JUDGMENT A.L. VAIDYA, J.—The present petitioner, Sh. Mohan Singh filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 2,50,000/- before the trial Court against the present respondent. Defendant No. 2 filed an application under Section 8(i) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter to be called as the Act), with the prayer that the plaint be either returned to the plaintiff for presenting it before the named Arbitrator or any other appropriate order in the given facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed. It was alleged in this application that the suit filed by the plaintiff-petitioner was based on two agreements for working Lot No. 2/93-94 and Lot No. 3/93-94. The said agreements were alleged to have been executed between the parties, on the allotment of the said work. It was further pleaded that Clause 28 of the said agreement(s) was as under: "that the contractor (Labour supply mate) agrees/agree that in case of any difference/dispute, the decision of the Managing Director/ Director, South, Shimla, HPSFC Ltd. shall be final and binding." It was also averred that in view of the aforesaid clause, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and the matter was to be referred for arbitration to the person named in the clause. 2. This application was contested on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner and the trial Court after hearing the parties, accepted the application and ordered that parties shall refer the dispute to Managing Director (South), HP. State Forest Corporatin Ltd., Shimla and the parties were directed to appear before the Managing Director (South) HP. State Forest Corporation Ltd., Shimla on 1.9.1997. The aforesaid order has been assailed in the present petition on various grounds: 3. Learned Counsel for the parties have been heard and the relevant record has been minutely scrutinised. 4. The arguments submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner were three folds which can be dealt with as under: (1) that this Clause 28 did not amount to an arbitration agreement between the parlies; (ii) the clause, even if, taken as it is amounts to an unilateral agreement which cannot be said to be an arbitration agreement; (iii) the Court below could not appoint an arbitrator, which function under Section 11 rested with the Honble Chief Justice of the High Court. 5. 5. There is no dispute to the proposition that to constitute an arbitration agreement, it is not necessary that the words, reference or arbitration or similar expression should actually be used in the agreement. It would be sufficient if the agreement in substance amounts to an arbitration agreement. The Arbitration agreement has been defined under Section 7 of the Act, which runs as under : "Arbitration agreement.—(1) In this part, "arbitration agreement" means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. (2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. (3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing. (4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in— (a) a document signed by the parties; (b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement; or (c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other. (5) The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract." 6. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the alleged agreement is in writing and has been signed by the parties. There is no dispute to the factual aspect of the matter It is not always that when two persons agreed to be bound by a decision of their own choice that would constitute an arbitration agreement. !n order to determine the real nature of the agreement, it is necessary to ascertain what was the intention of the parties when entering into that agreement and, therefore, for that specific purpose consideration must be given not only to the exact words of the agreement and also to the position, knowledge and skill of the person to whom the matter is referred for decision. Thus, when the parties agreed to settle the dispute through arbitration, the interpretation to the clause has to be given in the said manner. Thus, when the parties agreed to settle the dispute through arbitration, the interpretation to the clause has to be given in the said manner. But, on the other hand, if the intention appears to be not to settle the differences after they have arisen but to prevent differences from arising, that would not be arbitration. 7. Again, it is admitted position of law that the object of the arbitration is to determine a dispute which has actually arisen. Various judicial decisions have been referred by the learned counsel for the parties, in support of their respective case concerning interpretation of the aforesaid clause, which may be dealt with at this stage. In Dewan Chand v. The State ofJarnmu and Kashmir, AIR 1961 J&K 58, it was held as follows: "All that the statute requires is that there should be a written agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration. It is not necessary that the word "reference" or "arbitration" should actually be used in the agreement, if the agreement, in substance, amounts to an arbitration agreement within the meaning of Section 2, Clause (a). Where the agreement states that for any dispute between the contractor and the P.W. Department the decision of the Chief Engineer RW.D. will be final and binding upon the contractor the agreement amounts to an arbitration agreement though the word reference is not used in it nor it has been mentioned that the Chief Engineer should be the arbitrator" The relevant agreement in the aforesaid case read as under: "For any dispute between the contractor and the Department the decision of the Chief Engineer PWD Jammu & Kashmir, will be final and binding upon the contractor" 8. The same High Court in Radha Krishan Mirza v. The State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1964 J&K 75,held as under: "Where a clause in a contract entered into between the contractor and the Government department was to the effect that in the event of any dispute between the contractor and the department, the decision of the Chief Engineer, RW.D. J, and K. Government, would be final and binding on both the parties: Held (obiter) that the language of the clause did not constitute an arbitration clause at all. The essence of an arbitration clause is that the parties must consciously submit to the jurisdiction of a person or persons in his or their capacity of arbitrator or arbitrators and not in any other capacity. But it was not clear from the language of this clause in what capacity the Chief Engineer RW.D. had to give his decision. The ordinary rule is that all civil matters shall be instituted in a civil court of competent jurisdiction; the jurisdiction of a civil court cannot be taken away unless it is expressly so provided by some enactment for the time being in force. Therefore^ when a party wants to snatch away the ordinary powers of a civil court, he has clearly to establish that the civil court is precluded by an express provision of some enactment to hear a cause." 9. The aforesaid two judgments have been delivered by a single Bench. 10. In The State of UP v. Tipper Chand, AIR 1980 SC 1522, it was held that on interpretation of relevant clause, it did not amount to arbitration clause as it did not contain any express arbitration agreement nor it could be implied. It was further held that clause vested the Superintending Engineer only with supervision and administrative control over the work. The relevant clause 22 in the agreement, referred in the aforesaid case was as under: Except where otherwise specified in the contract the decision of the Superintending Engineer for the time being shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to the contract upon all questions relating to the meaning of specifications, design, drawing and instructions hereinbefore mentioned. The decision of such Engineer as to the quality of workmanship, or materials used on the work, or as to any other question, claim, right, matter or things whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the contract, designs, drawing specifications, estimates, instructions, orders or these conditions, or otherwise concerning the works or the execution or failure to execute the same, whether arising during the progress of the work, or after the completion or abandonment of the contract by the contractor, shall also be final, conclusive and binding on the contractor." 11. In Girdhari Lai Bansal v. The Chairman Bhakra Beas Management Board, Chandigarh and others, AIR 1985 P&H 219, his Lordship held as under— "Where a clause in the works contract of dispute between the parties and for reference of same to Superintending Engineer of the Circle and though the words arbitration and awards were not mentioned in the clause but the clause was clear enough to show that the dispute which was to arise between the parties had to be referred to the Superintending Engineer, there was a sufficient indication of the Superintending Engineer was being an arbitrator and his decision was to be an award and it could not be said that there was no agreement between the parties, to refer dispute to him for adjudication." The relevant clause of arbitration in the aforesaid case was as under:— "In matter of dispute the case shall be referred to the Superintending Engineer of the Circle, whose order shall be final." 12. In State of Uttar Pradesh and another v. M/s. Sardul Singh Kulwant Singh and another, AIR 1985 All 67, the Division Bench held as under— "It is the substance and not the form of an arbitration clause which is material. The mere absence of the word arbitration does not make any difference." Where the substance of a clause in a contract of construction clearly was that all disputes between the contractor and the department will be referred to the arbitration of the named arbitrator and his decision was to be final and legally binding on the parties, the clause was an arbitration clause." The clause 34 of the agreement was relevant in the aforesaid case, which runs as under:— "All disputes in respect of the contract arising between contractor and the department will be put up to the Chief Engineer, Madhya Ganga, Irrigation Department, Lucknow and his decision shall be final and legally binding on both the parties." 13. The Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal and others v. Haripada Santra, AIR 1990 Cal 83, while interpreting the arbitration agreement held as under:— "Where a clause in the Form of Public Works Department of Tender for supply of materials, read that in the event of a dispute the decision of the Superintending Engineer of the circle shall be final, it was held that, though the expression award or arbitration, was not appearing in the aforesaid clause, even then the expression as it stood embodied an arbitration clause which can be enforced. It is very clear from the said clause that all the disputes between the parties to the contract shall be decided by the Superintending Engineer Obviously such decision can be arrived at by the Superintending Engineer only when it is referred to him by either party for decision. The reference is also implied. As the Superintending Engineer will decide the matter on reference he has to act judicially and decide the dispute after hearing both the parties and permitting them to substantiate their claim by adducing materials in support. In deciding the dispute he must act judicially. Moreover, in the said clause it was also provided that his decision shall be final and as the agreement is binding between the parties the decision shall also bind both of them. The result would be the decision would be finally binding on the parties." 14. It is correct that so far as the factual position is concerned, no two cases would be similar. Taking into consideration the principle laid down in the case law cited by learned Counsel for the parties and as discussed above, the intention of the parties is to be gathered from the wording of the alleged clause. Not only that it has to be inferred from the words used in the clause as to the parties intended specifically for deciding the dispute through arbitration. 15. It has been forcefully contended on behalf of the petitioner that the aforesaid clause specifically did not amount to arbitration clause inasmuch as according to the learned Counsel the person named to decide the dispute has not been referred as an arbitrator and there is no specific word used by the parties to refer the matter for arbitration. 15. It has been forcefully contended on behalf of the petitioner that the aforesaid clause specifically did not amount to arbitration clause inasmuch as according to the learned Counsel the person named to decide the dispute has not been referred as an arbitrator and there is no specific word used by the parties to refer the matter for arbitration. As has been pointed out above, it is the intention of the parties which is to be gathered from the wording of the clause and in certain cases, even if the word arbitrator has not been used by the parties it has to be inferred in between the lines used by the parties. 16. Even if for arguments sake it is assumed and as has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that this clause 28, as referred to above, did not amount to arbitration agreement and so far as the arbitration agreement is concerned it was redundant, in that event the sole question arises as to for what purposes the said clause has been executed by the parties? In case, it is not an arbitration agreement, what would be its effect otherwise? Under what circumstances the applicability of this clause would be called for? Simply to say, it is redundant, clause will not amount to be so. 17. The Contractor, that is, the plaintiff-petitioner has bound himself that in case of any difference/dispute, the decision of the Managing Director (South) Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation, Shimla, shall be final and binding. Whenever, any dispute arises under the clause that dispute has to be decided by the Managing Director, referred in the clause, whose decision has been agreed to be final and binding. It is correct that the word reference or arbitration has not been used in the clause, but the sole effect of the words used in the clause amounted to reference of the dispute to the arbitration of Managing Director, whose decision has been agreed to be final and binding. The trial Court has acted legally in interpretating this clause to be an arbitration clause. 18. It has further been contended that the clause did not bind the opposite party that the decision of the Managing Director would be final. According to the learned Counsel, it is an undertaking only given by the contractor, therefore it amounted to an unilateral agreement. 18. It has further been contended that the clause did not bind the opposite party that the decision of the Managing Director would be final. According to the learned Counsel, it is an undertaking only given by the contractor, therefore it amounted to an unilateral agreement. Such an interpretation under the circumstances present in this case cannot be accepted. Admittedly, the agreements have been signed by the parties, meaning thereby both the parties had agreed to every clause referred in the agreement including clause 28. The alleged agreement of the contractor envisaged under Section 28, referred to above, is accepted by the opposite party by executing the document after affixing its signature. There is no doubt that for any agreement what to speak of arbitration agreement the execution of such agreement would be complete if it is signed by both the parties and parties agreed for the same so far as the present case is concerned. There is no dispute to that effect that the parties are bound by this agreement. Thus, in this view of the matter also, the submissions being made cannot be favourably considered. 19. The application for referring the matter for arbitration was preferred under Section 8 of the Act, which runs as under: 8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement, 1. A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. 2. The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. 3. Notwithstanding that an application has been made under subsection (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made. 20. It has been argued that the court where the suit was pending had no authority for making any direction for referring the matter for arbitration, but under Section 11 of the Act, such a direction could be made by Honble Chief Justice. I think, such an interpretation under the circumstances cannot be there. 20. It has been argued that the court where the suit was pending had no authority for making any direction for referring the matter for arbitration, but under Section 11 of the Act, such a direction could be made by Honble Chief Justice. I think, such an interpretation under the circumstances cannot be there. Section 8(1) of the Act clearly postulates that the judicial authority before which an action was brought in the matter was competent to refer the parties to arbitration. The present case comes within the ambit of Section 8 of the Act, as the civil suit was pending and during the pendency of that suit, application under Section 8 of the Act was moved and that very court has referred the parties for arbitration. 21. Section 11 of the Act deals with the appointment of Arbitrator, which covers an altogether separate and distinct situation, the applicability of which is not attracted to the facts of the present case. 22. No other point has been stressed. 23. Thus, in view of the foregoing reasons, this Court does not find any occasion to interfere with the order passed by Seamed District Judge, which has been assailed in the present petition. The order does not suffer from any illegality and has been passed in accordance with the agreement of the parties, as referred to above. The order passed in CMP No. 160/ 97 staying the operation of the order under reference and making that stay order absolute later on shall stand vacated. The arbitrator is to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with law. Accordingly, the. present petition stands disposed of and the parties are left to bear their own costs in the present proceedings. Order accordingly.