S. K. KESHOTE, J. ( 1 ) AS all these special civil applications have arisen from one common order of the Labour Court, Surendranagar, dated 26. 9. 1995, the same are being taken up for hearing and are being disposed of by this common judgment. The respondent workmen in these special civil applications filed application before the Labour Court, Suendranagar under Sec. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for computation of their claim of medicial allowance from 1st April, 1982 to 1st March, 1983 at the rate of Rs. 15 per month and from 1st March, 1983 to 30th September, 1988 at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month. These applications were filed by the respondent workmen on 3rd April, 1993. The claim for medical allowance has been made by the respondents on two Government resolutions dated 7th July, 1973 and 7th April, 1982. All these respondent workmen filed separate applications which were decided under common order impugned in these special civil applications. Hence these sepcial civil applications before this Court. ( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners contended that the Labour Court has committed serious error of jurisdiction in granting medical allowance to the respondent workmen under Sec. 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act. The claim of the respondent workmen was not accepted nor it flows from any award or statutory provision and as such the Labour Court which exercises power of the executing Court under Sec. 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act could not have granted substantial claim of the respondent workmen. Their claim should have been adjudicated and granted only on reference, and not otherwise. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of New Delhi vs. Ganesh Razak, reported in JT 1994 (7) SC 476. It has next been contended that otherwise also the claim of the petitioner suffers from the defect of delay and latches. The claim pertains to the period from 1. 3. 1983 to 30. 9. 1988. But the application has been filed on 3rd April, 1993 and the same should have been dismissed only on the ground of delay. It has next been contended that otherwise also the claim of the petitioner suffers from the defect of delay and latches. The claim pertains to the period from 1. 3. 1983 to 30. 9. 1988. But the application has been filed on 3rd April, 1993 and the same should have been dismissed only on the ground of delay. Lastly the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that otherwise also the benefits of medical allowance is not available to the respondent workmen under resolution dated 7th April, 1982 as they have not opted for the same. ( 3 ) ON the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent workmen contended that the claim of the respondent workmen for medical allowance has been granted by the Labour court on the basis of its own earlier decision, which decision has been affirmed by this court and ultimately the SLP filed by the State has also been dismissed by the Supreme court. So once in the case of identically situated persons the claim has been accepted by the Labour Court and it has been affirmed by this Court and the Supreme Court, the labour Court has not committed any error or illegality much less an error of jurisdiction in acceding to the claim of the respondent workmen. It has next been contended that the plea of jurisdiction raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner before this Court is not available to them as this pont was not raised before the Labour Court. Further, the right to claim medical allowance by the respondents flows from the government Resolution dated 7th July, 1973 and 7th April, 1982. So the application under Sec. 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act was maintainable before he Labour Court. Replying to the other contention of the counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the respondent workmen contended that the plea of delay in filing of the application was not taken before the Labour Court and as such no such plea could be taken in the proceedings under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution of india. In case this plea would have furnished explanation to give out reasons for the delay in filing the application. In case this plea would have furnished explanation to give out reasons for the delay in filing the application. Replying to the last contention, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it is true that resolution dated 7th April, 1982 contemplates for giving of option but this plea was not taken before the Labour Court and rightly so because the petitioners never sought options from the respondent workmen. A preliminary objection has also been raised by the learned counsel for the respondent workman that these special civil applications deserve to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner in the rejoinder has taken one additional contention that the respondent workmen were daily wagers and they were given regular pay-scale and other benefits at par with the regular Government servants under government Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 with effect from 1st October, 1988 and as such they could not have been given any past benefit by the Labour Court, more so when Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 nowhere contemplates for giving of benefit of past period. ( 5 ) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised by the counsel for the parties. ( 6 ) I may first take up the preliminary objection which is raised by the learned counsel lor the respondent workmen regarding maintainability of this special civil applicaion on the ground of delay and laches. The impugned order was passed by the Labour Court, surendranagar in these matters on 26th September, 1995. This Special civil application is filed by the State before this Court on 21. 4. 1997. So this petition is filed by the petitioner before this Court after about 1 year and 6 months. This delay of one year and six months in filing this special civil application under Art. 226 of the Contitution of India is certainly a matter of concern, and the learned counsel for the respondent is correct to say that the petition suffers from the defect of delay and laches. In the special civil application, explanation for dealy has been furnished in para 5 of the petition. I consider it proper to briefly deal with the same. In the special civil application, explanation for dealy has been furnished in para 5 of the petition. I consider it proper to briefly deal with the same. After receiving copy of the order dated 4th October, 1995 it is stated that to examine as to whether in the absence of option the benefit of medical allowance can be extended to the workmen or not, the matter was submitted for the opinion of the learned AGP and on recipt of opinion the matter was referred to the government in Roads and Buildings Department for appropriate decision. The Roads and buildings Department transmitted the proceedings to the Legal Department and ultimately decision was taken to present the petition. The petitioner then sumbitted that on account of the communication gap between the Roads and Buildings Department and the Executive engineer, and on account of other proceedings by respondent No. 1 it has been on mistaken belief that the administration felt that the proceedings were decided. However, on verification of the facts in February, 1997 the office of the Government Solicitiors was approached for presenting the petition. Accordingly necessary documents were called for and the petition was presented after some delay. The petitioner stated that looking to the larger issue in question having wide repercussions of the judgment and order passed by the Labour Court, which may give rise to thousands of such claims, the petitioners prayed that the Court may entertain the petition and decide the same on merits. This is the sum and substance of the explanation furnished by the petitioners for the delay in filing these special civil applications. ( 7 ) THE explanation for delay given by the petitioners is nothing but only an explanation for the sake of explanation. The material particulars of the facts have not been disclosed by the petitioners. This is the sum and substance of the explanation furnished by the petitioners for the delay in filing these special civil applications. ( 7 ) THE explanation for delay given by the petitioners is nothing but only an explanation for the sake of explanation. The material particulars of the facts have not been disclosed by the petitioners. The petitioners have very conveniently avoided to disclose the fact, namely, on which date copy of the order of the Labour Court dated 4th October, 1995 was received; when the matter was sent for opinion of the leanred AGP; when the opinion of the AGP has been received back; when the matter has been referred to the roads and Buildings Department for apporpriate decision; when the Road and Buildings department transmitted the proceedings to the Government in Legal Department; when the Legal Department had given opinion for filing the petition; what was the communication gap between the Roads and Buildings Department and the Executive engineer; and what was the basis for the mistaken belief that the proceedings were decided. The papers were scnt to the Solicitors for filing petition in February, 1997. In absence of the material facts on record of these special civil applcations it is difficult to believe that the explanation furnished for delay in filing the special civil application is reasonable and sufficient. I consider it necessary to make reference to fact that it is admitted by the petitioners that in identical matters the Labour Court earlier passed order on 21. 12. 1992 and the special civil application filed by the State against those orders was dismissed by this Court on 19th August, 1994. ( 8 ) THEN comes another set of litigation which has been filed in this Court against the award of the Labour Court dated 30th September, 1992; and the special civil application filed has been dismissed and the SLP against the judgment has also been dismissed on 3rd november, 1995. So far as this Court is concerned, it has already decided earlier matter in respect of the orders passed by the Labour Court under Sec. 33-C (2) of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 giving benefits of medical allowance to daily wagers. So in case the government was intending to challenge the orders passed in the present case before this court, despite the earlier orders of this Court, then immedialtely action should have been taken. So in case the government was intending to challenge the orders passed in the present case before this court, despite the earlier orders of this Court, then immedialtely action should have been taken. "it appeas that the Government was waiting for the Supreme Courts decision, but that decision has also come on 3rd November, 1995 i. e. , after less than two months of the order of the Labour Court. In the present case after the decision of the Supreme Court, though normally the opinion would have been not to file special civil application, but still the State Government thought that the matter required reconsideration, then the petition should have been filed immediately. The explanation furnished for the delay in filing the special civil application is only illusory and without any substance, and as such it cannot be accepted. Though this petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay, the matter has been heard and considered on mertis also. ( 9 ) THE first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding maintainability of the application of the respondent workmen under Sec. 33-C (2) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947. suffice it to say that medical allowance was ordered to be paid to the workmen by Lobour Court vide impugned orders under Government resolution, and further on the basis of its own decision which has been confirmed by this court and the Apex Court. In view of this fact it cannot be said that the application under Sec. 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act was not maintainable before the Labour Court in the present case. ( 10 ) THE second contention is regarding delay in making claim by the respondent workmen. Delay is certainly there. But it is not purely a question of law. I find sufficient merits in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent workmen that in case the petitioners would have contested the claim of the respondent workmen on the ground of delay they would have given out their explanation for the delay. But the very fact that the petitioners have not raised this contention before the Labour Court shows that the claim of the respondent workmen was not considered to be suffering from the vice of delay and laches. The petitioners have not contested the claim of the respondent workmen on the ground of delay before the Labour Court. But the very fact that the petitioners have not raised this contention before the Labour Court shows that the claim of the respondent workmen was not considered to be suffering from the vice of delay and laches. The petitioners have not contested the claim of the respondent workmen on the ground of delay before the Labour Court. This point has been raised by the petitioners before this Court in the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. It is true that under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India in a given case this Court may permit the parties to raise a new point, may be where the new point pertain to a pure question of law. The point at issue is not purely of law. In petition under Art. 226 such a point cannot be permitted to be raised. Delay itself may not be a ground for the dismissal of the claim of respondent workmen, because in case this point would have been raised before the Labour Court they would have given out their explanation for the delay. So this contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is without any substance. ( 11 ) NOW I may deal with the last contention rasied by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Copy of the resolution dated 7th April, 1982 is on the record of the special civil application at Annexure-C. This resolution provides that the Government has sanctioned medical allowance at the rate of Rs. 15 per month in cash from 1st April, 1982. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent workmen have not given option for drawal of medical allowance in cash from 1st April, 1982, and as such no benefit could have been given to them under that resolution. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, admits that after the said resolution the petitioner had not called for option for drawal of medical allowance in cash from the respondent workmen. If the options were called from the respondent workmen and they have not given the same, then there may be some justification in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, but when the petitioner has not called for option from the respondent workmen how far their own inaction or error or mistake can be made a ground to deny the benefit of medical allowance to the respondent workmen. Otherwise also the judgment of the labour Court is based on its own earlier decision in identical matter and the orders passed by it earlier have been confirmed by this Court and that decision has also been confirmed by the Supreme Court. So the petitioner has no case on mertis on this ground also. ( 12 ) BEFORE parting with the judgment I consider it proper to state that the filing of this petition by the State Government in these matters in nothing but waste of public money in the litigation. Identical claim by daily wagers of the medical allowance has been accepted by the same Labour Court thrice and that decision has been challenged by the petitioners before this Court. Those special civil applications had been dismissed by this court and the matter was carried in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has also confirmed the decision of this Court on 3. 11. 1995. So when this claim of daily wagers has been confirmed by the Apex Court I fail to see how the Legal Department has opined for filing of this special civil application. These matters are taken causally. Otherwise, after the decision of this Court and the Supreme Court in identical matters, there may not be any justification for filing of these special civil applications more so when the same pertains to low paid employees. ( 13 ) IN the result all these special civil applications fail and the same are dismissed. The matter has been decided earlier on the same issue by this Court as well as the supreme Court, but still by filing this petition the respondent workmen have been dragged into litigation. Taking into consideration totality of the facts and circumstances of the case it is hereby ordered that the petitioners shall pay Rs. 5,500/- by way of cost of these litigations, towards professional fees of the counsel who has appeared lor respondent workmen. The counsel for the respondent workmen has very fairly stated that she will charge from the respondent workmen towards professional fees in all these matters only whatever has been awarded by this Court towards cost. Rule discharged in each of the petition. .