ORDER TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. - The short question that falls for consideration in this writ petition is whether a dealer, who has exercised the option of departmentally compounding an offence under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, can at any subsequent stage question the validity of the composition order and claim refund of the composition fee paid in pursuance thereof. The question arises in the following circumstances : The petitioner is a registered dealer under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act carrying on business in the sale of liquor at Bailhongal in Belgaum district. On June 19, 1989, the respondent visited the petitioner's shop and asked for production of the books of account maintained in connection with the business. Sri Deepak Chayappa Phasalkar, one of the partners of the concern produced the relevant books including ledger, day book, sales bill book, stock register, etc., and furnished the details of the stock in hand. In the entire process of inspection of the books and verification of the stocks, the petitioner had the assistance of one Sri S. G. Udayar, a sales tax practitioner, who according to the respondents scribed a statement on behalf of the petitioner, and signed by Sri Phasalkar, its partner. The verification of the stocks and the books Maintained by the petitioner disclosed that 179 cases of liquor valuing Rs. 71,600 and involving an estimated tax payment of Rs. 25,000 had not been duly accounted for. No bills for the purchase of the said excess stock were produced by the petitioner. The respondent was therefore of the opinion that the petitioner had not maintained true and complete accounts and in the process fraudulently evaded the payment of tax due to the State contrary to section 29(1)(e) and 29(2)(c) of the Act. A notice dated June 23, 1989 to this effect was issued to the petitioner, in which the above violations were pointed out besides stating that the department proposed to launch a prosecution against the petitioner for the offences committed by it. The notice gave an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner before the proposed penal action was initiated. In response, the petitioner offered to compound the offences departmentally by paying a composition fee of Rs. 37,500 and also depositing the estimated tax amount of Rs. 25,000 on a turnover of Rs. 71,660. The notice gave an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner before the proposed penal action was initiated. In response, the petitioner offered to compound the offences departmentally by paying a composition fee of Rs. 37,500 and also depositing the estimated tax amount of Rs. 25,000 on a turnover of Rs. 71,660. The respondent was requested to accept the compounding fee in lieu of the proposed prosecution. This the respondent did in terms of an order dated June 23, 1989. In due course the respondent forwarded copies of the relevant documents to the assessing authority to enable the latter to take the same into consideration while concluding the final assessment proceedings. 2. An appeal was thereafter preferred by the petitioner before the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Tax against the recovery of the compounding fee, inter alia, on the ground that no excess stocks were detected nor was any opportunity afforded to the petitioner before compounding the offences allegedly committed by it. The appellate authority did not however find favour with these contentions and following the decision of this Court in W.P. Nos. 800 to 806 of 1989 dated March 17, 1990 dismissed the appeal holding that the petitioner having agreed to compound the offences alleged against it and also having paid the amount of tax and composition fee there was no illegality in the acceptance of the said amount or the composition of the offences. In the present writ petition, the petitioner has once again assailed the composition of offences and sought a mandamus directing the refund of the amount paid by it towards compounding fee. 3. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Gandhi, argued that the inspection of the books and verification of stocks was not carried out properly. He urged that the inspection was conducted even without the respondent having any reason to believe that the petitioner had evaded the payment of tax due to the State. He contended that the respondent had worked out the stocks in hand on the basis of empty cartons lying in the shop and that there was no basis for the respondent to conclude that the petitioner had been guilty of any offence punishable under section 29(1)(e) and 29(2)(c) of the Act. There is, in my opinion, no merit in any one of these submissions. There is, in my opinion, no merit in any one of these submissions. Whether or not there were any unaccounted stocks in hand with the petitioner at the time of verification is a pure and simple question of fact, which cannot be agitated in the present proceedings. Besides, having admitted the violation notified to him and compounded the same departmentally the petitioner cannot turn round and question the factual foundation on which such violations were alleged. If the petitioner disputed the conclusions arrived at by the respondent on the basis of his inspection and verification, it could have done so on receipt of the notice, which proposed to initiate prosecution proceedings against it. Instead of doing so, the petitioner readily offered to departmentally compound the offence upon payment of the amount mentioned therein. This offer implied an unequivocal admission of the findings recorded on the basis of the verification. It is not therefore permissible for the petitioner to question the correctness of the said findings in the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court, .which the court can decline to exercise in cases where the petitioner has acquiesced in the proceedings and even consented to the passing of the order, which it now seeks to avoid. The scope of judicial review is limited in such situations only to trading out whether on the facts admitted the order under challenge could have been made. That however is different from assailing the factual foundation on which the order is passed as is sought to be done in the present case. 4. It was next contended that the petitioner had been forced to make an offer for a settlement of the matter departmentally. The offer, its acceptance and the deposit of the amount were according to the learned counsel all vitiated by undue influence and coercion of the departmental officials. There is no merit even in that submission. The petitioner has laid no factual basis in the writ petition for the case which Mr. Gandhi, tried to build at the bar. A bald assertion devoid of any particulars and unsupported by any material to even prima facie probabilise the version of the petitioner is much too slender a foundation for this Court to hold an enquiry into its veracity. Gandhi, tried to build at the bar. A bald assertion devoid of any particulars and unsupported by any material to even prima facie probabilise the version of the petitioner is much too slender a foundation for this Court to hold an enquiry into its veracity. That apart, the fact that the petitioner was assisted by his sales tax consultant in the course of the inspection and throughout the composition proceedings as also the fact that the petitioner not only made an offer but deposited the amount towards the estimated tax dues as also the compounding fee is sufficient to belie its version that the offer culminating in the composition order was involuntary. As held by a Full Bench of this Court in S. V. Bagi v. State of Karnataka [1992] 87 STC 138; ILR 1992 Kar 1123, the fact that the dealer had made the payment towards the composition fee would itself indicate beyond any doubt that he was a willing party to the compounding. The court has in Bagi's case [1992] 87 STC 138 (Kar) [FB]; ILR 1992 Kar 1123 observed as under : "The process of compounding is completed only when the money that is agreed upon actually changes hands .......... there can never be a situation where the person who has committed or is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence under the Act can be aggrieved. The fact that he has made the payment would indicate beyond any doubt that he was a willing party to the compounding and he cannot object thereto. 5. Mr. Gandhi then argued that no notice was issued to the petitioner before passing the impugned composition order. Such a notice it was contended was essential not because the statute made it so but because fair play in action demanded that the dealer is given an opportunity to explain the discrepancies before the offences were compounded. The relevant official record produced by Mr. Shivayogiswamy, however belies the petitioner's version that no notice was issued to it. It bears a copy of the notice issued to the petitioner in which the petitioner was informed about the violations alleged against it, and the action proposed to be taken in the matter. The receipt of this notice has been acknowledged by the petitioner in the application for composition filed on its behalf. It bears a copy of the notice issued to the petitioner in which the petitioner was informed about the violations alleged against it, and the action proposed to be taken in the matter. The receipt of this notice has been acknowledged by the petitioner in the application for composition filed on its behalf. That being so, it is difficult to see how the petitioner can dispute either the issue or the receipt of the notice in question. From the notice the petitioner' had a clear idea of what was in store for it if the violations were not departmentally compounded. Its offer for a settlement of the issue, does not suggest any misapprehension as to the nature of the allegations or the offences for which it was sought to be prosecuted. This was in my opinion a sufficient compliance with the requirement of fair play in action. No further notice before the acceptance of the offer made by the petitioner was necessary. Reliance by Mr. Gandhi, upon the decision of a single Bench of this Court in K. M. Puttaswamy v. Commercial Tax Officer (Intelligence), Mysore Circle, Mysore [1988] 68 STC 241, is misplaced. In that case the business premises of the petitioner was visited by the Intelligence Officer, and according to the petitioner without affording any opportunity to him to explain the discrepancies he was compelled to give a cheque representing the compounding fee and the amount of tax due in respect of the turnover allegedly suppressed. These allegations made by the petitioner were not controverted. It was in that background that the court considered the recovery of the amount from the petitioner to be legally bad. The decision is not an authority for the proposition that if on receipt of a notice, from the officer, the dealer appears and voluntarily makes an offer for compounding the offences alleged against him, such an offer cannot be accepted unless the officer gives a further notice to the dealer. The process of compounding an offence is in substitution of a trial by the competent court, the only difference between the two being that in the case of composition of offences, the issue gets resolved on the basis of an agreement between the parties whereas in the case of a trial, it is the judgment of the court on contest that sets the matter at rest. Once therefore the party accused of the violations under the Act, comes forward to make an offer for composition, all that the authority competent to compound the same is required to examine is whether the offer should be accepted keeping in view the nature of the offences alleged and if so, the terms as regards the composition fee at which such an offer should be accepted. It is only if the authority accepting the offer proposes a higher amount than what is offered by the dealer that a response from the dealer may become necessary. In cases where the amount proposed by the dealer is acceptable to the authority, there is no need nor any rationale behind insisting upon the issue of a notice to the dealer before making a composition order. Acceptance of the offer made by the dealer in compounding the offences departmentally, which has the effect of acquitting the dealer of the penal liability attached to his acts of omission and commission cannot even be treated to be an adverse consequence which may necessitate the issue of a prior notice. It is noteworthy that the decision in Puttaswamy's case [1988] 68 STC 241 (Kar), was declared per incuriam by Rajendra Babu, J., being contrary to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Veerendra Stores v. State of Mysore [1973] 32 STC 596. Dealing with the decision Babu, J., in Gayathri Oil Industries v. Commercial Tax Officer (Intelligence)-II (W.P. Nos. 800 to 806 of 1989 dated March 17, 1990) observed as under : "However, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of this Court in Puttaswamy v. Commercial Tax Officer [1988] 68 STC 24 to contend that such notice is required. I am afraid and with great respect to the learned Judge, the view expressed there is not in consonance with the Division Bench rulings referred to above and hence the question of notice in the matter of composition does not arise at all. When an offer is made by the dealer for composition which is accepted by the authorities to except a notice as contended on behalf of the petitioners is fundamentally incorrect." 6. I have therefore no difficulty in rejecting the submissions made by Mr. Gandhi that any further notice was required to be given to the petitioner before the offer made by it could be accepted. 7. I have therefore no difficulty in rejecting the submissions made by Mr. Gandhi that any further notice was required to be given to the petitioner before the offer made by it could be accepted. 7. It was lastly contended by Mr. Gandhi, that the recovery of a sum of Rs. 37,500 towards the compounding fee was legally bad being in excess of the maximum prescribed by section 31 of the Act. He argued that although the petitioner is alleged to have committed offences punishable by sections 29(1)(e) and 29(2)(c), yet, the composition must be deemed to have taken place only in so far as the offence punishable by section 29(1)(e) was concerned. That was because for an offence punishable under section 29(2)(c), it was according to the learned counsel necessary that the assessment proceedings for the relevant period are completed and the petitioner declared to have fraudulently evaded the payment of tax or other amount payable for the said period. No such assessment having been completed the question of the petitioner being found guilty of any fraudulent evasion of tax did not arise. The recovery of compounding fee could not in terms of section 31(b) go beyond a sum of Rs. 1,000 rendering the amount received from the petitioner an illegal exaction of money, hence liable to be refunded to it. Reliance in support was placed by him upon a Division Bench decision of this court in Assistant Commercial Tax Officer (Intelligence) v. N. N. Jariwala [1992] 86 STC 229; ILR 1991 Kar 4414. Reliance was also placed upon a few unreported single Bench decisions of this Court which have taken the view that summary recovery of any money on account of tax or composition fee was improper without giving to the dealer an opportunity to explain the discrepancies alleged against him. 8. Section 29(1)(e) and 2(2)(c) as the same stood during the relevant period ran thus : "Section 29 : Offences and penalties. - (1) Any person who - (a) to (d)......... (c) fails to keep true and complete accounts;` (f) to (h)......... shall on conviction by a magistrate, not below the rank of a Second Class Magistrate, be liable to a fine which shall not be less than two hundred and fifty rupees but which may extend to five hundred rupees. (2) Any person who - (a) to (bbb)......... (c) fails to keep true and complete accounts;` (f) to (h)......... shall on conviction by a magistrate, not below the rank of a Second Class Magistrate, be liable to a fine which shall not be less than two hundred and fifty rupees but which may extend to five hundred rupees. (2) Any person who - (a) to (bbb)......... (c) fraudulently evades the payment of any tax or other amount payable by him under this Act; or (d) to (e)......... shall on conviction, in addition to the recovery of any tax or other amount that may be due from him, be punishable with simple imprisonment which may extend to twelve months or with a fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees but which may extend to five thousand rupees or with both; and when the offence is a continuing one, with a daily fine not exceeding one hundred rupees during the period of the continuance of the offence." 9. Section 31 of the Act, deals with composition of the offences and, inter alia, provides that the prescribed authority may accept from any person who has committed or is reasonably suspected of having committed any offence punishable under the Act by way of composition of such offence, in addition to the tax or amount not paid or evaded to be paid a sum of money not exceeding Rs. 1,000 or double the amount of tax or amount so remaining unpaid or evaded to be paid whichever is greater where the offence committed is under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 29 or clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 29. In all other cases, compounding fee cannot under section 31 (h) exceed Rs. 1,000. 10. In the present case, in so far as the offence punishable under section 29(2)(c) was concerned the composition fee for the same could be a sum of Rs. 1,000 or double the amount of tax or the amount remaining unpaid or evaded whichever was greater. The amount of tax which the petitioner was alleged to have evaded was estimated by the respondent at Rs. 25,000. The composition fee could therefore extend up to a sum of Rs. 50,000 by the standards prescribed under section 31 of the K.S.T. Act. Payment and acceptance of any amount lesser than the optimum was therefore perfectly in order. 11. The amount of tax which the petitioner was alleged to have evaded was estimated by the respondent at Rs. 25,000. The composition fee could therefore extend up to a sum of Rs. 50,000 by the standards prescribed under section 31 of the K.S.T. Act. Payment and acceptance of any amount lesser than the optimum was therefore perfectly in order. 11. The argument that since the assessment proceedings had not been completed, it was premature for the respondent to estimate the amount of tax evaded and to accept a compounding fee on that assumption, does not appeal to me. What was the precise amount the payment whereof was evaded by the petitioner may have to be determined in the course of the assessment proceedings, but the very fact that such determination had not taken place did not prevent the petitioner from acknowledging the evasion even in anticipation of a finding of the assessing authority. At the stage of composition what is important is not whether a fraudulent evasion has been established but whether the person who makes the offer for composition has or is reasonably suspected of having committed the offence alleged. The words "has committed or is reasonably suspected of having committed" appearing in section 31 do not lend themselves to any other interpretation. 12. Now the question whether the dealer has committed any offence is a matter which is best known to him. In case a dealer either on account of his knowledge that an offence has been committed and may therefore result in his conviction or for any other reason such as avoidance of inconvenience, harassment or the ignominy involved in prosecution offers to compound the offence in lieu of prosecution, any such offer, would imply an admission of the facts constituting the offence alleged against him so that after the offences are compounded it shall not be open to him to conveniently retract or withdraw such admissions at his will. If the charge against the dealer is that he has failed to keep true and complete accounts, after the offence is compounded it is no longer open to the dealer to rum round and say that the accounts maintained by him were true and complete and therefore there was no occasion for levy or collection of any composition fee. If the charge against the dealer is that he has failed to keep true and complete accounts, after the offence is compounded it is no longer open to the dealer to rum round and say that the accounts maintained by him were true and complete and therefore there was no occasion for levy or collection of any composition fee. Similarly if the charge against the dealer is that he has fraudulently evaded the payment of tax due under the Act, and committed an offence contrary to section 29(2)(c) an offer for composition made by him would imply that he admits the facts which constitute such a fraudulent evasion. Any such admission which becomes the basis of an order of composition tantamount in law to the acquittal of the dealer from the charge against him cannot be withdrawn by the person making the same, except in cases where the admission is found to be vitiated by fraud or any other legal disability. Generally speaking such withdrawals, cannot be permitted in the courts' writ jurisdiction under article 226 particularly when the same involve disputed questions of fact and have the effect of depriving the department of the option of prosecuting the dealer which it would have done but for the order of composition made at his instance. Having benefited from an order invited by him by inducing the opposite party to agree to a composition the dealer cannot avoid the, consequences by merely contending that the basis on which the composition had been offered by him and accepted by the prescribed authority, did not exist. 13. The decision of this Court in Assistant Commercial Tax Officer (Intelligence) v. N. N. Jariwala [1992] 86 STC 229; ILR 1991 Kar. 4414, relied upon by Mr. Gandhi, does not lend any assistance to him. All that the same lays down is that if the amount of composition fee recovered is in excess of what is prescribed the dealer can demand the refund of the excess no matter he had paid the amount voluntarily. Even according to the division Bench in cases where the amount of fee paid was within the maximum prescribed under section 31 of the Act, the dealer could not demand its refund having acquiesced and being estopped from doing so. Even according to the division Bench in cases where the amount of fee paid was within the maximum prescribed under section 31 of the Act, the dealer could not demand its refund having acquiesced and being estopped from doing so. This is apparent from the following passage : "If the amount of compounding fee demanded and accepted by the respondent was within the maximum prescribed under section 31 of the Act, there would have been considerable force in the contention of the appellant that the dealer concerned having agreed for compounding of the offences on payment of the amount within the maximum limit prescribed by law and having avoided prosecution, cannot subsequently turn round and challenge that the compounding fee collected was excessive." 14. What therefore needs to be asked is whether on the facts admitted by the dealer the payment of compounding fee could be said to be in excess of what was otherwise prescribed under section 31. In the instant case, the charge against the petitioner being one of fraudulent evasion of tax, the offer made by him to compound the said offence necessarily implied an admissions of the facts constituting the said offence. Such being the position the recovery of the composition fee has to be seen in the context of what is prescribed by section 31(a) which does not limit the said fee to Rs. 1,000, but permits recovery of an amount twice as much as the amount of tax evaded. The payment of an amount of Rs. 37,500 and its acceptance did not therefore fall beyond the limits prescribed by section 31 so as to be rendered illegal. 15. Reliance by Mr. Gandhi, upon the unreported decisions, also does not lend much assistance to him. Most of the said decisions, have been rendered by S. R. Rajashekara Murthy, J., following his Lordship's earlier view in Puttaswamy's case [1988] 68 STC 241 (Kar.). The said cases dealt with situations where without any assessment of the liability, the tax authorities had compelled the dealers to pay up the amounts of tax allegedly evaded by them together with the composition fee. Such recoveries were found by the court to be improper. The said cases dealt with situations where without any assessment of the liability, the tax authorities had compelled the dealers to pay up the amounts of tax allegedly evaded by them together with the composition fee. Such recoveries were found by the court to be improper. That however is not the position here for as noticed earlier the offer to compound had come from the petitioner after die respondent had proposed to initiate prosecution proceedings on the basis of the findings in the course of inspection of record and verification of the stocks. The offer made included a voluntary payment of Rs. 25,000 towards the tax, which it is obvious would be properly adjusted at the time of final assessment proceedings, besides a sum of Rs. 37,500 towards the composition fee. It was, not therefore a case where on a spot recovery was made under compulsion or coercion by the officers as appears to have happened in most of the cases referred to by Mr. Gandhi. Such cases therefore stand on a totally different footing and cannot be called in aid to reverse the composition in cases where the same has been properly made. 16. In the result there is no merit in this writ petition which fails and is hereby dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 2,000 (rupees two thousand) only. Writ petition dismissed.