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1998 DIGILAW 578 (GUJ)

ANILKUMAR ISHWARLAL PARMAR v. STATE

1998-09-07

A.L.DAVE, J.N.BHATT

body1998
J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE central theme of both these appeals is the macabre bride- burning for dowry against the appellants-accused No. 1 (A-1) and accused No. 2 (A-2) out of four original accused who were tried for the charges under Secs. 302, 498-A and 114, I. P. C. , for causing the murder of Bai Saroj, wife of A-l and since both these appeals are against one judgment filed by A-1 and A-2, they are being decided and disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ). A few material and relevant skeleton of facts giving rise to these appeals may be narrated at the inception. A-l Ashok is the husband of deceased Saroj and a-2 Anil is the cousin brother of A-l. Original accused No. 3 Taraben and accused no. 4 Kusumben are sisters of A-1. Deceased Saroj and A-l entered into matrimony two years before the unfortunate incident which occurred on 15-6-1991 which took the toll of the young bride-wife. It was second marriage for both. A-l has two children from the first wedlock. ( 3 ). The prosecution case has been that deceased Saroj and A-l both were not only unfortunate to enjoy the marital bliss but were unhappy to pull on with each other. A-l and his family members were very much disturbed and unhappy as Bai saroj could not fulfil the expected but unlawful demands arising out of deadly social evil of dowry. Again, the deceased was accused of not treating and maintaining properly the step-children of A-l who were born out of the first wedlock with another woman. It would be quite interesting to narrate at this juncture that end of the first wedlock of A-l was tragic. His first wife also bid the final voyage and left the world due to burn injuries. Be that as it may, it is the prosecution case that a-1 has committed murder of his wife for a motive as stated above in collaboration with A-2 Anil, and original accused Nos. 3 and 4. the cousin sisters, by putting her ablaze without learning from the first experience. Bai Saroj was the victim of not only unbearable domestic violence but was living in the family as a dejected-rejected person as she remained unsuccessful in satisfying the dowry demands of her husband and other members of his family. 3 and 4. the cousin sisters, by putting her ablaze without learning from the first experience. Bai Saroj was the victim of not only unbearable domestic violence but was living in the family as a dejected-rejected person as she remained unsuccessful in satisfying the dowry demands of her husband and other members of his family. She was subjected to violent cruelly and torture which compelled her to seek shelter at the parental house and voice her grievance in this behalf to the parents and many other relatives in past before her life was cut short at the cruel hands of the accused persons. ( 4 ). It is the prosecution version that on 15-6-1991 at about 10-30 p. m. , in the matrimonial house situated at Saiyedpura. Nagoriwad. Surat, on the first floor. ghastly crime of dowry-bride-burning came to be committed, in that, the prosecution alleged that alter giving physical torture and harm by A-l and brother-in-law. A- 2, in their mission to finish Bai Saroj with the help of their cousin sisters, poured kerosene on the person of Bai Saroj and thereafter A-l lighting match-stick, threw it on the person of Saroj and thereby pulling her to instant flame which culminated into serious first and second degree burn injuries and which as such culminated into her death, after four days. ( 5 ). F. I. R. came 10 be recorded by P. S. I. M. R. Chavda. PW S in the hospital at about 2-15 a. m. . in the early morning on the next day. like that, on 16-6-1991 as narrated by deceased Saroj while undergoing medical treatment in the Maskati hospital. Surat. That is how. the investigation started. A-l came to be arrested on the next day at about 7 p. m. The investigating officer got dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate in view of the seriousness of the injuries and recorded statements of prosecution witnesses. Part of investigation was also done by P. S. I. K. H. Devkar- PW 10 and upon completion of the investigation, the accused persons were sent up for trial before the Sessions Court by the learned Chief J. M. F. C. , Surat in whose Court, the accused persons came to he charge-sheeted on the charged being, framed under Secs. 302. 498-A and 114 against all the accused persons, to which they denied and desired to he tried. 302. 498-A and 114 against all the accused persons, to which they denied and desired to he tried. ( 6 ). In order to fortify and substantiate the charge against the accused persons. prosecution relied on the following ten prosecution witnesses : pw 1 Maganlal Nathalal Exh. 12 pw 2 Manharlal Mohanlal Exh. 13 pw 3 Becharbhai Nanalal Exh. 17 pw 4 Dr. Meghrekhaben Mehta Exh. 19 pw 5 Dr. Prafulchandra Lapsiwala Exh. 21 pw 6 Dilip Ramchandra Exh. 24 pw 7 Pravinbhai Kantilal Exh. 27 pw 8 Mahendrasinh R. Chavada Exh. 28 pw 9 Vishnuprakash Sharma Exh. 31 pw 10 Keshav H. Devkar Exh. 33 the prosecution also placed reliance on the documentary evidence in the nature of medical certificate, PM report, Panchnamas, two dying declarations, etc. . to which we will refer to as and when required, at appropriate stage. ( 7 ). The trial Court found the present appellants guilty and convicted and sentenced them for life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 200. 00. and in default, to undergo s. I. , for one month for the offences punishable under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 114, i. P. C. , while acquitting Accused Nos. 3 and 4. That is how. Criminal Appeal No. 243 of 1992 under Sec. 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure came to be filed by A-2 challenging his conviction and sentence; whereas. Criminal Appeal No. 570 of 1992 is filed by A-1. ( 8 ). Learned Advocates appearing for the appellants have seriously criticised the impugned conviction judgment and sentence order infer alia contending that the trial Court has committed serious error and has failed to appreciate the law relating to dying declaration and that the prosecution has failed to establish the complicity of both the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the alleged murder of Saroj. The learned Addl. P. P. Mr. Desai countenanced the submissions raised for defence of the accused and has fully supported the impugned judgment and order. We have been also taken through the relevant testimonial collections and documentary evidence in course of the marathon submissions before us. ( 9 ). Obviously, in the case of bride-burning, the Court is called upon to decide as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal or suicidal or accidental. We have been also taken through the relevant testimonial collections and documentary evidence in course of the marathon submissions before us. ( 9 ). Obviously, in the case of bride-burning, the Court is called upon to decide as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The trial Court, upon analysis of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses reached the conclusion that deceased Saroj met with homicidal death the author of which are none but the appellants before us, A-l and A-2 husband and brother- in-law of the deceased Saroj, excluding all and any possibility of suicidal or accidental death. ( 10 ). In fact, the question of homicidal death will not detain us any longer, in view of the strong, reliable and potent evidence led by the prosecution. Deceased saroj had sustained serious burn injuries on 15-6-1991. The burn injuries were of first and second degrees and in terms of percentage, it was about 70%- of the body. Initially, she was examined and treated by PW 4 Dr. V. P. Shaema examined at exh. 31. She was kept as indoor patient in the Maskati Hospital at Surat. She was also treated and seen by PW 5 Dr. P. C. Lapsiwala, Exh. 21. She succumbed to the burn injuries after valiant struggling for a spell of six days, on 20-6-1991 while undergoing treatment in Maskati Hospital at Surat. The autopsy was carried out by dr. M. H. Mehta, PW 4, examined at Exh. 19. ( 11 ). It is evident from the medical papers of Bai Saroj that she sustained serious injuries due to burning and the cause of death was septicemia as a result of extensive burns over the body of Bai Saroj. Post-mortem report produced at Exh. 20 and the medical evidence of PW 4 Dr. M. H. Mehta undoubtedly would go to show that deceased Saroj had met homicidal death. The manner and mode in which the bum injuries were sustained, the type and situs of the anatomy where the injuries were caused as unfolded by the medical evidence, we are also convinced that death of saroj was homicidal and not suicidal or accidental. ( 12 ). At this stage, the second question which will come before focus is as to who was the author of the ghastly homicidal death of Saroj. ( 12 ). At this stage, the second question which will come before focus is as to who was the author of the ghastly homicidal death of Saroj. The trial Court, in clear terms, has held that the appellants are the authors of the homicidal death of Bai saroj. The serious contention advanced on behalf of the appellants during the course of submissions before us that the accused persons cannot be compaginated for the alleged complicity of committing murder of Bai Saroj, may prima facie appear to be subtle but not sound and sustainable when one gets into the reality in the light of evidence on record. The main plank of the defence is that the medico-legal history recorded by Dr. Sharma in the medical case papers indicating the history of burning by husband at 10-45 tonight and the role assigned to A-2 without specifically involving A-l husband in the dying declaration Exh. 25 recorded by the Executive magistrate, PW 6 Dilip Ramchandra and the partisan evidence of PW 3 B. N. Mistry and PW 7 Pravinbhai K. Bhagat, examined at Exh. 27 and interested evidence of police officer, create material doubt about the involvement of the accused persons in the alleged crime of committing murder of Bai Saroj. It was, therefore, vehemently submitted that the accused persons are entitled to benefit of doubt. ( 13 ). The prosecution has placed reliance on the evidence of PW 3 Becharbhai nanabhai Mistry who is the uncle of deceased Saroj and who was the resident of the same area and neighbour of A-1. He was as such residing in the fourth house, next to the house of A-1 which is the venue of offence. ( 14 ). After having dispassionately examined the evidence of Becharbhai Mistry, we are convinced that the trial Court has rightly placed reliance on his evidence as he is a witness of truth. He has positively and directly involved and connected both the appellants. He is the cousin brother of the father of deceased Saroj. ( 15 ). It becomes very clear from the testimony of PW 3 Becharbhai Mistry that deceased Saroj was undergoing unbearable mental and physical cruelty at her matrimonial house at the hands of her husband A-1 and two sisters-in-law. He is the cousin brother of the father of deceased Saroj. ( 15 ). It becomes very clear from the testimony of PW 3 Becharbhai Mistry that deceased Saroj was undergoing unbearable mental and physical cruelty at her matrimonial house at the hands of her husband A-1 and two sisters-in-law. She used to visit the house of the witness being in the very proximity in terms of geography as well as in terms of relationship, being her uncle. She frequently visited his house on account of severe beating,. harassment and torture meted out to her in the matrimonial house. He has clearly testified in para 1 of his testimony at Exh. 17 that deceased Bai Saroj during her life-time used to visit his house atleast one or two times in a week to voice her agony and harassment. However, he used to pacify her and used to advise her to tolerate malfeasance, misconduct and violent domestic violence by her husband and his family members. ( 16 ). Insofar as the main theme of incident which took the life of Bai Saroj is concerned, he has clearly testified that on that day, Bai Saroj was screaming. Anil and her husband both were beating her. She, therefore, came out of her house and was followed by her husband and Anil, A-2. Even after coming out of her house, her husband slapped her and directed her to go away from his house to which helpless bai Saroj replied saying where could she go after leaving ? Anil also manhandled her. Since she could not obey the command of her husband of leaving the matrimonial house, she went back inside the house and paid a heavy penalty. ( 17 ). It is clearly found from the evidence of this witness Mistry that he could see that A-1 and A-2 immediately followed her and started accomplishing the mission of ghastly killing by pouring kerosene on her body and then to put her to fire, as a result of which, Bai Saroj repeatedly imploring, came out of the house. Not only that A-1, even after seeing his wife burning, came out of the house, desired his neighbours to extinguish the fire, raising shouts - "save her, save her" without himself making any effort to save her. Not only that A-1, even after seeing his wife burning, came out of the house, desired his neighbours to extinguish the fire, raising shouts - "save her, save her" without himself making any effort to save her. Out of humanitarian approach, one neighbour patel Ravji Nanji came to her rescue, but little late, and offered piece and part of quilt due to which fire on the person of Saroj was extinguished. ( 18 ). After the fire came to be extinguished, victim Saroj set near the staircase leading to the house of A-1 and her husband A-1 also went there. At that time, saroj in a very painful way, inquired of her husband as to why he acted in such a way ? What is wrong done by her ? "i have also taken care of your children", to which A-1 could not reply. In the meantime, one of the neighbours telephoned to the Maskati Hospital to send urgently Ambulance Van. That is how Bai Saroj was taken to the Maskati Hospital for treatment by A-1. Evidence of PW 3 - becharbhai Mistry has remained unimpeachable despite thorough and searching cross-examination. He has fully supported the prosecution case. He has involved both the accused persons. This witness is the uncle of the deceased and he is a neighbour residing only in the fourth house in a row situated near the house of A-l which is the venue of the offence. There is no reason to discard or discredit the testimony of this witness which is quite reliable and whose presence at the relevant time was quite natural. The trial Court has rightly placed reliance on his evidence. ( 19 ). Insofar as oral dying declarations are concerned, victim Saroj made three dying declarations, one before the father, one before the doctor and one before her uncle. PW 1 - Maganlal Nathalal is examined at Exh. 12. As per his testimony, the matrimony between victim Saroj and A-l had transpired two years before the incident. A-1 and A-2 are cousin brothers. The first wife of A-l had died due to burning. The marriage between Saroj and A-l was a second marriage. PW 1 - Maganlal Nathalal is examined at Exh. 12. As per his testimony, the matrimony between victim Saroj and A-l had transpired two years before the incident. A-1 and A-2 are cousin brothers. The first wife of A-l had died due to burning. The marriage between Saroj and A-l was a second marriage. It is very clear from the evidence of the father of the deceased that his daughter had time and again narrated the account of inhuman treatment and unbearable psychological, and physical cruelty meted out to her by A-l and relatives of her husband. ( 20 ). On being informed by some neighbours of A-l, PW 1 - father of the deceased along with his wife went to the house of A-l from where they went to maskati Hospital on the next day when Saroj was undergoing medical treatment. On seeing the parents, the victim could not resist the temptation of screaming and crying helplessly. On being asked by the father, she narrated the incident as elaborately stated in para 5 of deposition of this witness. She specifically involved a-1 her husband and A-2. cousin brother of A-1. . ( 21 ). It is apparent from the testimony of this witness that both the accused persons were equally responsible for committing crime of murder. It becomes clear from the evidence of the father of the deceased that she told him that "ashok and anil gave me beating and fist flows. I could not tolerate beating. Therefore. I came down. Thereafter, even on the ground floor, Ashok gave me two slaps. Subsequently. Ashok and Anil both forcibly dragging her. took her on the first floor and thereafter both of them poured kerosene on my body and Ashok while lighting Bidi. threw one lit match-stick on her person, as a result of which there were extensive burn injuries. This dying declaration orally made to the father radiates imprint of truth. It is quite voluntary account given by the victim to her father. Evidence of PW 1. father of the victim is quite creditworthy and dependable. ( 22 ). The trial Court has also placed reliance on the evidence of PW 6 - executive Magistrate Dilip Ramchandra. He has recorded the dying declaration at about 3-45 p. m. . on 16-A-1991 upon being summoned by the police at Maskati hospital. The dying declaration recorded by him is produced at Exh. ( 22 ). The trial Court has also placed reliance on the evidence of PW 6 - executive Magistrate Dilip Ramchandra. He has recorded the dying declaration at about 3-45 p. m. . on 16-A-1991 upon being summoned by the police at Maskati hospital. The dying declaration recorded by him is produced at Exh. 25. Despite detailed cross-examination, the evidence of the Executive Magistrate has remained unshaken. It is recorded in a question-answer form. It is very clear from the dying declaration. Exh. 25 recorded by the Executive Magistrate that A-l and A-2 were present and deceased Saroj had sustained serious burn injuries which proved fatal and the accused persons arc the authors of the ghastly killing of Bai Saroj. ( 23 ). Dying declaration. Exh. 25 recorded by the Executive Magistrate is sought to he challenged on me following grounds : (i) that the deceased has not assigned any incriminating role to her husband A- 1 and no overt-act is also attributed to him. (ii) that mere presence at the scene of offence is not sufficient to prove the guilt. (iii) The questions and the statement at the end of the dying declaration were already got typed. Prima facie, the aforesaid three contentions may appear to he subtle but not sound and sustainable if one goes into the evidence and the reality thereof. It cannot be said that no overt-act is attributed to A-l. It is true that the active role in the dying declaration Exh. 25 is ascribed to A-2 Anil. However, the expression lastly made by the deceased when translated into English reads as under : "lastly. I was burnt". Prima facie, it cannot be said that it was A-2 only who had burnt her. Apart from that. this dying declaration which came to be recorded at about 3-30 p. m. . on 10-6-1991 on the next day of the incident in the Maskati Hospital undoubtedly stales that both the accused persons were present at the time of the incident. No doubt, the role assigned to A-l is sought to be diluted in the written dying declaration before the Executive Magistrate Exh. 25. So. it is not a case that there is addition or some improvement by giving more names in the subsequent written dying declaration. Strictly speaking, it cannot be said to be a contradiction as it happens in the social life. 25. So. it is not a case that there is addition or some improvement by giving more names in the subsequent written dying declaration. Strictly speaking, it cannot be said to be a contradiction as it happens in the social life. The wife might have thought to condone the ghastly act when she was in the teeth of death. No doubt, this is one probability. The second probability which can be safely inferred in such set of facts would be that written dying declaration came to be recorded after almost 14 hours and. therefore, faculty perception and understanding would be, to an extent, affected because of pain and extensive treatment without any information by any other source as no relatives like the parents were present till her dying deciaration came to be recorded by the executive Magistrate. Be that as it may. one thing is quite certain that both the accused persons were present at the time of ghastly killing and that too arising out of dowry-bribe-burn-episode. It is not the phraseology that came to be employed by the deceased in her last words in the form of dying declaration but the substance which matters. In substance, both the accused persons were present and the last expression "lastly. I was burnt" is relatable to both and no one. So. voluntary, untutored, natural statement in reality and substance conveyed through this written dying declaration before the Executive Magistrate clearly involves both the accused persons in the bride-burning case. ( 24 ). Of course, the typed questions and also the last statement though seriously criticised on behalf of the defence is of no avail or is of no significance. In fact. we would consider and discuss at great length the relevant proposition of law relating to dying declaration and the important principles. One of them is that it need not be in specified or prescribed fixed form. It is the substance and not the form which matters. Therefore, serious criticism levelled against written dying declaration Exh. 25 recorded by the Executive Magistrate ends in smoke. ( 25 ). PW 7 - Pravinbhai Kantilal is examined at Exh. 27. He has turned hostile to the prosecution case. Obviously so. because he is the brother-in-law of A-1. It may he noted that evidence of hostile witness is not to be always discarded in its entirely. It is. 25 recorded by the Executive Magistrate ends in smoke. ( 25 ). PW 7 - Pravinbhai Kantilal is examined at Exh. 27. He has turned hostile to the prosecution case. Obviously so. because he is the brother-in-law of A-1. It may he noted that evidence of hostile witness is not to be always discarded in its entirely. It is. therefore, evident from the evidence of this witness that matrimonial relationship between Saroj and A-l was wrecked on bad rock and apart from enjoyment of marital bliss, they were as such fighting with each other. Not only that. because of quarrels. Saroj had to take shelter at Nari Sanrakshan Gruh from where a letter was written at his address which is produced at Exh. 18. Therefore. evidence of PW 7 Pravinbhai clearly goes to show that relationship between the spouses was not only cordial but was totally wrecked. ( 26 ). In our opinion, the trial Court has rightly placed reliance on the evidence of PW 8 Mahendrasinh Chavda who recorded the second written dying declaration of the deceased at 2-30 a. m. . on 16-6-1991. He was working as P. S. I, in Chowk bazaar police station who. upon direction from the P. S. O. . rushed to (he Maskati hospital at about 2 a. m. . on the next day early morning who inquired from Dr. Lapsiwala about the physical condition of the patient. Dr. Lapsiwala informed him that the patient was in fit condition to make statement as he had examined her some time before, as a result of which, he straightaway went to the patients ward and after ascertaining the mental and physical fitness recorded the dying declaration as narrated by the victim Saroj which is produced at Exh. 29. The evidence of this witness has remained unshaken. Not only that. it is borne out to be reliable and dependable one. The dying declaration recorded by him at Exh. 29 leaves no manner of doubt that both the accused persons were guilty of the offence of bride-burning punishable under Sec. 302, I. P. C. We have no hesitation in finding that Bai Saroj was in fit state of mind to give her rational statement and the written dying declaration as at Exh. 29 was voluntary, unprompted, untutored, spontaneous and dependable. 29 was voluntary, unprompted, untutored, spontaneous and dependable. The macabre role played by both the accused came to be vividly narrated in the written dying declaration as recorded by P. S. I. Chavda. It is also very clear from his evidence that deceased Saroj at that point of time was in-fit state of physical and mental condition to give her rational statement. Dr. Lapsiwala of course supported the evidence of P. S. I. Chavda. Dr. Lapsiwala. PW 5 is examined at Exh. 21. No doubt, the time fraction or sequence is not consistent in the evidence of Dr. Lapsiwala and P. S. I. Chavda. But that does not affect the fit condition of the deceased. Whether P. S. I. Chavda inquired from Dr. Lapsiwala or Dr. Lapsiwala had earlier examined her and made endorsement in the case papers. This is quite incidental and does not affect the substratum of the main core like that, fitness of mind to make a rational statement. In our opinion, therefore, the dying declaration exh. 29 recorded by P. S. I. Chavda of deceased Saroj is quite rightly relied upon by the trial Court. ( 27 ). Incidentally, it would be appropriate to refer to the serious criticism levelled against the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate wherein it came to be submitted that the Executive Magistrate did not verity from the medical officer that the deceased was in fit mental condition to make the rational statement. It is true that the deponent obviously did not ascertain from the medical officer about fitness of the deceased to make the statement. However, mere fact that the Executive magistrate unequivocally did not ascertain from the medical officer that the deceased was in fit condition to make the statement, would not ipso facto be subversive to the declaration made by the deceased. In fact, the anxiety of the Court has always been to see that the dying declaration made by the deceased should be in fit state of mental condition. Which should be the source of ascertaining the physical or mental fitness is for Court to consider. At times, it may happen that when a dying declaration is being recorded, the doctor is not present or at times when the dying declaration is recorded, the victim is on way to hospital. Which should be the source of ascertaining the physical or mental fitness is for Court to consider. At times, it may happen that when a dying declaration is being recorded, the doctor is not present or at times when the dying declaration is recorded, the victim is on way to hospital. Therefore, what is of emphasis is that the Court should be satisfied that the declarant was in fit mental condition to make a rational statement. Whether the person is in fit state of mind or not can be decided by the person who is recording such statement. The questions and answers incorporated in Exh. 25 - dying declaration recorded by the Executive magistrate speaks volumes about fit mental condition of the deceased and omnibus question is also put at the end of the dying declaration and it is replied. Therefore, it cannot be contended that merely because opinion of the medical officer is not obtained before recording of dying declaration by the authority, the same is weak piece of evidence or is unreliable. Therefore, serious criticism levelled on this count is nothing but polishing the brass when the ship is sinking. ( 28 ). Before we advert to the relevant proposition of law with regard to dying declaration, we would like to highlight and articulate five dying declarations, three oral and two written, in the following tabular chart : ( 41 ). In Rabi Chanadra v. Stale of Orissa, AIR 1980 SC 1738 , it has been held that recording of dying declaration preferably should be in question-answer form. However, non-recording of dying declaration in question-answer form is not fatal. It is also further observed that even absence of eye-witnesses would not by itself introduce infirmity in the dying declaration. ( 42 ). The learned Addl. P. P. has placed strong reliance on a Constitution Bench decision of the Honble Apex Court in Bhayant Luhana Radhabai v. State of Gujarat. 1977 SCC (Cri.) 181. In this case, the material and relevant principles of law relating to dying declaration are extensively and elaborately expounded. What are the important principles of dying declaration are very well established. This decision was rendered by the Bench of three Honble Judges which was also a case of bride burning wife of the accused. Mukta aged about 23. In this case, the material and relevant principles of law relating to dying declaration are extensively and elaborately expounded. What are the important principles of dying declaration are very well established. This decision was rendered by the Bench of three Honble Judges which was also a case of bride burning wife of the accused. Mukta aged about 23. After elaborate discussion of the facts and material propositions relevant to the law of dying declaration, the following propositions have been succinctly propounded : (i) A dying declaration stands on the same footing as any other evidence and it is to be judged in the surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the assessment of evidence. (ii) If the deceased had several opportunities of making dying declarations, apart from the official record of it and whether the statements have been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of torturing by interested parties. (iii) The Court must. in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, keep in view the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation should also be considered. In Bhavanis case (supra), the several dying declarations, as in the present case. had been made and the defence had contended that there was accidental death. It was found to be false. The dying declaration of deceased Mukta was accepted and preferred than the dying declaration recorded by the Taluka Magistrate. There was discrepancy between the dying declaration made by the deceased before the police head constable and the one made before the Taluka Magistrate. The infirmity was held to be not of any consequence as the dying declaration recorded by the police head constable at the earliest point of time was found quite reliable and trustworthy and. therefore, though there was discrepancy and contradiction in the dying declaration recorded by the Taluka Magistrate, the dying declaration recorded by the police head constable was preferred. In short, the principle laid down in that case is quite clear that the ultimate anxiety of the Court should be to satisfy itself about the genuineness and trustworthiness of the voluntary version of the deceased. In the present case. the first written dying declaration came to be recorded by the police as at Exh. 29. In short, the principle laid down in that case is quite clear that the ultimate anxiety of the Court should be to satisfy itself about the genuineness and trustworthiness of the voluntary version of the deceased. In the present case. the first written dying declaration came to be recorded by the police as at Exh. 29. It was 2-30 a. m. , in the early morning on the next day which involves both the accused persons with past history and the motive fur the same. Even in the dying declaration before the Executive Magistrate, it cannot be contended that A-l was totally excluded. He was present when the incident occurred. As we have observed hereinabove. the last words in the dying declaration before the executive Magistrate clearly involved both the accused. Apart from that, it is settled proposition of law that merely because there is omission in ascribing overt-act to any of the accused persons, it does, not necessarily mean that it is vital contradiction or significant discrepancy. At best. it can be said that there is no specific role assigned to the other accused, but it cannot be said to be addition to what was stated earlier in the other dying declaration. Therefore, the decision rendered in Bhavanis case (supra) is directly applicable and attracted to the fucts of the present case. ( 43 ). Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Honble Apex Court in meherban and Ors. v. State of M. P. . AIR 1997 SC 1528 and it has been contended that dying declaration can be relied on to base the conviction even in the absence of motive. It has been so held in the said case that dying declaration is corroborated from the medical evidence and last articles recovered from the accused persons and no explanation from them in their examination under Sec. 313 of the Criminal procedure Code. The dying declaration was accepted even in the absence of any motive and without any material to show that the deceased would falsely implicate the accused persons. Similarly, in Kumbhar Dhiraj/al Mohanlal v. State of Gujarat. AIR 1997 SC 1531 : [1997 (2) GLR 1526 (SC)], it has been held by the Honble apex Court that the dying declarations before the medical officer and Executive magistrate when found reliable and when made in a fit state of mind. Similarly, in Kumbhar Dhiraj/al Mohanlal v. State of Gujarat. AIR 1997 SC 1531 : [1997 (2) GLR 1526 (SC)], it has been held by the Honble apex Court that the dying declarations before the medical officer and Executive magistrate when found reliable and when made in a fit state of mind. conviction can be founded upon only on dying declaration without motive. ( 44 ). In Ravi Chander v. State of Punjab, 1988 SCC (Cri.) 1004, it has been held by the Honble Apex Court that in case of bride-burning, even when there are three dying declarations and first dying declaration recorded by P. S. I, making out a case of accidental death, was not found acceptable in view of subsequent two dying declarations. No infirmity was noticed in subsequent two dying declarations. Second dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate was found quite reliable. In absence of any circumstance or material on record to suspect that the Executive magistrate had any animus against the accused or in any way interested in fabricating the dying declaration, the evidence of such witness cannot be discarded. Incidentally, in that case. dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate was subsequently corroborated by the oral dying declaration made to the brother. It was held that second and third dying declarations were reliable. In short, the principle settled and enunciated in this decision is that genuineness of dying declaration recorded by the executive Magistrate or an officer cannot be doubted on facts merely because delay of about a fortnight in sending the same to the investigating officer. In the present case. at the earliest point of lime. dying declaration was recorded by P. S. I. Chavda followed by written dying declaration by the Executive Magistrate and followed by two oral dying declarations. ( 45 ). In Babu Ram v. State of Punjab, 1998 SCC (Cri.) 1043. it has been held that dying declaration recorded by the officer in a fit state of mind of the declarant when the statement was made. is proved, the same can be relied on. In that case. declarant was suffering from 60% burn injuries. The evidence of the doctor was clear that the deceased was in fit state of mind when she made the statement. is proved, the same can be relied on. In that case. declarant was suffering from 60% burn injuries. The evidence of the doctor was clear that the deceased was in fit state of mind when she made the statement. The executive Magistrate also recorded the dying declaration when he inquired from the doctor about her mental condition and on finding her fit, he recorded her statement. Second dying declaration was also recorded by the police giving the same version. In the circumstances, dying declarations were held to be rightly relied upon. It is very clear from the evidence of Dr. Lapsiwala that he had examined the declarant and found her menial condition fit lor recording her statement. The Executive magistrate has clearly slated that he on his own ascertained that the declarant was quite fit menially to give her rational statement. Therefore, the dying declarations made by the deceased are quite reliable and truthful. This view is also fortified by the decision of the Honble Apex Court in Ram Bihari v. State of Bihar: 1998 SCC (Cri.) 1985. It was held that though dying declaration is indirect evidence being a specie of hearsay, yet it is an exception to the rule against admissibilily of hearsay evidence. Indeed, it is substantive evidence and like any other substantive evidence requires no corroboration for forming basis of conviction of an accused. ( 46 ). In the present case. two written dying declarations are in material particulars corroborated by two oral dying declarations and the evidence of eye-witness becharbhai Mistry. ( 47 ). Again, we templed to mention one more important aspect with regard to the conduct of the husband A-1. The plea that he was not involved and was falsely implicated is even farthest from truth. It is very clear from the evidence and it is an admitted position that both the accused were present at the time when the incident happened. A-1 is the husband, if not better-half and A-2 is the brother-in-law, if not the real brother. What will be the natural conduct of such persons ? How would they react ? What will be their perceptions ? Obviously, in a ghastly crime committed by somebody else or even in case of accidental, or even in case of suicide burn case of wife. What will be the natural conduct of such persons ? How would they react ? What will be their perceptions ? Obviously, in a ghastly crime committed by somebody else or even in case of accidental, or even in case of suicide burn case of wife. the spontaneous reaction of the close relative like the husband and brother-in-law would be to atleast make serious attempt to put out the fire on the person of the victim. Apart from that. even on humanitarian ground, one would be tempted to make efforts to put out the fire. In the present case. admittedly, no attempt has been made either by the husband or her brother-in-law to put out the fire. Not only that. the husband also did not care to provide or to afford victim emergency medicare. Not only that. the neighbour had sent a call to the police station which in turn had arranged tor Ambulance Van from the hospital in which helpless victim was shitted lor medical treatment. From the time of burning till first aid was administered in the hospital, it was not less than two hours during which these two accused persons had done nothing which would even whisper about thei innocence. On the contrary, the conduct exhibited by the accused persons all throughout steals the heart of law. The main incident was preceded by not only mental torture, physical harassment but physical violence upon a helpless woman and then making a show that her life could be saved as she was burnt. This is nothing but only and only indicative of criminality and complicity on their part so as to see that unwanted, undesirable, dejected and rejected Bai Saroj who allegedly did not take care of the step-children, to be done away with to get rid of her. This sort of conduct on the part of the husband and the close relative like brother-in-law is demonstrably condemnable. undoubtedly objectionable and evidently corroborating the prosecution case and directly fitting in the link which undoubtedly point at the ghastly culpability on the part of both the accused. Apart from truthful, voluntary. This sort of conduct on the part of the husband and the close relative like brother-in-law is demonstrably condemnable. undoubtedly objectionable and evidently corroborating the prosecution case and directly fitting in the link which undoubtedly point at the ghastly culpability on the part of both the accused. Apart from truthful, voluntary. reliable, dependable four dying declarations supported by the evidence of eye- witness Becharbhai Mistry who is the uncle of the deceased coupled with the motive successfully spelt out from the record, this Court has not the slightest hesitation in holding that the conviction and sentence under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 114. I. P. C. , against the appellants-accused is quite justified requiring no interference throwing the appeals overboard. Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed. .