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1998 DIGILAW 566 (PAT)

Janardan Das v. Bindeshwari Prasad Sah

1998-08-17

NARAYAN ROY

body1998
Judgment Narayan Roy, J. 1. By this application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated September 30, 1997, passed by the Fifth Additional Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur, in Criminal Revision No. 289 of 1997, whereby and whereunder the learned Additional Sessions Judge has affirmed the order dated May 20, 1997, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate in Mojahidpur P. S. Case No. 60 of 1997 appertaining to G. R. No. 896 of 1997 releasing the seized materials in favour of the accused-applicant. 2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that since a petition was filed by the petitioner on June 10, 1997, before the learned Magistrate praying therein to hand over the ornaments, etc., the same could have been handed over to the petitioner by the learned Magistrate. Learned counsel further submitted that even the revisional court has failed to appreciate the provisions of Sec. 132A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short, "the Act"), and no sooner the petitioner had approached the court, unassessed wealth could have been handed over to him. 3. It appears that on April 6, 1997, the premises of opposite party No. 1 was searched by the Officer-in-Charge of Mojahidpur Police Station in connection with a case under the provisions of the Bihar Money Lenders Act and in course of search, a huge amount of wealth including cash and ornaments was recovered from the possession of opposite party No. 1 and, accordingly, a seizure list was prepared and a case under Secs. 420, 421, 465, 468, 174 and 175/511 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sec. 34 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974, was instituted against opposite party No. 1. After the seizure of the properties of opposite party No. 1, as referred to above, he filed a petition before the learned magistrate, who was in seisin of the matter, for release of the properties and the learned magistrate vide order dated May 20, 1997, released the seized properties by the police in favour of opposite party No. 1. Thereafter, a petition was filed on June 10, 1997, before the learned magistrate by the Income-tax Officer praying therein to hand over the entire property to him as the property was unassessed one under Sec. 132A of the Act. The learned magistrate, however, vide order June 13, 1997, directed the petitioner to bring a stay order from the competent authority. Thereafter, a petition was filed on June 10, 1997, before the learned magistrate by the Income-tax Officer praying therein to hand over the entire property to him as the property was unassessed one under Sec. 132A of the Act. The learned magistrate, however, vide order June 13, 1997, directed the petitioner to bring a stay order from the competent authority. The petitioner thereafter filed Criminal Revision No. 289 of 1997 against the order dated May 20, 1997, before the learned Sessions Judge and the learned Sessions Judge admitted the revision application and stayed the operation of the order dated May 20, 1997, during the pendency of the revision application. The revision application was ultimately heard on September 30, 1997, and the learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the same on the same day. Against the order dated September 30, 1997, the petitioner has filed the present application in this court. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 submitted that the petitioner at no point of time had taken shelter of sec. 132A of the Act and only when the release order was passed by the learned magistrate on May 20, 1997 a petition was filed before the learned magistrate on June 10, 1997. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the courts below have not acted illegally and the orders impugned cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. 5. Sub-sec. (1)(c) of Sec. 132A of the Act reads as follows : "(c) any assets represent either wholly or partly income or property which has not been, or would not have been, disclosed for the purposes of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or this Act by any person from whose possession or control such assets have been taken into custody by any officer or authority under any other law for the time being in force, then, the Director-General or Director or the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner may authorise any Deputy Director, Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Director, Assistant Commissioner or Income-tax Officer (hereinafter in this section and in Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 278D referred to as the requisitioning officer) to require the officer or authority referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b) or Clause (c), as the case may be, to deliver such books of account, other documents or assets to the requisitioning officer." 6. On a reading of Clause (c) of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 278D referred to as the requisitioning officer) to require the officer or authority referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b) or Clause (c), as the case may be, to deliver such books of account, other documents or assets to the requisitioning officer." 6. On a reading of Clause (c) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 132A of the Act, it appears that where the authorities of the Income-tax Department in consequence of information in their possession, have reason to believe that any assets represent either wholly or partly income or property which has not been, or would not have been, disclosed for the purposes of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or this Act by any person from whose possession or control such assets have been taken into custody by any officer or authority under any other law for the time being in force, then, the Director General or Director or the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner may authorise any Deputy Director, Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Director, Assistant Commissioner or Income-tax Officer to require the officer or authority referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b) or Clause (c), as the case may be, to deliver such books of account, other documents or assets to the requisitioning officer. 7. There is nothing on record to show nor any statement has been made in the petition that after seizure of the property referred to above dated April 6, 1997, the prescribed authority has sent its requisition to the Officer-in-Charge who has seized the property to deliver the same to it ; rather it appears that only when the learned judicial magistrate who was in seisin of the matter passed an order of release of the property dated May 20, 1997, a petition was filed before it by the Income-tax Officer on June 10, 1997, invoking the jurisdiction of the court in purported exercise of its power under Sec. 132A( 1) of the Act. The petitioner then filed a revision application before the learned Sessions Judge which was ultimately heard on the merits and the same was dismissed on September 30, 1997. 8. Since no step was taken by the prescribed authority under Sec. 152A(1) of the Act, the courts below, in my opinion, are not wrong in saying that the power as referred to above, has not been exercised in time. 8. Since no step was taken by the prescribed authority under Sec. 152A(1) of the Act, the courts below, in my opinion, are not wrong in saying that the power as referred to above, has not been exercised in time. In my opinion, power as envisaged under Sec. 132A(1) of the Act should be exercised immediately after the property is seized by making requisition to the police officer to hand over the same but in no way, in my opinion, will it be applicable in the proceeding before a court. No other provision, however, has been shown to me enabling the authority to make such a prayer as envisaged under Sec. 132A(1) of the Act for release of the property before the court more so as I have noticed above when at no point of time any requisition was sent to the police officer who had seized the property. Mr. Rastogi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that even if the authorities have failed to exercise power under Sec. 132A(1) of the Act, they can take recourse to Sec. 226(4) of the Act. 9. Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 226 of the Act postulates that the Assessing Officer may apply to the court in whose custody there is money belonging to the assessee for payment to him of the entire amount of such money or, if it is more than the tax due, an amount sufficient to discharge the tax. In the case at hand, there is no question of tax due and it appears that the authorities of the Income-tax Department are trying to seize the property as the same was unassessed property, In that view of the matter, Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 226 of the Act has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case. Besides this Mr. Rastogi, learned senior counsel, submitted that the authorities have proceeded under the Act itself and the assessment proceeding has been completed and penalty proceeding has already been initiated against the opposite party No. 1. That being the position, it must be held that the petitioner/income-tax authorities, however, have efficacious remedy for recovery of unassessed wealth. 10. Besides this Mr. Rastogi, learned senior counsel, submitted that the authorities have proceeded under the Act itself and the assessment proceeding has been completed and penalty proceeding has already been initiated against the opposite party No. 1. That being the position, it must be held that the petitioner/income-tax authorities, however, have efficacious remedy for recovery of unassessed wealth. 10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also in view of the legal propositions noticed above, I see no reason to interfere with the order impugned specially when there is efficacious remedy under the Act itself which is being availed of by the authority concerned. 11. In the result, therefore, I find no merit in this application. It is, thus, dismissed.