JUDGMENT : R.K. Patra, J. - In this writ application the petitioner seeks quashing of the "charge sheet- cum-show cause notice" dated February 28, 1997 (Annexure 1) issued by the Disciplinary Authority calling upon him to show cause as to why the proposed penalty of removal from service would not be imposed on him since he has been found guilty of offence u/s 471 IPC. 2. To get a hang of the controversy raised in mis matter facts in brief may be set out. The petitioner came to be appointed as sub-staff in Life Insurance Corporation of India, District Branch Office, Cuttack. While serving as such, notice dated July 20, 1988 was issued calling upon him to show cause as to why any one or more of the penalties specified under Regulation 39(1) (a) to (g) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 would not be inflicted on him for having committed breach of Regulations 21 and 24 of the aforesaid Regulations. The gist of the charge was that the minimum standard of educational qualification required for eligibility for appointment to the post of sub-staff being a pass in Standard IX, he submitted at the time of his appointment a forged school leaving transfer certificate indicating therein that he had passed Class-IX, but as a matter of fact he had passed only Class-VIII and was reading in Class IX on the date of leaving the school and by giving such false information, he got himself appointed as sub-staff. The petitioner submitted reply denying the charge. The Disciplinary Authority appointed Enquiry Officer who after making enquiry submitted report. A second notice dated August 26,1991 was issued calling upon him to show cause as to why penalty of removal from service would not be imposed on him. The petitioner without submitting any cause filed a writ application bearing O.J.O. No. 4779 of 1991 in this Court challenging the entire disciplinary proceedings. A Bench of this Court disposed of the aforesaid case on October 11,1991 by holding that the writ application was premature as no final order had been passed and it would be open to him to challenge the final order after it was passed. The Court gave liberty to him to file reply to the second show cause notice and directed the Disciplinary Authority to consider reply, if filed, while passing the final order. The Court gave liberty to him to file reply to the second show cause notice and directed the Disciplinary Authority to consider reply, if filed, while passing the final order. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority passed order dated January 28/29, 1992 removing him from service. Against the said order of removal, the petitioner preferred appeal before the Zonal Manager, Calcutta which was rejected on January 11, 1993. Undaunted with dismissal of the appeal, he submitted memorial to the Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Bombay who by order dated June 16, 1994 set aside the order of removal as well as the order of the appellate authority and remitted the matter to the Disciplinary Authority with a direction to hold fresh enquiry by giving a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Pursuant to the said order, the petitioner was reinstated in November, 1994. On the basis of the order of the Chairman, the Disciplinary Authority (Senior Divisional Manager) appointed M.K. Rout, Manager (OG888) as the Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges which had been communicated to the petitioner. Meanwhile, the Inspector of Vigilance, Cuttack Division had received confidential information to the effect that the petitioner got himself appointed as sub-staff by submitting a forged Class-IX pass certificate at the time of his appointment. On the basis of such information, the Inspector took investigation and filed charge sheet against the petitioner and one Sk. Maulla Bux. They were placed on trial in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack in Vig. G.B. Case No.74 of 1988. The petitioner was charged u/s 471 read with Section 420 IPC on the allegation that he fraudulently and dishonestly used a forged school transfer certificate as genuine knowing or having reason to believe the same to be a forged document. His co-accused Sk. Maulla Bux was charged u/s 468 IPC on the allegation of forging the school transfer certificate for the purpose of cheating. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by judgment dated August 8, 1995 acquitted the petitioner of the charge u/s 420 IPC but held him guilty u/s 471 IPC and convicted thereunder. His co-accused was also convicted u/s 468 IPC. The learned Magistrate, however, instead of sentencing the petitioner any punishment released him u/s 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 after due admonition. His co-accused was also convicted u/s 468 IPC. The learned Magistrate, however, instead of sentencing the petitioner any punishment released him u/s 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 after due admonition. The petitioner challenged his conviction u/s 471 IPC in Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1995 in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Cuttack which is said to be pending. 3. While the matter stood thus, the Disciplinary Authority issued the impugned "charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice" dated March 26, 1997 (Annexure-1) stating therein that his conviction u/s 471 IPC attracts Regulation 39 (4) (i) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 for which it (Disciplinary Authority) proposes to impose the penalty of removal from service on him in terms of Regulation 39 (1) (f) of the aforesaid Staff Regulations. The petitioner has been directed to submit his cause as to why the proposed penalty of removal from service would not be imposed on him. In the impugned notice, it was further indicated that the fresh enquiry proceedings started on the basis of the earlier charge-sheet dated July 20, 1988 are kept in abeyance till the present "charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice" comes to its logical end. 4. On April 28,1997, a Bench of this Court issued notice for rule nisi. On May 15, 1997, the Court directed that the departmental proceedings to continue but no final orders should be passed therein. Opposite parties have filed their counter affidavit on May 4, 1997. On October 21, 1997 Misc. Case No. 12554 of 1997 was filed on their behalf seeking leave of the Court to pass final order in the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that departmental proceedings against the petitioner has been "completed and finalised" since May, 1997 but in view of the interim order dated May 15, 1997, no final order has been passed, when the aforesaid Misc. Case No. 12554 of 1997 came up on November 4, 1997 before a Bench of this Court for consideration, the Court directed the writ application to be listed for final disposal and observed that the prayer of the opposite parties for leave to pass final order in the disciplinary proceedings would be considered at the time of hearing. By this judgment the aforesaid Misc. Case No. 12554 of 1997 stands disposed of. 5. By this judgment the aforesaid Misc. Case No. 12554 of 1997 stands disposed of. 5. Shri Palit, learned counsel for the petitioner raised the following contentions in support of the writ application: (i) In view of the order of release of the petitioner on probation which was based on a compassionate ground, even if a conviction is recorded, it does not affect his services. (ii) Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 should be read and interpreted to tone down the rigour of dismissal from the service. (iii) In view of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 which provides that a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of Section 3 or 4 shall not suffer disqualification attaching to a conviction and the petitioner having been released by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate u/s 3 of the said Act on probation, his conduct which is sought to be established in the disciplinary proceeding automatically stands washed out and the impugned charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice is misconceived. (iv) The aim and object of the aforesaid Act being to reform and rehabilitate a convict, the same would be defeated if a person is to lose his job on account of conduct which led to his conviction even though he is given the benefit of release on probation. Shri Ranjit Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties submitted that the stigma of conviction is not washed out merely because the petitioner was released on probation. The order of release on probation is in substitution of sentencing him to any punishment and the misconduct resulting in conviction has to be treated to be a conclusive proof and the same has to be dealt with appropriately in the departmental proceeding. Shri Mohanty further submitted that this writ application is pre-mature in as much as no final decision has yet been taken on the impugned charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice. 6. Basically and essentially the rival contentions of the parties revolve round the scope and sweep of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). It is therefore necessary to refer to the aforesaid provision and extract its relevant part as hereunder: "12. 6. Basically and essentially the rival contentions of the parties revolve round the scope and sweep of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). It is therefore necessary to refer to the aforesaid provision and extract its relevant part as hereunder: "12. Removal of disqualification attaching to convictions-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of Section 3 or Section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law. The scope of Section 12 of the Act along with Sections 4 and 9 thereof came up for discussion, before the Supreme Court in The Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and Another Vs. T.R. Chellappan and Others. It has been held therein that the order of release on probation comes into existence only after the accused is found guilty and is convicted of an offence. The conviction or finding that the accused is guilty is not washed out at all because, that is the sine qua non for the order of release of the offender on probation. Releasing the convict on probation is a mere substitution of the sentence to be imposed by the Court. The factum of guilt on the criminal charge is not swept away by passing order releasing the convict on probation under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. The stigma continues and the finding of the misconduct resulting in conviction must be treated to be a conclusive proof. In that case, it was contended before their Lordships that Section 12 of the Act obliterates the effect of any conviction and wipes out the disqualification attached to a conviction of an offence under such taw. In repelling the said contention, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "..... The words "attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law" refer to two contingencies: (i) that there must be a disqualification resulting from a conviction ; and (ii) that such disqualification must be provided by some law other than the Probation of Offenders Act. The Penal Code does not contain any such disqualification. Therefore, it cannot be said, that Section 12 of the Act contemplates an automatic disqualification attaching to a conviction and obliteration of the criminal misconduct of the accused...". The Penal Code does not contain any such disqualification. Therefore, it cannot be said, that Section 12 of the Act contemplates an automatic disqualification attaching to a conviction and obliteration of the criminal misconduct of the accused...". This legal position has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. Bakshi Ram, ). In that case, Bakshi Ram was a constable in Central Reserve Police Force and was convicted for an offence u/s 10(i) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 and was sentenced to imprisonment. Against the said conviction and sentence, he preferred appeal before the Sessions Judge. During the pendency of the appeal, the Department by way of disciplinary action, dismissed him from service in view of his conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Judge. The Sessions Judge, in appeal, upheld the conviction but released him u/s 4 of the Act on probation. After the expiry of the period of good conduct, he filed a writ application in the Rajasthan High Court challenging his dismissal from service. The High Court relying on Section 12 of the Act quashed the order of dismissal and directed his reinstatement in service. The aforesaid order of the High Court was challenged in appeal. The Supreme Court after considering the decisions in Challappan (supra), Union of India and Another Vs. Tulsiram Patel and Others, ) and Trikha Ram Vs. V.K. Seth and Another Union of India and Another Vs. Tulsiram Patel and Others in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment observed as follows :- "Section 12 of the Act does not preclude the department from taking action for misconduct leading to the offence or to his conviction thereon as per law. The Section was not intended to exonerate the person from departmental punishment. The question of reinstatement into service from which he was removed in view of his conviction does not therefore arise. That seems obvious from the terminology of Section 12............". "Section 12 is thus clear and it only directs that the offenders "shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law". Such law in the context is other law providing for disqualification on account of conviction. That seems obvious from the terminology of Section 12............". "Section 12 is thus clear and it only directs that the offenders "shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law". Such law in the context is other law providing for disqualification on account of conviction. For instance, if a law provides for disqualification of a person for being appointed in any office or for seeking election to any authority or body in view of his conviction, that disqualification by virtue of Section 12 stands removed. That in effect, is the scope and effect of Section 12 of the Act. But that is not the same thing to state that the person who has been dismissed from service in view of his conviction is entitled to reinstatement upon getting the benefit of probation of good conduct. Apparently, such a view has no support by the terms of Section 12 and the order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained". As the said appeal of Bakshi Ram was directed against the order of the High Court setting aside the order of dismissal, the Supreme Court altered the penalty of dismissal from service into removal of service as it was done in the case of Trikha Ram (supra). From the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court in Challappan (supra) and Bakshi Ram (supra), it is crystal clear that the declaration made in Section 12 of the Act that a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of Section 3 or 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attached to the convict of an offence under such law means that if disqualification flowing from a conviction has been provided in any law, the said disqualification shall stand removed. In many statutes there are prohibitions on a convict from standing in election. Section 8 of the Representation of the People's Act, 1951 provides, inter alia, that a person convicted of certain offences punishable under certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code or under some other Acts shall be disqualified to be a Member of Parliament or Member of the State Legislature. Section 8 of the Representation of the People's Act, 1951 provides, inter alia, that a person convicted of certain offences punishable under certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code or under some other Acts shall be disqualified to be a Member of Parliament or Member of the State Legislature. Section 25(1) of the Orissa Grama Panchayat Act, 1964 provided that a person shall be disqualified for being elected or nominated as Sarpanch or any other member of the Grama Panchayat constituted under the said Act if he is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. Therefore if a convict is given benefit u/s 3 or 4 of the Act by virtue of Section 12, the disqualification flowing from his conviction for that purpose of standing for election shall stand washed out. 7. This is not however the end of the journey. What is the effect of the order of release on probation u/s 3 or 4 of the Act in a case arising out of service matter has to be examined. It was contended by Shri Palit that the aim of the Act being to reform the offender and rehabilitate him as a useful and self-reliant member of the society, the Courts have observed that the offender should not lose his job. In this connection, he refers to the judgments of the Madras High Court in V. Manickam Pillai Vs. State and Another of the Supreme Court in Bakhshish Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, : Trikha Ram (supra) and of this Court in Susil Kumar Parida v. State 1992 5 OCR539. In Pillai's case (supra), while maintaining the conviction u/s 314, I.P.C., the learned single Judge of the Madras High Court by taking into consideration the submission made on behalf of the accused that since she was a Government servant in the event of sentence of imprisonment she was likely to lose her job directed her release on probation u/s 4 of the Act. In Rajbir (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal filed against conviction u/s 323, I.P.C. The conviction u/s 323, I.P.C. was not disturbed by the Supreme Court. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that he was in Government service and if the conviction and sentence were maintained, he would lose his service. In Rajbir (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal filed against conviction u/s 323, I.P.C. The conviction u/s 323, I.P.C. was not disturbed by the Supreme Court. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that he was in Government service and if the conviction and sentence were maintained, he would lose his service. In the background of such submission, the Court examined and found that both parties to the assault were close relations and there was no material on record to show that the appellant had any previous conviction. Accordingly, while maintaining his conviction u/s 323, I.P.C, he was directed to be released on probation of good conduct u/s 4 of the Act. We may state that in none of the aforesaid two cases there was any observation that the convict should not lose his service because he/she was released on probation. The fact, however, remains that the Court directed release of the convict on probation by considering the submission that in case he/she would be sentenced to imprisonment, he/she would lose his/her service. Let us examine the case of Trikha Ram (supra). It was a case in which the appellant was dismissed from service as he was convicted for criminal offence. It was argued on his behalf before the Supreme Court that the Disciplinary Authority should have heard him before imposing the punishment of dismissal. The Court did not accept the said contention in view of the decision in Tulsiram Patel (supra). Another point that was pressed on behalf of the appellent before the Apex Court was that since the appellant was released on probation by the trial Magistrate who recorded the order of conviction, the Disciplinary Authority should not have dismissed him from service having regard to Section 12 of the Act. The Court considered the aforesaid submission and held that the offender who had been released on probation shall not suffer disqualification attaching to a conviction of the offence for which he had been convicted notwithstanding anything contained in any other law as provided in Section 12 of the Act and substituted the order of dismissal by an order of removal from service so that it would not be a disqualification for his future employment. In Susil Kumar Parida (supra), the question that arose for determination was whether the convict having already suffered the sentence could be released on probation and consequently would get the benefit of Section 12 of the Act. D.P. Mohapatra, J. (as he then was) held that the question of giving the benefit of Section 3 or 4 of the Act does not become infructuous merely because the convict had already suffered the sentence. In that case, it was argued that notwithstanding the fact that the convict had already undergone the sentence imposed, unless he was given the benefit of Section 3 or 4 of the Act, he would lose his service in the Bank on account of his conviction in the criminal case. Having regard to the prayer made and in the facts and circumstances of that case, the Court admitted the convict to the benefit of Section 3 of the Act and directed his release on probation of good conduct u/s 4 after due admonition. 8. In the back-drop of the decisions referred to above, it has now to be considered whether the Disciplinary Authority is justified in law in issuing the impugned charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice (Annexure-T). The relevant portion Annexure-1 reads as follows: "xx xx xx xx That since the said Sri Kedar Das has been found guilty of offence u/s 471 of IPC as enumerated above which attracts Regulations 39(4) (1) of the LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, I propose to impose upon him the penalty of removal from service in terms of Regulations 39(1) (f) of the aforesaid (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Now, therefore, the said Sri Kedar Das, SR No. 321260, Sub-staff LIC of India, Dist. Branch Office, Cuttack under Cuttack Division is hereby directed to show- cause in writing within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of this Charge-sheet-cum-show Cause Notice as to why the proposed penalty of "Removal" from service be not imposed upon him..........." 9. Sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 39 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations 1960 deals with different penalties which can be imposed on an employee who commits delinquencies mentioned therein. One of the penalties (vide Regulation 39(1)(f)) is "removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment". Sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 39 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations 1960 deals with different penalties which can be imposed on an employee who commits delinquencies mentioned therein. One of the penalties (vide Regulation 39(1)(f)) is "removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment". Sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 39 states, inter alia, that an employee shall be given a reasonable opportunity of defending himself before the penalties (except censure) is imposed. Sub- regulation (4) with which we are concerned provides, inter alia, as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-regulations (l) and (2) above- (i) where a penalty is imposed on an employee on the grounds of conduct which had led to a conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) to(iii) xxxxxxx the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit". Similar provision can be found in the second proviso of Article 311(2) of the Constitution which provides that where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, the clause dealing with affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard shall not apply. A case similar to the case at hand came to be decided by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Akella Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Madras, : where it was observed that "we are of the view that what Section 12 of the Central Act has in view is an automatic disqualification flowing from a conviction and not an obliteration of the misconduct of the official concerned. The disciplinary authority is not precluded from proceeding under Regulation 39(4)." The aforesaid view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was approved by the Supreme Court in Challappan (supra). 10. As already indicated, the factum of conviction is not washed out merely by passing the order releasing the offender on probation under Sections 3, 4 or 6 of the Act. The stigma continues and the finding of misconduct resulting in conviction has to be treated to be a conclusive proof. The Disciplinary Authority is, thus, within its jurisdiction to pass appropriate order as envisaged under Sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 39 after the petitioner submits his cause to the impugned charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice (Annexure-1). The stigma continues and the finding of misconduct resulting in conviction has to be treated to be a conclusive proof. The Disciplinary Authority is, thus, within its jurisdiction to pass appropriate order as envisaged under Sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 39 after the petitioner submits his cause to the impugned charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice (Annexure-1). While passing the order, the Disciplinary Authority is obliged to consider and take into account the conduct of the petitioner, the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration and other extenuating circumstances or redeeming features as well as the fact that the petitioner has been given the benefit of Section 12 of the Act on his release on probation. The petitioner is free to place relevant materials to make out a case that the extreme penalty of removal from service should not be inflicted on him. As appropriate decision is to be taken by the Disciplinary Authority, any observation made by us may prejudice the case of the petitioner. The petitioner is, therefore, given liberty to submit his cause to the impugned charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice within four weeks hence. On submission of the cause within the time as stipulated, the Disciplinary Authority will consider the same and pass appropriate order according to law. 11. With the aforesaid observations and direction the writ application is disposed of. There would be no order as to costs. Pradipta Ray, J. 12. I agree.