Judgment 1. Heard. 2. The above revision is directed against an order of acquittal dated 12.12.1994 made in S.C.No.82 of 1993 wherein the I Additional Sessions Judge. Periyar District at Erode, acquitted the respondents 1 to 5 herein from their respective charges with regard to an alleged murder of one Raghupathy, who is the son of the petitioner herein, who was examined as P.W.2, and the occurrence was said to have taken place on 23.3.1993 at about 9.00 p.m., within the jurisdiction of the sixth respondent herein. 3. Mr.M.S.Kandasamy learned counsel for the petitioner seriously complains the non-application of mind, non-consideration and improper appreciation of material evidence, faulty reasons and lack of judicial approach which ultimately resulted in grave miscarriage of justice in acquitting the respondents 1 to 5 herein. 4. For the purpose of convenience, respondents 1 to 5 herein are referred to as A-l to A-5 respectively. 5. According to the prosecution, P.W.I and the deceased Raghupathy were proceeding on cycle at about 9.00 p.m. on 23.3.1993 on Ganapathypalayam-Salai Pudur Main Road to irrigate their lands. When they were crossing the A-3s coconut godown, A-1 and A-2, along with three other persons, namely, A-3 to A-5, restrained P.W.1 and the deceased Raghupathy, A-1 kicked the cycle, on account of which P.W.I sustained injury on his left hand. A-2 dragged the deceased Raghupathy by holding his shirt. A-l cut the deceased Raghupathy on his head by using aruval namely, M.O.3. A-3 to A-5 held the deceased Raghupathy and A-l and A-2 further delivered cuts on the deceased Raghupathy with their aruvals, namely M.O.3 and M.O.4, indiscriminatively. 6. Apart from P.W.1 the occurrence was also witnessed by P.W.4, Muthusamy, who, on his way to cinema, heard the alarm raised by P.W.1 and witnessed the occurrence. Thereafter, people gathered and all the accused ran away with their weapons. 7. P.W.4 went to Kodumudi and hired a taxi, in which the deceased Raghupathy was taken to Erode, but on the way, he died, Therefore, he was taken to Kodumudi Government Hospital at 2.00 a.m. on 24.3.1993. P.W.I gave a complaint in the Kodumudi Police Station, which was reduced in writing by the Sub-Inspector of Police, and the said complaint was marked as Ex.P-1. The Sub Inspector of Police at the Kodumudi Police Station was examined as P. W.7. Hence the above case, namely, S.C.No.82 of 1993, for the offences punishable under Secs. P.W.I gave a complaint in the Kodumudi Police Station, which was reduced in writing by the Sub-Inspector of Police, and the said complaint was marked as Ex.P-1. The Sub Inspector of Police at the Kodumudi Police Station was examined as P. W.7. Hence the above case, namely, S.C.No.82 of 1993, for the offences punishable under Secs. 147, 148, 341 and 302, I.P.C. 8. The Investigating Officer, who was examined as P.W.10, inspected the scene of occurrence in the presence of Village Administrative Officer, who was examined as P.W.6 and prepared an observation mahazar report marked as Ex.P-9. He also prepared a rough plan, which was marked as Ex.P-19. He also seized the cycle, produced as M.O.5, blood stained soil from two places, produced as M.O.6 as M.O.8 and prepared a mahazar, which was marked as Ex.P-16. Investigating Officer, P.W.10, held an inquest over the dead body of Raghupathy and filed an inquest report, which was marked as Ex.P-20. 9. P.W.5 was the doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body of Raghupathy and Ex.P-7 is the post mortem certificate. M.Os.12 to 15 are the clothes found on the dead body of Raghupathy. On the basis of the above investigation. P.W.10 arrested A-1 and A-2 and on whose information, which was marked as Ex.P-12, P.W.10 recovered M.O.3 -aruval, M.O.10 -Lunghi and M.O.11 baniyan, belong to A-1, free the bush, under mahazar Ex.P-13, which was duly attested by P.W.6. 10. After thus completing the investigation, P.W.10 filed the following charges against the A-1 to A-5. 1st charge against A-3 to A-5 under Sec.147, I.P.C. 2nd charge against A-1 and A-2 under Sec.148,I.P.C. 3rd charge against A-1 and A-2 under Sec.341, I.P.C. (2 counts) 4th charge against A-1 under Sec.323, I.P.C. 5th charge against A-1 and A-2 under Sec.302, I.P.C. 6th charge against A-2 to A-5 under Sec.302 read with Sec.149, I.P.C. 7th charge against A-1 and A-2 under Sec.506(ii), I.P.C. (4 counts) 8th charge against A-3 to A-5 under Sec.506 (ii) read with Sec.149, I.P.C. (4 counts). 11. On behalf of the prosecution, ten witness were examined as P.Ws.l to 10, twenty documents were marked as Exs.P-1 to P-20 and seventeen material objects were produced as M.Os.l to 17. 12. 11. On behalf of the prosecution, ten witness were examined as P.Ws.l to 10, twenty documents were marked as Exs.P-1 to P-20 and seventeen material objects were produced as M.Os.l to 17. 12. P.W.1 deposed that A-1 and A-2 were doing business in finance as well as coconut marketing; A-3 was having a coconut godown on the Ganapathypalayam Salai Pudur Main Road; P.W. 1 is related to the deceased Raghupathy as well as A-2, as Pangalis A-1, was working in the garden of one Sembayi, the mother of A-2, and A-1 was having illicit intimacy with her. Therefore, the deceased Raghupathy who was also related to A-2, condemned the illicit intimacy of A-1 with Sembayi, the mother of A-2. 13. According to P.W.I on 22.3.1993, at about 10.00 p.m. P.W.1 and the deceased Raghupathy were present in their lands. At that time, A-1 and A-2 were also present in their lands, which were located nearby, A-1, in order to reach his land, was driving his power tiller through the lands of the deceased Raghupathy, where turmeric was raised and therefore the deceased Raghupathy objected the same. Immediately, A-1 raised a quarrel with deceased Raghupathy and scolded that the deceased Raghupathy was unnecessarily interfering with his personal family matters very often and warred him that he would be put in the pit. Immediately, the father of the deceased Raghupathy, namely the petitioner herein, viz., P.W.2, came to the spot and dispersed them. 14. P.W.I further deposed that on the next day, namely 23.3.1993, at about 8.00 p.m. he, the deceased Raghupathy, Thangavelu and P.W.3 were having tea in the tea stall. Thereafter, Thangavelu and P.W.3 left to their house. P.W.1 and the deceased Raghupathy proceeded to the lands to irrigate the same; P.W.I was riding the cycle and the deceased Raghupathy was sitting at the back. When they were crossing A-3, coconut godown, A-1 and A-2, along with three other persons namely A-3 to A-5, restrained P.W.1 and the deceased Raghupathy and kicked their cycle. P.W.I sustained injury on his left hand. A-2 pulled the deceased Raghupathy, by holding his shirt. A1 delivered cuts by aruval, on the head and left hand of the deceased Raghupathy. A-3 to A-5 were holding deceased Raghupathy. A-1 and A-2 delivered multiple injuries on the hands and legs of deceased Raghupathy indiscriminately. P.W.I sustained injury on his left hand. A-2 pulled the deceased Raghupathy, by holding his shirt. A1 delivered cuts by aruval, on the head and left hand of the deceased Raghupathy. A-3 to A-5 were holding deceased Raghupathy. A-1 and A-2 delivered multiple injuries on the hands and legs of deceased Raghupathy indiscriminately. When P.W.I shouted at A-1 to A-5, they chased P.W.1 In the meanwhile, P.W.4 also saw occurrence, when he was on his way to cinema, Sweeper Raju, Ponnusamy and other persons also came to the scene of occurrence on hearing the alarm. 15. Thereafter, P.W.4 went to Kodumudi and hired a taxi and then took the deceased Raghupathy to Erode, but, on the way, he died. Therefore, P.W.I and P.W.4 took the deceased Raghupathy to the Kodumudi hospital and lodged a complaint in the Kodumudi police station. 16. P.W.2, father of the deceased Raghupathy, deposed that A-1 and A-2 were doing business in finance and coconut marketing. There was a prior enmity between the deceased Raghupathy, and A-1, as A-1 made a false complaint that the deceased Raghupathy had stolen their hen. He further deposed that on 22.3.1993 had driven the power tiller in the turmeric field of the deceased Raghupathy, which corroborated with the evidence of P.W.1. 17. P.W.3 deposed that P.W.I, the deceased Raghupathy, Thangavelu and P.W.3 were having tea in the tea stall at about 8.00 p.m. and thereafter, P.W.I and the deceased Raghupathy went to irrigate their land. 18. P.W.4 deposed that on his way to cinema on 23.3.1993 at about 8.30 p.m. he saw the said occurrence P.W.4 also deposed that he went to Kodumudi, hired a taxi driven by one Vadivelu and took the deceased Raghupathy to Erode hospital, but on the way, Raghupathy died. Hence P.W.I and P.W.4 took the body of the deceased Raghupathy to the Kodumudi Government Hospital and lodged a complaint at the Kodumudi police station. 19. P.W.5 was the doctor who conducted autopsy and issued a post mortem certificate, namely, Ex.P-7. P.W.6 was the Village Administrative Officer, who spoke about the preparation of the mahazar report relating to the seizure of the weapons produced as M.Os.3 and 4, used by A-1 and A-Z respectively, P.W.7 was the Sub-Inspector of Police, who registered the F.I.R. P.W.10 was the Investigating Officer. 20. P.W.6 was the Village Administrative Officer, who spoke about the preparation of the mahazar report relating to the seizure of the weapons produced as M.Os.3 and 4, used by A-1 and A-Z respectively, P.W.7 was the Sub-Inspector of Police, who registered the F.I.R. P.W.10 was the Investigating Officer. 20. In appreciation of the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 10, Exs.P-1 to P-20 and M.Os.1 to 17, the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Periyar District at Erode, by his order dated 12.12.1994 in S.C.No.82 of 1993, acquitted A-1 to A-5, giving them benefit of doubt, Hence, the above revision. 21. The reasons that weighed the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, for acquitting A-1 to A-5 are: (i) there are contradictions in the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, with regard to the prior enmity, between A-1 and the deceased Raghupathy, as well as with regard to the motive for the murder. The learned I Additional Sessions Judge observed that while P.W.I would say that there as a quarrel between A1 and the deceased Raghupathy on 22.3.1993 when A-1 had driven the power tiller in the turmeric fields of the deceased Raghupathy P.W.4 would say that there was a prior enmity between the families of A-1 and the deceased Raghupathy, as A-1 had complained that the deceased Raghupathy had stolen his hen. That apart, P.W.1 also states that there was an illicit relationship between A-1 and one Sembayi, mother of A-2 and the same was condemned by the deceased Raghupathy, which motive was not at all referred by P.W.2, who is the father of deceased Raghupathy and a close relative to the said Sebayi and A-2. (ii) the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, also found a contradiction between the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.4 with regard to the identification of A-3 to A-5 and their respective overt act in the said occurrence. The learned I Additional Sessions Judge observed that P.W.1 had deposed that three persons, who could be identified by their appearance but not by their names, had restrained P.W.1 and the deceased Raghupathy, when they were proceeding to irrigate their lands. P.W.1 was riding the cycle and the deceased Raghupathy was sitting at the back. A-1 kicked the cycle and thereby P.W.1 sustained injury on his left hand. P.W.1 was riding the cycle and the deceased Raghupathy was sitting at the back. A-1 kicked the cycle and thereby P.W.1 sustained injury on his left hand. Thereafter A-2 caught hold of the shirt of the deceased Raghupathy and dragged him; A-3 to A-5 caught hold the deceased Raghupathy; A-1 delivered a cut on the head of deceased Raghupathy, by his aruval. M.O.3 and thereafter, A-1 and A-2 delivered cuts with their respective aruval, M.Os.3 and 4, indiscriminately. The learned trial Judge observed that, according to the prosecution, A-1 and A-2 were doing business in finance and coconut marketing, A-3 was haying a coconut godown, A-4 is the elder brother of A-3 and A-5 was working under A-3 and A-4, but still, P.W.1 in the F.I.R. Ex.P-1, stated that A-1 and A-2 along with three other accused, who could be identified by their appearance but not by names, had committed the said offence. On the other hand, P.W.4 had stated that he knew the names of A-3 to A-5. Similarly, it is observed that P.W.4 went to Kodumudi. hired a taxi driven by one Vadivelu and took the deceased Raghupathy to Erode, but, on the way, he died and therefore, P.Ws.1 and 4 took the deceased Raghupathy to the Government Hospital at Kodumudi and lodged a complaint in the Kodumudi police station, Ex.P-1. But the names of A-3 to A-5 were not mentioned the names of A-3 to A-5, particularly when P.W.4 had accompanied P.W.1 to the police station were not mentioned. (iii) The learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, further observed that there was no necessity to conduct an identification parade since P.Ws.1, 2 and 4 knew A-3 to A-5. The learned I Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, found discrepancies and contradictions as to the identification of and participation by A-3 to A-5, in the commission of offence. (iv) The learned I Additional Sessions Judge observed that even though P.W.1 deposed that A-2 dragged the deceased Raghupathy by holding his shirt and threatened him that he would also get the same treatment while and A-3 to A-5 chased him, no such statement was found in the F.I.R. (v) That apart, P.W.I immediately after the occurrence informed the gathering that A-1 had cut the deceased Raghupathy, but had no stated that A-2 also delivered cuts on the deceased Raghupathy. (vi) The learned trial Judge further observed the discrepancy with reference to the weapon used by A-2, namely M.0.4 and the recovery of the same in the house of A-2. When P.W.6, village Administrative Officer and P.W. 10. Investigating Officer had stated that they recovered a small aruval from the bamboo partition, in the house of A-2, P.W.1 had stated that he had seen A-2 was handing over M.0.4 to P.W.10, If that is so, there is no reason why P.W.6 and P.W.10 had not stated that A-2 had taken the M.O.4 from bamboo partition in his house and handed over the same to P.W.10. (viii) The learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, disbelieved the evidence of P.W.4 as he was in jail for eight months under the Goondas Act. That apart, P.W.4 had informed the Investigating Officer that he went from Oththakadai, namely the place of occurrence, to Kodumudi by cycle to hire a taxi. But, in the deposition, he had stated that he went to the coconut godown of A-3, took the motor cycle and then went to Kodumudi to hire taxi. Therefore, the learned I Additional Sessions Judge observed that the statement of P.W.4 was self contradictory. (ix) According to the prosecution, all the accused climbed upon the compound wall of 15 feet and ran away with their weapons, when the people gathered at the place of occurrence, after hearing the alarming noise of P.W.1, but the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode observed that it would not be possible to climb 15 feet compound wall with their weapons. (x) The learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, also observed the discrepancy with regard to the time of occurrence because as per the post mortem certificate, Ex.P-7, certain half-digested food particles were found in the stomach of the body of the deceased Raghupathy. Therefore, it is evident that the occurrence would have taken place only after few hours from the time when the deceased Raghupathy had taken his food. But, on the other hand, the evidence of P.W.1 was to the effect that he and the deceased Raghupathy came to the tea stall at about 8.30 p.m. after their dinner, and thereafter, the occurrence had taken place at 9.00 p.m. (xi) The learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, found that M.O.Ps.1, 3 and 4 contained human blood stains. But, on the other hand, the evidence of P.W.1 was to the effect that he and the deceased Raghupathy came to the tea stall at about 8.30 p.m. after their dinner, and thereafter, the occurrence had taken place at 9.00 p.m. (xi) The learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, found that M.O.Ps.1, 3 and 4 contained human blood stains. In Ex.P-18, it was stated that the deceased Raghupathy blood belonged to ‘B’ group. But, there was no material evidence that M.Os. 1, 3 and 4 contained ‘B’ group blood. (xii) In view of the above discrepancies, the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Periyar District at Erode, believed the case of the defence that the deceased Raghupathy had illicit intimacy with some ladies in the sweeper colony, on account of which, he was murdered by the members of the sweeper colony and held that conviction A-1 to A-5 on the basis of prosecution witnesses. Exhibits and material objects could not he safe and therefore, acquitted A-1 to A-5. 22. Mr.M.S.Kandasamy, learned counsel for the petitioner challenges the order of acquittal on the ground that the trial court erred in disbelieving the evidence of P.W.1, the injured eye-witness, whose evidence corroborates with the evidence of P.W.4, who was passing through the scene of occurrence, immediately at the time of occurrence and the outright rejection of evidence of P.W.4 is erroneous. 23. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that it is not possible in every case that the eye witness should identify all the accused by name. The evidence of P.W.1 that he could able to identify A-3 to A-5 by person and not by name. Certainly, is justified, and therefore, the conduct of identification parade in that regard is also justified. 24. Deriving a discrepancy on that score is nothing but an improper appreciation of material evidence available on record. In this regard, he relies upon the decisions in: (a) Rana Partap v. State of Haryana Rana Partap v. State of Haryana, 1983 Crl.L.J. 1272. (b) Appabhai v. State of Gujarat Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1908 S.C. 696. (c) State of Gujarat v. Naginbhai Dhulabhai Patel State of Gujarat v. Naginbhai Dhulabhai Patel , 1983 S. C. C. (Crl.) 590 and (d) State v. Bharwadd Jakshibhai Nagribhai State v. Bharwadd Jakshibhai Nagribhai, (1990)1 Crimes 83 25. (b) Appabhai v. State of Gujarat Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1908 S.C. 696. (c) State of Gujarat v. Naginbhai Dhulabhai Patel State of Gujarat v. Naginbhai Dhulabhai Patel , 1983 S. C. C. (Crl.) 590 and (d) State v. Bharwadd Jakshibhai Nagribhai State v. Bharwadd Jakshibhai Nagribhai, (1990)1 Crimes 83 25. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the prosecution had clearlyestablished the prior enmity between the accused and the deceased Raghupathy and the discrepancies observed by the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, are very minor, whether it related to the prior enmity, motive for the commission of offence, identification of A-3 to A-5, the overt act committed by A-1 to A-5, the material objects used by A-1 and A-2, the time of occurrence, or the group of human blood stains in M.Os.1, 3 and 4. It is also contended that the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, failed to consider the corroboration of evidence of P.Ws.1, 2, 3 band 4, particularly, when the prosecution had proved the commission of offence against the accused. 26. For all these reasons, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, had failed to take the probative value of the material evidence on record, and had arrived at a perverse finding and held that the prosecution had not proved the case beyond all reasonable doubts and acquitted A-1 to A-5, by misquoting the evidence, which ultimately resulted in the miscarriage of justice. 27. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, failed to appreciate that the evidence produced by the prosecution which are not merely circumstantial in nature. But are also positive, direct and unimpeachable in their character. Therefore, Mr.M.S.Kandasamy, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks the interference of this Court under the revisional jurisdiction, by relying upon the decisions in (a) Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 753. (b) State of U.P. v. Anil Singh State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1993 and (c) Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singh Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singh , 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 471. 28. (b) State of U.P. v. Anil Singh State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1993 and (c) Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singh Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singh , 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 471. 28. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, erred in over looking that evidence of injured eye-witness, P.W.1 also on account of the discrepancy with regard to the time of occurrence, based on the evidence of P.W.5, doctor read with Ex.P-7, post moretem certificate, finding half digested food particles in the stomach of the deceased. Raghupathy. In this regard, the relies upon the decision in P. Venkaiah v. State of A.P. P. Venkaiah v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1715. 29. Per contra,Mr.B.Sriramulu, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent. At the outset, contends that in the mater of revision against acquittal, this Court cannot reappreciate the evidence on record that were considered by the learned trial Judge while acquitting the respondents 1 to 5. assuming, a different view is possible. In this regard, he relied upon the decision in (a) Mahendra Pratap v. Sarju Singh Mahendra Pratap v. Sarju Singh, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 707. (b) B.R.Raut v. State of Maharashtra B.R.Raut v. State of Maharashtra, 1995 Crl.L.J. 2631. (c) State of Punjab v. Om Prakash State of Punjab v. Om Prakash, 1995 Crl.L.J. 3655. (d) G.R.Hanubha v. State of Gujarat G.R.Hanubha v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Crl.L.J. 3607. (e) Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2145: 1974 MLJ. (Crl.) 168. (f) Gajanan v. State of Maharashtra Gajanan v. State of Maharashtra , 1997 S.C.C. (Crl.) 605 30. The learned senior counsel for the respondents 1 to 5 herein (A-1 to A-5) contends that non-examination of vadivelu, the taxi driver would give an adverse inference to the case of the prosecution. In this regard, he relies upon the decision reported in State of U.P. v. Jagga State of U.P. v. Jagga, A.I.R. 1971 S.C 1586. 31. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the learned I AdditionalSessions Judge, Erode, had given several reasons, after analysing the evidence on record, from all angles, pointing out the discrepancies and contradictions in detail and had rightly given benefit of doubt to A-1 to A-5, and finally, acquit-‘ted them by him order dated 12.12.1993. 31. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the learned I AdditionalSessions Judge, Erode, had given several reasons, after analysing the evidence on record, from all angles, pointing out the discrepancies and contradictions in detail and had rightly given benefit of doubt to A-1 to A-5, and finally, acquit-‘ted them by him order dated 12.12.1993. Therefore, any interference with the said order of acquittal by this Court by exercising the revision-ary powers, overlooking the above discrepancies and contradictions, would be contrary to the very principles of criminal jurisprudence, as it would not be safe to convict A-1 to A-5 in view of the discrepancies and contradictions highlighted in the order dated 12.12.1993. 32. Mr.Gunasekaran, learned Government Advocate for the sixth respondent contends that even though there is no positive and direct evidence to prove the charges against A-3 to A-5, the court below erred in overlooking the material evidences available on record for the charges framed against A-1 and A-2, and therefore, contends that learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, had erred in acquitting A-1 and A-2. 33. I have given a careful consideration to the submissions of both sides. 34. Before analysing the validity of the order of acquittal dated 12.12.1994 made in S.C.No.82 of 1993, which is challenged in the above revision, it is just and proper to refer the decisions relied upon by both sides on the revisional powers of this Court against an order of acquittal. 35. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the following decisions contending that the order dated 12.12.1993 deserves interference by exercising revisional powers of this Court. (a) Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 753 (b) State of U.P. v. Anil Singh State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1998 and (c) Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singh Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singh , 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 471. 36. In Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hijibhai v. State of Gujarat Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hijibhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 753 the Apex Court has held as follows: “Overmuch importance cannot be given to minor discrepancies. Discrepancies which do not got to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witness, therefore, cannot be annexed with undue importance. More so when the all important”Probabilities-factor“echoes in favour of the version narrated by the witnesses.” 37. Discrepancies which do not got to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witness, therefore, cannot be annexed with undue importance. More so when the all important”Probabilities-factor“echoes in favour of the version narrated by the witnesses.” 37. In State of U.P. v. Anil Singh State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1998the Apex Court has held as follows: “But the Supreme Court will not hesitate to interfere if the acquittal is perverse in the sense that no reasonable person would have come to the conclusion, or if the acquittal is manifestly illegal or grossly unjust.” “In an appeal against acquittal the Supreme Court observed that in the great majority of cases, the prosecution version is rejected either for want of corroboration by independent witnesses, or for some falsehood stated or embroidery added by witnesses. In some cases, the entire prosecution case is doubted for not examining all witnesses to the occurrence. The indifferent attitude of the public in the investigation of crimes could also be pointed. The public are generally reluctant to come forward to depose before the court. It is, therefore, not correct to reject the prosecution version only on ground that all witnesses to occurrence have not be examined. It is also not proper to reject the case for want of corroboration by independent witnesses if the case made out is otherwise true and acceptable. With regard to falsehood stated or embellishments added by the prosecution witnesses, it is well to remember that there is a tendency amongst witnesses in our country to back up a good case by false or exaggerated version. It is also experienced that invariably the witnesses add embroidery to prosecution story, perhaps for the fear of being disbelieved. But that is no ground to throw the case overboard. If true, in the main. If there is a sign of truth in the main, the case should not be rejected. It is the duty of the court to cull out the suggests of truth from the evidence unless there is reason to believe that the inconsistencies of falsehood are so glaring as utterly to destroy confidence in the witnesses. It is necessary to remember that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. It is necessary to remember that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. One is as important as the other. Both are public duties which the Judge has to perform.” 38. In Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singh In Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singh , 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 471 the Apex Court has held as follows: “In our view the High Court has given adequate reasons for interfering with the acquittal and ordering a retrial of the appellants. We may add that the High Court also expressed the view that the instances mentioned by this Court in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R., 1962 S.C. 1788: (1963)3 S.C.R. 412 as justifying interference with orders of acquittal in the exercise of revisional powers were illustrative and not exhaustive. We agree with the view expressed by the High Court and we only wish to say that the Criminal Justice system does not admit of pigeon-holding. Life and the law do not fall neatly into slots. When a court starts laying down rules enumerated (1), (2), (3), (4) or (a), (b), (c), (d), it is arranging for itself traps and pitfalls. Categories, classifications and compartments, which statute does not mention, all tend to make law less flexible, less sensible and less just.” 39. Per contra, the learned senior counsel for the respondent contends that the revisionary powers of this Court cannot be exercised to interfere with the above order dated 12.12.1993, in view of the following decisions: (a) Mahendra Pratap v. Sarju Singh Mahendra Pratap v. Sarju Singh, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 707. (b) B.B.Raut v. State of Maharashtra B.B.Raut v. State of Maharashtra, 1995 Crl.L.J. 2631. (c) State of Punjab v. Om Prakash State of Punjab v. Om Prakash, 1995 Crl.L.J. 3655. (d) G.R.Hanubha v. State of Gujarat G.R.Hanubha v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Crl.L.J. 3607. (e) Akalu Ahip v. Ramdeo Ram Akalu Ahip v. Ramdeo Ram, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2145: 1974 MLJ. (Crl.) 168. (f) Gajanan v. State of Maharashtra Gajanan v. State of Maharashtra , 1997 S.C.C. (Crl.) 605. 40. (d) G.R.Hanubha v. State of Gujarat G.R.Hanubha v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Crl.L.J. 3607. (e) Akalu Ahip v. Ramdeo Ram Akalu Ahip v. Ramdeo Ram, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2145: 1974 MLJ. (Crl.) 168. (f) Gajanan v. State of Maharashtra Gajanan v. State of Maharashtra , 1997 S.C.C. (Crl.) 605. 40. In Mahendra Pratap v. Sarju Singh Mahendra Pratap v. Sarju Singh, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 707 the Apex Court has held as follows: “In revision, the learned Judge in the High Court went into the evidence very minutely. He questioned every single finding of the learned Sessions Judge and gave his own interpretation of the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it. He discounted the theory that the weapon of attack was a revolver and suggested that it might have been a shot gun or country made pistol which the villagers in the position of Kuldip and Sarju could not distinguish from a revolver. He then took up each single circumstance on which the learned Sessions Judge had found some doubt and interpreting the evidence de novoheld, contrary to the opinion of the Sessions Judge that they were acceptable. All the time he appeared to give the benefit of the doubt to the prosecution. The only error of law which the learned Judge found in the Sessions Judges judgment was a remark by the Sessions Judge that the defence witnesses who were examined by the police before they were brought as defence witness ought to have been cross-examined with reference to their previous statements recorded by the police, which obviously is against the provisions of the Code. Except for this error, no defect of procedure or of law was discovered by the learned judge of the High Court in his appraisal of the judgment of the Sessions Judge. As stated already by us, he seems to have gone into the matter as if an appeal against acquittal was before him making no distinction between the appellant and the revisional powers exercisable by the High Court, if matter of acquittal except to the extent that instead of convicting the appellant he only ordered his retrial. In our opinion, the learned Judge was clearly in error in proceeding as he did in a revision filed by a private party against the acquittal reached in the Court of Session. In our opinion, the learned Judge was clearly in error in proceeding as he did in a revision filed by a private party against the acquittal reached in the Court of Session. The practice on the subject has been stated by this Court on more than one occasion. In D.Stephens v. Nosibolla D.Stephens v. Nosibolla, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 254: A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 196 only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is misappreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas Logendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas, 1951 S.C.R. 676:1951 S.C. 316this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. this Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is “perverse” or “lacking in the true correct perspective”. It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the subordinate court, it is always difficult to reweigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh , (1963)3 S.C.R. 412 : A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1788 it is pointed out thatan interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the court had shut out some material evidence which as admissible or attempted to take into account, evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which, the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid down by this Court was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court, it is apparent to us that the learned Judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” 41. In B.B. Raut v. State of Maharashtra B.B. Raut v. State of Maharashtra, 1995 Crl.L.J. 2631 the Apex Court has held as follows: “We also do not find High Court to have pointed out that the appreciation of evidence by the trial court was not fair. Without recording any of these findings, how are High Court upset the order of acquittal, is not intelligible. It was, in our view,‘ not appropriate for the High Court to have interferred with an order of acquittal merely because it thought that it could take a different view of the appreciation of the evidence to us. It appears that the High Court has erred gravely to set aside the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. We have ourselves analysed the evidence on the record and find that the appreciation of the same by the trial court was proper and fair. The reasons for acquittal as recorded by the trial court appeal to us.” 42. It appears that the High Court has erred gravely to set aside the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. We have ourselves analysed the evidence on the record and find that the appreciation of the same by the trial court was proper and fair. The reasons for acquittal as recorded by the trial court appeal to us.” 42. In State of Punjab v. Om Prakash State of Punjab v. Om Prakash , 1995 Crl.L.J. 3655 the Apex Court held as follows: “The High Court has indicated that the deceased was attacked by the other accused, namely Satpal and Om Prakash and Vijay Kumar had not caused any harm to the deceased and it has also been held by the High Court that they had no intention to murder Subhash Chander. “We, therefore, see not reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and this appeal is therefore, dismissed.” 43. In G.R.Hanubha v. State of Gujarat G.R.Hanubha v. State of Gujarat , 1995 Crl.L.J. 3607 the Apex Court has held as follows: “No doubt it is well settled that the powers of an appellate court to review evidence in appeals against acquittal is as extensive as its powers it appeals against convictions, but that power is with the note of caution that the appellate court should be slow in interfering with the orders of acquittal unless there are compelling reasons to do so. If a finding reached by the trial court cannot be said to be an unreasonable finding, then the appellate court should not disturb that finding. It is also settled Taw that if two views are possible on the evidence in record and the trial court has taken one of such views it is not for the appellate court to evaluate the evidence and take a different view than the one taken by the trial court.” 44. In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, 1974 MLJ. (Crl.) 168: A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2145the Apex Court has held as follows: “The power of revision conferred on a High Court by Sec.439 read with Sec.435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an extraordinary discretionary power vested in the superior court to be exercised in aid of justice in other words, to set right grave injustice. (Crl.) 168: A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2145the Apex Court has held as follows: “The power of revision conferred on a High Court by Sec.439 read with Sec.435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an extraordinary discretionary power vested in the superior court to be exercised in aid of justice in other words, to set right grave injustice. The High Court has been invested with this power to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognised rules of criminal jurisprudence and that the Subordinate Courts do not exceed their jurisdiction or abuse the power conferred on them by law. As a general rule this power in spite of the wide language of Secs.435 and 439, Criminal Procedure Code does not contemplate interference with the conclusions of fact in the absence of serious legal infirmity and failure of justice, This power is certainly not intended to be so exercised as to make one portion of the Code of Criminal Procedure conflict with another as would seem to be the case when in the garb of exercising revisional power, the High Court in effect exercises the power of appeal in face of statutory prohibition.” “The High Court when approached by a private party for exercising its power of revision from an order of acquittal, should refrain from interfering except when there is a glaring legal defect of a serious nature which has resulted in grave failure of justice. It is not expected to act under Secs.435 and 439, Criminal Procedure Code, as if it is hearing an appeal in spite of the wide language under Sec.435 which empowers it to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of a finding, sentence or order and as to the regularity of any proceeding and also in spite of the fact that under Sec.439 it can exercise inter alia the power conferred on a court of appeal under Sec.423, Criminal Procedure Code. The power being discretionary, it has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. The power being discretionary, it has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. Judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which is informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system.” “In the present case, the High Court has re-weighed the evidence from its own point of view and though at the outset it noticed the correct legal position and expressly acknowledged the limits within which it was called upon to decide whether or not to interfere with the order of acquittal, in actual practice, it does not seem to have attended to the rules laid down by the Supreme Court in earlier decisions. No doubt the appraisal of evidence by the trial judge is not perfect or free from flaw and a Court of Appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with its conclusion, but from this it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is entitled to reappraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of Appeal and then order a re-trial. 45. In Gajanan v. State of Maharashtra Gajanan v. State of Maharashtra, 1997 S.C.C. (Crl.) 605 the Apex Court has held as follows: “The trial court gave cogent and sufficient reasons to acquit the appellant. The High Court should not have interfered with the order of acquittal more so when the reasons given by the trial court were neither perverse nor even unreasonable. The High Court did not dispel the reasons given by the trial court while upsetting the order of acquittal. Though, no distinction is made regarding powers of the High Court in dealing with appeals against acquittal as well as against conviction and it has full power to review all the evidence and arrive at independent findings, nonetheless the High Court should be rather slow to interfere with the findings of the trial court, unless the same are perverse or otherwise unreasonable. Judicial approach in dealing with a case of appeal against acquittal has to be cautious, circumspect and careful. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked these salutary principles and interfered with a well-merited order of acquittal by adopting an erroneous approach. The order of the High Court under the circumstances convicting and sentencing the appellant for an offence under Sec.302, I.P.C. to life imprisonment cannot be sustained.” 46. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked these salutary principles and interfered with a well-merited order of acquittal by adopting an erroneous approach. The order of the High Court under the circumstances convicting and sentencing the appellant for an offence under Sec.302, I.P.C. to life imprisonment cannot be sustained.” 46. By a close and careful reading of the decisions, the following principles are derived with regard to the revisional powers of this Court against an order of acquittal: this Court can interfere with the orders of acquittal under revisional powers: (a) only if the order of acquittal is perverse in the sense that no reasonable person would come to such conclusions; (b) if the order of acquittal has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice, so far as the opposite party is concerned; (c) if the acquittal is based on minor discrepancies; (d) If the acquittal is based on its own interpretation of evidence or misquoting the material evidence on record; (e) the judicial discretion sought to be exercised in the revisional jurisdiction should be well informed by tradition, methodized by analogy and disciplined by the principles of criminal jurisprudence and there should not be a glaring legal defect, serious legal infirmity or grave failure of justice apparent on the face of the order of acquittal due to the failure of appreciation of the material evidence on record or due to the non-application of mind to the available evidence which rendered the miscarriage of justice. 47. It is therefore necessary to analyse the reasons given by the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Erode, for acquitting A-1 to A-5, in the light of the above mentioned principles. 48. No doubt, P.W.1 is an injured eye-witness, whose evidence cannot be lightly disregarded merely on the ground of minor discrepancies between his statement and that of the other prosecution witnesses. In this regard, the decisions referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner deserved my consideration. 49. In Rana Partap v. State of Haryana Rana Partap v. State of Haryana , 1983 Crl.L.J. 1272 the Apex Court has held as follows: “In a murder trial by describing the independent witnesses as chance witnesses it cannot be implied thereby that their evidence is suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a brothel,” prostitutes and paramours are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a street only passersby will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere chance witnesses. The expression chance witnesses is borrowed from countries where every mans home is considered his castle and every one must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another mans castle. It is a most unsuitable expression in a country whose people are less formal and more casual. To discard the evidence of street hawkers and street vendors on the ground that they are chance witnesses, even where murder is committed on a street, is to abandon good sense and taken too shallow a view of the evidence.“ ”Every person who witnesses a murder reacts in his own way. Some are stunned, become speechless and stand rooted to the spot. Some become hysteric and start wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim, even going to the extent of counter attacking the assailants. Every one reacts in the own special way. There is no set rule of natural reaction. To discard the evidence of witnesses on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and imaginative way.” 50. In Appabhai v. State of Gujarat Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 696 the Apex Court has held as follows: “We have, however, also examined the relevant evidence. It is truethat there are many contradictions in the evidence of Devji. He has not attributed overt acts to individual accused in his statement before the police whereas he has attributed such overt acts in his evidence before the court. But that is no ground to reject his entire testimony. It must not be forgotten that he was a victim of the assault. Fortunately he has survived. He must, therefore, be considered as, the best eye-witnesses. The court while appreciating the evidence must not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. But that is no ground to reject his entire testimony. It must not be forgotten that he was a victim of the assault. Fortunately he has survived. He must, therefore, be considered as, the best eye-witnesses. The court while appreciating the evidence must not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be discarded. The discrepancies which are due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance. The errors due to lapse of memory may be given due allowance. The court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in different cases must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts alleged by such witness, the proper course is to ignore that fact only unless it goes into the root of the matter so as to demolish the entire prosecution story. The witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to their version perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the court. The courts, however, should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. speaking for this Court in Sohrab v. State of Madhya Pradesh Sohrab v. State of Madhya Pradesh, l972 Crl.L.J. 1382at 1305:A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2020at 2024observed: “This Court has held that falsus in no falsein omnibus is not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one cores across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain or untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishments. In most cases, the witnesses when asked about details venture to give some answer, not necessarily true or relevant for fear that their evidence may not be accepted in respect of the main incident which they have witnessed but that is not to say that their evidence as to the salient features of the case after cautious scrutiny cannot be considered, particularly those who had been injured are, in our opinion, unintelligible and insupportable.” 51. In State v. Bharwadd Jakshibhai Nagribhai State v. Bharwadd Jakshibhai Nagribhai, (1990)1 Crimes 82Gujarat High Court has held as follows: “The court should take into considerationthe glaring prevailing fact in the society that independent witnesses are not forthcoming to assist the investigating agency for various reasons such as terror by the accused, danger to their life or property because of the accused, harassment at the investigation stage, repeated adjournments in the court and on some occasions irrelevant piercing cross-examination by the defence counsel. Therefore, merely because the prosecution has failed to examine so-called independent witnesses to the murder or incident would be no ground for discarding the evidence of the prosecution witnesses who may be either the injured or relative of the deceased accompanying the deceased.” 52. The learned trial Judge has overlooked the evidence of P.W.I, merely because there was certain discrepancies between his evidence and that of the other prosecution witnesses, namely, P.W.2 and P.W.4 either with regard to prior enmity between A-l and the deceased Raghupathy, the motive for committing the offences or the identification of P.Ws.3,4 and 5 or the overt act by A-l to A-5 or as to the weapons used by A-l and A-2 or with regard to the time of occurrence etc., as observed by learned I Additional Sessions Judge. 53. In this connection, I am obliged to refer the decision in Bharwada Bhaginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat Bharwada Bhaginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 753which is already referred to above. The discrepancies weighedby the learned trial Judge are, of course, very minor in nature, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned trial judge, instead of appreciating the “probabilities-factors” which echo in favour of the version of the prosecution witnesses and finding the irrebuttable truth in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, Had searched for uniformity, but found the same was lacking in the version of the prosecution witnesses, ultimately, earthed out certain discrepancies and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, gave benefit of doubt to A-l to A-5 and acquitted them; and in the process, the learned trial Judge had failed to consider the direct and irrebuttable evidence available, to establish the charge against A-l, if not, against A-2 to A-5. 54. 54. The overall reading of the deposition of P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4, makes it clear that there was a prior enmity between A-1 and the deceased Raghupathy, if not, between A-2 to A-5 and the deceased Raghupathy and on account of which, A-1 had a motive to murder the deceased Raghupathy and caused multiple grievous cut injuries by using an aruval, M.O.3 as a result of which, the said Raghupathy died, which is corroborated with the evidence of the doctor, P.W.5 read with post mortem certificate, Ex.P-7. Therefore, it is immaterial whether there was one or more reasons for previous enmity between A-1 and the deceased Raghupathy viz., either due to the stolen hen or on account of driving the power tiller in the turmeric field of the deceased Raghupathy on 22.3.1993 or due to the illicit relationship between A-1 and Sembayee, the mother of A-2 which was condemned by the deceased Raghupathy. 55. When a prior enemity between A-1 and the deceased Raghupathy had been spoken to by all the prosecution witnesses corroboratively, that itself is sufficient to accept the case of the prosecution, and therefore, it is not open for the defence to fish out the discrepancies and contradictions on that account and claim the benefit of doubt totally ignoring the truth behind the commission of offences, It is for this reason, the Apex Court is pleased to hold that the falsus in uno falsus in omnibus in is not a sound rule at all times for the reason that hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishments. 56. Similarly the evidence of P.W.I injured eye witness cannot be lightly rejected because he had not mentioned the names of A-3 to A-5 in the F.I.R. eventhough he was accompanied by P.W.4 to the police station. 57. The discrepancies observed by the learned trial Judge with regard to the time of occurrence on the basis of the medical report finding certain half digested food particles in the stomach of the deceased Raghupathy, is also erroneous and perverse. 57. The discrepancies observed by the learned trial Judge with regard to the time of occurrence on the basis of the medical report finding certain half digested food particles in the stomach of the deceased Raghupathy, is also erroneous and perverse. In this connection, it is relevant to refer the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner P. Venkaiah v. State of A.P. P. Venkaiah v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1715 wherein it is held as follows: “Where the trial court by merely misreading the medical evidence, which in fact was consistent with the evidence of eye witnesses, disbelieved the eye witnesses and acquitted the accused, it was held that the judgment of the trial court was extremely perverse and no other reasonable view was possible than the guilt of the accused. Their conviction by the High Court was proper.” 58. As already mentioned, in view of the clear and direct evidence of P.W.1 which is corroborated with the evidence of P.Ws. 2,3 and 4 and M.O.I, the mere existence of half digested roof in the stomach of the deceased Raghupathy cannot be misquoted to ignore the evidence of the P.W.1 the injured eye witness totally which corroborates with the evidences of P.Ws.2, 3 and 4. 59. Of course, the learned senior counsel for the respondents 1 to 5 contends that the non-examination of Vadivelu, the taxi driver, in whose taxi the deceased was taken to Erode, affects the truth of the prosecution case in view of the decision of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Jaggo State of U.P. v. Jaggo, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1586wherein, it is held as follows: “Ramesh is the person with whom Lalu was talking at the time of the alleged occurrence. Ramesh was mentioned in the first information report. It is true that all the witnesses of the prosecution need not be called but it is important to notice that the witness whose evidence is essential to the “unfolding of the narratives” should be called. This salutary principle in criminal trials has been stressed by this Court in the case of Habib Mohammad v. The State of Hyderabad Habib Mohammad v. The State of Hyderabad , 1954 S.C.R. 475:A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 51 for elicitingthe truth. The absence of Ramesh from the prosecution evidence seriously affects the truth of the prosecution case.” 60. This salutary principle in criminal trials has been stressed by this Court in the case of Habib Mohammad v. The State of Hyderabad Habib Mohammad v. The State of Hyderabad , 1954 S.C.R. 475:A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 51 for elicitingthe truth. The absence of Ramesh from the prosecution evidence seriously affects the truth of the prosecution case.” 60. But, as I have already observed, I do not consider that the mere non-examination of Vadivelu will render the prosecution case totally unbased. It is well settled that if there is a ring of truth in the main, the prosecution case should not be neglected totally. It is the duty of the court to cull out the neggetes of truth from the evidence unless there is reason to believe that the inconsistencies or falsehood are so glaring as utterly to destroy the confidence in the witness. There are clear and unimpeachable evidence for the prior enmity between A-1 and the deceased Raghupathy, as well as for the motive of A-1 to murder the deceased Raghupathy, for the presence of A-1 in the scene of occurrence and at the time of occurrence for the participation of A-1 in the commission of offence and for the overt act said to have been committed by A-1 by using M.O.3 as a weapon to commit the offence. Therefore, discrepancies and contradictions observed by the learned judge and giving benefit of doubt on that score to A-1, is, in my considerable opinion, amounts to a perverse finding which had resulted in grave miscarriage of justice, even though those discrepancies and contradictions may hold good and sound for acquitting A-2 to A-5. 61. For all the above reasons I do not think it is necessary to go into the merits and demerits of the defence taken by the accused in the trial. 62. I am, therefore, obliged to interfere with the order of acquittal in so far as the first respondent is concerned and consequently set aside the order of acquittal dated 12.12.1993 in S.C.No.92 of 1993 in so far as the first respondent A-1 is concerned, and confirm the order of acquittal dated 12.12.1994 in S.C.No.92 of 1993 insofar as A-2, A-5 are concerned. 63. 63. In the result, revision is partly allowed and the matter is remitted back to the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Periyar District at Erode, for re-hearing without being prejudiced by the observations of this Court in the above revision, and to dispose of the same within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. However, there is no order as to costs.