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1998 DIGILAW 586 (PAT)

United Commercial Bank v. Kuya Collieries (P. ) Limited

1998-08-20

P.K.DEB

body1998
Judgment P.K.Deb, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff-appellant against the judgment and decree dated 23-12-1987 passed by the then Subordiante Judge, Vth Court, Dhanbad in Money Suit No. 124/50 of 1976/87. 2. The plaintiff-appellant is a Government undertaking banking company having its branch office at Jharia, P.S.-Jharia, District-Dhanbad. As per the plaint, the defendant-respondent No. 1 through its Director, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 approached the plaintiff-Banking company for cash credit facility up to the limit of Rs. two lakhs. Plaintiff-Banking company sanctioned the same. The cash credit account was opened up and the defendant No. 1 agreed to pay interest at the rate of 5% per annum above the Reserve Bank of India rate subject to the minimum rate of interest of 10% per annum. The defendant Nos. 2 and 3 on behalf of the defendant No. 1 agreed to the personal guarantee for the payment of the said advance. As per rules of the Banking company the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 for and on behalf of the defendant No. 1 executed a promissory note on 16-5-1970 in favour of the plaintiff-Bank for a sum of Rs. 1,33,OOO/- payable on demand with interest at the rate mentioned above. The defendants had also hypothecated all the goods by way of security and defendant Nos, 2 and 3 personally .remained the guarantor for the payment of the loan advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant No. 1-colliery. Some other documents as per Banking rules as letter of continuity etc. were also executed by defendant Nos. 2 and 3 for and on behalf of the defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. The interest accrued on the amount and on 30-6-1972 the defendant No. 1 duly confirmed the balance due amounting to Rs. 1,97,017.91 p. The loan was taken by the defendant No. 1 for the development of Coal Mines and benefit of the said Colliery. It is submitted that the Coal Mines of the defendant No. 1 was nationalised as per provisions of coal Mines Nationalisation Act and the account of defendant No. 1 was frozen after the implementation of the vesting to the Central Government. According to the plaintiff-Bank upto 30-11-1976 the amount of Rs. 3,13,894.9 ps. remained outstanding to the Bank and the defendant Nos. According to the plaintiff-Bank upto 30-11-1976 the amount of Rs. 3,13,894.9 ps. remained outstanding to the Bank and the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 who were the guarantors of defendant No. 1 failed to repay money and hence the suit has been filed for recovery of the amount with interest future and pendents lite, 3. On appearance, the defendant filed written statement separately, but cases were almost the same. According to them, the suit was not maintainable. The plaintiff had no valid cause of action or right to sue. The suit is barred under the provisions of T.P. Act and that the Civil Court has got no jurisdiction after coming of the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act(hereinafter referred to as the Act). As per provisions of the Act, the same claims were preferred by the Banking authorities before the Assistant Commissioner of Payment and by his order and judgment dated 1-3-1978 decided the claim and allowed the claim of the plaintiff upto Rs. 1,84,813.13 ps. by calculating the interest on the principal amount upto 1-5-1973 when vesting took place as per the Nationalisation Act. As per that decree of the Assistant Commissioner of Payment, a cheque was issued in favour of the plaintiff-Bank and they have received the same without any objection. It is further stated that in view of such position when the same has already been adjudicated by Assistant Commissioner of Payment, further adjudication on the matter before the Civil Court is not maintainable and when receipt of payment has been made by the Bank without any objection, the suit is not maintainable. The defendant Nos. 2 and 3 had also pleaded the same pleas as per defendant No. 1 in their separate written statements. 4. On the basis of the pleading of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Court below: (i) Has the plaintiff got any cause of action for the suit ? (ii) Is the suit maintainable in its present form ? (iii) Whether the suit is barred by limitation and under the provisions of the T. P. Act? (iv) Is the suit, barred by the principle of waiver, estoppel, acquiescence and res judicata ? (v) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree of Rs. 3,13,894,9 ps. or any portion thereof? (vi) Is the plaintiff entitled to get decree for the relief claimed ? (iv) Is the suit, barred by the principle of waiver, estoppel, acquiescence and res judicata ? (v) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree of Rs. 3,13,894,9 ps. or any portion thereof? (vi) Is the plaintiff entitled to get decree for the relief claimed ? (vii) What other reliefer reliefs, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to ? 5. Issue Nos. V/s. vi and viii being the vital issues were taken up together by the learned Court below and held that Civil Court have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit when the plaintiff-Banking company had already submitted to the jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner of Payment as per the Act and under Clause IV of Sec. 23 of the Act, the present suit is barred. Hence the suit was dismissed and as such this appeal. 6. In this appeal, Mr. Marathia, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant alleged short point that the learned Court below has committed error of law in holding that the Civil Court has got no jurisdiction in view of Sec. 23 of the Act. 7. This point about the jurisdiction of Civil Court after the Special Act came into force was raised in very many cases and Hon ble two Single Judges of this Court had given divergent views. In the case of Gupteshwar Pd. Singh V/s. Allahabad Bank and Ors. 1988 BLT page 181. Hon ble Justice Satyeshwar Roy, as then he was, held that the Civil Courts jurisdiction has not been ousted by the provisions of Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act and a claim by a Creditor can be maintained in civil suit against the owner of the Colliery and it was further held that Sec. 23 of the Act provided only an additional remedy for preferring claim before the Commissioner of Payment, but contrary view was taken by Hon ble Justice S.C. Mookherji, as then he was, in the case of M/s. B.C.C.L. v. Untied Commercial Bank and Anr. reported in 1988 BLT, page 344. When there were divergent views by two Hon ble Single Judges in another case Hon ble Mr. reported in 1988 BLT, page 344. When there were divergent views by two Hon ble Single Judges in another case Hon ble Mr. Justice B.P. Singh had referred the matter regarding jurisdiction before a Division Bench and the Division Bench was inclined to accept the views as taken in Gupteshwar Prasads case and the matter was kept open to be decided afresh without considering the contrary views of the two Single Judges as mentioned above. This Bench has decided the matter in East Angrapathra Colliery Co. Pvt. Ltd. V/s. United Commercial Bank and Anr. case heard analogously in United Commercial Bank v. The East Ganoodih Colliery Co. Put. Ltd,, holding that the Civil Courts jurisdiction being a vast one, it cannot be curtailed by any special Legislation when no specific bar has been enumerated in the said Act. The said judgment has been reported in 1997 (1) All P.L.R. page 682. Para-17 of that judgment was the crux in the matter by referring to Supreme Court judgment as -- Dhulalbhai V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. and two other Division Bench cases of Calcutta High Court and of Madhya Pradesh High Court. Para-17 is required to be reiterated of that judgment, which I do accordingly: Para 17- From the above, it follows that the Commissioner of Payment appointed under Sec. 20 of the Act is to entertain a claim by the Creditor of the erstwhile owner and to decide the payment to the creditor from the compensation amount assessed for the purpose purpose of vesting of the erstwhile owner of the Colliery. Thus, the different provisions of the section relate to disbursement of creditors claim on the compensation amount assessed, but it does not take away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court when the Creditor can claim its dues against the erstwhile owner irrespective of its claim towards the compensation amount assessed towards in favour of the owner. The claim of the creditor may be satisfied from other properties of the erstwhile owner besides the compensation amount and in that way Civil Courts jurisdiction cannot be barred. 8. Thus, Civil Courts jurisdiction cannot be ousted because of the provisions of Secs. 20, 23 and Sec. 9(b) of the Act as has been held by this Court in the above judgment. 8. Thus, Civil Courts jurisdiction cannot be ousted because of the provisions of Secs. 20, 23 and Sec. 9(b) of the Act as has been held by this Court in the above judgment. It was held that the Commissioner of Payment as appointed by the Act can adjudicate the claim, if referred to it. 9. In the present case, the plaintiff has chosen both the forums for the same claim, which according to me, is not maintainable. It is true that for the purpose of limitation, the plaintiff had no other alternative but to file civil suit but for getting his dues, he also made its claim before the Commissioner of Payment and Commissioner of Payment had allowed the claim regarding the principal amount together with interest calculated up to the date of vesting and the rest interest accrued was not allowed as it was not within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Payment to grant such interest beyond the period of vesting. But, when a part of the claim was allowed in favour of the plaintiff, he had received the same but he did not come up for any amendment of the plaint. It is true that for the rest of the amount, it could have proceeded with the claims before the Civil Court as there were personal guarantors also, which could be satisfied from other properties, those which had not been hypothecated etc. for the purpose of loan. But, in that case, the Central Govt. or the B.C.C.L. which had now been substituted after vesting in place of the private colliery should have been made party and the claim should have been lessened for the rest of the amount, but that was not done, rather the plaintiff-appellant had preferred an appeal as per forum under the Act before the District Judge. 10. Mr. Marahia, Counsel for the appellant or the Counsel for the respondents could not inform this Court about the result of the appeal or whether any further revision had been filed before the High Court as per forum under Section 23 of the Act. 10. Mr. Marahia, Counsel for the appellant or the Counsel for the respondents could not inform this Court about the result of the appeal or whether any further revision had been filed before the High Court as per forum under Section 23 of the Act. When apart of the claim had already been allowed and when the plaintiff had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner of Payment then even if for the balance amount of interest he had the jurisdiction to proceed in the Civil Court, it did not make any amendment in the plaint rather proceeded as it was, even not making BCCL a party. I do admit the legal position that for the rest of the interest amount, the plaintiff-Bank had the jurisdiction to proceed in the Civil Court but when no amendment of the plaint was made, now this Court cannot remand the matter to the Court below as by this time the claim has already been barred by limitation. Thus, taking a bit different views regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, I find and hold that the ultimate decision arrived at by the learned Court below cannot be disturbed as for the laches of the plaintiff, no amendment was made in the plaint after a part of the claim was allowed by the Assistant Commissioner of Payment and that the substituted owner i.e. M/s. B.C.C.L. had not been made parties and by this time rest o the claim has already become barred by limitation. 11. In view of the above position, taking a different view I find that this appeal cannot be allowed and it must be dismissed. Although, in the circumstances, I am not inclined to pass any order regarding costs in the appeal.