed. The effect of the proviso was to take the matter out of Section 7^~BOMBAY GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1904~^ of the Bombay General Clauses Act and to provide for a special saving. It cannot be used to decide whether Section 12 of the Act is retrospective. It was observed by Wood V. C. in Fitzgerald v. Channeys, (1861) 70 ER 958, that saving clauses are seldom used to construe Acts. These clauses are introduced into Acts which repeal others, to safeguard rights which but for the savings would be lost. The proviso here saves pending suits and proceedings, and further enacts that suits and proceedings then pending are to be transferred to the Courts, designated in the Act and are to continue under the Act and any or all provisions of the Act are to apply to them. The learned Solicitor General contends that the savings clause enacted by the proviso, even if treated as substantive law, must be taken to apply only to suits and proceedings pending, at the time of the repeal which, but for the proviso, would be governed by the Act repealed. According to the learned Attorney General, the effect of the savings is much wider and it applies to such cases as come within the words of the proviso whenever the Act is extended to new areas." 13. According to the learned Attorney General, the effect of the savings is much wider and it applies to such cases as come within the words of the proviso whenever the Act is extended to new areas." 13. In State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Leela Jain (supra) the Supreme Court observed that - "With due respect to the learned judges, we do not find it possible to agree that it is permissible to omit or delete words from the operative part of an enactment which have meaning and significance in their normal connotation merely on the ground that according to the view of the Court it is inconsistent with the spirit underlying the enactment. Unless the words are unmeaning or absurd, it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give effect to the provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to give them their ordinary meaning leads to consequences which are not in accord with the notions of propriety or justice entertained by the Court. No doubt, if there are other provisions in the statute which conflict with them, the Court may prefer the one and reject the other on the ground of repugnance. Surely, that is not the position here. Again, when the words in the statute are reasonably capable of more than one interpretation, the object and purpose of the statute, a general conspectus of its provisions and the context in which they occur might induce a Court to adopt a more liberal or a more strict view of the provisions as the case may be, as being more consonant with the underlying purpose. But we do not consider it possible to reject words used in an enactment merely for the reason that they do not accord with the context in which they occur, or with the purpose of the legislation. The preamble may, no doubt, be used to solve any ambiguity or to fix the meaning of the words which may have more than one meaning but it can, however, not be used to eliminate as redundant or unintended the operative provisions of a statute. The preamble may, no doubt, be used to solve any ambiguity or to fix the meaning of the words which may have more than one meaning but it can, however, not be used to eliminate as redundant or unintended the operative provisions of a statute. Besides if not strictly applied this rule of interpretation that the Act did not intend to make provision for nothing except a forum for appeals, the whole of the proviso even where it provided for revision against the orders of a commissioner, must be rejected as travelling beyond the long title and the preamble, for in neither of them is reference made to revisions. We do not, therefore, consider that in the case of the Act under consideration, it would be possible to reject the words "or a municipal authority" by reference to the preamble and the long title." 14. In the matter of S. Sunderam (supra), the Supreme Court placed its strong reliance upon its earlier judgment reported in AIR 1965 SC1296. 15. In the matter of Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. R. S. Shaver, AIR 1968 SC 59 , the Supreme Court observed that generally speaking it is true that the proviso is an exception to the main part of the section, but it is recognised that in exceptional cases, a proviso may be a substantive provision itself. 16. In Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das, AIR 1975 SC 1758 , the Supreme Court observed that if on a fair construction, the principal provision is clear a proviso cannot expand or limit it. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction. In the matter of Hiralal Ratanlal v. Sales Tax officer, AIR 1973 SC 1034 , the Supreme Court observed that ordinarily a proviso of a section is intended to take out a part of the main section for special reasons. It is not expected to enlarge the scope of the main section. Cases have arisen in which this Court has held that despite the fact that the provision is called proviso, it is really a separate provision and so called proviso substantially alters the main section. 17. It is not expected to enlarge the scope of the main section. Cases have arisen in which this Court has held that despite the fact that the provision is called proviso, it is really a separate provision and so called proviso substantially alters the main section. 17. In the matter of S. Sunderam, the Supreme Court observed that a proviso may serve four different purposes (1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment; (2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable; (3) it may be so embodied in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the character and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and (4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision. 18. From the judgment of the Supreme Court, it would clearly appear that a proviso in all cases is not to be read as exception to the main section or main provision. Section 6(a), Clause (iii) now gives a right or authority to the management to dismiss or remove a teacher or other employee form service and also to terminate his services if the order is passed after following the prescribed procedure. 19. The proviso appended to Clause (iii) of Section 6(a) in fact is not an exception to the main clause, it provides a right of appeal to the teacher or other employee. So far as Clause (iii) is concerned, rules have been framed for terminating services, etc. In relation to the proviso other set of rules have been framed as 'appeal rules'. The intention of the legislature is thus very clear. The legislature nowhere says nor the intention of the legislation appears to be that Clause (iii) and the proviso are to be read as integral parts of each other. The intention of the legislature is writ large. Instead of providing a separate right of appeal, it has appended appeal rights in the form of a proviso under Clause (iii). Clause (iii) applies to cases of dismissal, removal or termination, while the proviso relates to and governs the right of appeal provided to a teacher or other employee. The intention of the legislature is writ large. Instead of providing a separate right of appeal, it has appended appeal rights in the form of a proviso under Clause (iii). Clause (iii) applies to cases of dismissal, removal or termination, while the proviso relates to and governs the right of appeal provided to a teacher or other employee. If Clause (iii) and proviso appended to it are read together, it cannot be held that the proviso restricts the application of Clause (iii) or carves out an exception to Clause (iii). On the other hand, Clause (iii) and the proviso if read separately, then too there would be no problem because Clause (iii) in itself is a complete provision and the proviso again would be a complete provision governing the rights of a party in relation to appeal. 20. By no stretch of imagination, it can be held that the proviso is an integral part of Clause (iii). Unhesitatingly I hold that Clause (iii) of Section 6(a) and the proviso appended to Clause (iii) talk of different rights of the parties. Clause (iii) gives right to the management/employer to take disciplinary action against a teacher or other employee while the proviso gives right to such teacher or employee to prefer an appeal. Clause (iii) and the proviso talk of different situations, they stand on different pedestal. They consider different situations, they talk of different exigencies. The provision cannot be held to be inapplicable to a minority institution nor can it be held that it affects the rights of a minority institution guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 21. In the matter of Tribal Education (supra) the Supreme Court with approval quoted the following observations made by this Court which read as under: "So far as laying down the mode of procedure of personnel is concerned, there can be no objection so long as there is no interference in the actual recruitment of personnel in the case of minority institutions. All that this Sub-clause does is to enable the State Government to fix the scales of pay and lay down the general mode or procedure for recruitment of teachers and other employees and it does not enable any interference by the State Government in the choice of personnel selected by that mode, which continues to remain with the management of the institution. It has not been shown to us that scale of pay in any case has been fixed so high as to be unreasonable and an indirect interference with the mode or procedure of recruitment laid down in such as to amount to an undue influence with the right of management of any educational institution run by any minority." 22. If, according to the Supreme Court, Government can provide a procedure for recruitment of teachers and other employees and the same is not treated to be an interference by the State Government in the choice of personnel selected by that mode which continued to remain with the management of the institution, then it cannot be held that simply because the right of appeal is given to the teacher or employee, it would offend the basic spirit of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 23. In the matter of Frank Anthony (supra), the Supreme Court, considering Section 8(3) of the Delhi School Education Act, observed as under: "Section 8(3) provides for an appeal to the Tribunal constituted Under Section that is, a Tribunal consisting of a person who has held office as a District Judge or any equivalent judicial office. The appeal is not to any departmental official but to a tribunal manned by a person who has held office as District Judge and is required to exercise his powers not arbitrarily but in the same manner as Court of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure. The right of appeal itself is confined to a limited class of cases, namely, those of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and not to every disputes between an employee and the management. The limited right of appeal and the character of the authority constituted to hear the appeal and the manner in which the appellate power is required to be exercised make the provision for appeal perfectly reasonable." 23A. In the present case, though an appeal is not to be preferred to a person who was a District Judge but the appeal is to be preferred to a competent authority who is not less than a Joint Director. It is expected of the Joint Director that he would understand the law, the legal problems and the questions raised before him in relation to the employment, conditions of service and the effect and impact of removal, dismissal or termination. It is expected of the Joint Director that he would understand the law, the legal problems and the questions raised before him in relation to the employment, conditions of service and the effect and impact of removal, dismissal or termination. The present is also not a case where every dispute can be referred to the Joint Director, raised between the incumbent and the management. It cannot be held that by creating an appellate forum or conferring right of appeal in favour of teacher or other employee, the legislation in fact offended the rights of the minority institutions. 24. For the reasons aforesaid, I am unable to hold that after substitution of Clause (iii) in Section 6(a) of the 1978 Adhiniyam, the principles laid down by this Court in the matter of Sidhi Bala Bose (supra) can still be applied. This Court, in the matter of Sidhi Bala Bose, was considering Clause (iii) as it stood at the time of its enactment. After the language has been changed and clause has been substituted it cannot now be argued that Clause (iii) and its proviso would not apply to minority institutions. The provisions are valid and in accordance with law. They do not offend the rights of any minority institution but do in fact provide certain measures in favour of aggrieved teacher employee. 25. The appeal filed by the employees/teachers is in accordance with law. The appellate authority certainly has jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter and if the law provides that in case of non-observance of the directions of the appellate authority it would have powers to proceed against such institution, then the said powers are also valid, otherwise in spite of a finding, the appellate authority would be a tiger without nails and teeth. It would not be possible for the appellate authority to execute and enforce its orders. When orders are passed by the appellate authority they are to be observed and in case of non-observance the authority must have powers to execute and enforce its orders. 26. I do not find any force in this petition, it deserves to and is accordingly dismissed. As a consequence of the dismissal of the petition, it is held that the appellate authority has powers to hear and decide matters as provided under the proviso to Clause (iii) of Section 6(a). 26. I do not find any force in this petition, it deserves to and is accordingly dismissed. As a consequence of the dismissal of the petition, it is held that the appellate authority has powers to hear and decide matters as provided under the proviso to Clause (iii) of Section 6(a). The appeal preferred by the petitioner of W. P. No. 4072/97 deserves to be decided in accordance with law at an early date. W. P. No. 4072/97 stands disposed of.