Judgment :- 1. The main contention raised in the Second Appeal is whether the notice to quit satisfies the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The site and the machinery had been leased out by the respondent to the first defendant in the suit on a monthly rent of Rs. 90/-, that the first defendant had committed default and as on 21.11.1979 there were arrears in a sum of Rs. 761/-, that notice of termination was issued to take effect at the end of 31.12.1979 and as the first defendant did not comply with thee notice of demand, the suit came to be filed lor recovery of possession. Pending suit, the first defendant died and his legal representatives were brought on record as defendants 2 and 3 and they are the appellants in the Second Appeal. 2. The defence was that the monthly rent was Rs. 607- and not Rs. 90/- as claimed in the notice that there was no arrears and the termination was invalid. 3. The trial court decreed the suit in respect of the arrears of rent but dismissed the suit for recovery of possession holding that the suit notice did not conform to the requirements of the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The respondent herein filed appeal A.S. No. 146/84 before the Subordinate Judges Court, Tiruchirappalli and the learned V Additional Subordinate Judge by his judgment and decree dated 18.3.1985 allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court in so far as it related to the relief of recovery of possession and decreed the suit for that relief also. Aggrieved, the present Second Appeal has been filed. 4. At the time of admission, the following substantial question of law was raised for decision in the Second Appeal. “Whether the notice to quit is proper”. 5. Mr. M.V. Krishnan, learned Counsel for the appellants contended that what was done in the suit property was a manufacturing process and Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act require 6 months clear notice before the initiation of proceedings for recovery of possession. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Idandas v. Anant Ramachandra ( AIR 1982 SC 127 ). 6. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Idandas v. Anant Ramachandra ( AIR 1982 SC 127 ). 6. A reading of the notice shows that indeed the termination was to take effect with expiry of 31.12.1979. But the essential difference to be noticed in the present case distinguishes the facts of the decision of the Supreme Court relied upon. In the instant case, the tenancy had been conceded by the first defendant to be a monthly tenancy. If it was a monthly tenancy, then there was no question of the tenant insisting on 6 months clear notice. Even otherwise, it is to be noticed that Ex. A4 notice is dated 22.11.1979 and the suit itself was filed on 30.6.1980 more than 6 months after Ex. A-4. In my view, even conceding that the first defendant was entitled to 6 months notice in as much as the suit had been filed more than 6 months after the date of Ex. A-4, the requirement of Section 106 was satisfied. No exception can therefore be taken to the validity of the suit notice Ex. A-4. The substantial question of law has therefore to be answered against the appellants. As regards, the cross objections, it relates to the dismissal of the suit regarding the claim of mesne profits or damages for use and occupation after the date of termination summarily without framing necessary points for decision. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants had been paying the contractual rent. This is disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent. It is further represented that the conditional order passed in the Civil Miscellaneous Petition in C.M.P. No. 9674/85 in C.M.P. No. 7109/85 pending Second Appeal was not complied with and the respondent had taken possession of the suit property along with the equipment and machinery. In my view, nothing therefore survives in the cross objections and consequently, the cross objections are dismissed. The Second Appeal is dismissed, There will be no order as to costs.