Order Title Suit no.104 of 1983 was filed by the plaintiff for declaration that there was already a previous partition of the suit property detailed in Schedule I to the plaint. It was alternatively prayed that if previous partition is not accepted by the defendant then a decree for partition of his half share in the suit house, bearing holding no. 152, situated in Mohalla Bekapur of Munger town be passed. The plaintiff Santosh Kumar Jalan @ Kanhaiyalal Jalan and the defendant Chandra Kishore Jalan were full brothers, being sons of late Dwarika Prasad Jalan and as such he was entitled in the half share in the ancestral suit house. According to defendant, the plaintiff was already adopted on 17.2.1966 by Radha Krishna Jalan as his son and thereafter he ceased to have any right, title and interest in the suit house. The suit was dismissed holding that there was no previous partition of the suit house. The plaintiff was validly adopted by Radha Krishna Jalan and after that he cannot Claim any share in the suit house. On appeal by the plaintiff, the first appellate court affirmed the same. 2. Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant submitted that under Section 12(b) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the plaintiff being a coparcener in respect of the suit house belonging to his natural father, late Dwarika Prasad Jalan and his two sons, including the plaintiff, governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law got a vested right therein which even on adoption he continued to retain. Reliance has been placed on a Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Yarlagadda Nayudamma etc. vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1981 AP 19 ). 3. In the present case it is not in dispute that there was neither any such custom nor agreement to the effect that a son, namely the plaintiff having been given in adoption was not to loose interest in the family of his birth and he shall have a share in the property of late Dwarika Prasad Jalan. 4. Section 12 speaks about effects of adoption. It has three provisos which are exceptions to the general rule contained in main part. 4. Section 12 speaks about effects of adoption. It has three provisos which are exceptions to the general rule contained in main part. The effect of adoption is that the adopted child is to be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to have been severed and replaced by those created by adoption in the adoptive family. Proviso (b) says that the property which is vested in the adopted child before adoption shall continue to vest in the adoptee, subject of course, to any obligation attaching to the ownership of such property including the obligation of the adoptee to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth. This proviso, therefore, clearly says that the adopted child shall take from the family of his birth to the family of adoption only that property which was vested in him before adoption and no other. If the property which was not vested in him as the absolute owner thereof, then the said property is not taken away by him from the family of his birth to the adoptive family. 5. In my view, if there is any coparcenary or joint family in existence in the family of birth on the date of adoption, then the adoptee cannot be said to have any vested property. The property does not vest and, therefore, provision of Section 12 proviso (b) is not attracted. In the context of Section 12 proviso (b) "vested property" means where indefeasible right is created, i.e. on no contingency it can be defeated in respect of a particular property, in other words where full ownership is conferred in respect of a particular property. But this is not the position in case of coparcenary property. The coparcenary property is not owned by a coparcener and never any particular property. The ownership of the coparcenary property vests in the whole body of coparceners. 6. In my view Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act supports the view that coparcenary property is not vested in the coparcener. The coparcenary property is not owned by a coparcener and never any particular property. The ownership of the coparcenary property vests in the whole body of coparceners. 6. In my view Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act supports the view that coparcenary property is not vested in the coparcener. No one member, including even a sole surviving coparcener, can ever claim to be the owner of the entire or any specific share in a specific property, till the partition takes place. Considering this, according to me, there is no vested property in a coparcener and therefore proviso (b) to Section 12 cannot be attracted. It is only such property, if any which had already vested in the plaintiff before adoption as absolute owner was not forfeited by the adoption and he continued to hold the same in the new family. In the present case in respect of the coparcenary property in the family of the plaintiff's birth it cannot be said that he being the coparcener was having right to a particular part of it so as to get it vested. It is no doubt that plaintiff got a right by birth in the suit house but the said right or interest by coparcener was liable to fluctuation, increasing by the death of a coparcener or decreasing by birth of a new coparcener. In case there was a partition of the suit house before the plaintiff's adoption only then specific part of it can be said to have been vested to him. 7. In my view, on the date of adoption the plaintiff had no vested right in any part of the suit house and, therefore, proviso (b) to Section 12 cannot be attracted. 8. No doubt Yarlagadda Nayudamma (supra) supported the proposition of the appellant's counsel, wherein it was held that the property vests in a coparcener by birth and hence he gets a vested right in that property by virtue of inheritence which is based on the commentary on Hindu Law by Sri S.V. Gupta which differs from the view expressed in the Book on Hindu Law by Mulla, wherein this illustration has been given. A has two sons, namely, Band C. A gives C in adoption to X. C is not intitled to inherit A as his son. A has two sons, namely, Band C. A gives C in adoption to X. C is not intitled to inherit A as his son. With great respect, it is not possible for me to agree with the view expressed by Andhra Pradesh High Court, for the reasons stated above. There is no merit in this appeal. This appeal is dismissed under Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.