JUDGMENT SURINDER SARUP, J.—This judgment will dispose of four Criminal Revision Petitions, which have been filed against the same impugned order of the Court of Shri R.L. Sharma, Addl. Sessions Judge, Solan and Sirmour Districts, Nahan dated June 18, 1985. Out of the four cases, three have been filed by Inder Vikram Singh and Kewal Ram (Cr. Revision No. 106/ 85), D.R. Awasthy (Cr.M.P (M) No. 433/85) and P.P. Kaushik (Cr. Revision No. 99/85), all three of whom are accused in the case giving rise to the impugned order of the present revision petitions. The fourth revision petition has been filed by the State of H.R, i.e. Cr. Revision No. 123/85 against that part of the order whereby the learned Court below has discharged all the accused persons for committing the offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which was the Act in force at the relevant time. However, the learned Court below has found a prima facie case against Inder Vikram Singh and Kewal Ram petitioners under Section 467/468/120-B, I.PC. and so far as D.R. Awasthy and PP. Kaushik petitioners are concerned, the learned trial Judge has found a prima facie case under Section 467/ 468/120-B, I.PC. as well as Section 420,1.PC. He has transferred the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan with a direction that the latter will frame charges accordingly. Hence, the present four revision petitions. 2. It may be mentioned here that before the learned Court below, there were as many as 18 accused out of whom, only 4 have challenged the impugned order as mentioned above. During this long lapse of time since the year 1985 when the impugned order was passed, Jasmer Singh, accused No. 7, Krishan Dutt accused No. 11, Durga Ram accused No. 16 and Lachhmi Singh accused No. 17, have passed away from this world. Therefore, in the revision filed by the State against them for a prima facie case under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, their names have been deleted. 3. The facts of the prosecution case as disclosed during the investigation, have been set out in detail in the impugned order. However, for facility of reference the relevant facts bear mentioning herein. 4. 3. The facts of the prosecution case as disclosed during the investigation, have been set out in detail in the impugned order. However, for facility of reference the relevant facts bear mentioning herein. 4. The then Chief Secretary, Government of Himachal Pradesh received a complaint from one Netar Singh of Village Taproli Rajgarh with regard to alleged illicit felling of trees by M/s. Gulab Singh and sons of that very village. He sent that complaint with his D.O. letter dated 4.12.1976 to Shri R.R. Verma, Dy. Inspector-General of Police (CID), Himachal Pradesh, Shimla to inquire into the allegations levelled therein. It was mentioned in the complaint that M/s. Gulab Singh and Sons forest contractors in collusion with the revenue and forest officials had indulged in illicit felling of forest trees in Nahan Range. 5. The S.R (CID), Himachal Pradesh, was appointed to hold an inquiry and after conducting the same, he reported that M/s. Netar Singh Durga Singh had pruchased trees from the owners of private/shamlat land in Patti Shahar of village Shahar Pajoga and Patti Ullakh of village Ullakh Katoga in 1972. The said firm, in connivance with the revenue and forest officials posted in Rajgarh sub-division fraudulently and dishonestly felled trees of different species from Government forest. In consequence of the inquiry report, a case was registered and investigation was taken up by the officials of the CID Crime Branch. 6. During the course of investigation, it was revealed that the firm M/s. Netar Singh Durga Singh of Taproli, which was registered with the H.P. Forest Department for the year 1973-74 had applied for demarcation of certain private Shamlat Khasra numbers of six villages, including village Shahar Pajoga and Ullakh Katoga on 3.11.1972 to S.D.O. (Civil) Rajgarh. These applications were sent to the Naib-Tehsildar, Rajgarh for demarcation the same day. He, i.e. the Naib Tehsildar, returned the applications to the S.D.O. (Civil) Rajgarh with the report that he had given demarcation of Khasra numbers to other firm during the last two years and there was no tree worth felling, standing in that area. The S.D.O. (Civil), Rajgarh again sent the papers for demarcation ignoring the report of the Naib-Tehsildar and these papers were marked to Jasmer Singh, Field Kanungo, respondent No. 7, who gave demarcation of Khasra numbers of private Shamlat area. However, during investigation, it was revealed that no demarcation was actually given at the spot. 7. The S.D.O. (Civil), Rajgarh again sent the papers for demarcation ignoring the report of the Naib-Tehsildar and these papers were marked to Jasmer Singh, Field Kanungo, respondent No. 7, who gave demarcation of Khasra numbers of private Shamlat area. However, during investigation, it was revealed that no demarcation was actually given at the spot. 7. Lachhmi Singh, Forest Guard, Dhamla Beat gave a report that demarcation was given on 14.1.1973, but the entry of Roznamcha Karguzari Field Kanungo Halqa No. 1 (Pajhota Circle) indicated that no demarcation was given on that date. 8. The prosecution case further is that Jasmer Singh had recorded that the demarcation was given in the presence of Netar Singh and Block Officer Thanedhar Beat, however, according to the tour diary of Block Officer, Thanedhar, i.e. Shri Inder Singh, he was not present there. Therefore, Jashmer Singh, in connivance with the members of the firm M/s. Netar Singh Durga Singh and Lachhmi Singh Forest Guard had made a false document of demarcation with the intention to cause it to be believed that it was prepared at the time of demarcation, but no demarcation was done as written therein. 9. Thereafter, Shamsher Singh and Inder Vikram Singh Naib-Tehsildar, Sub-Tehsil Rajgarh went on tour to Pargna Pajhota on 17.2.1973 and returned on 21.2.1973, No demarcation was given in these two villages according to the rules. R.F. hammers were affixed by Shri Kewal Ram Kanungo who had accompanied them. According to the prosecution case Inder Vikram Singh or any of his subordinates did not prepare any document on the sport and later on 13.3.1973, issued a certificate that he verified the demarcation already given by the Field Kanungo. This certificate was a false document, having been executed with the intention of causing it to be believed that it was made after verification of the demarcation on the spot, whereas no demarcation was done at the spot. According to the prosecution, this false document was forged to give authority to the firm M/s. Netar Singh Durga Singh to receive/fell trees from adjoining forest on the pretext of felling trees from the private land. No official entered in the certificate of demarcation nor anyone was present on that day in village Shahar and Ullakh and the Khasra numbers entered in the certificate against Patti Shahar were also wrong. No official entered in the certificate of demarcation nor anyone was present on that day in village Shahar and Ullakh and the Khasra numbers entered in the certificate against Patti Shahar were also wrong. Further in the certificate dated 13,3.1973, the Naib-Tehsildar affixed 11 hammers in village Ullakh and five in village Shahar to separate the private forest from Government forest, but according to the report of the forest officials 8 and 20 hammers, respectively, were affixed in village Ullakh and Shahar. 10. The prosecution case is that on 5.4,1973, P.P. Kaushik, Range Officer, Habban requested the D.F.O. Rajgarh to order marking of trees on the basis of the reports of the Block Officers, Habban and Thanedhar Blocks. He also certified that no demarcation had been done during the last 15 years in these khasra numbers, whereas according to private sale register of Habban Range, trees were marked and felled from various khasra numbers of Patti Shahar in the year 1971-72 by M/s, Mohar Singh Prem Singh of village Taproli. This act, according to the prosecution case, i.e. marking and felling of trees from the khasra numbers in question in. favour of the said firm was recommended by Inder Singh Block Officer and P.P. Kaushik Range Officer, Habban, who certified that no marking/felling had been carried out in the said khasra numbers during the last 15 years. Thus, the Range Officer and the Block Officer deceived the D.F.O. Rajgarh and dishonestly induced him to issue the marking order. 11. According to the prosecution, the marking of trees of Patti Shahar and Patti Ullakh was not taken up in the years 1973 and 1974 and in June, 1975 Gurcharan Singh, D.F.O. Rajgarh vide his memo dated 4.6.1975 requested the Deputy Commissioner, Sirmour to accord marking/felling permission in respect of Shamlat area of these two villages because of the coming into force of the H.P. Village Comman Land Vesting and Utilization Act, 1974 without any written request of the firm. That apart, the firm M/s. Netar Singh Durga Singh was not a registered firm of the Forest Department in 1974 and the D.F.O. recommended permission to the firm in contravention of the directions of the Chief Conservator of Forests. On this recommendation the Dy. That apart, the firm M/s. Netar Singh Durga Singh was not a registered firm of the Forest Department in 1974 and the D.F.O. recommended permission to the firm in contravention of the directions of the Chief Conservator of Forests. On this recommendation the Dy. Commissioner, Sirmaur accorded marking/felling permission of the trees from the khasra numbers mentioned in the said marking order No. 496/R dated 28.4.1975 vide his order dated 22.7.1975, by imposing conditions which are mentioned in extenso in the impugned order. 12. The prosecution case further is that the D.F.O. ignored the second condition imposed by the Deputy Commissioner, Sirmaur and endorsed a copy of marking/felling permission as aforesaid to the Range Officer, Habban Range vide his endorsement dated 28.5.1975 with the direction that he should carry out the marking personally. According to the prosecution theory on criminal conspiracy, lists were already prepared and the Field Kanungo Kewal Ram verified them on 30.8.1975. Moreover, the marking was done on 15.9.1975 along with Block Officer, Habban, therefore, the marking lists were forged by the Contractor in connivance with the forest and revenue officials with intent to cause damage to the Government forest and in this way, the D.F.O., the Range Officer and his subordinates deceived the Deputy Commissioner, Sirmaur who, on the recommendation of the D.F.O. passed marking/felling order. According to the prosecution, with a view to cover all the previous illegalities and irregularities, a certificate of joint inspection was prepared and got signed by S/Shri R.S. Chopra, S D.O. (Civil) Rajgarh, DR. Avasthi, ACF, Rajgarh, K.D. Sharma, Naib-Tehsildar Forest, Vijay Ram Field Kanungo, Keshva Nand Patwari, Halqa Jadol Taproli and Durga Ram, Forest Guard. According to this certificate, the inspection was carried out at the spot on 3.3.1976, but the perusal of the tour diaries, T.A. Bills and notes maintained by the officials who signed the above certificate revealed that the team never visited the spot on that day or some other day in the company of each other. These officers had allegedly issued a joint inspection certificate in respect of six villages of private sale in case FIR No. 58 dated 25.9.1977 under Sections 379/420/468/120-B, IPC read with Section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 registered at Police Station, Rajgarh. These officers had allegedly issued a joint inspection certificate in respect of six villages of private sale in case FIR No. 58 dated 25.9.1977 under Sections 379/420/468/120-B, IPC read with Section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 registered at Police Station, Rajgarh. As such, it was humanly impossible, according to the prosecution, to cover the area within 7/8 hours apart from the time required to do actual demarcation work. According to the prosecution, on the recommendation of Shri Y.S. Bhandari, Range Officer, Habban that no felling had been carried out in the khasra numbers in question during the last 15 years as per report of the Block Officer Gurcharan Singh D.F.O., Rajgarh who was fully aware of the conditions imposed by the Deputy Commissioner, Sirmaur, issued felling order vide his office memo dated 20.3.1976 without satisfying that the conditions had been fulfilled. The Range Officer had reported that the firm had started felling without getting felling permission and penalty should be charged. The D.F.O., however, ignored the instructions of the Chief Conservator of Forests, H.R conveyed vide his memo, dated 9.9.1974 and the request of the Range Officer, Habban, and issued the felling order. Further allegations are that no amount of royalty was got deposited by the firm as ordered by the Deputy Commissioner, Sirmaur and thus caused loss to the State Government. Further details of the prosecution case, which are mentioned in the impugned order, need not detain us here. 13. At the outset, the learned Court below has found that no offence has been made out against the accused persons, including the three petitioners herein under Sections 435 and 201, IP.C. and also under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The reasons for this finding are contained in the impugned order. 14. As regards the other offences, whereby a prime facie case has been found to have been made out for framing a charge qua them, the learned Court below has discussed the material on record as gathered by the prosecution after investigation. This has been done by him from para 8 onwards of the impugned judgment, the same shall be considered in its proper context and sequence hereinafter. 15. This has been done by him from para 8 onwards of the impugned judgment, the same shall be considered in its proper context and sequence hereinafter. 15. It has been submitted by Shri Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for P.P. Kaushik, petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 99 of 1985 that there is no material on record to show that he had committed any offence or that he was a party to the criminal conspiracy as defined in Section 120-A, I.P.C. He has also cited certain rulings in support of his contention, which shall be discussed and analysed hereinafter. 16. in order to appreciate the argument of Shri Kuldip Singh it would be necessary to refer to the alleged material relied on in the impugned order and reasons contained therein insofar as the part of Shri P.P. Kaushik petitioner is concerned. The relevant portion of the discussion qua the alleged offence against this petitioner is in para 8 of the impugned judgment, wherein it has been mentioned that against him, being a forest official the offences alleged to have been committed by him are under Sections 467/468/120-B, I.P.C. and 420 I.P.C. In para 10 of the impugned judgment at para 16 thereof, it is indicated that in the file of M/s. Mohar Singh Prem Singh, respondent P.P. Kaushik Range Officer and Inder Singh, Block Officer had made reports and on the basis of the same, felling was allowed in favour of the said firm in the year 1971, but subsequently in the present case in the year 1973 the same officers had made report that no felling had taken place in the above said villages during the last 15 years and D.F.O. Gurcharan Singh had also not verified this fact from his record or had prepared wrong record at the office and moved the case for sanction to the Collector and then sent the case for marking to the Range Officer, accused YS. Bhandari, Habban Range. 17. In order to verify these facts, and also in the interest of doing substantial justice, I have gone through the material on record with the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties. In this connection, I have been referred to various documents on record. Bhandari, Habban Range. 17. In order to verify these facts, and also in the interest of doing substantial justice, I have gone through the material on record with the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties. In this connection, I have been referred to various documents on record. Vide document No. 28, an application dated 13.3.1973 was made by Netar Singh accused for permission to fell trees on behalf of his firm, namely, M/s. Netar Singh Durga Singh of Teproli. The said application was marked by P.P. Kaushik, petitioner to the Block Officer, that the latter should report after carrying out demarcation in case he is satisfied that the application should be allowed. This endorsement of the petitioner is dated 16.3.1973. Documents No. 39 and 40 dated 30.3.1973 and 27.3.1973, respectively, are also relevant in this behalf. Moreover, the author of the report vide document No. 39, i.e. the Block Officer Habban Range, who, even if the prosecution allegations are taken as correct, was also a party to the alleged criminal conspiracy, has not been made an accused. 18. The certificate dated 30.3.1973 indicates that no marking was done for the last 15 years in concerned khasra numbers. The petitioner, i.e. P.P. Kaushik referred the case to the D.F.O. through document No 41 dated 5.4.1973 with the remarks that he was on leave, when the demarcation was done. Document No. 42 dated 28.4.1973 is also relevant in this behalf. 19. Apart from the above, the prosecution is relying on Government circular dated 11.8.1973 contained in document No. 98. According to the prosecution, the investigation indicates at page 17 of the impugned order, P.P. Kaushik petitioner along with Inder Singh Block Officer had made a report contrary to the said circular, which requires that if felling had been done on certain date, it could not be done subsequently for a number of years provided therein. This fact is not correct as already pointed out vide document No. 41 dated 5.4.1973 addressed by the petitioner to the D.F.O. with the remarks that he was on leave when the demarcation was carried out. The prosecution as well as the investigating agency did not verify from the record, which it could easily do so as to whether PP. Kaushik petitioner was actually on leave or not during the aforesaid period. Benefit of this necessarily has to go to him, being an accused person. The prosecution as well as the investigating agency did not verify from the record, which it could easily do so as to whether PP. Kaushik petitioner was actually on leave or not during the aforesaid period. Benefit of this necessarily has to go to him, being an accused person. 20. Apart from the above, it has been vehemently argued by Shri Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for P.P. Kaushik petitioner that the so-called circular, being in the nature of departmental instructions, has no force of law and it is nowhere shown that it is purported to have been issued under some law or statutory rules, etc. Hence, even if it be taken as correct that the report made by P.P. Kaushik along with Inder Vikram Singh accused, was contrary to the said departmental instructions/circular, no offence has been made out as no law or statutory rules have been violated. 21. I find considerable force in this argument of Shri Kuldip Singh. Therefore, looked at from the factual angle, no offence appears to have been committed by Shri P.P. Kaushik, petitioner as alleged by the prosecution, much less any offence of criminal conspiracy, as it has not been shown that he was a party to the alleged criminal conspiracy. 22. Apart from the above factual aspect of the case, insofar as the alleged inculpation of PP. Kaushik petitioner is concerned, the aspect of delay has also to be considered. The alleged offence as per the prosecution, the investigation and the findings in the impugned order, was committed by him in the year 1972. The investigation was set in motion on 4.12.1976 when the Chief Secretary, Government of Himachal Pradesh sent the complaint of Netar Singh to the Dy. Inspector-General of Police (CID), Himachal Pradesh. Shimla for probe. After the investigation was completed, the challan was filed in the Court in the year 1982 as is apparent from the impugned order to be more precise it was filed on 8.3.1982/3.11.1982. The impugned order regarding finding a prima facie case for the concerned offences against the various accused persons and directing framing of charge by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan was rendered on 18.6.1985. 23. A perusal of the record of these cases indicates that they were filed in this Court somewhere in September 1985. The impugned order regarding finding a prima facie case for the concerned offences against the various accused persons and directing framing of charge by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan was rendered on 18.6.1985. 23. A perusal of the record of these cases indicates that they were filed in this Court somewhere in September 1985. Various orders are on record which indicate that right from the time of filing till they were finally heard, when arguments were concluded in October, 1997 by this Bench, they were being listed for orders/hearing by various Benches of this Court, presided over by Honble Judges, some of whom have retired or been transferred. In other words, for no fault of the petitioners, the decision of these revision petitions was being delayed due to their pendency in this Court and being listed for orders/hearing before various Benches of this Court during this long period of time. There is an order dated 28.12.1994 on record of this case, which indicates that arguments were heard by a learned Judge of this Court and judgment was reserved. Subsequently, it was re-listed for re-hearing before the same learned Judge who heard it in part and finally on 19.7.1998 released it from his Board. Thereafter, these cases were put up for arguments/hearing before this Court, 24. It is clear that not only the investigation has been tardy, having taken almost six years from 1976 to 1982, it took the learned Court below, i.e. the Addl. Sessions Judge, Solan at Nahan about three years to come to a prima facie conclusion that a case was made out for framing charge for the concerned offences and directing the Chief Judicial Magistrate to do so by the impugned order. Thereafter, for the facts already stated immediately hereinbefore, various Benches of this Court treated the case as not to be of an urgent nature and the pendency was prolonged for a period of 12 years before the same were finally heard in October 1997, having been seized of the case the previous year, Le. 1996. Thus, this is a classic case of judicial having been inordinately delayed and having thus been denied to the petitioners as well as the State, which, as mentioend above, has also come up in revision against that part of the impugned order whereby no case has been found against the accused persons under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 1996. Thus, this is a classic case of judicial having been inordinately delayed and having thus been denied to the petitioners as well as the State, which, as mentioend above, has also come up in revision against that part of the impugned order whereby no case has been found against the accused persons under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. : 25. Shri Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for P.P. Kaushik, petitioner has cited before me, the judgment of the Apex Court reported as State of Bihar v. Uma Shankar Katriwal and others, (1981) 1 SCC 75. It was held therein, that where in a criminal case the trial had been pending for 20 years, even though the accused were themselves largely responsible for the slow progress of the trial and the case involved commission of a serious offence, the delay being inordinate, the Supreme Court did not deem it fit to interfere with the High Courts order in quashing the proceedings against the accused. In the present case, the accused-petitioners are on a much better footing. As already indicated above, the delay is not at all attributable to them as they are not responsible for the inordinate delay of almost 22 years from the date of initiation of probe into the complaint regarding the alleged offence, i.e. 1976 till today. Therefore, apart from the merits, which have been found in favour of P.P. Kaushik-petitioner, this inordinate delay is an additional ground for quashing the impugned order insofar as he is concerned. 26. In fairness to Shri Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner P.P. Kaushik, he has cited a number of authorities in support of his argument that on merits, no case has been made out against the said petitioners. They may briefly be mentioned, i.e., Bihar State Electricity Board and another v. Nand Kishore Tamakhuwala, (1982) 2 SCC 414. It was held therein that where no positive acts of omission or commission were alleged, nor nature of duty cast upon any particular person was stated, prima facie offences were not made out An additional ground in that case was long lapse of time and on that score also, it was held that the prosecution was (liable to be quashed. It was held therein that where no positive acts of omission or commission were alleged, nor nature of duty cast upon any particular person was stated, prima facie offences were not made out An additional ground in that case was long lapse of time and on that score also, it was held that the prosecution was (liable to be quashed. This ruling fully supports the contention of Shri Kuldip Singh learned Counsel for petitioner Shri P.P. Kaushik, In Kehar Singh and others v. State (Delhi Administration), (1988) 3 SCC 609, it was held in the celeberated case pertaining to the assassination of the then Prime Minister that the criminal conspiracy by the third accused (Balbir Singh) with co-accused having not been proved on facts of that case, his conviction was liable to be set aside. This ruling only supports the case of P.P Kaushik-petitioner to the extent that no criminal conspiracy has been made out by the investigation or the material collected by the prosecution in the present case. 27. Shri Kuldip Singh has also relied on another celeberated judgment often cited, i.e. State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lai and others, AIR 1992 SC 604, He has referred to para 108 of the said report at page 629 where various categories of cases have been laid down by way of illustration, wherein the power under Section 482 CrPC. could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice...... The first two category of cases are as follows: "1. Where the allegations made In the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2 Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FSR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code/ On the facts, the case of the petitioner is covered by both these categories and to that extent this authority is applicable, 28. Coming now to the case of Inder Vikram Singh and Kewal Ram \ (Cr. Revision No. 106 of 1985). Coming now to the case of Inder Vikram Singh and Kewal Ram \ (Cr. Revision No. 106 of 1985). It will be seen from a perusal of the impugned order that the allegations of the prosecution against them are that the application of Durga Singh accused, moved on behalf of M/s. Netar Singh Durga Singh to the S.D.O. (C) Rajgarh, were taken up by the Naib-Tehsildar Parma Nand, who sent them to the Field Kanungo (respondent No. 3 Jashmer Singh), who gave the demarcation report dated 14.1.1973. This was certified to be correct by Lachhmi Singh, Forest Guard. Verification of this demarcation report was then made by accused Inder Vikram Singh, Naib-Tehsildar on 13.3.1973 in the company of accused Jashmer Singh, Girdawar and accused Kewal Ram Girdawar, Halqa Rajgarh. This verification, as per the prosecution case, is false in view of the facts already enumerated above. In other words, there is a prima facie case for framing a charge against these two petitioners under Sections 467/468-120-B, I.P.C. 29. However, the learned Counsel for these two petitioners has submitted that the demarcation was done jointly with Kewal Ram by Inder Vikram Singh. No doubt, this is so, but I fail to see how this argument helps the case of Inder Vikram Singh at this stage, when admittedly, his co-petitioner Kewal Ram is also an accused. 30. Insofar as the case of D.R. Awasthy-petitioner is concerned i.e. Cr.M.P. (M) No. 433/85, the allegations of the prosecution against him are that with a view to cover all previous irregularities and illegalities in the conspiracy hatched by the accused in this case, a certificate of joint inspection was got prepared and signed by this petitioner i.e. D.R. Awasthy amongst others. According to this certificate, the inspection was carried out on the spot on 3.3.1976 but a perusal of the tour diaries, T.A. Bills and notes maintained by the officials, who signed the above certificate revealed that the team never visited the spot on that day or some other day together. Another allegation against him is that he along with other officers, had also allegedly issued a joint inspection certificate in respect of six villages of private sale in case FIR No. 58 dated 25.9.1977. As such, it was humanly impossible to cover the area within 7-8 hours apart from the time required to do actual demarcation work. Another allegation against him is that he along with other officers, had also allegedly issued a joint inspection certificate in respect of six villages of private sale in case FIR No. 58 dated 25.9.1977. As such, it was humanly impossible to cover the area within 7-8 hours apart from the time required to do actual demarcation work. Further, the Khasra number of hammers affixed were not shown in the appropriate column and such omission also led to the conclusion that ho joint inspection was carried out at the spot and the said document was nothing but a false and sham transaction, prepared with an intention of causing it to be believed that it was made after the Joint Inspection, which was never done. In view of this material on record, prima facie a case has been made out against D.R. Awasthy, (petitioner), for framing a charge under Sections 467/468/120-B, I.P.C. and Section 420, I.P.C. 31. Learned Counsel for D.R. Awasthy petitioner has pointed out some documents on record. These, however, are of no avail to this petitioner at this stage in view of the facts mentioned immediately hereinabove. The accused, including D.R. Awasthy petitioner, will have ample opportunity at the trial to plead their innocence. 32. Now, we are left with the revision petition of the State i.e. Cr. Rev. No. 123 of 1985. At the outset, Shri S.D. Vasudeva, learned Addl. Advocate-General has submitted that the revisional powers of this Court under Section 397, Cr.P.C. are limited in nature. Accordingly to him, when no glaring defect or illegality, insofar as the petitioners are concerned, can be made out from the impugned order, the High Court cannot interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 33. The argument of the learned Addl. Advocate-General is untenable. The High Courts power of revision is concurrent with the Sessions Judge under Section 397. Accordingly to him, when no glaring defect or illegality, insofar as the petitioners are concerned, can be made out from the impugned order, the High Court cannot interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 33. The argument of the learned Addl. Advocate-General is untenable. The High Courts power of revision is concurrent with the Sessions Judge under Section 397. No doubt, as per the same, this Court may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its area or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order.........but, a perusal of Section 401 of the CrP.C, shows that the High Court in case of any proceeding, the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, may, in its discretion exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Sessions by Section 307 and, when the Judges composing the Court of Revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by Section 392. In other words, this Court, in exercise of its revisional powers under Section 401, CrP.C, has ample jurisdiction to go into not only the illegality or impropriety by an inferior Court as in the present case, it may in its discretion, also exercise the powers of an appellate Court in view of Section 401 ibid. 34. As regards the second limb of the argument of the learned Addl. Advocate-General is concerned that there is no glaring defect or illegality in the impugned order so far as the petitioners in the three revision petitions are concerned, this also is not available to him in view of the facts and reasons recorded hereinbefore qua the case of P.P. Kaushik. However, as already pointed out and held above, a prima facie case has been made out for proceeding further in the matter against Inder Vikram Singh, Kewal Ram and D.R. Awasthy petitioners. 35. In support of his submissions, the learned Addl. Advocate-General has cited case law. I proceed to notice and analyse the same insofar as its applicability to the present case is concerned. In Amar Chand Agarwala v. Shanti Bose and another, 1973 Crl. 35. In support of his submissions, the learned Addl. Advocate-General has cited case law. I proceed to notice and analyse the same insofar as its applicability to the present case is concerned. In Amar Chand Agarwala v. Shanti Bose and another, 1973 Crl. L.J. 577, the Apex Court was called upon to consider the case of an accused, who had moved the High Court at the time when the trial was almost coming to a close and what remained to be done was the examination of two prosecution and one Court witnesses and the High Court quashed the charge and the entire proceedings on the grounds that the complainant suppressed material facts and that the evidence on the record did not establish the alleged offence. In these circumstances, it was held that the order was liable to be set aside. It was further held by the Apex Court that the proper course at that stage to be adopted by the High Court was to allow the proceedings to go on and to come to its logical conclusion, one way or the other, and decline to interfere with those proceedings. That was a case under the old Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, and Section 439 thereof, which corresponds to Section 397, CrP.C. of the new Code, and the Apex Court held that the jurisdiction under Section 439 is normally to be exercised only in exceptional cases, when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. 36. The above ruling of the Apex Court is clearly distinguishable on facts. In the present case, the impugned order has been challenged at the stage when it was considered by the lower Court whether any prima facie case has been made out for framing a charge against the accused persons, including the petitioners herein. Moreover, as per the Index Note (A) that was a case in which the High Court had interfered in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the old CrP.C. corresponding to Section 482 of the new Code, which is not the case here. Moreover, as per the Index Note (A) that was a case in which the High Court had interfered in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the old CrP.C. corresponding to Section 482 of the new Code, which is not the case here. Moreover, on the facts of the present case, as disclosed from the record, this Court is of the considered view that prime facie, no material exists on record to proceed to frame charge against P.P. Kaushik-petitioner for the alleged offence/offences of which he has been accused. As regards the other three petitioners, this Court, having come to a conclusion that prima facie, there is material on record to proceed against them, has declined to exercise its revisional jurisdiction. 37. !n State of J&K v. Darshan Singh and others, 1994 Cr.L.J. 3362, it was held by the Jammu and Kashmir High Court while interpreting Sections 268 and 269 of J&K CrP.C. (37 of 1989) that at the stage of framing of charge against an accused in a given case, the Sessions Judge has to consider the broad probabilities of the case and the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before him and to consider the basic infirmities in the case, but that does not mean that he should make a roving inquiry into pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was considering the trial. This case is aiso distinguishable on facts as stated hereinabove. 38. In State of Maharashtra v Priya Sharon Maharaj and others, 1997 Cr.L.J. 2248, it was held by the Apex Court that at the stage of framing of the charge, the Court has to consider the material with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the. 38. In State of Maharashtra v Priya Sharon Maharaj and others, 1997 Cr.L.J. 2248, it was held by the Apex Court that at the stage of framing of the charge, the Court has to consider the material with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the. offence or that there* is no sufficient ground for proceeding against him and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction, it is manifest that this authority is also distinguishable on facts of the present case, indeed, applying the test laid down therein, this Court is of the considered view that in case of P.P. Kaushik-petitioner, on consideration of the material, there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against him, while in the cases of other three petitioners, on a similar approach, it has come to the contrary conclusion. 39. Similarly, the other two rulings cited by the learned Addl Advocate-General, namely, State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, 1996 Cr.L.J. 2248 and Prem Singh and another v. State of Himachal! Pradesh and others, 1990 CuL/J, 1354, are distinguishable on facts. 40. Now coming to the revision petition filed by the State against that part of the impugned order whereby all the accused persons in this case have been discharged for the alleged offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, has been assailed. The reasons in respect of this finding are contained in paras 5, 6 and 7 of the impugned order. In para 5 thereof, it has been found that the Public Prosecutor has not been able to refer to any direct evidence from the record showing the complicity of any of the accused in the commission of the offence under Sections 435 and 201. In para 6, Section 5(1 )(d) of the said Act has been reproduced. In para 7, it is indicated that PP. has not been able to show that the accused persons, who are public servants had obtained for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage from the firm concerned. In para 6, Section 5(1 )(d) of the said Act has been reproduced. In para 7, it is indicated that PP. has not been able to show that the accused persons, who are public servants had obtained for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage from the firm concerned. On this basis, it has been held that there is no prima facie ground against any of the accused, all of whom being public servants, to connect them with the commission of the offence punishable under Section 5(2) of the said Act. 41. The learned Addl. Advocate-General has not been able to convince me that there is any material on record to take a contrary view from the one taken by the learned lower Court despite his best efforts after referring to the material on record. In these circumstances, no fault can be found with the discharge of the accused persons for the alleged offence punishable under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 42. To sum up, there is no material on record to inculpate P.P. Kaushik-petitioner for the alleged offence for which a case has been found to have been made out by the impugned order and consequently direct the competent Court, i.e. the Court of C.J.M., Nahan to frame charges accordingly. Insofar as Inder Vikram Singh, Kewal Ram and D.R. Awasthy-petitioners are concerned, there is prima facie material on record to sustain the findings against them in the impugned order. The revision petition filed by the State against that part of the impugned order whereby all the accused persons have been discharged for the alleged offence punishable under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, is without any merit. 43. For the reasons recorded above, the revision petition of P. P. Kaushik, namely, Criminal Revision No. 99/85, is allowed and the impugned order insofar as he is concerned is set aside. Consequently, he is discharged from the case, i.e. No. 14-N/7 of 1982. The two revision petitions filed by Inder Vikram Singh and Kewal Ram petitioners (Cr. Revision No. 106/85) and D.R. Awasthy (Cr.M.P (M) No. 433/85) are dismissed, thereby upholding the impugned order insofar as they are concerned. Consequently, he is discharged from the case, i.e. No. 14-N/7 of 1982. The two revision petitions filed by Inder Vikram Singh and Kewal Ram petitioners (Cr. Revision No. 106/85) and D.R. Awasthy (Cr.M.P (M) No. 433/85) are dismissed, thereby upholding the impugned order insofar as they are concerned. However, in view of the inordinate delay, as disclosed from the facts of this case and pointed out in detail in this judgment of mine, the C.J.M., who will proceed with framing of charge, trial, etc. is directed to complete the entire process before the end of this year, i.e., 1998. in this manner, there will be sufficient time of six months to do so. It is hoped that both prosecution as well as accused shall co-operate in the matter for the expeditious trial of the case as it is in their own interest. 44. Insofar as the revision petition filed by the State in concerned, i.e. Criminal Revision No. 123/85, the same is also dismissed. 45. All the four revision petitions stand disposed of accordingly. Revision Petition & Criminal Revision dismissed. -