JUDGMENT P. SHANMUGAM, J. – Petitioner is a company incorporated under the Companies Act and is a dealer under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 manufacturing ferro silicon. Petitioner seeks for a declaration to declare that the respondents are not entitled to collect and levy any tax in terms of section 3 of the Kerala Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 1994. Petitioner seeks for a further declaration that the petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of any entry tax on the iron and steel. They have also prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash exhibit P6 assessment order, exhibit P7 demand notice, and exhibit P8 order of penalty. 2. Petitioner has effected purchases of MS scrap from outside the State for Rs. 68,04,797 for the year 1997-98. Petitioner has not filed any return as required under rule 4(1) of the Kerala Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Rules, 1994 (for short, "the Rules"). Section 3 of the Kerala Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") provides for levy of tax. As per this provision, there shall be levy and collection of tax on the entry of any goods into any local area for consumption, use or sale therein. The tax shall be at such rate or rates as may be fixed by the Government. But that rate shall not exceed the rates specified for the goods in the First Schedule to the KGST Act. Section 2(ee) defines "goods" as the goods mentioned in the Schedule. Item 9 of the Schedule to the Act is iron and steel. S.R.O. No. 589 of 1996 is a notification issued under section 3, notifying the rate of tax to the items mentioned thereunder to be levied and collected on entry of those goods into any local area in the State of Kerala. Item 9 is "iron and steel" and the rate of tax is 4 per cent. Section 7 obliges every person to pay tax and to furnish the return. Section 15 provides for a penalty against any person who fails to comply with any of the provisions of the Act. The said provision enables the officer to impose on him, in addition to any tax Payable, a sum by way of penalty not exceeding twice the amount of tax. Section 15 provides for a penalty against any person who fails to comply with any of the provisions of the Act. The said provision enables the officer to impose on him, in addition to any tax Payable, a sum by way of penalty not exceeding twice the amount of tax. Section 12 deals with the exemption, as follows : "Subject to such conditions as they may impose, the Government may, if it is necessary so to do in the public interest, by notification, exempt any specified class of importers from payment of the whole or part of the tax payable under this Act." In exercise of the power conferred by section 12, the Government granted exemption in respect of tax payable under section 3 of the Act by the importers in respect of iron and steel imported by them for use as raw material in the manufacture of other goods, in S.R.O. No. 263/98 by Notification G.O.(P) No. 44/98/TD dated March 19, 1998 in Kerala Gazette, Extraordinary No. 484 dated March 23, 1998. The exemption is subject to the condition that the goods in respect of which exemption is claimed is purchased inter-State by issuing "C" form and manufactured product thereof is liable to sales tax either under the KGST Act or under the Central Sales Tax Act. 3. The question that arise for consideration is whether this notification dated March 19, 1998 is retrospective in operation ? In other words, whether petitioner is entitled for exemption for the import of iron and steel with effect from April 1, 1997 to March 19, 1998 ? Secondly, whether the petitioner satisfies the condition of liability to sales tax either under the KGST Act or under CST Act for the goods manufactured ? 4. The notices and the assessment order say that the petitioners have not filed the return and not paid the tax for the import of iron and steel. It is also found that the petitioner is exporting substantial portion of the product. Therefore, they are not eligible for exemption from sales tax under KGST Act or CST Act. It is also found by exhibit P8 order that there is a wilful attempt on the part of the petitioner to evade payment of tax. It is also found that the petitioner is exporting substantial portion of the product. Therefore, they are not eligible for exemption from sales tax under KGST Act or CST Act. It is also found by exhibit P8 order that there is a wilful attempt on the part of the petitioner to evade payment of tax. On the question of alternative remedy, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the appeal against the assessment as well as penalty orders are onerous in the sense they will be compelled to remit the whole amount due and the penalty. The further contention is that on interpretation of exhibit P8 notification, it should be held that it has got a retrospective effect in operation. The argument is on the basis that section 3 states that the rate of tax shall be at such rate or rates as may be fixed by the Government, but not exceeding the rates specified in the First Schedule to the KGST Act. Inasmuch as the rate has not been specified for the goods, there cannot be any levy of tax. It is further argued that though the Government is entitled to fix the rate of tax, the same is subject only to the latter part of the section which qualifies that the rate shall not exceed the rate specified for the goods mentioned in the First Schedule of the KGST Act. Since there is no mention of the goods in the First Schedule, it may not be possible to ascertain the rate of entry tax leviable on such goods. MS iron and steel scrap purchased by the petitioner are declared goods which are not mentioned in the First Schedule to the KGST Act and therefore it cannot be treated as goods which are exigible to entry tax. 5. On the face of it, such a contention cannot be accepted. First of all Schedule 1 of the KGST Act, item 83 describes as follows : "83. Metal scraps other than those specified in the Second Schedule." Therefore, it is specifically stated in the First Schedule, and the contention that the same is coming under item 68 is not correct. Secondly, the tax under this Act shall be at such rate as may be fixed by the Government. Metal scraps other than those specified in the Second Schedule." Therefore, it is specifically stated in the First Schedule, and the contention that the same is coming under item 68 is not correct. Secondly, the tax under this Act shall be at such rate as may be fixed by the Government. As per the Notification in S.R.O. No. 586/96, the rate of tax for iron and steel fixed is 4 per cent. The petitioner cannot say that the scrap iron is not iron and steel, since the exemption is referable only to iron and steel, as per S.R.O. No. 263/98. The latter part of section only says that the rate of tax shall not exceed the rate specified in the First Schedule. In the First Schedule, the rate is 8 per cent and in the notification it is only 4 per cent. So, it has not exceeded the rate specified in the First Schedule. 6. The next point urged by the learned counsel is that the notification has to be given retrospective operation since the notification has come during the financial year and the entry tax is on the taxable turnover of the financial year. Non-mentioning of the goods, its tax and its commencement will have to be decided considering the entire year. Such an argument cannot be countenanced. Entry tax is payable on entry of goods into local areas which has been defined under section 2(d). According to this section, "entry of goods into a local area" with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means entry of goods into a local area from any place outside the State for use or sale therein. The charging section 3 provides that tax shall be levied and collected on the entry of any goods into any local area for consumption. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the entry tax is payable on the taxable turnover of a dealer for one financial year. Tax is payable on the entry of goods into the local area' Section 12, exemption clause, does not provide for giving exemption retrospectively. The power is given to the Government as a subordinate legislative authority to notify the exemption. The notification also does not state that the exemption is retrospective in operation. Therefore, the notification and exemption can only be prospective in operation and cannot be given retrospective effect. 7. The power is given to the Government as a subordinate legislative authority to notify the exemption. The notification also does not state that the exemption is retrospective in operation. Therefore, the notification and exemption can only be prospective in operation and cannot be given retrospective effect. 7. Vepa P. Sarathi on "Interpretation of Statutes" while dealing with the retrospective effect of operation of statutes, stated as follows : "(a) Nova constitutio futuris forman imponere debet non praeteritis - every new enactment should affect future and not the past. (b) The presumption is against the retrospective effect being given to a statute." Justice G. P. Singh on "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" regarding "retrospective operation" says as follows : "The Union Parliament as also State Legislatures have plenary powers of legislation within the field of legislation committed to them and subject to certain constitutional restrictions they can legislate prospectively as well as retrospectively. It is, however, a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is 'deemed to be prospective only ...........'.." 8. In Calicut-wynad Motor Service Ltd. v. State of Kerala (1959) KLT 521 a learned Judge of this Court held as follows : "Even in a case where the executive Government acts as a delegate of a legislative authority, it has no plenary power to provide for retrospective operation unless and until that power is expressly conferred by the parent enactment." Learned counsel for the petitioner strongly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mathra Parshad and Sons v. State of Punjab [1962] 13 STC 180; AIR 1962 SC 745 . The Supreme Court, in that case, was dealing with payment of sales tax on manufactured tobacco. The Government issued notification exempting the manufacturers from levy of sales tax. The notification did not mention the date from which exemption would operate. The question that arose is whether the notification had the effect only from September 27, 1954 or from the beginning of the financial year. The Government issued notification exempting the manufacturers from levy of sales tax. The notification did not mention the date from which exemption would operate. The question that arose is whether the notification had the effect only from September 27, 1954 or from the beginning of the financial year. It was held as follows : "This clearly shows that the tax is for a year. The method of collection allows collection of tax at intervals; in some cases, the tax is collected at the end of the year; in some others, the tax is collected quarterly and in still other cases, even monthly. If the exemption can be said to operate for that period for which the tax is payable according as it is annually, quarterly or monthly, the tax would be different for different persons. Those who are paying the tax annually would get exemption for the whole year; but those who are paying it quarterly or monthly would get benefit in the quarter or the month of the notification but not for earlier quarters or months. It could not have been intended that the exemption was to operate differently in the case of dealers with different intervals of assessment." The Supreme Court further observed as follows "We cannot help saying that the Act and the notification could have been framed to obviate such unnecessary questions by providing clearly in them the time from which such exemptions would begin to operate ......... Contradictory press notes were issued, which showed that the State Government itself was not sure of the true legal position, thus causing great confusion and distrust in the minds of the tax-payers." Thus, it could be seen that the decision of the Supreme Court is clearly distinguishable on facts where there were conflicting notifications and the assurance given by the Government regarding the grant of exemption, and that the tax was found to be payable annually. In this case, there is no conflicting notification and it is clear that the tax is payable on the entry of goods and not annually. Thus the scope of exemption of tax is entirely different from the case referred to above and it will not be of any help to the petitioner in this original petition. From the language of section 12, there is no scope for retrospective operation. Similarly, notification does not state that the exemption has retrospective effect. Thus the scope of exemption of tax is entirely different from the case referred to above and it will not be of any help to the petitioner in this original petition. From the language of section 12, there is no scope for retrospective operation. Similarly, notification does not state that the exemption has retrospective effect. If the construction suggested by the learned counsel is adopted, then the Government may have to return all the entry tax collected from April 1, 1997 to March 19, 1998 from all other dealers. Conversely, if exemption order is rescinded or withdrawn without fixing date, is it possible to say that the assessees are liable to pay the entry tax retrospectively ? Therefore, the cardinal principle of interpretation, namely, that without express words in the statute, no such retrospective effect can be given to the provision much less to the delegated authority, namely, the Government. 9. In Nagalingam Nadar Sons v. State of Kerala [1993] 91 STC 61 (Ker); (1993) 1 KLT 822 a learned Judge of this Court dealing with the power of the Government to make retrospective operation of a rule of exemption, held that the Government has no such power. In the words of the learned Judge, it is stated thus "Power is thus given under sub-section (1) to make an exemption or reduction in rate either prospectively or retrospectively in respect of any tax payable under the Act. Sub-section (3) enables the Government to cancel or vary any such notification issued under sub-section (1). Significantly, sub-section (3) is silent about retrospectivity for any notification issued under it. Thus while sub-section (1) authorises the grant of an exemption or reduction in rate with retrospective effect in respect of any tax payable under the Act, sub-section (3) does not provide for any cancellation or variation retrospectively. In issuing notifications under section 10, the Government is exercising only delegated powers. While the Legislature has plenary powers to legislate prospectively and retrospectively, a delegated authority like the Government acting under the powers conferred on it by the enactment concerned, can exercise only those powers which are specifically conferred. In issuing notifications under section 10, the Government is exercising only delegated powers. While the Legislature has plenary powers to legislate prospectively and retrospectively, a delegated authority like the Government acting under the powers conferred on it by the enactment concerned, can exercise only those powers which are specifically conferred. Therefore, if it is intended to confer on the Government a power to cancel/withdraw/vary an exemption or reduction in rate of tax, with retrospective effect, such a power has to be specifically conferred, and in the absence of any such specific conferment of power in sub-section (3) of section 10, the Government cannot issue notifications thereunder affecting a vested right or imposing an obligation to act retrospectively. This provision is significantly silent on such a power. Equally, the Government has also no power to levy a tax with retrospective effect. The retrospective cancellation/withdrawal of an exemption or a reduction in rate tantamounts to levy of a tax, or tax at a higher rate from a date in the past, for which the Government has no power under sub-section (3)." 10. In Punjab Tin Supply Co. v. Central Government AIR 1984 SC 87 the Supreme Court held that all laws which affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations unless the legislative intent is clear and compulsive. Such retrospective effect may be given where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the language used necessarily implies that such retrospective operation is intended. 11. In this case, section 12 of the Act cannot operate retrospectively, unlike section 10 of the General Sales Tax Act where specific power is given to make retrospective effect of the law. Therefore, the Government has no power to make retrospective effect and the notification also does not give retrospective operation. From both notification as well as section 12, it is clear that the exemption will he available only prospectively and not retrospectively. 12. It could further be seen that the petitioner had exported the products substantially and therefore the petitioner would not come within the conditions of the notification. Unless sales tax or Central sales tax is paid, the exemption is not available to the petitioner. 13. 12. It could further be seen that the petitioner had exported the products substantially and therefore the petitioner would not come within the conditions of the notification. Unless sales tax or Central sales tax is paid, the exemption is not available to the petitioner. 13. On the question of mens rea, it could be seen that the petitioner is importing iron scraps throughout the year and they have not even bothered to file the return and pay the tax for the whole year. Therefore, in the light of the clear provision of law, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that there was bona fide dispute, deserves no acceptance. Petitioner has withheld the payment of tax due to the Government for the whole year up to March 19, 1998. Therefore, the failure on the part of the petitioner in not filing the return and not paying the tax is intentional and the finding of the 2nd respondent in this regard cannot be held to be illegal. 14. For all these reasons, I find no reasons to grant the relief sought for. Hence this original petition is dismissed. C.M.P. No. 39592/98 in O.P. No. 22460/98W dismissed. Petition dismissed.