Judgment :- 1. Plaintiff in O.S.No.672 of 1981, on the file of Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, is the appellant. 2. The suit was filed by the plaintiff/appellant for recovery of an amount of Rs.27,980.27 with costs and subsequent interest at 18% p.a., till realisation. The material facts could be summarised thus: “The plaintiff company is a very reputed dealer in automobiles and its spare parts. The defendant is a business-man and is the sole owner of an Ambassador car bearing registration No.TMC.3006. The Ambassador car met with an accident on 27.6.1980 and the car sustained heavy damages. At the instruction of the defendant, the car was brought to the office of the plaintiff and was entrusted to them for carrying out repairs and replacement of spare parts. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant undertook that out of the amount due to the plaintiff in this connection, the defendant would instruct his insurer to pay such amount as he would be entitled to under the policy and the balance amount would be paid by the defendant personally. Acting on the promise and undertaking given by the defendant, the plaintiff company after entrustment of the car informed the defendant that lot of damages were caused due to the accident. The various apparent defects in the vehicle at the initial inspection were also brought to the notice of the defendant. The defendant agreed to pay for the repairing charges and on the assurance of the defendant, the appellant carried out the work of repairs. After rectification of repairs and replacement of spare parts, the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs.8,956.28 through his insurer. The Insurer also sent a satisfaction note, which was received by the plaintiff on 7.3.1981. If is further said that while progressing with the repairs, it was found by the plaintiff that certain components apart from what were quoted in the estimate of the plaintiff were also found severely damaged, and the impact has been much more. Accordingly, by their letter dated 7.5.1981, the plaintiff informed the Insurance Company and also the defendant to that effect, informing the defendant that he is bound to pay labour and replacement charges. The defendant approved it without any protest. But the Insurance Company refused to pay the amount by their letter dated 23.5.1981. Accordingly, by their letter dated 7.5.1981, the plaintiff informed the Insurance Company and also the defendant to that effect, informing the defendant that he is bound to pay labour and replacement charges. The defendant approved it without any protest. But the Insurance Company refused to pay the amount by their letter dated 23.5.1981. It is the case of the plaintiff that as per the contract between the parties, the plaintiff performedits obligation by fully and satisfactorily carrying out the repairs and also by supplying new parts. At every stage, the defendant was insisting the plaintiff to carry out the repairs on top priority basis and he was even prepared to pay the additional labour charges. After being satisfied with the performance and the charges levied, the defendant requested the plaintiff to release the car and unconditionally undertook to pay the value of the bills. Accordingly, the plaintiff released the car. According to the plaintiff, as per three invoices, a sum of Rs.25,780.27 is due to it from the defendant. The conduct of the defendant in not settling the bills is illegal, highhanded, unjustified and arbitrary. The defendant has taken delivery of the car on 30.4.1981 and the salvaged parts thereafter. The failure on the part of the defendant to honour his commitment and liability would clearly show that he is bent upon delaying the payment as far as possible. In spite of repeated demands, the defendant has failed to pay the amount, and therefore, legal notice was issued on 6.10.1981, for which a reply was sent denying the very entrustment of the Car to the plaintiff for repairs and raising false and untenable contentions. The suit was, therefore, filed for recovery of the amount covered under the three bills.” 3. In terms of the reply, the defendant filed a written statement, refuting his liability and contended that he never entrusted the car with the plaintiff for repairs. He also denied the quantum of the amount claimed by the plaintiff. 4. The trial court on the above pleadings suggested the following issues: “1. Whether the entrustment of car TNC.3006 with the plaintiff for repairs by the defendant as claimed in para 5 of the plaint is true and bind this defendant 2. Whether there is any privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant as claimed in para 9 of the plaint. 3. Whether the entrustment of car TNC.3006 with the plaintiff for repairs by the defendant as claimed in para 5 of the plaint is true and bind this defendant 2. Whether there is any privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant as claimed in para 9 of the plaint. 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree. If so to what amount. 4. To what other reliefs if any, the plaintiff is entitled.” On issue Nos. 1 and 2, the trial court found that there is privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the vehicle was entrusted to the plaintiff for repairs. On issue No.3, the trial court found that one claim of the plaintiff is a duplication. It also found that the amount paid by the Insurance Company, i.e., Rs.8,956.28 is liable to be adjusted towards the plaint claim. After adjusting the said amount and disallowing the duplication, a decree was granted for Rs. 12,614.69. Proportionate cost was also allowed. The plaintiff was also allowed interest at the admissible rate from the date of decree. For fixing the quantum the trial court also found that the various bills produced by the appellant would show that apart from the estimate given to the Insurance Company, the appellant had to replace many items by supplying new items, and the accounts produced by the plaintiff are genuine and could be believed. It also found that the defendant had to honour the contract, even though the plaintiff exceeded the original estimate, out of necessity. 5. Against the Judgment of the trial court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal as A.S.No.22 of 1984, on the file of the Principal District Judge, Coimbatore. The appeal related to that portion of the decree, which was disallowed by the trial court. The defendant also filed a cross-appeal, challenging the correctness of the finding of the trial court regarding the entrustment of the vehicle for repairs. The lower appellate court found that there is no entrustment and therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any amount from the defendant. It dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal. The net result was that the entire suit was dismissed. 6. The lower appellate court found that there is no entrustment and therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any amount from the defendant. It dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal. The net result was that the entire suit was dismissed. 6. It is against the judgment of the lower appellate court, the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal, on the following substantial question of law: “Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the lower appellate court was entitled to go into the question whether there was an entrustment of the car and even if it can go into that question, whether the finding is sustainable in law.” 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the judgment of the lower appellate court is perverse and the statements recorded by the trial court as to what happened before it should have been taken into consideration. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that before the trial court, the defendant conceded that the vehicle was entrusted with the plaintiff. When such concession was made and the same is recorded in the judgment of the trial court, the lower appellate court has no jurisdiction to reconsider the question of entrustment once again. Before considering the said contention, Let us see what is the statement that is recorded by the trial court. 8. In paragraph 7 at page 3 of the printed judgment of the trial court, lines 5 to 10 read thus: “The defendant was confronted with too many document to show that the car was entrusted with the plaintiff. It was after the production of a number of documents, the defendants counsel has conceded that the car was given to the plaintiff for effecting repairs.” In paragraph 8 at the same page of the printed judgment, the trial court has recorded in between the lines 45 and 52 thus: “The defendant has first emphatically denied having entrusted the car with the plaintiff. Subsequently when he was confronted with the numerous documents he has conceded that the entrustment was made. Subsequently when he was confronted with the numerous documents he has conceded that the entrustment was made. Inasmuch as the defendant has fairly conceded at the later stage, that the vehicle was entrusted with the plaintiff company for effecting the repairs, I feel that it is quite unnecessary to analyse and scrutinise each and every document filed by the plaintiff to prove that the vehicle was entrusted with them for repairs.” When the matter came before the lower appellate court, this fact was brought to its notice. But the lower appellate court did not enter any finding on the same. It simply stated that the entrustment is not proved, and consequently it dismissed the suit. 9. According to me, the question of law raised in this second appeal has to be found in favour of the appellant. It is settled law, that statement of fact recorded in a proceeding of court, such as admissions or concessions must be taken as conclusive, and it is not open to be contradicted in appeal. In State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and another State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and another State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and another , A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1249: (1982)2 S.C.C. 463 . their Lordships in paragraphs 4 to 8 of the judgment, held thus: “4. When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney-General to the concession made before the High Court, Shri A.K.Sen, Who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led the arguments for the respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and protested that he never made any such concession and invited us to peruse the written submissions made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an enquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. “Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation”. We are bound to accept the statement of the judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. “Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation”. We are bound to accept the statement of the judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the judges, to call the attention of the very judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error. That is the only way to have th record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily and there. Of course a party may resale and an appellate court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resale from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment. 5. In R. v. Mellor , 169 E.R. 1084 Martin, B. was reported to have said: We must consider the statement of the learned judge as absolute verity and we ought to take his statement precisely as a record and act on it in the same manner as on a record of court which of itself implies an absolute verity. 6. In King-Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose King-Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose King-Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose , A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 6. In King-Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose King-Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose King-Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose , A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 257, Page, J. said: “….these proceedings emphasise the importance of rigidly maintaining the rule that a statement by a learned Judge as to what took place during the course of a trial before him is final and decisive: It is not to be criticized or circumvented; much less is it to be exposed to animadversion.” 7. In Sarat Chandra Maiti v. Bibhabati Debi Sarat Chandra Maiti v. Bibhabati Debi Sarat Chandra Maiti v. Bibhabati Debi, A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 584 Sir Asutosh Mookerjee explained what had to be done: ….It is plain that in cases of this character where a litigant feels aggrieved by the statement in a judgment that an admission has been made, the most convenient and satisfactory course to follow, wherever practicable, is to apply to the Judge without delay and ask for rectification or review of the judgment… 8. So the judges’ record is conclusive. Neither lawyer nor litigant may claim to contradict it, except before the judge himself, but nowhere else.” 10. In Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi Slate Mineral Development Corporation Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi Slate Mineral Development Corporation Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi Slate Mineral Development Corporation , (1990)1 S.C.C 361 it was held thus: “The statement of facts recorded by a court or quasi-judicial tribunal in its proceedings as regards the matters which transpired during the hearing before it would not be permitted to be assailed as incorrect unless steps are taken before the same forum. It may be open to a party to bring such statement to the notice of the court/ tribunal and to have it deleted or amended. It is not, therefore, open to the parties or the counsel to say before the Supreme Court that the proceedings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal were incorrect. ” 11. In Apar (P) Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others Apar (P) Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others Apar (P) Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others , (1992)1 S.C.C. (Supp.) 1 their Lordships in paragraph 7 of the judgment, held thus: “Learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously urged that the concessions attributed to the petitioners’ counsel in the High Court are wrongly recorded in the High Courts judgment. An affidavit of counsel filed in this Court disputing the making of such concessions which have been recorded in the High Courts judgment was relied on by learned counsel for the petitioners. In reply to our query, the learned counsel, however, clearly conceded that no such affidavit was filed in the High Court saying that, the concessions recorded in the judgment had not been made by the petitioners’ counsel. The permissible manner in which such challenge to the concession of counsel recorded in the High Courts judgment can be made is well settled (See: State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak , (1982)2 S.C.C. 463 . This being the settled practice to assail a concession of counsel recorded in the High Courts judgment and the same not having been adopted by the petitioners in spite of the fact that the petitioners were represented by several senior counsel before us, this contention cannot be accepted and the petitioners must be held bound by the concessions made on their behalf by their counsel in the High Court as recorded in the High Courts judgment to which the learned Chief Justice was a party.” 12. In State of Maharashtra and others v. Admane Anita Moti and others State of Maharashtra and others v. Admane Anita Moti and others State of Maharashtra and others v. Admane Anita Moti and others , (1994)6 S.C.C. 109 their Lordships in paragraph 3 of the judgment, held thus: “The factual recitals or observations made in a judgment or order are taken to be correct unless rebutted. The burden to rebut it is on the person who challenges it. One of the methods to rebut such observation is to file the affidavit of the person who was present in the court and to produce such material which may satisfy the court that the recital in the judgment crept in advertently or it was erroneous. But the averment in the present case was a statement more of law than rebuttal of fact of what happened in the court. The counsel who appeared before the court and was required to file affidavit did not do so. A skilful drafting by vague assertion cannot be held to be sufficient rebuttal of statement of fact in the order passed by the High Court.” 13. The counsel who appeared before the court and was required to file affidavit did not do so. A skilful drafting by vague assertion cannot be held to be sufficient rebuttal of statement of fact in the order passed by the High Court.” 13. In view of this legal position, I do not think that the lower appellate court was correct in setting aside the judgment of the trial court, on a fact which was already conceded before the trial court. In this connection it may also be noted that even in cross-appeal filed by the defendant, the statement recorded by the trial court was not challenged. The procedure that has to be followed in withdrawing the concession was also not followed by the defendant. That apart, the trial court has also come to the conclusion that there was an entrustment. It is not disputed by the defendant that Insurance Company paid an amount of Rs.8,956.28. That was on the basis of a claim put forward by the defendant himself and the amount was paid by the Insurance Company directly to the appellant. Along with the claim form, the estimate given by the plaintiff was also forwarded. The claim form was forwarded by none other than the defendant. Exs.A-41 and A-42 are the letter and claim form sent by the defendant to the New India Assurance Co. The originals have been produced before Court by the Insurance Company and marked as Exs.X-1 and X-2. 14. The trial court has also considered the entire correspondence between the parties and has rightly come to the conclusion that there was privity of contract between the appellant and the respondent. The conduct of the defendant also must be taken as a circumstance to hold that there was a concluded agreement between them to repair the vehicle. At no point of time, the defendant protested that the plaintiff cannot have the custody of the vehicle nor effect the repairs, even though the defendant aware of the fact that the vehicle was in the possession of the appellant. There had been various correspondence between the parties and at no point of time, the defendant either refused to pay the amount or objected to the custody of the vehicle with the plaintiff. The various facts and circumstances have been taken note of by the trial court in coming to the conclusion that there was a privity of contract. There had been various correspondence between the parties and at no point of time, the defendant either refused to pay the amount or objected to the custody of the vehicle with the plaintiff. The various facts and circumstances have been taken note of by the trial court in coming to the conclusion that there was a privity of contract. The lower appellate court, in fact, did not consider the effect of the concession, and was really moved away by a statement that the plaintiff has not produced the document of entrustment. The lower appellate court has acted without jurisdiction in reconsidering an issue, which was conceded by the counsel for the defendant before the trial court. That by itself is sufficient to set aside the judgment of the lower appellate court and to allow the second appeal. 15. When this fact was brought to the notice of the learned counsel for the respondent, he submitted that there is no evidence to fix the quantum. The estimate is only for a far less amount and now the defendant is directed to pay a huge amount far in excess of the estimate. Counsel submitted that there is no evidence to prove that any new part has been supplied or the vehicle was repaired for the estimate value. I do not think that the respondents counsel can be heard to say on this point. The trial court has passed the decree not on imagination or on certain assumptions. It has discussed the evidence before it, especially Ex.A-40, all vouchers produced by the appellant to show that it is entitled to the decree for the amount claimed. It must also be noted that the trial court also took note of the very same argument, which is clear from paragraph 10 of the judgment: “The defendant now contend that what is claimed by the plaintiff is exorbitant and the plaintiff is not legitimately entitled to claim the total sum of Rs.25,780.27. He has also stated that he had never authorised the plaintiffs to incur so much amount for repairing the car. ” The trial court in the very same paragraph held thus: “It may be recalled here that the defendant has denied having entrusted the car with the plaintiff. When such is the case it cannot be expected of the defendant to speak the truth. ” The trial court in the very same paragraph held thus: “It may be recalled here that the defendant has denied having entrusted the car with the plaintiff. When such is the case it cannot be expected of the defendant to speak the truth. The fact remains that the car was repaired by the plaintiffs using all the necessary spare parts. It was when the repair work was over the plaintiff had to replace some more components and spare parts to complete the repair works in a satisfactory manner. The evidence of P.W. 1 also indicates that the defendant had approved the said repairs. He has also stated that the defendant had visited the workshop and approved all the works. The plaintiffs have also produced numerous records to prove that materials were used to replace the components. Ex.A-40 is a bunch of bills showing the materials used. In any event there are sufficient materials in the evidence of P.W.I and also the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff have exceeded the original estimate out of necessity.” The lower appellate court has not entered a finding how the trial court went wrong in its approach. As 1 said earlier, the lower appellate court has only considered the question of entrustment and dismissed the suit. Ex.A-40 was also brought to my notice by learned counsel for the appellant, which is also among the original records of the case. I find that Ex.A-40 is a relevant piece of material placed by the plaintiff and on that basis, the claim put forward by it is only to be sustained. 16. In this connection, learned counsel for the appellant also brought to my notice Sec.70 of the Indian Contract Act. It is only an alternates argument put forward by her to support the plaint claim. According to the counsel for the appellant, if for any reason, the Court finds that the concession could be retracted or withdrawn, even then the plaintiff is entitled to the plaint amount on the basis of quasi contract. Counsel relied on the decision reported in State of West Bengal v. M/s. B.K. Mondal and Sons State of West Bengal v. M/s. B.K. Mondal and Sons State of West Bengal v. M/s. B.K. Mondal and Sons, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 779 wherein their Lordships in paragraphs 13 and 14 held thus: “13. Counsel relied on the decision reported in State of West Bengal v. M/s. B.K. Mondal and Sons State of West Bengal v. M/s. B.K. Mondal and Sons State of West Bengal v. M/s. B.K. Mondal and Sons, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 779 wherein their Lordships in paragraphs 13 and 14 held thus: “13. Sec.70 reads thus: Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof. The latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. ‘ 14. It is plain that three conditions must be satisfied before this section can be invoked. The first condition is that a person should lawfully do something for an other person or deliver something to him. The second condition is that in doing the said thing or delivering the said thing he must not intend to act gratuitously; and the third is that the other person for whom something is done or to whom something is delivered must enjoy the benefit thereof. When these conditions are satisfied Sec.70 imposes upon the latter person the liability to make compensation for the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. In appreciating the scope and effect of the provisions of this section it would be useful to illustrate how this section would operate. If a person delivers something to another it would be open to the latter person to refuse to accept the thing or to return it; in that case Sec.70 would not come into operation. Similarly, if a person does something for another it would be open to the latter person not to accept what has been done by the former; in that case again Sec.70 would not apply. In other words, the person said to be made liable under Sec.70 always has the option not to accept the thing or to return it. It is only where he voluntarily accepts the thing or enjoys the work done that the liability under Sec.70 arises. Taking the facts in the case before us, after the respondent constructed the warehouse, for instance, it was open to the appellant to refuse to accept the said warehouse and to have the benefit of it. It is only where he voluntarily accepts the thing or enjoys the work done that the liability under Sec.70 arises. Taking the facts in the case before us, after the respondent constructed the warehouse, for instance, it was open to the appellant to refuse to accept the said warehouse and to have the benefit of it. It could have called upon the respondent to demolish the said warehouse and take away the materials used by it in constructing it; but, if the appellant accepted the said warehouse and used it and enjoyed its benefit then different considerations come into play and Sec.70 can be invoked. Sec.70 occurs in Chapter V which deals with certain relations resembling those created by contract. In other words, this chapter does not deal with the rights or liabilities accruing from the contract. It deals with the rights and liabilities accruing from relations which resemble those created by contract. That being so. reverting to the facts of the present case once again, after the respondent constructed the warehouse it would not be open to the respondent to compel the appellant to accept it because what the respondent has done is not in pursuance of the terms of any valid contract and the respondent in making the construction took the risk of the rejection of the work by the appellant. Therefore, in cases falling under Sec.70 the person doing something for another or delivering something to another cannot sue for the specific performance of the contract nor ask for damages for the breach of the contract for the simple reason that there is no contract between him and the other person for whom he does something or to whom he delivers something. All that Sec.70 provides is that if the goods delivered are accepted or the work done is voluntarily enjoyed then the liability to pay compensation for the enjoyment of the said goods or the acceptance of the said work arises. Thus, where a claim for compensation is made by one person against another under Sec.70, it is not on the basis of any subsisting contract between the parties, it is on the basis of the fact that something was done by the party for another and the said work so done had been voluntarily accepted by the other party. That broadly stated is the effect of the conditions prescribed by Sec.70”. 17. That broadly stated is the effect of the conditions prescribed by Sec.70”. 17. Learned counsel also relied on the decision reported in Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh , A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1218:1968 S.C.D. 961 in which it was held thus; “In a case falling under Sec.70 the person doing something for another or delivering something to another cannot sue for the specific performance of the contract, nor ask for damages for the breach of the contract, for the simple reason that there is no contract between him and the other person. So, where a claim for compensation is made by one person against another under Sec.70, the juristic basis of the obligation is not founded upon any contract or tort but upon a third category of law, namely, quasi-contract or restitution.” 18. Pollock & Mulla on Indian Contract and Specific Reliefs Act - Eleventh Edition - Volume 1 - 1994, commenting on Sec.70 at page 772 stated thus: “Implied Contract - Quasi Contract: Sec. 175(3) of the Government of India Act and Art.299 of the Constitution do not prevent a contract with the Government being implied or the Government incurring an obligation under a quasi contract. Sec. 175(3) of the Government of India Act does not prevent a contract with Government being implied or Government from incurring an obligation under a quasi contract. A quasi contract or a contract implied in law is not a real contract; or, as it is called, a consensual contract and Sec. 175(3) is concerned only with such contracts. In a latter case, the Supreme Court held that under Sec.70, claim for compensation is not on the basis of any subsisting contract but on a different kind of obligation, not on contract or tort but on a third category of law, i.e., quasi contract or restitution. Compensation under Sec.70 is allowable if conditions of the section are complied with.” At page 773, it is stated thus; “Salvage - Quasi contract:Where a person rescues a ship from peril and the owner of the rescued ship or the cargo owners incur a liability to pay compensation there arises a genuine quasi contract because the elements of a contract may not exist. But cases where there may be an opportunity to bargain for it may be possible. But cases where there may be an opportunity to bargain for it may be possible. In the In The Troilus, it was pointed out that in salvage an obligation is imposed by law irrespective of any contract express or implied as distinguished from towage which only arises from a contract, express or implied. Usually, services are rendered and the question of salvers’ compensation arises later. It was observed by Sir James Hannen P. The right to salvage may arise out of an actual contract; but it does not necessarily do so. It is a legal liability out of the fact that property has been saved, that the owner of the property who has had the benefit of it shall make remuneration to those who have conferred the benefit on him, notwithstanding that he has not entered any contract on the subject.” 19. Counsel also relied on a Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court, reported in Haji Abdulla Haji Adam Sait Dharamasthapanam v. T.V.Hameed Haji Abdulla Haji Adam Sait Dharamasthapanam v. T.V.Hameed Haji Abdulla Haji Adam Sait Dharamasthapanam v. T.V.Hameed , A.I.R. 1985 Ker. 93 paragraph 10 of the judgment is relevant for our purpose, which reads thus; “10, The scope of the provisions of Sec.70 has succinctly been stated by Jenkins C.J. in Suchand Ghosal v. Balaram Mardana , (1911) I.L.R. 38 Cal 1. thus: ‘The terms of Sec.70 are unquestionably wide, but applied with discretion they enable the courts to do substantial justice in cases where it would be difficult to impute to the persons concerned relations actually created by contract, It is however, especially incumbent on final courts of fact to be guarded and circumspect in their conclusions and not to countenance acts or payments that are really officious.‘ The above observation of Jenkins. C.J. has been noted with approval by the Supreme Court in the decision State of West Bengal v. B.K. Mondal and Sons State of West Bengal v. B.K. Mondal and Sons State of West Bengal v. B.K. Mondal and Sons , A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 779. In the said deci-sion the Supreme Court held: ‘Sec.70 deals with cases where there is no valid contract and provides for compensation to be paid in a case where the three requisite conditions prescribed by it are satisfied….. What Sec.70 prevents is unjust enrichment and it applies as much to individuals as to corporations and Government….. In the said deci-sion the Supreme Court held: ‘Sec.70 deals with cases where there is no valid contract and provides for compensation to be paid in a case where the three requisite conditions prescribed by it are satisfied….. What Sec.70 prevents is unjust enrichment and it applies as much to individuals as to corporations and Government….. It is only where he voluntarily accepts the thing or enjoys the work done that the liability under Sec.70 arises.‘ It can thus be seen that the voluntary acceptance of the benefit of the work done or the thing delivered is the foundation of the claim under Sec.70. If once the benefit of the work done or thing delivered is accepted, it can be presumed that the said work was done or thing was delivered, not intending to do so gratuitously. Similarly it can as well be presumed that the person who has accepted the work done or thing delivered, has enjoyed the benefit also. Sec.70 deals with cases where there is no valid contract. However, it is possible to inform from the circumstances of given case that a lawful relationship is born between the two and such a relationship is recognised under the provisions of Sec.70.” 20. I find force in the contention also. In fact, the trial court also entered a finding in favour of the plaintiff in this regard in paragraph 11 of the judgment. All the ingredients that are to be satisfied are also understood while they gave evidence before trial court. It could be seen that the defendant has accepted the benefit of work done and has taken delivery of the vehicle. He never refused to accept the benefit and without demur he took the delivery of the vehicle and enjoyed the benefit of repairs. Once the benefit is accepted, it has to be presumed that the said work was done not intending to do so gratuitously. The quantum is also proved by evidence in this case. The defendant was the direct beneficiary of the repairs, when he obtained delivery of the vehicle from the plaintiff. 21. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment of the lower appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. The trial court has allowed the proportionate cost to the appellant and the same is confirmed. 21. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment of the lower appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. The trial court has allowed the proportionate cost to the appellant and the same is confirmed. Apart from the same, the appellant is also entitled to full costs in the first appeal and the cross-appeal, and also costs in this second appeal.