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1998 DIGILAW 600 (ALL)

Iksha Shanker Tripathi v. State Of U. P.

1998-05-19

S.R.SINGH

body1998
JUDGMENT : S.R. Singh, J. 1. By the order, impugned herein the petitioner has been placed under suspension by the Assistant Commissioner (Khadya Evam Rasad), Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur. The suspension has been ordered, inter alia on the charge of the petitioner being in connivance with black marketers and his consequential failure to take effective action against them. Legality of the impugned order has been challenged on two distinct grounds. Firstly, that the authority which passed the impugned order of suspension was not competent to order suspension of the petitioner and secondly, that the order suffers from the vice of mala fide. 2. In the short counter-affidavit filed by Sri. R. K. Dwivedi, Assistant Food Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur it has been alleged that the Commissioner. Food and Civil Supplies, U. P., Lucknow has passed a general order dated 13th August, 1997 by which a limited power to suspend a Supply Inspector has been delegated to the Assistant Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies, U. P. subject to the condition that suspension would be ordered only when the charges are so grave in nature that the delinquent will likely be dismissed/removed from service and the approval of the Food Commissioner is obtained within a week. Relevant part of the General Order dated 13.8.1997 (Annexure-S.C.A. 1) is quoted below:- ^^Ás"kd] vk;q|] [kk| rFkk jln foHkkx] mŒÁŒ y[kuÅA lsok esa] leLr lgk;d [kk| vk;q| mRrj Áns'kA y[kuÅ % fnukad 13 vxLr] 1997 fo"k; & iwfrZ fujh{kdksa ds lsok lEcU/kh ekeyksa esa [kk| vk;q| ds vf/kdkjksa dk Áfrfu/kk;uA egksn;] iwfrZ fujh{kdksa ds lsok lEcU/kh ekeyksa Rofjr fuLrkj.k ds mn~ns'; ls muds lsok lEcU/kh fuEufyf[kr ekeyksa esa dk;Zokgh gsrq vkidks vf/kd`r fd;k tkrk gSA ;s vf/kdkj vk;q| dks Áns'k lhek rd lhfer jgsaxsA 1- leLr Ádkj ds vodk'k dh Lohd`frA 2- fuyEcu dk lhfer vf/kdkj bl 'krZ ds lkFk fd fuyEcu dsoy rHkh fd;k tk; tcfd vkjksi brus xaHkhj gksa fd vkjksfir O;fDr dks lsok ls i`Fkd fd;s tkus dh laHkkouk gks rFkk fuyEcu ds mijkUr mldk vuqeksnu [kk| vk;q| ls ,d lIrkg esa vo'; ÁkIr dj fy;k tk;sA** 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the general order dated 13.8.1997 by which a limited power to suspend Supply Inspector has been delegated to all Assistant Food Commissioners is void at) initio. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the general order dated 13.8.1997 by which a limited power to suspend Supply Inspector has been delegated to all Assistant Food Commissioners is void at) initio. Learned counsel urged that the first proviso to Rule 49A (1) of the C.C.A. Rules empowers the appointing authority to delegate its power under sub-rule (1) to the next lower authority and not to an authority lower even to the authority next to the appointing authority. The impugned order has been assailed also on the ground of mala fide alleged against the Dy. Collector on whose report the action was initiated against the petitioner. Learned standing counsel, on the other hand, urged that the power of suspension under sub-rule (2) of Rule 49A could be delegated by the appointing authority to any authority : the provision that the approval of the Food Commissioner is obtained within a week is directory and not mandatory ; the suspension of the petitioner was no doubt not approved within a week as visualised by the Circular dated 13.8.1997, but it has since been approved by the Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies vide order dated 21.2.1998 (Annexure-S.C.A. 2) ; the plea as to illegality, if any, in the initial order of suspension has lost its relevance after the Commissioner accorded his approval to the suspension ordered by the Assistant Commissioner. Food and Civil Supplies of the concerned Division in that the petitioner would be deemed to have been suspended by the appointing authority itself vide order dated 21.2.1998 ; even controlling authority could order suspension of a servant ; and no mala fide has been alleged against the authority which passed the order of suspension and the allegations of mala fide made as against the Up-Zila Adhikari, Tehsil Sadar, district Gorakhpur would not vitiate the order of suspension. 4. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made across the Bar. Rule 49A (1) of the C.C.A. Rules in so far as it is relevant is quoted below : "49A. 4. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made across the Bar. Rule 49A (1) of the C.C.A. Rules in so far as it is relevant is quoted below : "49A. (1) A Government servant against whose conduct an enquiry is contemplated, or its proceeding, may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the inquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority : Provided that in the case of any Government servant or class of Government servants not belonging to a State service, the appointing authority may delegate its power under this sub-rule to the next lower authority : Provided farther that any other authority empowered by the Governor by general or special order in this behalf, may place a Government servant under suspension under this sub-rule." 5. The first proviso to Rule 49A (1) makes it abundantly clear that in case of any Government Servant or class of Government Servants, not belonging to State Service, the appointing authority may delegate its power under sub-rule (1) to "the next lower authority". Concededly the Assistant Food Commissioner of the Division to whom the power has been delegated and who passed the impugned order is not the "lower authority" next to the Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies. The power of suspension can be delegated to "any other authority" only by the Governor by general or special order made in this behalf, as visualised by the second proviso to Rule 49A (1) of the C.C.A. Rules. Concededly, the Governor has not issued any general or special order under the second proviso empowering the Assistant Food Commissioner of a Division to order suspension of a Supply Inspector. The Assistant Food Commissioner of the Division is not an authority immediately next to the Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies, U. P. As such the general order dated 13.8.1997 does not clothe the Assistant Food Commissioners of the concerned Division with the power to suspend a Supply Inspector under" Rule 49A of the C.C-A. Rules. 6. The next question that calls for determination is whether the Commissioner's order dated 21.2.1998 according approval to the suspension could validate the suspension order dated 3.2.1998 passed by the Assistant Food Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur. 6. The next question that calls for determination is whether the Commissioner's order dated 21.2.1998 according approval to the suspension could validate the suspension order dated 3.2.1998 passed by the Assistant Food Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur. In my opinion, the order dated 3.2.1998 issued by the Assistant Food Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur placing the petitioner under suspension being in the nature of a 'stillborn order', the question of its approval does not arise. The order of suspension being void ab initio and non-est, cannot be validated by the order dated 21.2.1998, whereby the Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies, U. P., Lucknow purports to have approved the suspension order dated 3.2.1998. The Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Chandra Bhushan Mishra v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria (1995) 1 UPLBEC 460 , reliance on which was placed by the standing counsel, has no application to the facts of the present case. That was a case where according to the provisions contained in Section 16G (7) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, no order of suspension could, unless approved in writing by the Inspector of Schools, remain in force for more than sixty days. The Full Bench held as under : "In view of the provisions of sub-section (7) an order of suspension of Head or a teacher of an Institution shall remain in force for a period of sixty days from the date of such order even if ft is not approved in writing by the Inspector : but in the absence of approval by the Inspector such an order will cease to operate on expiry of sixty days from the date of the order, although it will continue to exist though inoperative. But if the order of suspension is approved even after the expiry of sixty days, it will come into force again and will become effective immediately on such approval. Any other interpretation will lead to serious consequences. Inaction on the part of the Inspector either deliberate or otherwise may frustrate the object of the provision itself." 7. The power of suspension under the Rules herein is vested in the Director General, E.S.I. and another Vs. T. Abdul Razak, etc., (1996) 4 SCC 708 . Any other interpretation will lead to serious consequences. Inaction on the part of the Inspector either deliberate or otherwise may frustrate the object of the provision itself." 7. The power of suspension under the Rules herein is vested in the Director General, E.S.I. and another Vs. T. Abdul Razak, etc., (1996) 4 SCC 708 . It has been ruled by the Supreme Court that statutory power must be exercised only by the body or officer in whom it has been confided unless such delegation of power is authorised by express words or necessary implication. The power of suspension has not been delegated to the Assistant Food Commissioner in the manner prescribed by law as discussed herein above. As such, in the above view of the matter, the submissions made by Sri Kripa Shankar Singh, standing counsel that the controlling authority could also exercise the power of suspension even without delegation, cannot be sustained. The decision in the case of Transport Commissioner, Madras-5 Vs. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy, (1995) 1 SCC 332 , reliance on which was placed by Sri Kripa Shankar Singh, standing counsel cannot be pressed into service to support the submission that the order of suspension can be passed by the Controlling Authority as well for in that case what was held to be "unobjectionable" by the Supreme Court was "Initiation of inquiry" by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority and not an order placing the servant under suspension. 8. In the instant case, since suspension order was passed by an authority having no jurisdiction, the question of its becoming operative on the approval being accorded by the Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies does not arise inasmuch as an order which is non-est is Incapable of being approved of. The order dated 21.2.1998 cannot as well be regarded as an Independent order placing the petitioner under suspension. The Commissioner. Food and Civil Supplies, U. P. may, on proper self-direction to the "gravity of the misconduct sought to be enquired into or investigated and the nature of evidence", pass such order as may be considered necessary keeping in mind the principle governing exercise of discretion in the matter of suspension as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, (1994) 4 SCC 126 9. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, (1994) 4 SCC 126 9. In so for as the question of mala fide is concerned, suffice it to say that there is no allegation of mala fide against the relevant authority. The allegation, if any, is against the Up-Zila Adhikari Tehsil Sadar, district Gorakhpur who reported the matter vide letter dated 24.1.1998 to the District Magistrate. In his D.O. letter dated 24.1.1998, the Up. Zila Adhikari reported that the petitioner was in league and connivance with the black marketeers. Thereupon an explanation was called from the petitioner by the Additional District Magistrate (Food and Civil Supplies), Gorakhpur vide letter dated 27.1.1998. The petitioner is said to have submitted his reply vide letter dated 3.2.1998. The impugned order dated 3.2.1998 came to be passed by the Assistant Food Commissioner. Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur who, as held above, had no authority to order suspension of the petition in the circumstances of the case, therefore, it is left to the Food Commissioner to examine the tenability of the plea of mala fide taken by the petitioner as against the reporting authority and the evidentiary worth of the report submitted by the Deputy Collector. 10. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 3.2.1998 is quashed. The Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies, U. P., Lucknow will have the option to pass such order as may be considered necessary in the circumstances of the case.