JUDGMENT : D.C. SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. This revision, under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arises under the following circumstances: The plaintiff-respondent filed Suit for permanent injunction against the defendants revisionists praying that they may be restrained from attempting to discharge the plaintiff respondent from service as gardener. An application for ad-interim injunction was moved upon which order to maintain status-quo was passed by the trial Court. Application for ad-interim injunction was, however, finally rejected on 7.2.1989. Order to maintain status-quo was passed on 30.7.1983. The said order was passed before 6.00 p.m. on 30.7.1988 which was served on the same day in the evening. 31.7.1988 was Sunday. On 1.8.1988 the plaintiff respondent was permitted to sign the muster roll and worked in obedience of the order to maintain status-quo passed by the trial Court. However, from 2.8.1988 he was not permitted to work and in this way disobedience of the orders of the trial Court was committed by the revisionists. It was also alleged in the application under Order 39, Rule 2-A C.P.C. that not only the intentional disobedience of the trial Court's order was committed by the revisionist, but also erasers and alterations were made in the muster roll and the letter "P" on 1.8.1988 on the muster roll was erased and changed by letter "A." Accordingly in the application under Order 39, Rule 2-A C.P.C. prayer was made for taking suitable action against the revisionists. 2. The revisionists denied the alleged disobedience and pleaded that the University is law abiding statutory body and its officers can not dare to commit contempt of the Court. It was a case of the revisionists that before service of the trial Court's order to maintain status-quo on 30.7.1988 the plaintiff was relieved from the service before 6.40 p.m. The said order was served on the revisionist at 6.40 p.m. In this view of the matter it was further pleaded that no contempt of Court was committed by the revisionists. 3. The trial Court found that the order of injunction in the nature of direction to maintain status-quo became effective on 30.7.1988 and after 6.00 p.m. when it was passed and if termination order was passed thereafter it amounted to disobedience of the Court's order. 3. The trial Court found that the order of injunction in the nature of direction to maintain status-quo became effective on 30.7.1988 and after 6.00 p.m. when it was passed and if termination order was passed thereafter it amounted to disobedience of the Court's order. It further found that the revisionists with a view to give support to their stand made deliberate alterations and erasers in the muster roll by altering the word "P" in the master roll on 1.8.1988 to letter "A." In face of this finding the trial Court took a lenient view and instead of imposing any penalty on the revisionists directed them to reinstate the plaintiff respondent as gardener at once. 4. Feeling aggrieved from this order an Appeal was preferred by the revisionist which was dismissed, hence this revision. 5. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and examining the orders of the trial Court and the Appellate Court I am of the view that the impugned orders passed by the trial Court and the Appellate Court are illegal and not in accordance with law. The order also suffers from material procedural irregularities. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, contended that the order is perfectly in accordance with law and the concurrent findings of the two courts below regarding deliberate disobedience of the orders passed by the trial Court require no interference in this revision. 7. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the revisionist was that the order of the trial Court is not in accordance with law inasmuch as only two options were open to the trial Court after recording the finding of disobedience, viz. either to attach the property of the defendants or to keep the officers of the defendants committing contempt in Civil prison. In spite of that direction was given to the defendants to reinstate the plaintiff as gardener at once. Learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that this order does not suffer from illegality inasmuch as lenient view was taken by the trial Court and instead of imposing penalty it thought it proper to restore the position as it stood on 30.7.1988. Learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that this order does not suffer from illegality inasmuch as lenient view was taken by the trial Court and instead of imposing penalty it thought it proper to restore the position as it stood on 30.7.1988. He made reference of several cases in support of his contention that the court is empowered to restore the position which stood on the date the restraint order was passed and it can also impose punishment provided under Order 39, Rule 2A C.P.C. 8. On the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted. It was a case of alleged deliberate disobedience of the orders of the trial Court. The matter should not have been taken lightly and unless it was properly examined and a finding was recorded that beyond any shadow of doubt the revisionists had committed wilful disobedience of the restraint order passed by the Court no such order could be passed. On the facts and circumstances of the case the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court failed to examine the matter on proper lines. Admittedly an order to maintain status-quo was passed on 30.7.1998 around 6.00 p.m. This order was served on the revisionist at 6.40 p.m. The case of the revisionist was that before 6.40 p.m. order relieving the plaintiff was passed and also served on the plaintiff before 6.40 p.m. hence and also because 31.7.1988 was Sunday he was not permitted to work on 1.8.1988 and afterwards. This matter should not have been taken lightly. Evidence was required to be adduced by the respondent that he actually worked on 1.8.1988. Mere eraser in the muster roll on 1.8.1988 will not be enough for holding that the plaintiff respondent was actually permitted to work on 1.8.1988. It was neither disclosed nor proved by the plaintiff respondent, what work was taken from him on 1.8.88. It is possible that the clerical staff in routine manner might have prepared the muster roll of 1.8.1988 a day or two days before inasmuch as 31.7.1988 was Sunday and the official preparing muster roll might not have been aware of the order to maintain status-quo, the time of service of the order on the defendant and also regarding order relieving the plaintiff from service from 30.7.1998. This doubt was not clarified by the plaintiff respondent and in contempt proceeding which is in the nature of quasi-criminal proceeding benefit of doubt has to be given to the alleged contemnor. 9. The two Courts below have likewise not recorded any finding that the order to relieve the plaintiff respondent was not passed before 6.40 p.m. on 30.7.1988. Despite clear assertion of the revisionist that the order relieving the plaintiff was passed on 30.7.1988 before 6.40 p.m. and was also served before 6.40 p.m. on the plaintiff, there is no finding by the two courts below that this stand of the revisionist was false. If the order relieving the plaintiff was passed and served before 6.40 p.m. viz. before service of injunction order on the revisionists it cannot be said that they committed disobedience of the orders of the Court. 10. The observation of the trial Court that the injunction order became operative from 6.00 p.m. on 30.7.1988 is erroneous. An order which is passed behind the back of a party cannot be said to come into force against such party before it was served on such party or before it was brought to the notice of such party. The time of service of such order on the facts and circumstances of the case was material and the view that the injunction order became operative from 6.00 p.m. cannot be accepted to be correct view. The injunction order was served at 6.40 p.m. and as such the revisionists were expected to make compliance of the injunction order only after it was served on them. If before 6.00 p.m. they relieved the plaintiff from service and served the order relieving him from service before 6.40 p.m. it cannot be said that between 6.00 p.m. to 6.40 p.m. the revisionists, in any manner, committed disobedience of the order to maintain status-quo. 11. In view of the above discussion it is clear that it is not a case where benefit of doubt cannot be given to the revisionists nor it is a case where on the insufficient material on record finding can be recorded that deliberate disobedience of the court's order was committed by the revisionists on or after 1.8.1988. If this is so then the order under revision cannot be sustained. 12. The order under revision cannot be sustained for another ground. If this is so then the order under revision cannot be sustained. 12. The order under revision cannot be sustained for another ground. It is not a question of leniency which should weigh with the revisional court in affirming the orders of the Courts below. The practical aspect of the case cannot be lost sight of. The practical aspect is that the ex-parte order to maintain status-quo was passed on 30.7.1988 meaning thereby that the parties were required to maintain status-quo as it stood at the time when the order was served on the other side. This order to maintain status-quo became non-existent on 7.2.1989. When the interim injunction application was dismissed by the trial Court. The trial Court, still in its order dated 7.2.1989 observing that the plaintiff has no right to be absorbed in service of the defendant university, directed the defendants to consider the case of appointment of the plaintiff on permanent basis as and when the vacancy arises. The fact, however, remains that on 7.2.1989 the injunction order in the nature of direction to maintain status-quo therefore vanished. Consequently between 30.7.1988 to 7.2.1989 only the order to restore position during this period nor the position as it stood on the date of the suit could be passed. However, the direction of the trial Court in the impugned order dated 26.4.1990 to reinstate the plaintiff as gardener at once is patently illegal. At the most such order could be given during the period between 30.7.1988 and 7.2.1989. However, even this order could not be passed by the trial Court inasmuch as no court can pass redundant and infructuous order. The order to reinstate the plaintiff as gardener at once became infructuous after final rejection of the injunction application. Consequently no direction to reinstate the plaintiff respondent between 30.7.1988 to 7.2.1989 could be passed nor it was passed. 13. The order of the trial Court directing the defendants to reinstate the plaintiff as Gardner at once will have its operation prospectively from 26.4.1990 onwards. Such order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law because it has not restored the position as it stood between 30.7.1988 to 7.2.1989. 14. In view of the above discussion the cases cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent regarding restoration of status-quo need not be discussed in detail. Such order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law because it has not restored the position as it stood between 30.7.1988 to 7.2.1989. 14. In view of the above discussion the cases cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent regarding restoration of status-quo need not be discussed in detail. A passing reference of these cases will be sufficient inasmuch as these cases are distinguishable on facts. 15. In Hari Nandan Agrawal vs. S.N. Pandita, AIR 1975 All. 48 , the plaintiff was dispossessed wilfully disobeying the interim injunction restraining them from dispossessing the plaintiff. It was held that the Court which issued the order can in exercise of its inherent power after considering the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties pass such order in the ends of justice as would undo the wrong done to the plaintiff in whose favour the injunction order had been issued. In the case before me no such order could be passed to reinstate the plaintiff at once and not to grant monetary compensation between 30.7.1988 to 7.2.1989. 16. On similar ground the cases of Thakorlal Parshottamdas Bhavsar vs. Chandulal Chunilal Bhavsar, 1966 (7) GLR 970, Smt. Maya Devi vs. Mehria Gram Dall Mill, Hissar, AIR 1988 P&H 176 and Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. 1996 (2) GLH 36 can be distinguished. The Apex Court's verdict in Delhi Development Authority's case (supra) can not safely be applied to the facts of the case before me. The principle laid down in this case was that contemnor ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or if the fruits of its contempt is well settled and that under-going punishment for contempt does not mean that the court is not entitled to give appropriate direction for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its order. The same principles were laid down in the case of Mohmed Idrish vs. R.J. Babuji, 1985 (1) SCR 598 . However, this principle cannot be applied in abstract. What the Apex Court has said in these two cases is that the court is entitled to give appropriate direction for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its order. The same principles were laid down in the case of Mohmed Idrish vs. R.J. Babuji, 1985 (1) SCR 598 . However, this principle cannot be applied in abstract. What the Apex Court has said in these two cases is that the court is entitled to give appropriate direction for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its order. However, in the case before me there can be no definite finding regarding disobedience of the Court's order and secondly the direction which was given by the trial Court and which was confirmed by the Appellate Court cannot be said to remedying and rectifying the alleged wrong done by the revisionists. 17. The verdict of the apex Court in Manoharlal Chopra vs. Sheth Hiralal, 1962 SC 527 is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. 18. For the reasons given above I am of the view that the orders of the two courts below can not be sustained. The two courts below committed material irregularities and illegality in exercising their jurisdiction in coming to the conclusion that the revisionists committed contempt of Court. The application of the respondent under Order 39, Rule 2-A C.P.C. was liable to be rejected and in not rejecting the same the two courts below committed manifest error of law. The revision, therefore, succeeds and is hereby allowed. The orders passed by the two Courts below are hereby set aside. Application of the respondent under Order 39, Rule 2-A C.P.C. is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal Dismissed.