JUDGMENT 1. - This Special Appeal has been preferred before this court against the order, dated 19.9.1997 passed by learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4728/1996 whereby learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. 2. The salient questions which arise for consideration of this court in this appeal are:- 1. Whether it was not incumbent upon the competent authority to indicate the reasons as to how the so called adverse remarks are co-related to each other and their consequential effect on the service career of the delinquent official and which exist on the record ? 2. Whether the failure to achieve the requisite revenue targets in a supervisory capacity of a delinquent Govt. servant who is not directly responsible for achieving the said targets can be co-related to his personal assessment so as to deprive him of service benefits which are due and admissible to him in accordance with Rules ? 3. The facts giving rise to the filing of the present appeal briefly stated are that the petitioner-appellant had joined the services in the Department of Public Health and Engineering, State of Rajasthan, Jaipur (for short "PHED") after attaining the qualification of B.E. (Mechanical) and was initially posted as Assistant Engineer in the said department in the year 1967 consequent upon his selection for appointment by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer (for short "RPSC"). Thereafter he was promoted as Executive Engineer in the year 1973 and later on promoted as Superintending Engineer in the year 1987 on which post he is currently performing his duties in the Urban Design Circle Department of PHED, Jaipur. 4. It has been stated in the writ petition that after completion of his training in U.K. and thereafter at Hyderabad from January, 1991 to April, 1991, while he was posted as Superintending Engineer at Kota, he was surprised to note that one Shri P.K. Thakur had committed several irregularities while he was holding the charge of Superintending Engineer and the petitioner had reported this matter to the Chief Engineer and Addl. Chief Engineer at Ajmer for necessary action. It has further been contended that the then Addl v. . Chief Engineer, Ajmer who was controlling officer of Kota Circle, had soft corner for Shri P.K. Thakur. Chief Engineer at Ajmer for necessary action. It has further been contended that the then Addl v. . Chief Engineer, Ajmer who was controlling officer of Kota Circle, had soft corner for Shri P.K. Thakur. The petitioner had made adverse entries in the Annual Performance Appraisal Reports (for short "APARs") of Shri P.K. Thakur, the then Executive Engineer which were forwarded by him to the then Addl. Chief Engineer for taking note of onward progress of the work of the delinquent officer against whom adverse remarks had been made in the APARs by the petitioner for the period 1990-91 in respect of Kota region, and in view of the petitioner having discussed the matter personally with the then Chief Engineer, an order came to be passed on 5.5.1990 (Annexure 2) by the Chief Engineer, PHED, the perusal of which reveals that the then Chief Engineer, PHED had recommended the need for close monitoring and correctness of the officials at different levels in order to achieve the progress and had also authorised the Superintending Engineer regarding taking of the ultimate and final decisions pertaining to all relevant matters concerning the PHED. 5. It has further been contended by the petitioner in the writ petition that on account of the issuance of the order, dated 5.5.1990, and as a result of the action taken by the petitioner against Shri P.K. Thakur, the then Addl. Chief Engineer who was the Reporting Officer of the petitioner, became annoyed and on account of prejudice and malice, certain adverse entries were made by him in the APARs of the petitioner for the period 1989-00, 1990-91 and 1991-92 which form part of Annexures 3, 4 & 5 to the writ petition and are reproduced here-in-below as under:- 1989-90 "More attention should be paid to getting the works completed after planning for the same properly to make them useful in Scheduled time. Attention is also required in the revenue realisation and to adopt computerisation." 1990-91 Comments on the self assessment:- The Officer needs to properly plan his works and make efforts to bring them to a useful and in time. He should also pay attention to revenue realisation and improvement in the system by adopting computerisation. Enteries in APARs of 89-90 and 90-91 were advisory and hence no representation was permitted. He should also pay attention to revenue realisation and improvement in the system by adopting computerisation. Enteries in APARs of 89-90 and 90-91 were advisory and hence no representation was permitted. 1991-92 S.No. Name of the Branch Number of merit 1 Civil Police 62 2 Armed Force Police 58 3 Intelligence Branch 62 4 Raj. Armed Constabulary 59 6. From the perusal of the above APARs it is apparent that the report of the Reporting Officer as regards the entries for the period 1989-90 are advisory in nature, since the petitioner was advised to pay more attention to getting the requisite tasks completed after proper planning so as to enable to make it useful for the department within the scheduled time. The petitioner was further advised to give prompt attention in the matter of realisation of revenue and to adopt computerization. In our view this observation of the Reporting Officer cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be construed as adverse entry, since the department was more concerned in realisation of the revenue targets and computerisation and also getting the requisite project completed within the stipulated period. 7. Likewise the entries for the period 1990-91 in the APARs which pertain to the comments of the Reporting Officer on self-assessments are also para materia on the same lines as above, since the petitioner was advised to make proper planning as regards the completion of requisite tasks assigned to him and to make the same useful for the department within the stipulated period, apart from giving proper attention to realisation of revenue and improvement in the system by adopting computerization. 8. From the perusal of the aforesaid entries in the APARs of the Appellant for the period 1989-90 and 1990-91, it is clearly apparent that the same were persistently in respect of revenue realisation in lack of proper planning to achieve the requisite targets within the scheduled time and hence by any stretch of imagination this should not be construed as adverse entries casting any reflection on the service career on the appellant and obviously advisory in nature since it is impossible for smooth and proper functioning of the administrative system without proper planning by the concerned official so as to achieve optimum benefit for the department and the result oriented programme for the public at large to make their work useful for the society. It is significant to mention in this contest that since the entries in the APARs of the appellant for the aforesaid period were advisory in nature, hence no representation was permitted. 9. As regards the entries in the APARs for the period 1991-92 they are in no way different than the entries for the above period except that the difference as regards the entries made in column No. 2 of the APARs for the aforesaid period that the Reportee Officer had not submitted proper format and he required lot of pursuation for work and yet had failed to achieve the requisite revenue targets particularly and other targets generally, which in our view is a general direction in advisory capacity since what were those particular targets which were required to be achieved by the appellant within the stipulated period as well as other targets generally have not been clearly spelt out by the Reporting/Reviewing Authority nor the same were specifically conveyed to the petitioner resulting in deprivation of fair opportunity to make representation to the competent Authority in violation of natural justice and this in our considered view, cannot be construed as communication of adverse remarks. We are of the view that these remarks are general in nature since merely because a particular officer has failed to achieve the requisite targets within the stipulated period, by itself should not cast any reflection on his service career or cannot be construed as under estimation as regards his qualities and abilities, since it would depend on several factors which may be beyond the comprehension and beyond the actual physical control of the said officer and in our view the concerned delinquent officer should not be under-estimated in the eyes of his immediate superiors merely because he has failed to achieve the requisite targets within the stipulated period as referred to above and the same remarks are advisory in nature and should not be construed as adverse entries so as to deprive the said officer of the service benefits which are due and admissible to him in accordance with law. No doubt in administrative matters proper planning and careful handling of the matters which require properatention and planning are necessary but notwithstanding the exercise of proper planning and careful handling it may not be physically possible for concerned delinquent officer to complete the requisite task or the projects within the stipulated period, since that depends upon the active co-operation of so many agencies which are involved in public dealings and the sincerity and goodness and efficiency of an official cannot be whittled or lowered down in the estimation of his immediate superiors merely because for some reasons beyond his control the concerned officer has failed to achieve the same, since the revenue realisation and to adopt computerisation by itself cannot be construed as adverse entries as already referred to above as regards the self appraisal of the delinquent officer in terms of the standard of performances prescribed for the "Key Result Areas." However, if there is nothing adverse as regards the character, conduct, efficiency and integrity of the concerned officer, if so reported, by the concerned authority as regards the APARs of the said officer, in our considered view the said officer should not be deprived of service benefits as regards his promotions etc. which are due and admissible to him in accordance with the rules. 10. From the perusal of the writ petition it has been brought to our notice during the course of hearing by the learned counsel for the appellant at the bar that the entries in the APARs of the Appellant for the disputed period, i.e., 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92 are admittedly advisory in nature and against which no representation was necessary to be made to the competent authority for reviewing the said entries keeping in view the guidelines of the department which fact is evident from the Departmental Instructions APARs of 1976 (for short "instructions of 1976"). During the course of hearing it was further brought to our notice that the Department of Personnel, Govt. During the course of hearing it was further brought to our notice that the Department of Personnel, Govt. of Rajasthan, Jaipur vide its communication dated 3.1.1995 (annexure 5) to the writ petition had communicated the entries to the appellant for the period 1991-92 through the Chief Engineer which were received by the appellant on 13.1.1995 and in our view the said communication is obviously a belated communication which has resulted in deprivation of fair and adequate opportunity to the appellant of having made the representation to the competent authority within the time which, in our view, is also in gross violation of principles of natural justice, equity and fair play since the law is so well settled by the apex court that non communication of adverse entries of belated/delayed communication of the adverse entries to the concerned delinquent official should not be permitted and the department is not entitled to deprive the concerned delinquent official of the service benefits since the communication of adverse entries made by the reporting officer after considerable delay would obviously result in serious and irreparable damage to the said officer. The logical inference which emerges in such a situation is that the case of the appellant may not be considered fairly on account of existing adverse remarks or that he has been deprived of the fair opportunity of making effective representation to the competent authority as a result of delayed communication of the said remarks as it has happened in this case. 11. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended at the bar that the aforesaid entries for the period in dispute as recorded in the APARs, of the appellant were advisory in nature and cannot be construed as adverse. Infact the appellant had sought clarification immediately from the respondents by sending a notice to the Secretary, D.O.P., Jaipur dated 16.9.1996 wherein he had requested the Government to clarify as to whether the aforesaid two entries for the period 1989-90 and 1990-91 were to be treated as adverse or in the nature of advise to the appellant who had requested that the decision may be conveyed positively to him within 15 days of the receipt of the said communication. Notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence by the appellant, in our view, there was obviously no lapse on the part of the appellant but the conduct of the respondents is more blameworthy in not having responded to the appellant's request by not clarifying the position to him at the earliest possible opportunity, which, in our view, has resulted in deprivation of fair opportunity to the appellant of making proper and effective representation against the same resulting the grave injustice. We are further of the view that as regards the entry, i.e. 'proper format not submitted by the report officer,' for the period 1991-92, it is only a technical lacuna which cannot be considered as adverse entry so as to caste any aspersion on the conduct, character, efficiency and or on the integrity of the appellant and rather the respondents are deliberately responsible for having caused undue delay of more three years in not conveying the alleged adverse remarks which are only contrary to the instructions of 1976 as referred to above, but also are contrary to the settled law of the land which clearly goes to show that a reasonable apprehension was created in the mind of the appellant that the aforesaid material was deliberately cooked up and not communicated to the appellant within time by the Reporting Officer so as to damage his otherwise bright service career. In order to dispel any doubts we had summoned relevant confidential service record relating to the appellant for the period in dispute i.e., 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92 and from the perusal of the same we are fully satisfied that the said remarks recorded in the APARs of the appellant by Reporting Officer are merely advisory in nature and the mere failure to achieve revenue targets within the stipulated period cannot be construed as irresponsible conduct of the concerned delinquent official so as to adversely affect his service prospects and hence no responsibility should have been fastened on the appellant on his mere failure to achieve the said targets assigned to him within requisite period since the same would depend upon several unforseen factors and situations not within the comprehension and actual control of the said delinquent official. 12. 12. We have also perused the reply to the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents in reply to the show cause notice issued by this court in which the respondents have contended that the relief sought for by the appellant regarding expunging the adverse entries for the period in dispute as aforesaid shall not be extended to him since the appellant should have preferred an appeal before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal and without having exhausted the said statutory remedy he has erroneously invoked the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this court. 13. The other objections which were raised by the learned counsel for the respondents during the course of hearing are that till the recommendations of the DPC are challenged and implemented, no cause of action had arisen in favour of the appellant and no writ petition can be held maintainable only on the basis of presumption without challenging any adverse order which gives rise to the cause of action. Another objection which the respondents have taken is regarding non-impleadment of the necessary parties to the writ petition without mentioning which are those necessary parties which the appellant should have impleded and what damage or loss has been caused to the respondents as a result of non-joinder of necessary parties which the respondents have failed to spelt out in the reply to show cause notice and merely this by itself, in our view, should not be construed as depriving the appellant of his right to move this court for more effective and efficacious remedy by invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. During the course of hearing the respondents have also taken objection that the appellant has tried to shift the burden on other authorities without any basis and have further stated that in fact the Superintending Engineer being the immediate Incharge of the Circle was duty bound to see that the requisite targets are achieved within stipulated period and if there was any lacuna on his part then again the Superintending Engineer should be held responsible for the same and on the basis of the said conjectures and surmises the respondents have adopted the stand "that even if it is assumed without admitting that the Superintending Engineer is only for the purpose of supervising work of the subordinate authority, then also the said supervision of the petitioner was not proper as he had failed to supervise and observe that his subordinates fulfilled and achieved the targets. In such situation the Appellant just cannot shift his burden on others without any justifiable reasons." From the perusal of the above stand adopted by the respondents we are really surprised to note that as a matter of fact the respondents are themselves not sure of their stand as to whether failure to achieve the assigned revenue targets should be construed as adverse remarks merely for the reason that the appellant as Superintending Engineer was duty bound to see that the targets are achieved within time and how and in what manner it can be construed as adverse remarks affecting the service career of the appellant that the nature of the work assigned to the Superintending Engineer being only for supervising the work of subordinate authority apart from other duties assigned to him, in absence of any definite and positive act attributed to the appellant as regards failure to achieve the revenue targets particularly when he is not directly himself responsible to achieve the same and whether failure on the part of his subordinate officials to achieve the said targets should be construed as failure on the part of the appellant to have achieved the same since the respondents have themselves stated that the tasks of the Superintending Engineer is only supervisory in nature to supervise the work of the subordinate authority and hence the appellant cannot be blamed for any lapse on the part of his subordinate in not having achieved the said revenue target within the stipulated period. In our view each individual is responsible for his own acts and no responsibility on the principle of collective accountability can be assigned or fastened on any one particular immediate superior officer for any failure or lapse on the part of his or her subordinates since every individual shall be responsible for his own individual act of omission or commission which the learned counsel for the respondents has miserably failed to spell out or elaborate during the course of hearing of this appeal. 14. On merits it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that both the remarks regarding adverse entries in the APARs of the petitioner for the period 1989-90 and 1990-91 as aforesaid were expunged by the competent authority soon after the representation of the petitioner was decided by the respondents on 13.08.1996 and there was also delay in communication of adverse remarks which were conveyed beyond the period of two years after recording of the adverse entries in the year 1995 and the said delay was vital so as to prejudice the defence of the appellant, since he was prevented by a sufficient cause in making strong and effective representation to the competent authority against the communications of adverse remarks and as a result of which he was deprived of fair opportunity of making representation against the same. As regards the specified targets which the appellant was expected to achieve by the competent authority and which the appellant had failed to achieve while discharging his duties as Superintending Engineer, the obvious question which arises for our consideration is whether the said specified targets co-related to the nature of duties assigned to the appellant as the then Superintending Engineer. Learned counsel for the respondents failed to satisfy us since there was no proof on the record that what were those specified targets which the appellant was expected to achieve and further no satisfactory explanation was furnished regarding co-relation as to how the said specified targets were related to the nature of duties assigned to the appellant. Learned counsel for the respondents failed to satisfy us since there was no proof on the record that what were those specified targets which the appellant was expected to achieve and further no satisfactory explanation was furnished regarding co-relation as to how the said specified targets were related to the nature of duties assigned to the appellant. With regard to the above we are of the view that no adverse remarks for the periods in dispute were conveyed to the petitioner of which he was kept in absolute dark resulting in deprivation of fair opportunity to the appellant to make the representation against the adverse entries recorded in the APARs for the period in dispute as referred to above and we are further of the view that from the perusal of such adverse entries the same cannot be construed as communication of adverse remarks since first two entries for the period 1989-90 and 1990-91 are more in the nature of advisory remarks and which were also expunged by the competent authority as already referred to above, while the third and last remark regarding the non-compliance of the communication of a prescribed format for the period 1991-92 is a mere technical lacuna which does not go to the root of the matter and obviously cannot be construed as adverse remark. From the perusal of the impugned order dated 19.9.97 of the learned single Judge of this Court we are of the view that learned Single Judge has gone into technical aspects of the matter without examining the material on the record nor took into consideration the relevant law which has been so authoritatively settled in the series of decisions by the apex court and hence the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 15. We have also perused the order of learned single Judge dated 19.9.1997 passed in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 4726/1996 and in our view the learned single Judge has failed to take notice of the law which is so well settled by the Apex Court in series of decisions that it is not necessary that in each and every case the appellant as a matter of right should first approach the Service Appellate Tribunal constituted by the State Government before approaching this court by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The scope of Tribunal as regards the exercise of its jurisdiction in such matters which require immediate and prompt action is very limited because if there is serious violation of fundamental rights which are guaranteed under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India with reference to the relevant rules of the departments, and if any genuine grievance is raised as regards their violation, it is always open to the concerned aggrieved party to directly approach this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India instead of directing him to first exhaust the alternate remedy of approaching the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act of 1976. Notwithstanding the provision under the Act of 1976 as regards the disciplinary matters, though adequate provision has been made under the said Act for approaching the Service Tribunal on failure of concerned aggrieved party to seek necessary relief from the department by way of appeal or review, this by itself should not be construed as deprivation of extraordinary remedy which is available to the said individual by approaching the High Court directly under Article 226 or the Apex Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India if the circumstances so warrant in this regard. It is a matter of common experience that ordinarily the civil courts or Tribunals take a considerably long time in deciding the service matter which is expensive and burdensome to both, the Government servant and the government. The service matters which are defined in Section 2(f) of the Act of 1976 relating to seniority, promotion, confirmation, fixation of pay, any order denying or bearing pay, allowances, pensions and other service conditions to the disadvantage to the Government servant otherwise then as penalty or any other matter notified by the Government more particularly the recording of adverse entries in the APARs against any order rejecting the representation against the same is obviously not included within the ambit of sub-clause (v) of Clause (f) of Section 2 of the Act of 1976 and therefore, an appeal to the Tribunal against such adverse entry or an order rejecting the representation against the same is not available to the aggrieved party under the Act of 1976. Hence in our view the observation of learned single Judge that the appellant should have approached the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal before moving this court by way of present writ petition giving rise to this appeal is wholly untenable and unwarranted since it is not open to the concerned delinquent official to challenge the correctness of the adverse entries before the Tribunal resulting in violation of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution violation of which can be enforced more efficaciously and speedily directly by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by the High Court and the scope and exercise of jurisdiction of the Tribunal is very limited and the correctness of the said adverse entries can only be assailed by challenging any consequent order which has been passed by it relating to any of the matters as so specified in sub-clauses of clause (f) of Section 2 of the Act 1976. Since the limitation for appeal to the Tribunal is to be reckoned from the date of consequent order and not from the date of adverse entries or the order rejecting the representation against the same. The expression "other service conditions to the disadvantage of the Government servant" is a very comprehensive expression of wide amplitude so as to include the adverse entry in the APARs and notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the Tribunal who decides such matters, the jurisdiction of this court to deal with such matters of extraordinary nature where the service career of the delinquent official has been adversely affected as a result of non-communication or belated communication of the adverse entries with which he has been charged, cannot by itself divest this court of its jurisdiction to deal with such matters by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As a matter of fact learned single Judge, in our view, should not have adopted such narrow technical approach in rejecting the writ petition on this ground alone and should have rather adopted a broad and fair approach to the matter by first directing the respondents to place before the court confidential service record of the appellant for the period in dispute so as to examine the same and its consequential effect on service career of the appellant. The ratio of the decision of this court in the matter of Tayyab All V/s State of Rajasthan reported in 1988(2) RLR page 1 which has been relied by the learned single Judge, is not attracted to this case since nothing prevents this court from exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by scrutinising entire confidential service record more particularly the record of the disputed period so as to examine the correctness and propriety of so called adverse entries and its consequential effect on the concerned delinquent official for the purpose of making a fair estimation of the same as regards the period in dispute. We are further of the view that the learned single judge has failed to adopt a fair and a broad approach to the matter and had dismissed the writ petition as premature on the ground of alternate remedy which, in our view, was not correct and proper approach to have been adopted by the learned single Judge. 16. As regards the ratio of the decisions of the learned Full Bench in Tayyab Ali case (supra) we are of the view that learned Full Bench had held that such order is not included within the ambit of sub-clause (v) of clause (f) of Section 2 of the Act of 1976 and consequently the order was not appealable to the Tribunal and if this ratio had been appreciated by learned single Judge in its true and logical prospects, then the conclusion which should have been arrived at by learned single Judge would have been quite different and rather he would not have gone on the aspect of maintainability of the writ petition, since learned Full Bench has nowhere observed that the correctness of the order as regards APARs cannot be assailed or challenged by the concerned delinquent official by challenging any consequent order passed by the same, since it is merely an observation applicable to that case only and cannot be applied as a precedent in other cases where adverse entries are subject matter of challenge as had happened in the instant case. Thus in our considered view learned single judge has erred in misapplying the ratio of the aforesaid decision of learned Full Bench and which obviously goes to the root of the matter and in our view the writ petition should have been held maintainable against expunction of the adverse remarks prejudicing the fair chances of promotion which were due and available to the appellant and which he has been unjustly deprived of so unfairly by the respondents. 17. We are fortified in our aforesaid observations from the following decisions of the apex court as well as of this Court : Union of India and Ors. v. E.G. Nambudiri: 1991 (3) SCC 38 , S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. and other connected writ petitions: 1987 (1) SCC 124 , Mangal Chand Taylor v. High Court of judicature for Rajasthan & Anr. 1991(1) RLR 143 , Ratan Lal Agrawal v. High Court of Judicature for Raj. & Ors. : 1995(1) RLR 539 and Dr. Gyan Chand Jain v. State of Rajasthan & Anr.: 1993 (1) WLC (Raj.) 526 . 18. In the matter of Union of India & Ors. v. E.G. Nambudiri (supra) the respondent who was a Section Officer under the Government of India was communicated six adverse remarks for the period in dispute and he had made representation to the competent authority after communication of said adverse remarks which was rejected. Thereafter he submitted a memorial to the President of India as a result of which adverse remarks 1 to 4 were expunged while rest were maintained. Before communnication of the said remarks he had also filed a petition before the Central Administrative Tribunal challenging the earlier order of the Government rejecting his representation. The Tribunal quashed the orders expunging the remarks and retained 2 on the ground that orders were vitiated in absence of reasons. Allowing the appeal by the Government, the apex court held that the decision rejecting the representation does not adversely affect any vested rights of the Government servants nor does it visit him with any civil consequence. The principles of natural justice are intended to prevent miscarriage of justice and are now applied even to administrative orders which involve civil consequences. 19. The principles of natural justice are intended to prevent miscarriage of justice and are now applied even to administrative orders which involve civil consequences. 19. It was further observed as under : "Generally, principle of natural justice require that opportunity of hearing should be given to the person against whom an administrative order is passed. The application of principles of natural justice, and its sweep depend upon the nature of the rights involved, having regard to the setting and context of the statutory provisions. Where a statute requires an authority though acting administratively to record reasons, it is mandatory for the authority to pass speaking orders and in the absence of reasons the order would be rendered illegal. Where a vested right is adversely affected by an administrative order, or where civil consequences ensue, principles of natural justice apply even if the staturoy provisions do not make any express provision for the same, and the person concerned must be afforded opportunity of hearing before the order is passed. But principles of natural justice do not require the administrative authority to record reasons for the decision as there is no general rule that reasons must be given for administrative decision. Order of an administrative authority which has no statutory or implied duty to state reasons or the grounds of its decision is not rendered illegal merely on account of absence of reasons. It has never been a principle of natural justice that reasons should be given for decisions. However, there is necessity for giving reasons in view of the expanding law of judicial review to enable the citizens to discover the reasoning behind the decision. Right to reasons is an indispensable part of a sound system of judicial review. Under our Constitution an administrative decision is subject to judicial review if it affects the right of a citizen. It is therefore, desirable that reasons should be stated. If any challenge is made to the validity of an order on the ground of it being arbitrary or mala fide, it is always open to the Authority concerned to place reasons before the court which may have persuaded it to pass the orders. Such reasons must already exist on records as it is not permissible to the authority to support the order by reasons not contained in the records". 20. In the matter of S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. Such reasons must already exist on records as it is not permissible to the authority to support the order by reasons not contained in the records". 20. In the matter of S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. (supra) and other connected with petitions which were all decided by a common order dated 9.12.1996, the question which had arisen for consideration of learned Constitution Bench of the apex court as regards the question as to whether the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 by its Section 28 had excluded the power of judicial review exercisable by the High Courts in service matters in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. The apex court while deciding the said question held that though judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution, but if any Constitutional amendment made by the Parliament takes away from the High Court the power of judicial review in any particular area and vests the same in any other institutional mechanism or authority, it would not be violative of basic structure doctrine, so long as the essential condition is fulfilled, namely, that the alternative institutional mechanism or authority said order by the Parliamentary amendment is not less effective than the High Court. While placing reliance upon its earlier decision in the matter of Minarva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India; 1980 (3) SCC 625 = 1981(1) SCR 206 =AIR 1980 SAC 1789 the apex court observed as under:- "The Administrative Tribunal under the Act has been contemplated as a substitute and not as supplemental to the High Court in the scheme of administration of justice and it is entitled to exercise powers thereof. To provide the Tribunal as an additional forum from where parties could go to the High Court would certainly have been a retrograde step considering the situation and circumstances to meet which the innovation has been brought about. Thus barring of the jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be a valid ground of attack." 21. It has further been observed as under:- "But the Tribunal should be a real substitute of the High Court-not only in form and de jure but in content and de facto. The alternative arrangement has to be effective and efficient as also capable of upholding the constitutional limitations. It has further been observed as under:- "But the Tribunal should be a real substitute of the High Court-not only in form and de jure but in content and de facto. The alternative arrangement has to be effective and efficient as also capable of upholding the constitutional limitations. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the Administrative Tribunal established under the impugned Act can be regarded as equally effective and efficacious in exercising the power of judicial review as the High Court acting under Articles 226 & 227". 22. In the matter of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and ors. reported in 1997(3) SCC 261 the question which had arisen for consideration of learned Constitution Bench of the apex court which is also very much relevant for consideration before us in view of the prepositions of law which have arisen during the course of hearing of the appeal is as to whether the scope of judicial review whether as regards the communication of the adverse entries to the delinquent official by the competent authority in the context of future contemplated action against the delinquent, whether such delinquent has the remedy available to him to move to the High Court by involking its jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India or the Supreme Court by way of a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, whether the scope of such remedy can be whittled down or taken away from the delinquent official who is aggrieved by the same. On the mere technical ground that he should have approached the concerned Services Appellate Tribunal before approaching the High Court ? Another material question is as to what is the object of preparing APARs. by the Reporting Officer when the same are not conveyed to the delinquent within time and whether non-communication of adverse remarks may not amount to depriving him of fair chances of improving himself. 23. Relying upon the dectrine of basic structure as propounded by the Constitution Bench of the apex court in the matter of Keshvanand Bharti v. Union of India & Ors. 23. Relying upon the dectrine of basic structure as propounded by the Constitution Bench of the apex court in the matter of Keshvanand Bharti v. Union of India & Ors. reported in S.C.R. 1973 (Supp) page 1 =AIR 1973(SC) 1461=SCC 1973(4) 225 which is a judgment given by 13 Judges' Constitution Bench of the apex court, by a majority of 9:4 held that though by virtue of Article 368 Parliament is empowered to amend the Constitution, that power cannot be exercised so as to damage the basic features of the Constitution or to destroy its basic structure. As regards the origin power of judicial review it was held that broadly speaking it comprises three aspects, i.e., judicial review of legislative action, judicial review of judicial decisions and judicial review of Administrative actions. It was further observed that the judges of the superior courts have been entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret the same. It is they who have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is maintained and that the legislature and the executive do not, in the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional limitations. It is equally their duty to oversee that the judicial decisions rendered by those who man the subordinate courts and tribunals do not fall foul of strict standards of legal correctness and judicial independence. 24. It was further observed as under:- "We therefore, hold that the power of the judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. We also hold that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution. This is because a situation where the High Courts are divested of all other judicial functions apart from that of constitutional interpretation, is equally to be avoided." 25. In the matter of Dr. This is because a situation where the High Courts are divested of all other judicial functions apart from that of constitutional interpretation, is equally to be avoided." 25. In the matter of Dr. Gyan Chand Jain v. State of Rajasthan & another (supra) the question which had arisen in a writ petition before a learned single Judge of this Court was as to whether failure of the concerned delinquent officer who had not been able to achieve the requisite targets longed (sic launched) by the State Government in family planning programmes regards the compulsory sterilisation programme for the muslim population should be construed as casting any adverse reflection as regards assessment of his service career. The petitioner who was a Civil Asstt. Surgeon in the State Government and was subsequently promoted as Senior Medical Officer was communicated adverse remarks by the competent authority since he had failed to achieve the requisite targets regarding the motivation and sterilisation cases in relation to family planning programme. Since the respondents have not been able to show as to in what manner the representation of the petitioner was considered by the Government and weightage was given to the reasons specified by the District Magistrate regarding slow progress of Family Planning Programme and since the respondent had failed to produce any material before the Court to justify the making of adverse remarks in the APARs of the petitioner, it amounted to high handedness on the part of the Government and the learned single Judge of this Court while dismissing the writ petition came to the conclusion that the petitioner had been subjected to discriminatory treatment since there was no rational or justification in conveying the alleged adverse remarks and which were accordingly directed to be quashed and set aside. 26. In the matter of Mangal Chand Taylor v. High Court of judicature & another (supra) the petitioner who was a judicial officer of RHJS had filed a writ petition in this court against the impugned order dated 1.9.1989 whereby the adverse remarks in the ACRs for the year 1982 were conveyed as well as the order dated 27.1.1990 whereby the petitioner's representation against the adverse remarks was rejected by communication dated 1.9.1989 that while assessing his work for the year 1982 it was observed in his ACR as under:- "You write judgments ordinarily and not laboured judgments. You never bother yourself in the matters of keeping control over the office, administrative capacity and act. You cannot be depended upon for jobs assigned to you." 27. Against the aforesaid observations the petitioner submitted his representation to the competent authority and the same was rejected as per communication dated 27.1.1990. The petitioner had stated the remarks which were conveyed to him after the expiry of seven years, the same had become ineffective and inoperative because inspite of the same he was promoted to the post of Civil Judge & Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate in the year 1983 and further promoted as Addl. District Judge in the year 1987. It was alleged that the reporting officer had no cause of complaint as regard his functioning and it was further alleged that the then District Judge had no occasion to peruse his judgments and remark as unlaboured once in the year 1982 since he did not appear in Appeal or Revision from the said judgment and order and further there was no appellate court at Ajmer or any other place which had found his judgments either below standard or unlaboured ones, hence the observations made as regards quality of judgments is wholly unwarranted and were made for some extraneous consideration. The learned single Judge of this court while allowing the writ petition came to the conclusion that on the basis of relevant material placed on the record he was of the view that the petitioner's representation was considered by the committee without even calling for the comments of the Reporting Officer and in such matters when only the plea advanced in support of remarks is that the remarks were recorded on the basis of assessment of Reporting Officer, the committee ought to have first called upon the comments of the Reporting Officer and had the committee taken that trouble, the Reporting Officer would have been in a better position to inform the committee on the basis of which he had formed that opinion giving rise to the said adverse remarks and since the committee did not have the occasion to examine such materials placed before it, the remarks were not sustainable and deserved to be expunged and were accordingly expugned from the ACRs of the petitioner and were obliterated from his service record. 28. 28. Likewise in the matter of Ratan Lal Agrawal v. High Court of Judidature for Rajasthan (supra) the petitioner was a judicial officer belonging to RJS who was conveyed with adverse remarks as under:- "He has a tendency to mix freely with public, which should be curbed. Integrity controversial. A bad Officer." 29. These remarks were for the period when the petitioner was posted as ACJM, Ajmer during the period 10.1.1990 to 30.5.1990. As regards the first remark that a petitioner had tendency to mix freely with public which should be curbed, the same was not endorsed by the Inspecting Jud-ge and by the then Hon'ble Chief Justice. However, the remark regarding intergrity controversail was endorsed by the Inspecting Judge who further observed that the petitioner should be watched under some strict District & Sessions Judge. As regards the third remark, i.e. general reputation given by Hon'ble Chief justice on the basis of remarks given by the Inspecting Judge that the integrity of the petitioner was controversial and needed to be watched, in the year 1991 and other District Judge duly certified that there was nothing against the integrity of the petitioner since no complaint had been received by him. It is noteworthy to mention that the same Inspecting Judge had agreed with the report of the earlier Inspecting Judge as well as the report of Hon'ble Chief justice who had given the following remarks : "His disposal was 123% in the relevant year, work found satisfactory, good officer." 30. It is noteworthy to mention that the same Inspecting Judge had agreed with the report of the earlier Inspecting Judge as well as the report of Hon'ble Chief justice who had given the following remarks : "His disposal was 123% in the relevant year, work found satisfactory, good officer." 30. Relying upon decisions of the Apex Court in the matter of Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab & others SLR 1979 SC 1622 and Baidynath Mahapatra v. State of Orissa & others AIR 1979 SC 2218 on the well settled law that in accordance with the principles of natural justice even an adverse report in confidential role cannot be acted upon so as to deny promotional opportunities unless communicated to the person concerned so that he has an opportunity to improve his work and conduct or to explain the circumstances leading to the report, which is not an empty formality, its object being partially, to enable superior authorities to decide on a consideration of the explanation offered by the person and relying upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the matter of Smt. Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India & others AIR 1978 SC 597 and Union of India v. E.G. Nambudiri: 1991(3) SCC 38 wherein the Apex court has held that even in the administrative proceedings which involve civil consequences the doctrine of natural justice must be held applicable and the competent authority does not have any licence to act arbitratily but in a fair and just manner, the only conclusion which emerages as a result of the above discussion is that the respondents had obviously gravely erred in relying upon the adverse entries recorded in the petitioner's ACRs for the period in dispute as referred to above, in gross violation of well settled law as referred to above and the principles of natural justice, equity and fair play and the same deserved to be expunged from the appellant's ACRs for the aforesaid period and the same shall not be deemed to have been acted upon against the appellant. 31. We have also examined the ratio of the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in the matter of Bharat Ram Meena v. Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur & others 1997(3) SCC 233 , Tayyab All v. State of Rajasthan 1988(2) RLR 1 , Mrs. 31. We have also examined the ratio of the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in the matter of Bharat Ram Meena v. Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur & others 1997(3) SCC 233 , Tayyab All v. State of Rajasthan 1988(2) RLR 1 , Mrs. Anil Katiyar v. Union of India & others 1996(10) J.T. (SC) 768=Mrs. Anil Katiyar v. Union of India & others : 1997(1) SCC 280 . which are distinguishable both on law and facts and are not applicable to the instant case. 32. As a result of the above discussion the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 19.9.1997 passed by learned single Judge of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4726/1996 is quashed and set aside. The appellant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits as admissible to him in accordance with law. The summoned confidential record be sent back to the concerned department in a sealed cover immediately. There will be no order to costs.Spl. Appeal allowed. *******