JUDGMENT V.K. Singhal, J.—In this writ appeal the order of the learned Single Judge dated 26.8.1998 passed in Writ Petition No. 5576 of 1992 had been assailed. 2. The facts of the case are that there was an inspection of the business premises of the Appellant on 19.6.1989 by the CTO, Intelligence-II, North Zone, Commercial Tax Department, Belgaum. The statement of Sri Deepak Chayappa Phasalkar, and it was found that the books are not posted from time to time and bill of 125 cases of liquor not recorded. On verification of the stocks and the books maintained by the Appellant, it was found that 179 cases of liquor valuing Rs. 71,600/- involving an estimated tax payment of Rs. 25,000/- which were received including liquor received from Vorion Distilleries, INC, Bangalore, vide Invoice No. 1036, dated 15.6.1989 were not entered in the stock register. A letter dated 23.6.1989 in pursuance of alleged notice was submitted by the partner of M/s. Phasalkar Liquor Agency to the Commercial Tax Officer, Intelligence Wing, commercial department, which is extracted here below: I am in receipt of your notice No. CTO INT II/INS-9 of 1989-90 and I have to state as under: In lieu of prosecution, I am willing to have the offences compounded departmentally in a sum of Rs. 37,500/- (in words Thirty Seven Thousand Five Hundred only) and I also pay herewith the estimated tax of Rs. 25,000/- on the turnover of Rs. 71,600/- by way of cheques the compounding fees and the tax may please be accepted and drop further proceedings. The Assessee challenged the order of the CTO, intelligence, dated 23.6.1989 in appeal. The appeal was rejected following Writ Nos. 800-806 of 1989 dated 17.3.1991. Writ petition thereafter was filed, which also came to be dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ appeal came to be filed. 3. Now the learned Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that there was no notice issued and signature were obtained on a blank paper. The Assessee was forced to make the payment of tax and penalty. The amount have been collected in excess of the limit prescribed under Section 31(a) of the KST Act. The composition could have been only for a maximum sum of Rs. The Assessee was forced to make the payment of tax and penalty. The amount have been collected in excess of the limit prescribed under Section 31(a) of the KST Act. The composition could have been only for a maximum sum of Rs. 1,000/- and for the alleged revision of tax, there could not have been any composition as it was incumbent on the part of Respondent first to determine the amount of tax evaded and then, there could have been any conclusion of fraudulent evasion. In this regard, the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Assistant Commercial Tax Officer (Intelligence) Vs. N.N. Jariwala, ILR (1991) KAR 4414 is relied upon, wherein, the Division Bench has held that the maximum compounding amount which could be collected is Rs. 1,000/- and as double that amount had been collected, the Respondent had the right to challenge the legality of the levy. 4. On behalf of the Respondent it is submitted in the case of Webbs Farm Mechanization Private Limited v. State of Karnataka Civil Petition No. 288 of 1992 which was decided on 9.11.1998, the contention of the Assessee that there cannot be any composition in respect of the turnover without the assessment was not accepted. 5. Points which we have to decide is whether the Appellant was served with the notice before composition and whether the amount collected in excess of Rs. 1,000/- is without jurisdiction. 6. So far as the first point is concerned, copy of the notice which was produced is dated 19.6.1989. The same is acknowledged by the Appellant through his letter dated 23.6.1989 which shows that the notice was given and it was received by him. It may be a fact that the letter was signed in the office premises of the Respondent but this blank paper theory has not been raised by the Counsel for the Appellant either in the writ petition or before the appellate authority. The two main grounds urged before the appellate authority are: 1. That the learned CTO.II (int) NZ Belgaum was wrong in collecting CF Rs. The two main grounds urged before the appellate authority are: 1. That the learned CTO.II (int) NZ Belgaum was wrong in collecting CF Rs. 37,500/- for the so called offence stated to have been committed under Section 29(1)(e) and Section 29(2)(c) of the Act, for the reason that on the so-called excess stock no tax is payable for want of any sale and that too no finding is given by the authority as regards to fraudulent evasion of tax within the meaning of Section 29(1)(c) of the Act and the CTO (Int) not being an assessing authority is not empowered to calculate the tax on the future sales if any. 2. The order passed on 23.6.1989 under Section 31 of KST Act having been supplied on 15.12.1989 on application and not supplying the copy on the date of which it was passed amounts to non-passing of an order since the authority signing order is free to change it at any time before it is communicated in view of the decision of Kerala High Court in the case of Government Woods Works Limited v. State of Karnataka 1988 (69) STC P. 62. 7. If such any illegal action is taken by any authority, the Assessee could immediately move to the higher authority by making a complaint against the officer or some other action could have been taken to show that the letter was obtained under duress and was without issuing notice. The copy of the notice issued is also produced in this Court and was shown to the Counsel for the Appellant. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the notice was not given before the collection of amount. 8. Facts of Puttaswamy Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, 1988 (68) STC 241 relied by the learned Counsel for the Appellant are not similar to that of the Appellant, as here it cannot be said that reasonable opportunity was not given to the Appellant. 9. Learned Counsel relied on the judgment given in the case of Assistant Commercial Tax Officer (Intelligence) Vs. N.N. Jariwala, ILR (1991) KAR 4414 on the second point that there could not be any composition for more than Rs. 1,000/-. In this matter, it was found by the Division Bench that the offence committed is under Section 29(2)(d) for which maximum amount for composition is Rs. 1,000/- and as such the compounding fee of more than Rs. N.N. Jariwala, ILR (1991) KAR 4414 on the second point that there could not be any composition for more than Rs. 1,000/-. In this matter, it was found by the Division Bench that the offence committed is under Section 29(2)(d) for which maximum amount for composition is Rs. 1,000/- and as such the compounding fee of more than Rs. 1,000/- was liable to be refunded. If the matter of the Appellant is examined in the light of the provisions of KST Act and the judgment given in the case of N.N. Jariwala, it is evident that collection of composition money more than the amount permitted under the Act is without jurisdiction. In the case of the Assessee, the offence is stated to be under Section 29(1)(e) and 29(2)(c) of KST Act. It is not the offence under Section 29(2)(d) for which the maximum composition fee is Rs. 1,000/-. Section 29(2)(e) refers to failure of the Assessee to keep incomplete accounts, but 29(2)(c) refers to fraudulent evasion of payment of tax or other amount payable under the Act. Under Section 31(a), if the offence is under Section 29(2)(c), then the amount of composition money could be double the amount of tax which is evaded. In respect of offences under Section 29(1)(e) composition could be even under Clause (b) of Section 31 which at that point of time was for a sum of money not exceeding Rs. 1,000/-. Had it been the offence under Section 29(1)(e) there would have been substance in the argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellant but for an offence which is committed under Section 29(2)(c) it is double the amount of tax which remains unpaid or evaded to be paid. The decision of N.N. Jeriwalal's case therefore has no application as that was based completely for the default committed under Section 29(2)(d) for which the maximum amount of composition was Rs. 1,000/- under Section 31(b). 10. Learned Counsel for the Appellant also contended that there could not have been collection of composition money before the assessment is framed. In this regard it may be observed that normally the composition money under Section 31 of the KST Act should be recovered after provisional assessment under Section 12B or regular assessment under Section 12 or reassessment under Section 12A is completed and evaded tax is determined. In this regard it may be observed that normally the composition money under Section 31 of the KST Act should be recovered after provisional assessment under Section 12B or regular assessment under Section 12 or reassessment under Section 12A is completed and evaded tax is determined. A very strange situation may arise if the assessing authority ultimately comes to the conclusion that the evasion is at a figure which is lesser or higher than for which composition money is accepted before assessment. There is no provision for refund of the composition money or realising the deficit money. Even in the case of the Appellant the assessment was finalised on 28.8.1992 wherein the figure of evasion (suppressed turnover) was determined at Rs. 1,43,300/- which is double the amount of suppression, for which composition was made. The Assessee preferred an appeal before the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, (Appeals) which was rejected on 14.9.1994 and it was not pointed out that any further appeal was preferred against the order of the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, (Appeals). In the case of the Assessee the evasion was taken at a higher figure and no penalty was levied because of the composition. Whether it would be appropriate in the present case to interfere with the collection of composition fee at this stage. A Full Bench of this Court in S.V. Bagi Vs. State of Karnataka, ILR (1992) KAR 1123 while considering maintenance of appeal against composition observed that a willing party to the compounding cannot object for composition. In CP 288 of 1982 dated 9.11.1998 a contention was raised that since there was no assessment and the tax was not quantified, there could not have been any composition. It was found by the Division Bench that where the sales are suppressed and the Intelligence Authorities discover such suppression and after scrutinising and verifying the entire account books arrive at a conclusion, the tax amount arrived at has to be paid by the Petitioner, unless the same is set aside in appeal, or in revision or in review. These observations of the Division Bench refers to scrutinising the books of account, and determination of tax amount of suppression have to be considered in the context that normally the power for determination of tax, has to be undertaken for provisional assessment, regular assessment or reassessment. These observations of the Division Bench refers to scrutinising the books of account, and determination of tax amount of suppression have to be considered in the context that normally the power for determination of tax, has to be undertaken for provisional assessment, regular assessment or reassessment. At the relevant point of time, the Intelligence Wing was not having the power of provisional assessment. But the amount which was offered by the Assessee cannot be considered to have been paid under coercion as his Sales Tax Adviser was also present who has written his statement. The Assessee has not disputed the figures for which the notice was given either before the assessing authority or in appeal or even before the learned Single Judge and it is not even stated before us that the figure so arrived at of suppressed purchases were not correct. Beside that the assessment has already been confirmed by the appellate authority and has become final. At this stage, it cannot be considered to be a fit case for interference by this Court with regard to the quantum of composition money. The Assessee cannot take advantage of his own mistakes i.e., he cannot approbate and reprobate. At one point of time he has offered the amount of tax of composition money voluntarily and at the other point of time without challenging the quantum of tax he has challenged the composition money. 11. Even on fact we are not satisfied that it is a fit case for interference. Even on the point if the matter was to be examined regarding jurisdiction for collection of composition money without assessment we could have sent the matter back to the assessing authority for initiating the penalty proceedings on the basis of the finding recorded in the assessment order of suppression of sales and for which no penalty was levied because the composition was made. That would have put the Assessee to more burden of heavy penalty because the suppression of tax was found more. Learned Single Judge observed that the question as to whether there was unaccounted stock at the time of verification is a pure question of fact and it cannot be agitated in the writ proceedings. That would have put the Assessee to more burden of heavy penalty because the suppression of tax was found more. Learned Single Judge observed that the question as to whether there was unaccounted stock at the time of verification is a pure question of fact and it cannot be agitated in the writ proceedings. The contention that there was undue influence and coercion was not accepted and that any further notice after the application for composition was not required unless the amount of composition money was sought to be increased. 12. The conclusions therefore are as under: a) that composition under Section 31 of KST Act should be resorted after the provisional assessment under Section 12B or regular assessment under Section 12 or under Section 12A is completed and evaded tax amount is determined. b) that in a case where the assessment is subsequently completed of the composition and penalty is not levied because of the composition. If it is found that the composition was not proper then, the assessing authority has to proceed for levy of penalty after such an order is passed. c) that no appeal lies against the order of composition as held in S.V. Bagi Vs. State of Karnataka, ILR (1992) KAR 1123. d) that writ petition under Article 226 cannot be entertained against the order of composition unless such order is without jurisdiction or against the statutory provision, or based on fraud or against the principles of natural justice. 13. In view of the observations made above, the appeal stands dismissed.