ORDER D.P.S. Chauhan, J. 1. The election of Smt. Meena Singh for the office of Member of Janpad Panchayat, Sidhi was questioned by respondent No. 2 Smt. Padma Singh by way of election petition before the Collector Sidhi, who was the prescribed Authority under the M. P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. The petitioner was a successful candidate whereas Smt. Padma Singh was the candidate who lost at the contest. Both are inter se related as Nanad and Bhoujai. The compromise was arrived at between the two candidates and as such an application was moved before the Prescribed Authority for withdrawal of the Election Petition No. 3-A/89-93-94. The application so moved was rejected. Against this order, the successful candidate has come to this court instead of the candidate whose application for withdrawal was rejected. The person who moved the election petition is represented before this court by Shri L. S. Baghel, Senior Advocate. 3. Since both the parties are represented through counsel and they are before this court, I consider it in the interest of justice to waive the technicality as to who is the rightful person to approach this Court, as both the persons, so far as the matter of withdrawal of the election petition is concerned, are not at variance. 4. Learned counsel for both the parties Shri Anil Khare and Shri L.S. Baghel as well as learned State counsel, Shri R. S. Jha submitted that the view taken by the Prescribed Authority is erroneous in law as the elections took place in the year 1994 and the rules known as "The Madhya Pradesh Panchayats (Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1995" would not apply. The rules known as "Madhya Pradesh Panchayats (Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1991" as published in Madhya Pradesh Law Times 1992 (Vol. XXXIV) Page 51 would be applicable, and the relevant rule is Rule 13, which is as extracted below : "13. Withdrawal of election petition. - No election petition shall be withdrawn without the leave of the prescribed authority. The prescribed authority may also pass suitable order as to cost and mode of payment." 5. The election petition was only for recount of the ballot papers as there was difference of 5 votes. It was not a case founded on the corrupt practice. 6. - No election petition shall be withdrawn without the leave of the prescribed authority. The prescribed authority may also pass suitable order as to cost and mode of payment." 5. The election petition was only for recount of the ballot papers as there was difference of 5 votes. It was not a case founded on the corrupt practice. 6. The election Tribunal relied on the decision in the case of Sheo Baran v. Bindeshwari Prasad, AIR 1963 All. 607 , The case was on different premises. In that case, the election of the successful candidate was challenged on the ground that he was holding an office of profit under the Government at the time of his nomination and, therefore, disqualified for election. The election petition was filed by a person who was not having direct interest in the election as the person who filed the petition was not a candidate at the election but was only an elector. In that case parties compromised their dispute and Bindeshwari Prasad, who was a successful candidate and against whom the election petition was filed conceded that he held an office of profit and was, therefore, not entitled to contest the election, and in these circumstances parties filed a joint application before the tribunal praying that the election petition be allowed and the parties be directed to bear their own costs. The Tribunal held that Dudhnath being the only surviving candidate after Bindeshwari Prasad was disqualified, was entitled to be declared elected and accordingly the election petition was allowed after setting aside the election of Bindeshwari Prasad and Dudhnath was declared elected for the office of Pradhan. This order was the subject-matter of challenge before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. Before the High Court, the petitioner's case was that parties cannot decide the result of election by private compromise and thereby deprive the voters of their right to elect a candidate of their choice. In that case the Sub-Divisional Officer had not declared Dudhnath elected on the basis of the alleged compromise, but made it clear that the petition was decided on merits and not on the basis of the alleged compromise. In that case the Sub-Divisional Officer had not declared Dudhnath elected on the basis of the alleged compromise, but made it clear that the petition was decided on merits and not on the basis of the alleged compromise. It was only during the pendency of the case the parties compromised their dispute and an application was filed before the tribunal which clearly indicated that the respondent in the petition did not want to contest and in fact, conceded that he was a Government servant and, therefore, disentitled to stand for election. Faced with this situation, the only course open to the Sub-Divisional Officer was to go ahead with the petition and decide it on merits. This is precisely what he did. He examined the evidence in support of the petition and held that the petitioner's case that Bindeshwari Prasad held an office of profit was established. Accordingly he set aside the election and declared the petitioning candidate elected. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. This case has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 7. The other case relied on is Bijayananda v. Satrughna Sahu, AIR 1963 SC 1566 . That case was under the old provision of Representation of the People Act, 1951 when the election petitions were tried by the election tribunal, constituted there under and the appeals against the order of the election tribunal were preferred before the High Court. The Supreme Court considered that the power of the High Court Under Section 116A(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 when hearing an appeal from an election petition is the same as its power when hearing an appeal from an original decree, and the procedure is also the same, for there is no express provision to the contrary in the matter of withdrawal of an appeal in the Act. Therefore, when an appellant Under Section 116A makes an application for an unconditional withdrawal of the appeal, the power of High Court consistently with its power in an appeal from an original decree under Order 23, Rule 1(i) and Section 107(2), Civil Procedure Code, is to allow such withdrawal, and it cannot say that it will not permit the appeal to be withdrawn. The Court would be in error in importing the principles of Sections 109 and 110 of the Act which deal only with the withdrawal of election petitions and not with the withdrawal of appeals. This case has also no applicability to the present case. 8. The present case would be governed by the rules known as "The Madhya Pradesh Panchayats (Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1991" and the relevant rule is Rule 13, which has been extracted above. This rule only places rider that the withdrawal can be done with the leave of the prescribed authority and nothing beyond it. The prescribed authority has not given any reason for refusing to grant the leave to withdraw the election petition. 9. In the circumstances, the order of the election Tribunal, which is impugned in the petition, in relation to the withdrawal of the election petition, cannot be allowed to be sustained. In the present case the parties are so closely related and the withdrawal is in their domestic interest. Secondly, it was not a case involving any allegation of corrupt practice. It was only a case of recounting of ballot papers and in these circumstances there is nothing which may entitle refusal to withdraw the election petition. 10. In the circumstances, the writ petition succeeds. The impugned order dated 16-12-1997 is quashed. The petitioner is granted leave to withdraw the election petition and the election petition accordingly stands dismissed with no order as to costs. The security amount, if any, deposited by the election petitioner shall be refunded by the prescribed authority on the application being made by the petitioner within a period of three weeks from the date of filing of the application together with the certified copy of this order.