Judgment M.L. Singhal, J. 1. The present First Appeal filed under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as L.A. Act), and the Writ Petition, preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution, by U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as Avas Vikas Parishad), arise out of the award dated May 24, 1993, given by Shri O.K. Gupta, Presiding Officer, Nagar Mahapalika Tribunal, Agra on a Reference Petition under Section 18 of the L.A. Act, having been made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter referred to as the S.I.A.O.), whereby the Tribunal has enhanced the compensation. 2. The appeal was filed on February 7, 1994. The claimant-respondents on September 11, 1995 filed objection, alleging that in fact the present appeal was under Section 381 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam), the appellant having hot obtained the certificate of fitness from the Nagar Mahapalika Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as N.M.P.T.), required under Section 381(l)(a), and also not having deposited the decretal amount, required by Section 381(3) of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, the appeal is not maintainable. Being frowned by the respondents' objection, the Avas Vikas Parishad has filed the present writ petition on 1- 4-1996. The acquisition proceedings under challenge relate to acquisition of an area of 19 bighas, 2 biswa 52644. 375 sq. mm. of plots No. 457, 458, 459, 500, 501, 502, 507 and 508 of village Ghatwasam, Tehsil Mustaquil, district Agra. The Nagar Mahapalika, Agra on April 23, 1960 notified under Section 357 of Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam (which correspondents to Section 4 of L.A. Act) a scheme under the name "ghatwasam Grih Asthan Evam Sarak Yojna, Agra". Notification under Section 363 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam (which correspondents to Section 6 of the L.A. Act) wag issued on 18th of June, 1964. In the year 1965 the Uttar Pradesh Avas Vikas Parishad was established under the Avas Vikas Parishad Act (hereinafter referred to as the A.V.P. Act). On May 31, 1968 the said scheme was undertaken by the Avas Vikas Parishad through the Transfer Deed. The possession of the land required for the scheme, was taken by the S.L.A.O. on behalf of the Collector, Agra, and was handed over to the Avas Vikas Parishad on June 18, 1971. The S.L.A.O. gave his Award on November 24, 1972 awarding a sum of Rs. The possession of the land required for the scheme, was taken by the S.L.A.O. on behalf of the Collector, Agra, and was handed over to the Avas Vikas Parishad on June 18, 1971. The S.L.A.O. gave his Award on November 24, 1972 awarding a sum of Rs. 89,914.24 to the claimants, namely, Lokman, Dal Chand and Kunwar Singh. The said three claimants moved a petition under Section 18 of the L.A. Act on 23-12-1972/1-1-1973 before the Collector, Agra for reierence, claiming enhanced compensation. On January 27, 1981 the three claimants, namely, Lokman, Dal Chand and Kunwar Singh through six registered Sale Deeds transferred their rights in the acquired property to Shri Shashi Mittal, Smt. Geeta Agrawal, Km. Usha Mittal, Smt. Kanak (respondent No. 1), Smt. Madhu (respondent No. 2) and Mittal and Company, for a total sum of Rs. 90,000. The four transferees, namely, Shashi Mittal, Smt. Geeta Agrawal, Km, Usha Mittal and M/s, Mittal and Company on 3-5-1993 transferred their rights in the property in favour of the present two claimant-respondents Smt. Kanak and Smt. Madhu for a sum of Rs. 35,000, now the only claimants before the Court. The Tribunal by the award dated 24-5-1993 has enhanced compensation, which according to calculations made comes to Rs. 139,36,560.17. 3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 4. The argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that the present award is under the provisions of L.A. Act as modified by Schedule to the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, delivered under Section 381 of the Prescribed Authority Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, the deposit of the amount under award and the certificate of fitness required under Section 381(1) of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam are necessary conditions. The controversy in the present proceedings stands concluded by the decisions of Division Benches of this Court, namely, in State of U.P. v. Mithilesh, 1991 ALJ 516 and in Special Appeal No. 221 of 1972, decided on 17-5-1972, Dr. Prakash Narain Gupta v. State of U.P. On the contrary, the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant/petitioner is that the award should be treated as award of the N.M.P.T., as after the transferor the scheme on May 31, 1968 the acquisition proceedings were for the Avas Vikas Parishad. Prakash Narain Gupta v. State of U.P. On the contrary, the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant/petitioner is that the award should be treated as award of the N.M.P.T., as after the transferor the scheme on May 31, 1968 the acquisition proceedings were for the Avas Vikas Parishad. The acquisition proceedings start with the notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act (which corresponds to Section 357 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam and Section 20 of Avas Vikas Parishad Act) and end with the award of Collector/s. L.A.O., or vesting of property in the acquiring body (Nagar Mahapalika or Avas Vikas Parishad ). Before May 31, 1968 when the scheme was transferred to Avas Vikas Parishad, the acquisition proceedings were for Nagar Mahapalika Parishad, but after the said date the beneficiary having been changed, the acquisition proceedings are for the Avas Vikas Parishad. Whether the award is under the provisions of L.A. Act as modified by the Schedule of the N. M. P. Act or as modified by the Schedule of Avas Vikas Parishad Act, depends upon the beneficiary for whom the land has been acquired and not merely on the fact that the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal has described himself as Presiding Officer, N.M.P.T. or A.V.P.T. in the impugned award. The Reference Application dated 23rd December, 1972 has the heading U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Adhiniyam, the present respondents on 9th February, 1981 for arraying them as party in the Reference Petition, moved application before the A.V.P. Tribunal, the original tenure-holders also filed their consent before the said Tribunal, in the letter dated 25th February, 1981, written by the Tribunal to the S.L.A.O. it described itself as A.V.P.T./N.M.P. Tribunal. On 30th August, 1981 the original claimant Karamvir moved application under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. for impleading himself as party before the A.V.P. Tribunal, the four earlier References under Section 18 of the L.A. Act of the Scheme, namely, L.A Case Nos. 19 of 1977, 30 of 1977, 31 of 1977 claimant Mehra Khus Rehyal and Case No. 13 of 1981, Smt. Meerav. Collector, were decided by Shri Krishna Lal as Presiding Officer, A.V.P. Tribunal on 26th November, 1981. Only after the judgment of the Division Bench in State v. Mithilesh (supra) the Prescribed Authority started describing himself as Presiding Officer, Nagar Mahapalika Tribunal. Collector, were decided by Shri Krishna Lal as Presiding Officer, A.V.P. Tribunal on 26th November, 1981. Only after the judgment of the Division Bench in State v. Mithilesh (supra) the Prescribed Authority started describing himself as Presiding Officer, Nagar Mahapalika Tribunal. In the State of Uttar Pradesh, the same officer of the U.P. Higher Judicial Service functions as President, N.M.P.T. and President A.V.P.T. Consequently, the present impugned award is an award under the provisions of Section 66 of the AVP. Act read with Section 54 of the L.A. Act and not under the provisions of Section 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam and so the question of deposit of amount given under the award by the Tribunal does not arise. 5. We have considered the respective contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties the controversy involved in the present proceedings stands concluded by decisions of two earlier Division Benches of this Court, namely, in State of U.P v. Smt. Mithilesh (supra) and Special Appeal No. 221 of 1972 decided on 17 May, 1972, Dr. Prakash Narain Gupta v. State of U.P These two decisions related to the same scheme, the Court took due notice of the agreement dated 31 May, 1968, whereby the execution of the scheme has been transferred to the Uttar Pradesh Avas Vikas Parishad by the Nagar Mahapalika, Agra under Section 47 of the Act. In the earlier Special Appeal No. 221 of 1972. Dr. Prakash Narain Gupta v. State of U.P., the question of interpretation of Section 365(4) of the Mahapalika Adhiniyam was involved. Since after the transfer of the scheme of 31st May, 1968, the scheme was not completed within the statutory period laid down by Section 365(4) of the Mahapalika Adhiniyam, the further execution of the scheme was challenged on the ground that the period of time provided under Section 365(4) of the Mahapalika Adhiniyam having expired, the scheme became dead and could not be executed any further. On behalf of the U.P. Avas Vikas Parishad an argument was raised that the provisions of Section 365(4) of the Mahapalika Adhiniyam were not applicable to the scheme because of the transfer of the execution of the scheme to the Avas Vikas Parishad under the A.V.P. Act, which had no parallel provisions like Section 365(4) of the Mahapalika Adhiniyam. On behalf of the U.P. Avas Vikas Parishad an argument was raised that the provisions of Section 365(4) of the Mahapalika Adhiniyam were not applicable to the scheme because of the transfer of the execution of the scheme to the Avas Vikas Parishad under the A.V.P. Act, which had no parallel provisions like Section 365(4) of the Mahapalika Adhiniyam. After dilating upon the various provisions of the Avas Vikas Parishad Act, the Division Bench held that the provisions for the acquisition of the land are distinct and independent of the proceedings done in, the course of execution of the scheme. Since the proceedings for execution of land commence under the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by the Mahapalika Adhiniyam, which provide for limitation, for executing the scheme under Section 365(4) of the Mahapalika Adhiniyam, that provision will continue to apply even though the execution of the improvement scheme was transferred to the Avas Vikas Parishad. The subsequent Division Bench in the State of U.P. v. Mithilesh (supra) followed the view expressed in Dr. Prakash Narain Gupta v. State of U.P. (supra) and held that notwithstanding the transfer of the execution of the scheme which was originally undertaken by Nagar Mahapalika, Agra under the Mahapalika Adhiniyam to the Avas Vikas Parishad from 31 May, 1968, the acquisition proceedings had to be continued under the provisions of L.A. Act as modified by Mahapalika Adhiniyam and those proceedings continued upto the stage of the making of the impugned award. The Court held that the provisions of Section 66 of the Avas Vikas Parishad Act will apply to the award of the Tribunal if the land is acquired under the L. A Act as modified by U.P. A.V. Act, only in that event the award of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be an award of the Court under the L.A. Act and will be subject to the provisions of Section 54 of the L.A. Act. The present Ghatwasam Grin Asthan Evam Sarak Youjna, for which the acquisition of land is being made was initially notified under Section 357 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam and was subsequently finalised under Section 363 of the Mahapalika Adhiniyam. The land was not acquired under the provisions of L.A. Act as modified by Schedule to the Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 but was acquired under the provisions of the L.A. Act as modified by the provisions of Mahapalika Adhiniyam. The land was not acquired under the provisions of L.A. Act as modified by Schedule to the Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 but was acquired under the provisions of the L.A. Act as modified by the provisions of Mahapalika Adhiniyam. The transfer of the scheme under the agreement dated 31 May, 1968 had no effect. Further, the aforesaid scheme itself was not transferred to Avas Vikas Parishad under Section 44 of the Avas Vikas Parishad Act, only an execution of the scheme was transferred to the Avas Vikas Parishad under Section 47(1) of the Act. Relying upon the observations of the earlier Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 221 of 1972, Dr. Prakash Narain Gupta v. State of U.P. the Court held that the award of the Tribunal was u/s. 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam and as such the appellant having failed to deposit the amount required under sub-section (3) of the said Section 381, the appeal was not maintainable. 6. The view expressed by the two Division Benches has held the filed for a long period, we find no reason to deviate from the view taken by the two Division Benches of this Court earlier. Further, the S.L.P. No. C-90041 of 1991 against the judgment in Slate v. Mithilesh (supra) has been dismissed by the Supreme Court on July 8, 1991, though by a non-speaking, order the judgment has attained finality. The learned Counsel for the appellant/petitioner relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Sher Singh, 1997 Allahabad Civil Judgment 304. In that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it is settled legal position by a catena of decisions of the Court that the dismissal of Special Leave Petition without speaking order does not constitute res judicata, the question of law at large can be gone into. But in State of Maharashtra v. M.P. Himalaya, AIR 1996 SC 3069 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that though the dismissal of S.L.P. without speaking order does not constitute res judicata, the principle of res judicata is founded on public policy that the parties cannot be permitted to have the controversy directly or substantially in issue between the same parties or those claiming under the parties in the subsequent suit in the same proceeding in subsequent stages cannot be raised once over. It is a sound principle of public policy to prevent vexation. It is a sound principle of public policy to prevent vexation. The very subject-matter of the present appeal was in issue in State of U.P. v. Mithilesh (supra), the view expressed by the High Court was affirmed the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The learned Counsel for the appellant has referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 2279 , and urged that in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that case the appeal can be admitted or entertained, but cannot be heard or disposed of without pre-deposit of the decretal amount and so if the appellant deposits the amount decreed by the award subsequently, the appeal can be heard. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondents, the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) is distinguishable by reason of the marked difference in the language employed in Section 170(p) of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 qua Section 381(3) of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. Section 170(b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act reads thus: "no appeal shall be heard or determined under Section 169 unless – (a ). . . . . . . . . . . (b) the amount, if any in dispute in the appeal has been deposited by the appellant in the office of the Corporation. " As against above, Section 381, subsection (3) of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam reads as under: "(3). Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions, no appeal shall lie under this section unless the appellant has deposited the money which he is liable to pay under the order from which the appeal is filed." Thus, the words used in Section 170(b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act are "no appeal shall be heard or determined", in contrast to the wordings of Section 381(3) of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam that "no appeal shall lie". In view of the words used in the two different statutes, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant does not help the appellant. 7. In view of the words used in the two different statutes, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant does not help the appellant. 7. In view of the discussions made above we are also of the view of the discussions made above we are also execution of the scheme which was originally undertaken by the Nagar Mahapalika, Agra under the Mahapalika Adhiniyam to the Avas Vikas Parishad, the proceedings have to continue under the provisions of L.A. Act as modified by the Mahapalika Adhiniyam, the appeal against the impugned award lie under Section 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam and the appellant having not obtained the certificate of fitness from the Nagar Mahapalika Tribunal and also not having deposited the amount under the award required by Section 381(3) of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, the present appeal is not maintainable. 8. As seen above, to meet out the respondents' objection, the appellant has also filed the writ petition challenging the award during the pendency of the appeal. A vehement objection has been raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents that in view of the alternative remedy available under Section 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, the appellant having failed to deposit the decretal amount and having not obtained the certificate of fitness under Section 381 of the said Act, the present writ petition does not lie. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the requirement of the deposit of the amount under the award is a harsh and onerous condition. In view of the views expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court from time to time, the present writ petition is maintainable. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in U.P. State v. Mohd. Nooh, 1958 S.C. 86; Himmat Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 403 ; Khurai Municipality v. Kamal Kumar, AIR 1965 SC 1321 ; Customs Collector, Bombay v. Shanti Lal and Company, AIR 1966 SC 197 and Babu Ram v. Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556 . As referred to above, in the present case the S.L.A.O. awarded by his award a sum of Rs. 89,914.24 as compensation to the claimants. As referred to above, in the present case the S.L.A.O. awarded by his award a sum of Rs. 89,914.24 as compensation to the claimants. But the Tribunal by his impugned award has enhanced the compensation which according to calculations made comes to about Rs. 1,39,36,560.17. Under Section 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, the appellant is now required to deposit a sum of Rs. 1 crore and about forty lacs. In Himmat Lal v. State of M.P. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that where the appellant is required to deposit the whole amount of tax, such a provision can hardly be described as an adequate alternative remedy. The remedy provided by C.P. and Berar Sales-tax Act was held as onerous and of burden some character as before the assessee could avail of it, it had to deposit the whole amount of tax. Likewise, in the present case the remedy of the petitioner of filing appeal under Section 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam cannot be said to be adequate alternative remedy as the appellant is required to deposit a sum of Rs. 1 crore and about 40 lacs before the appeal could be entertained. In Customs Collector, Bombay v. Shanti Lal and Company (supra), which was a case under the Sea Customs Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that a remedy by way of an appeal against the order of confiscation and imposition of a large penalty under the Sea Custom's Act is not an effective remedy when no appeal can be filed unless the large penalty imposed upon the appellant has first been deposited. In U.P. State v. Mohd. Nooh (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be exercised by the High Court in cases where the question involved goes to the root of the case and the writ petition cannot be thrown out merely because the petitioner has alternative remedy. In Khurai Municipality v. Kamal Kumar (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that though the High Court not priginarily entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, where an alternative remedy is open to the aggrieved party, it has jurisdiction to grant relief to such a party if it thinks proper to do so in the circumstances of the case. In Babu Ram v. Zila Parishad (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court. But it should be remembered that the rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies before a writ is granted as a rule of self imposed limitation, a rule of policy and discretion rather than a rule of law and the Court may, therefore, in exceptional cases issue a writ, such as a writ of certiorari notwithstanding the fact that the statutory remedies have not been exhausted. 9. There is another special circumstance of the present case which entitles the appellant/petitioner to file the present writ petition. In the proceedings before the A.V.P. Tribunal, though Avas Vikas Parishad, was shown as a party in the Reference under Section 18 of the L.A. Act, but no formal notice was served on the Avas Vikas Parishad. No written statement, document, affidavit or paper was filed on behalf of the Avas Vikas Parishad, though the scheme had already been transferred to the Avas Vikas Parishad and the land was required for it. The mere fact that the Avas Vikas Parishad's Pairokar had been looking after the reference does not satisfy the requirement of law of due notice to the Avas Vikas Parishad. In U.P. Avam Avas Vikas Parishad v. Gyani Devi, AIR 1995 SC 724 , the apex Court inter alia laid down the following: "(3) The proviso to Section 50(2) L.A. Act only precludes a local authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprive the local authority which feels aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector of by the reference Court to invoke the remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution as well as the remedies available under the L.A. Act. (4) In the event of denial of the right conferred by Section 50(2) on account of failure of the collector to serve notice of the acquisition proceedings the local authority can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. (5) Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Art. 226." 10. (5) Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Art. 226." 10. The Avas Vikas Parishad is being required to pay compensation about rupees one crore and forty lacs, no notice was given to the Avas Vikas Parishad. In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad being aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation by the Tribunal, has a right to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Counsel for the respondents argued that the pairokar of the Avas Vikas Parishad has been looking after the case and the knowledge of the proceedings can be equated with the service of notice and relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neel kanth v. Kashi Nath, AIR 1962 SC 666 ; Raja Harish Chandra v. Dy. L.A. Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 and V.V. Joseph and Ors. v. U.O.I. and Ors., AIR 1993 SC 299 . We have gone through these decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but in view of the clear law laid down by the Supreme Court the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Ghayni Devi (supra), these decisions do not help the respondents in the instant case. 11. The another aspect of the matter which also persuades the Court to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that the Reference under Section 18 was moved before the Collector on 23-12-1972/1-1-1973, but it was forwarded by the Collector to the Tribunal in the month of January, 1981, after the original tenure holders, namely, Lokman Lal Chandra and Kunwar Singh had transferred their rights to the respondents only for the sum of Rs. 90,000, which has been enhanced to about rupees one crore and forty lacs by the Tribunal. Though on examination of the record of the case we could find that in fact the petition under Section 18 of the L.A. Act was filed by the respondents on 23-12-1972 and of the 1-8-1975, but could not detect the reason as to why the Reference Petition remained pending before the Collector for such a long period say about eight years. 12. 12. The learned Counsel for the respondents argued that the two parallel remedies cannot be availed of by the petitioner and as such the present writ petition is not maintainable, the relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority, Bombay v. Gokal Patel Vokart Ltd. and Ors., (1995) 1 SCC 642 . In that case the Supreme Court observed: "this is a case, where there is not only the existence of an alternative remedy but the writ petitioner actually had availed that remedy. The writ petitioner's appeal before the statutory authority was pending. In that view of the matter this writ petition should not have been entertained." The learned Counsel for the respondents also relied upon the decision of this Court in Prof. M. Zamiruddin v. The Visitor, 1992 A.W.C. 387, in which the Division Bench opined thus: ". . . . . . . It is not open to a person to pursue two parallel remedies at the same time. The petitioner, having taken recourse to the remedies provided by the Act, cannot be allowed to pursue the writ petition for the same relief which has been claimed by him before the visitor. This writ petition, as such, is liable to be dismissed on ground of alternative remedy." 13. The learned Counsel also relied upon the decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar v. State of U.P., 1995 (2) Education and Service Cases 392, where the writ petition of the petitioner was also held not maintainable on the ground of the petitioner having availed the statutory remedy. All these three cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents are distinguishable. In the two cases, namely, Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority, Bombay v. Gokal Patel Volkart Ltd. and Ors. (supra) and Prof. M. Zamiruddin v. The Visitor (supra), representation of the petitioner was also pending when the writ petition was filed by the petitioner. In the present case, appeal of the petitioner is not maintainable and so the petitioner cannot be debarred from pursuing his remedy of filing the writ petition before this Court. The learned Counsel for the respondents also argued that the Court while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not come to the aid of the defaulting party, if the appeal is dismissed as non-maintainable it would mean aid to the defaulting party. The learned Counsel for the respondents also argued that the Court while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not come to the aid of the defaulting party, if the appeal is dismissed as non-maintainable it would mean aid to the defaulting party. In support of his contentions the learned Counsel relied upon the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.V. Venkateswaran v. R.S. Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506 , and of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Re S. Papireddy, AIR 1977 A.P. 112 . Further, the condition of deposit under Section 381(3) of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam is not onerous or unreasonable, so as to entitle the petitioner not to comply and file the writ petition. In case of Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), the requirement to deposit disputed tax was not held to be onerous. Similarly, in Nand Lal andanr v. State of Haryana and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 2097 , the requirement of depositing land holding tax before filing appeal/revision was not held onerous, which rendered the right to appeal as illusory. As regards decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nand Lal and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Ors. (supra) as is apparent from the observations as appear in para 19 of the said judgment, the amount of land holding tax which was to be deposited was very meager amount and this persuaded the Court in holding that the requirement was not onerous. Here in the present case, the question is of deposit of rupees one crore and about forty lacs, the U.P. Avas Vikas Parishad is a public body, the public funds are involved, which has to make arrangement for the deposit of the amount, especially when the compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer is about Rs. 90,000 only. 14. The learned Counsel for the respondents also argued that there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition, the award was made on 24 May, 1993, while the present writ petition has been filed on April 3, 1996 after the lapse of about three years. The petitioner in the writ petition has stated that the delay in filing the writ petition deserves to be condoned as the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad was never issued any notice by the Tribunal, the proceedings were conducted merely against the State and the Collector. The petitioner in the writ petition has stated that the delay in filing the writ petition deserves to be condoned as the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad was never issued any notice by the Tribunal, the proceedings were conducted merely against the State and the Collector. The present writ petition has been filed to avoid any controversy, as the position was not clear whether the petitioner can maintain appeal under Section 54 of the L.A. Act or is required to file an appeal under Section 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam after complying with the conditions of deposit of the amount in award etc. Further, the learned Counsel for the respondents also contended that the petitioner has not come with clean hands, has suppressed certain facts, and as such the writ petition is liable to be thrown on this ground alone. In support of his contention the learned Counsel relied upon the decisions of Chancellor v. Baijayananda Kar, AIR 1994 SC 579 ; G. Narayanaswamy Ready v. Government of Karnataka, (1991) 3 SCC 261 ; Lourdu Man David and Ors. v. Louis Chinay Arogiaswamy and Ors., 1996 (5) SCC 589 and J.H. Patel v. Subhan Khan, (1996) 5 SCC 312 . The petitioner has not alleged by false facts nor has suppressed material facts, on the basis of which it can be said that the petitioner has not come with clean hands and as such the writ petition deserves dismissal on this ground alone. As such the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents do not help the respondent in the present case. 15. In view of the discussions made above, we find that the alternative remedy of appeal being onerous, the facts and circumstances of the present case are such which pursuade and compel the Court to invoke its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. We accordingly, find the writ petition as maintainable. 16. Coming to the merits of the case, the first serious contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that through the sale-deeds respondent-claimants have purchased right to prosecute the proceedings for enhancement of compensation which can be equated "with right to sue", the transfer of which is prohibited by Section 6, Clause (e) of the Transfer of Property Act. The sale-deeds in favour of the respondent-claimants are void being champerteous and opposed to public policy under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. The claimants took the Sale-Deeds for a petty amount below rupees one lac. The said amount has swollen to rupees one crore and about forty lacs before the Tribunal. The learned Counsel relied upon the decision of Privy Council in Ram Swamp v. Collector's Award, AIR 1940 PC 19, of this Court in Babu Ram v. Ram Chandra Lal, AIR 1934 Allahabad 1023, and of Delhi High Court, rendered in M/s. Thermofriz Insulations Pvt. Ltd. Calcutta v. M/s. Vijay Udyog, AIR 1981 (Delhi) 385. The learned Counsel for the respondent-claimants, in reply, urged that right to receive enhance compensation is 'property' and can be transferred under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. The relevant portion of Section 6 of Transfer of Property Act is extracted hereunder: "6. What may be transferred.- Property of any kind may be transferred, except as otherwise provided by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force. (a). . . . . . . . . . (b). . . . . . . . . . (c). . . . . . . . . . (d). . . . . . . . . . (dd). . . . . . . . . (e) A mere right to sue cannot be transferred." A perusal of provisions of Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act extracted above, shows that property of any kind can be transferred, but a mere right to sue cannot be transferred. The Transfer Deeds dated 27 January, 1981 on the record state that vendors' land stands acquired on 18-6-1971, the U.P. Avas Vikas Parishad is in possession of the land, the award by the S.L.A.O. was made on 24 November, 1972, six annas of awarded sum has been received under protest, for the balance amount of ten annas a Reference under Section 30, L.A. Case No. 29 of 1975, was made, which stands adjudicated, but its amount has not been paid. The amount of the compensation fixed by the S.L.A.O. was wholly inadequate and was against law and facts, a joint application by tenure-holders under Section 18 has been filed, eight years have passed since then, a considerable time may be taken for its final decision, substantial amount has been spent as also difficulties have been faced by the transferees in the past and would be facing in future also. The sale-deeds further recite that it would not be possible for the vendors to contest the case, keeping all that in view, the vendors transferred all their compensation rights with the right to pursue the Reference under Section 18 and its appeal, revisions etc. In Khursheed Shopper Chenai v. Assistant Collector, Estate Duty, AIR 1980 SC 775 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the right to receive compensation equivalent to market value of the lands on the dates of notification, which spang directly from the acquisition was 'property'. 17. In Mr. Khorshed's case (supra), the facts were that one Shapoor Rasheed Chenai died on 7 May, 1965, prior to his death, certain agricultural land had been acquired, the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer had already been revived. On the date of his death on 7-5-1965 References under Section 18 of the L.A. Act were pending. An account of properties that passed on his death was filed by Mr. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai under the provisions of Easte Duty Act, the assessment under the Estate Duty Act was completed on 30-12-1966, the value of the lands awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer was adopted by the Estate Officer. Later on 6-3-1967 in Reference Petition under Section 18 of the L.A. Act the amount of compensation awarded by the L.A. Officer was enhanced by the Civil Court. Consequently, a notice under Section 59(a) of the Estate Duty Act was issued upon the widow of Shapoor, namely, Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai to show cause why the Estate Duty assessment completed earlier on 30-12-1966 be not re-opened and revised in view of the extra compensation awarded by Civil Court. 18. Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai filed writ petition before the High Court, assailing the notice issued under Section 59(a) of the Estate Duty Act, contending that after compensation had been awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer under. 18. Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai filed writ petition before the High Court, assailing the notice issued under Section 59(a) of the Estate Duty Act, contending that after compensation had been awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer under. Section 11 of the L.A. Act, the heirs of the tenure-holder Rashid had merely exercised a right to sue for further compensation, which was merely a hope or a chance that the compensation might be enhanced, but such hope or enhance could not be elevated to the status of an asset or property and as such no asset or property chargeable to estate duty had escaped assessment. The Andhra Pradesh High Court took the view that the right to receive compensation equivalent to market value of the lands on the dates of notification which sprang directly from acquisition was 'property' and as such no fresh or independent right to receive extra compensation accrued to the deceased. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was assailed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was contended (vide page 779 paragraph 8) that – ". . . . . . . . compensation as determined under the awards made by the Special Deputy Collector was paid to and received by the deceased and, hence, at the time of the death the initial right to receive compensation had already merged in those awards and the only right which the deceased had was the right to agitate against the correctness of the award and nothing more and this right to claim further compensation was a precarious right, being merely a right to litigate a chancy and dicey right, which could not be elevated to the status of any asset or property and as such there was no question of any property having escaped the assessment to duty. . . . . . . . . . . . . ." It was also urged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that against the decree passed by the City Civil Court appeals had been preferred by the Government to the High Court and even the High Court's decision might be carried in further appeal to this Court and, therefore, till the claim as finally accepted by the highest Court no property (enhanced compensation) could be said to have come into existence, the awards made by the Land Acquisition Officer in law, are nothing but offers made by the Government to the claimant, are not accepted or are accepted under protest and the claimant seeks land reference in Civil Courts, the right to compensation must be regarded as having survived or kept alive by the claimants and it is their property (right to compensation) which will have to be evaluated by the assessing authority as on the date of death. The Hon'ble Supreme Court repelling the arguments raised on behalf of the appellant held - "in our opinion the High Court was right in holding that there are no two separate rights one a right to receive compensation and other a right to receive extra or further compensation. Upon acquisition of his lands under the Land Acquisition Act the claimant has only one right, which is, to receive compensation for the lands at their market value on the date of the relevant notification and it is this tight which is quantified by the Collector under Section 11 and by the Civil Court under Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act. . . . . . ." It was finally concluded thus (at pg. 781): ". . . . . . . if the offer is not accepted or is accepted under protest and a land reference is sought by the claimant under Section 18, the right to receive compensation must be regarded as having survived and kept alive which the claimant prosecutes in Civil Court. It is impossible to accept the contention that no sooner the Collector has made his award under Section 11 the right to compensation is destroyed or ceases to exist or is merged in the award, or what is left with the claimant is a mere right to litigate the correctness of the award." 19. It is impossible to accept the contention that no sooner the Collector has made his award under Section 11 the right to compensation is destroyed or ceases to exist or is merged in the award, or what is left with the claimant is a mere right to litigate the correctness of the award." 19. The claimant can litigate the correctness of the award because his right to compensation is not fully redeemed but remains alive which he prosecutes in Civil. Court. It is impossible to accept the contention that no sooner the collector has made his award under Section 11 the right to compensation is destroyed or ceases to exist or is merged in the award, or what is left with the claimant is a mere right to litigate the correctness of the award. The claimant can litigate the correctness of the award because his right to compensation is not fully redeemed but remains alive which he prosecutes in Civil Court. 20. It is also useful to reproduce the following extract of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court (vide A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 782 para 11): ". . . . . . . . In the case of the right to receive compensation, which is property, where the Collector's award has been made but has not been accepted or has been accepted under protest and a reference is sought or is pending in Civil Court at the date of deceased's death, the estimated value can never be below the figure quantified by the Collector because under Section 25(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, Civil Court cannot award any amount below that awarded by the Collector; the estimated value can be equal to the Collector's award or more but can never be equal to the tall claim made by the claimant in the Reference nor equal to the claim actually awarded by the Civil Court, inasmuch as the risk of hazard of litigation would be a detracting factor while arriving at a reasonable and proper value of this property as on the date of the deceased's death. The assessing authority will have to estimate the value having regard to the peculiar nature of the property, its marketability and the surrounding circumstances including the risk or hazard of litigation looming large at the relevant date. . . . . The assessing authority will have to estimate the value having regard to the peculiar nature of the property, its marketability and the surrounding circumstances including the risk or hazard of litigation looming large at the relevant date. . . . . ." Similar point came for determination in F.A. No. 70 of 1971, Collector, Agra v. Munia Devi Jain, decided on November 22, 1979. In that case the following contention was raised : "the first submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that Smt. Munia Devi Jain was not entitled for receiving any compensation as the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act had been issued on 6-11-1956 while the sale-deed in favour of Munia Devi Jain had been executed by Dalip Singh only on 29-2-1960." 21. The Earned Single Judge of this Court repelled the contention and held thus: ". . . . . . The right to receive compensation is certainly a property which is capable of being sold. Dilip Singh having executed a sale-deed under which he transferred the right to receive compensation to Munia Devi, she in effect stepped into his shoes and became entitled to receive compensation for the land which has been acquired and in respect of which acquisition Dilip Singh had a vested right to receive compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. . . . . . ." 22. As seen above there is no absolute bar on champertous agreement in India. The settled law is that the fairness of the transaction in all the circumstances has to be seen. It has to be evaluated whether the terms of the agreement are inequitable, unjust or unfair so much so as to compel the Court to refuse enforcement of such agreement. Coming to the instant case, the law of champertous does not apply at all; as the 'property', namely, compensation rights have been transferred to the respondents, there is no surety in the result of the litigation. In the case of Ram Sarup v. Court of Wards (supra) in agreement between the plaintiffs who financed the litigation providing for payment of three anas share in the property was held to be just and fair, the agreement was not termed as champertous one. In the case of Ram Sarup v. Court of Wards (supra) in agreement between the plaintiffs who financed the litigation providing for payment of three anas share in the property was held to be just and fair, the agreement was not termed as champertous one. In the case of Babu Ram v. Ram Charan Lal (supra), the persons who financed the litigation had been given rights to share the half of the decretal amount. Such an agreement was held to be inequitable, unjust and unfair and as such the enforcement was refused by the Court. In the present case at the cost of repetition there is a bare transfer of the property in the land acquired, the respondents having given right to prosecute the Reference and to receive the amount that may be awarded by the Court. Absolutely there is no sharing of profits of the litigation between the respondents and the original ten re-holders. As regards judgment of the Delhi High Court in Thermofriz Insulations (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Vijaya Udyog (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that case related to infringement of trade mark for rendition of accounts and damages, the facts of that case were entirely different, the said case does not help the petitioner in the instant case. 23. In view of the discussions made above we hold that the sale deeds whereby the respondents-claimants once have acquired property rights in the land acquired and the right to receive compensation, did not envisage transfer of mere right issue, transfers of property in the acquired land are not of champertous nature, hit by the provisions of Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. 24. Coming to the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal as stated above, the S.L.A.O. awarded compensation @ Rs. 1.34 per sq. yd. the same has been raised to Rs. 12 per sq. yd. The learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that admittedly the respondents and their predecessors have purchased the claim from the original tenure-holders in the year 1981 for a sum of Rs. 90,000, of which they have received about Rs. 55,000, the decretal amount of Rs. 50,000 of the pending Reference under Section 30 of the Act. yd. The learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that admittedly the respondents and their predecessors have purchased the claim from the original tenure-holders in the year 1981 for a sum of Rs. 90,000, of which they have received about Rs. 55,000, the decretal amount of Rs. 50,000 of the pending Reference under Section 30 of the Act. The amount awarded by the Tribunal is about rupees six lakh on the date of the notification under Section 357 of N.M.P.A. (Section 4 of the L.A. Act), dated 23-4-1960. The amount awarded is highly excessive. It is true that in the absence of examination of the vendor and vendee of a sale-deed if relied upon, the award of the Land Acquisition Officer renders itself illegal. In the instant case the vendor of the sale- deed through which the land in question was purchased by respondents No. 1 and 2 have not been examined and in view of this infirmity either the award can be set aside or a finding can be called for by us. 25. However, as we have decided to exercise our extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India under which jurisdiction in exceptional cases we as a constitutional Court can record findings of fact, in view of much delay already having caused and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case instead of following the aforementioned two courses as an exception case and in the public interest in order to save public time and money we proceed to determine the compensation amount on the day of acquisition ourselves. 26. The learned Counsel for the respondents argued that no ground whatsoever has been raised in the writ petition against the award of the market value @ Rs. 12 per sq. yd. As such no dispute in relation thereto can be permitted to be raised by the petitioner. Rather in para 9 at page 25 of the writ petition the petitioner has averted "even if Rs. 12 per sq. yd. be treated to be the market value, the total amount would not exceed minor fraction of the award." Further the rate of Rs. 12 per sq. yd. in a town like Agra is ex facie quite low besides being based on the appreciation of evidence, to which this Court would be loath to appreciate in its writ jurisdiction. The rate of Rs. 12 per sq. yd. 12 per sq. yd. in a town like Agra is ex facie quite low besides being based on the appreciation of evidence, to which this Court would be loath to appreciate in its writ jurisdiction. The rate of Rs. 12 per sq. yd. has attained finality in respect of several other lands acquired under the same Scheme and self-same notification. The learned Tribunal has placed reliance on an exemplar award, Exhibit 8, wherein compensation has also been awarded @ Rs. 12 per sq. yd. under the same scheme, the decretal amount of the exemplar award, Exhibit 8, has been released by the Housing Commissioner. Hence the award of market rate at Rs. 12 per sq. yd. is wholly in consonance with earlier duly accepted award. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Rangiah v. Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, AIR 1982 SC 877 , referred to by the learned lower Court, the land similarly situated acquired under one and the same housing scheme and the same notification should be treated alike. In the vary first paragraph of the writ petition the grant of compensation @ Rs. 12 per sq. yd. has been challenged by the petitioner. It is true that in none of the paragraphs of the writ petition the petitioner has challenged the market value of Rs. 12 per sq. yd. fixed by the Tribunal but the petitioner in the writ petition in clear words has challenged the award of compensation as highly excessive and inflated. 27. It is the settled law that the claimants in a claim petition under Section 18 of the Act like the plaintiff are entitled to succeed for higher compensation only on proof of value prevailing as on the date of notification. What is the market value as on the date of notification is, a question of fact to be proved by adducing evidence, burden is always on him to prove the same (vide Topandas Kundanmal v. State, AIR 1995 SC 2396 . As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. and Ors. v. Ram Kumari Devi and Ors., 1996 (8) SCC 577 , it is the duty of the Court to assess reasonable compensation. Burden is on the owner to prove the prevailing market value. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. and Ors. v. Ram Kumari Devi and Ors., 1996 (8) SCC 577 , it is the duty of the Court to assess reasonable compensation. Burden is on the owner to prove the prevailing market value. On adduction of evidence by the parties, the acid test which the Court has to adopt is that the Court has to sit in the armchair of a prudent purchaser, eschew feats of imagination and consider whether a reasonable prudent purchaser in the open market would offer the same price which the Court is intending to fix the market value in respect of the acquired land. Since it is a compulsory acquisition, it is but the solemn duty of the Court to assess reasonable compensation so as to allow the same to the owner of the land whose property has been acquired by compulsory acquisition and also to avoid needless burden on public exchequer. In the present case as seen above, the land acquired is agricultural land, measuring 19 bigha, 2 biswa 52644.375 sq. ft. The learned S.L.A.O. and the learned Tribunal has awarded compensation on per sq. ft. IT is the consistent view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that where large extent of agricultural land in bighas/acres is being acquired, determination of compensation on a sq. ft./metre-basis is perse illegal, vide Indumati Chitaley v. Government of India, AIR 1996 SC 531 and State of U.P. v. Ram Kumari Devi (supra). 28. The observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Ram Kumari Devi (supra) are as follows: "no feats of imagination would require to bog the mind that when 13.75 acres of land was offered for sale in an open market, no prudent man would have credulity to purchase that land on square foot basis. The High Court as well as the District Judge have committed a grave error in not applying the above acid test while considering the case. They merely proceeded by accepting the sale deeds which were obviously brought into existence to inflate the market value and determined the compensation on the price settled by them. The High Court as well as the District Judge have committed a grave error in not applying the above acid test while considering the case. They merely proceeded by accepting the sale deeds which were obviously brought into existence to inflate the market value and determined the compensation on the price settled by them. Thus, we hold that both the Courts have applied a wrong principle of law in determining the compensation." The observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indumati Chitaley v. Government of India (supra) are thus: "the question is what would be the principle to be adopted in this case. This Court has repeatedly deprecated the method of evaluating the compensation on the basis of square foot. When a large extent of 17.57 acres of land is offered for sale by private negotiation, would any prudent purchaser negotiate to purchase lands put for sale in open market at square foot basis ? No one would come forward to purchase such a vast extent of land on square foot basis. It is seen that the lands are admittedly agricultural lands. Therefore, no one would prefer to purchase the agricultural land on square foot basis. The principle of determining the compensation on square foot basis is perse illegal." 29. The learned Tribunal has placed reliance on the judgment of the Tribunal (vide Exhibit 8) wherein the Tribunal has awarded compensation @ Rs. 12 per sq. metre in respect of the land which was under the same notification and situate in the same village. A perusal of Exhibit 8 judgment of the Tribunal, appeal against which has been dismissed by the Allahabad High Court (vide Exhibit 10) shows that in that case also a large chunk of agricultural land was acquired and so in that case also the award of compensation @ Rs. 12 per sq. metre is not in consonance with the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 30. In the present case 19 bigha, 2 biswa land has been acquired, so the award of compensation on square metre basis by the learned Tribunal is per se illegal and not sustainable in law. The next question which arises for determination is as to what should be the market value of the land per bigha acquired in the instant case. In the present case 19 bigha, 2 biswa land has been acquired, so the award of compensation on square metre basis by the learned Tribunal is per se illegal and not sustainable in law. The next question which arises for determination is as to what should be the market value of the land per bigha acquired in the instant case. There is no exemplar sale deed on the record of the instant case on the basis of which the market value per bigha of the land can be fixed. The best piece of evidence in the case is the admission of the claimant himself. In the instant case, as stated above, the respondents and their predecessors in the year 1981 acquired the aforesaid land and the right to raise the compensation for Rs. 90,000 only, out of which they themselves have received Rs. 55,000 from the S.L.A.O. by award under Section 30 of the L.A. Act. After excluding the said sum of Rs. 55,000, the respondents and their predecessors have purchased the land and the right of compensation of a sum of Rs. 35,000. It is also worthy to note that this purchase was made by the respondents and their predecessors in the year 1981, the value of the land must have been much less in the year 1960. The market value of the land must have been much less. But keeping in view the fact the risk taken by the respondents in purchasing land and the right to realise the compensation, matter of which was pending in the Court, we are of the opinion that it would be just and proper to fix the market value of the land at Rs. 90,000, which respondents and their predecessors themselves have paid to the original land holders. The learned Tribunal has committed error in awarding compensation at the are a of Rs. 12 per sq. yd. There is no dispute about the award of Rs. 10,000 as price of the two wells and Rs. 3,000 as price of the trees existing on the land acquired. We, therefore, hold that the claimant-respondents are entitled to recover Rs. 90,000 as price of the land, Rs. 10,000 price of the two wells and Rs. 3,000 as price of the trees as existed on the disputed land, total Rs. 1,08,000. 31. 3,000 as price of the trees existing on the land acquired. We, therefore, hold that the claimant-respondents are entitled to recover Rs. 90,000 as price of the land, Rs. 10,000 price of the two wells and Rs. 3,000 as price of the trees as existed on the disputed land, total Rs. 1,08,000. 31. As regards statutory benefit of 12% per annum in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) of the L.A. Act, the learned lower Court has awarded same relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Johra Singh, 1991 (4) JT (SC) 538. In that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the benefit arising out of the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Act could be extended to such awards which were made after September 24, 1984. The said decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been overruled by a Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.S. Paripuran v. State of Kerala, (1994) S.C.C. 539, and it has been held that where the compensation has been awarded by the Collector prior to the enforcement of the Land Acquisition Amending Act No. 68 of 1984, the claimants are not entitled to statutory benefit under Section 23 (1-A) of the L.A. Act. The claimant-respondents, therefore, are not entitled to recover the amount of 12% under Section 23 (1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act. The award of the Tribunal is, therefore, modified accordingly. 32. The Tribunal has also awarded solatium @ 30% under Section 23(2) of the L.A. Act, as amended by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 (hereinafter referred to as Act 68 of 1984), interest under Section 4(3) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Alteration) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the Act No. 13 of 1967) @ 6% per annum on the market value of the land, interest @ 9% under the amended main para of Section 28 and @ 15% per annum under the proviso added to Section 28 by Act No. 68 of 1984 and also interest @ 9% per annum under the amended main para of Section 34 and 15% per annum under the provided under Section 34 added by Act No. 68 of 1984, apart from compensation under Section 48-A of the Nagar Mahapalika Act. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that if it is found as contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the acquisition has been made under the provisions of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have been inserted in the Mahapalika Act and in the Schedule 2 to the Mahapalika Adhiniyam, under Section 376 of the Mahapalika Adhiniyam. The said legislation is by incorporation and as such subsequent amendments in the Land Acquisition Act under which the enhanced solatium and interest have been claimed and awarded would not automatically apply to the present acquisition under the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, the compensation interests etc. have be granted under the provisions of the unamended Land Acquisition Act. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in support to his contention relied upon the decision of Full Bench by this Court earlier in Doctors' Sahkari G.W.S. Ltd. v. A.A.V. Parishad, A.I.R. 1984 Allahabad 234, of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gauri Shanker Gaur v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 169, and in U.P. Avas Avam Vikas Parishad v. Pushp Lata Awasthi, 1995(3) S.C.C. 573 . On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents urged that the award was made by the Tribunal on 24 May, 1993 that is after 24 September, 1984 when the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 had come into force. It is now the settled law that the amended provisions of Section 23(2) of the L.A. Act enjoining payment of solatium @ 30% apply to all the awards made by Reference Court on or after 30 April, 1982 (vide Hindusthan Paper Corporation Limited v. Sakha Ram Gaur, 1995(5) S.C.C. 282 and K.S. Paripurnam v. State of Kerala, 1995(1) S.C.C. 367 . In un-reported Division Bench decision dated 8 August, 1986 in First Appeal No. 38 of 1977, Sheo Dutt v. State of U.P., decided by Lucknow Bench of this Court, interest and solatium as per Act No. 68 of 1984 were awarded, in that case the Full Bench decision of this Court in Doctors' Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Limited v. Avas Avam Vikas Parishad, Lucknow, was also considered. Interest under Section 28, as amended by the Act No. 68 of 1984 has to be awarded as the award was made on 24-5-1993 (vide Hindusthan Paper Corporation Limited v. Sakha Ram Gaur (supra) and K.S. Paripurnam (II) v. State of Kerala and Ors., 1995(1) S.C.C. 367 . In Bhatinda Improvement Trust v. Balwant Singh, 1991(4) S.C.C. 368 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 which are in pan materia with the provisions of AYR Act and held it to be a case of amendment by 'reference' and not that of incorporation. The cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner were under the provisions of Avas Avam Vikas Parishad and not under the provisions of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam and the amendment in Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam being amendment by incorporation and not by reference, the claimant-respondents are entitled to the solatium and interest under the amended provisions of the L.A. Act. 48. The Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 under which the land has been acquired in the instant case also contains provisions for promotion of Housing Development Schemes and other schemes provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by the Act, and has also incorporated provisions in II Schedule to the Act. In U.P Avas Avam Vikas Parishad v. Pushp Lata Awasthi (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act were incorporated in the said Act, viz. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, it was a case of amendment by incorporation and not a case of reference. In consequence the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 was not applicable unless the State Legislature incorporates the amendment. Those amendments could not be applied to the proceedings initiated under the said Act. The Court relied upon the earlier decision of the apex Court in Gauri Shanker Gaur v. State of U.P. (supra) made detailed Reference to the provisions of the U.P. Avas Avam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam and after discussion came to the conclusion that the amendment in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad was a case of amendment by incorporation and not amendment by reference and consequently the provisions of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 were not applicable to the acquisition made by U.P. Avas Avam Vikas Parishad. It is useful to refer to Section 55 of the U.P. Avas Avam Vikas Parishad which is as under: "55. It is useful to refer to Section 55 of the U.P. Avas Avam Vikas Parishad which is as under: "55. Power to acquire land - (1). Any land or any interest therein required by the Board for any of the purposes of this Act, may be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1894), as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh, which for this purpose shall be subject to the modifications specified in the Schedule to this Act. (Emphasis supplied) In the schedule it has been provided thus: "modifications in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter called the said Act.) The corresponding provisions in Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 in Section 365(2) and Section 376 are as under: "365(2) the Corporation may for the purpose of an improvement scheme sanctioned (under this Chapter) acquire land or interest in land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as modified by the provisions of this Chapter." "376. Modification of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.- For the purpose of the acquisition of land for the Corporation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 whether under this Chapter or any other Chapter of this Act - (a) the said Act shall be subject to the modifications specified in the schedule to this Act; (b) the award of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the award of the Court under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894." 49. A perusal of the provisions of the two Acts clearly shows that the acquisition under the respective Acts are to be made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as amended in its application to the State of U.P., subject to the modifications specified in Schedule to the Act. 50. Like the provisions of the Avas Avam Vikas Parishad, the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam also contains provisions for floating of various housing or improvement schemes under Chapter 14 of the Act. Sections 343 to 356 contain provisions for the various schemes. 50. Like the provisions of the Avas Avam Vikas Parishad, the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam also contains provisions for floating of various housing or improvement schemes under Chapter 14 of the Act. Sections 343 to 356 contain provisions for the various schemes. Section 357 of the Act like Section 28 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Act (corresponding to Section 4 of the L.A. Act) provides for issuance of notice stating the fact that the scheme had been framed, the boundary of the areas comprising in the scheme and the place at which, particulars of the scheme, a map of the area comprised in the scheme and a statement of the land which it is proposed to acquire may be seen. Section 358 of the Act provides for notice of the proposed acquisition of land and provides for filing of objections by the aggrieved persons. Section 359 of the Act provides for consideration of the objection, to their scheme or by the Corporation after hearing the parties. Under Section 360, the Mahapalika may abandon or sanction their scheme. Under the said section where the estimated cost of the scheme is over Rs. 10,00,000, the sanction of the State Government is necessary. Under Section 361 of the Act, the State Government may sanction either with or without modification, or may refuse to santion or may return for consideration, any improvement scheme submitted to it under the preceding Section 360. If a scheme returned for re- consideration under subsection (1) of Section 361, is modified by the Corporation, the same shall be re- published in accordance with the provisions of Section 357. Section 363 which corresponds to Section 32 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Act and Section 6 of the L.A. Act, provide for notification of a sanctioned scheme. Section 365(2) of the Act as seen above empowers the Mahapalika for the purposes of an improvement in scheme to acquire land or interest in the land under the provisions of L.A. Act and as modified by the provisions of the Nagar Mahapalika Act. In Schedule II to the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam the provisions of Sections 3, 4, 6, 11, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 31 and 41 of the Land Acquisition Act with certain amendments have been included and new Sections 17-A, 24-A and 48-A have been added. In Schedule II to the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam the provisions of Sections 3, 4, 6, 11, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 31 and 41 of the Land Acquisition Act with certain amendments have been included and new Sections 17-A, 24-A and 48-A have been added. The first Proviso to Section 6 of the L.A. Act as inserted by the Amendment Act No. 1 of 1967 prescribes limitation of three years within which a notification under Section 6 of the Act has to be published. The moot point in the Gauri Shankar Gaur v. State of U.P. (supra) was whether the limitation of three years prescribed by the First Proviso to Section 6 of the Act would apply to the acquisition made under Sections 22 and 32 of the Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Act. After discussing the provisions of the Act and the various decisions of the Court pronounced earlier, the apex Court found that since the provisions of the L.A. Act have been incorporated in the Avas Avam Vikas Parishad, by incorporation and not by reference to the provisions of the proviso to Section 6 of the L.A. Act was not applicable to the acquisitions made under the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. It is necessary to reproduce the observations of the apex Court appearing in paras 22, 31 and 32 of the judgment which are extracted asunder: "22. It would thus be clear that in case of legislation by incorporation, incorporated provisions would become part and parcel of the later fresh statute as if it is written by pen in ink or printed bodily therein as part of the letter statute and became an integral scheme of that Act. The Legislature while incorporating them did not intend to speculate that any subsequent amendment previous Act or its repeal would alter the texture of the later Act unless the former is supplemental to each other or both are in pan materia in which case it would render the latter Act wholly unworkable and in effectual or by necessary intendment applies it." "31. It would thus be clear that in case of legislation by incorporation the former Act becomes an integral part and parcel of the later. Act, as if it was written with ink and printed in the later Act. It would thus be clear that in case of legislation by incorporation the former Act becomes an integral part and parcel of the later. Act, as if it was written with ink and printed in the later Act. Its validity including the provisions incorporated thereunder would be judged with reference to the power of the legislature enacting the later Act. It is not by reference. Logically when provisions in the former Act were repealed or amended, they do not, unless expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act, be deemed to be incorporated in it. The later Act is totally unaffected by any amendment or repeal. It would be subject to the exceptions enumerated hereinbefore. The statute being distinct and different each is to be judged with reference to its own source that emerges from the scheme, language employed and purpose it seeks to achieve." "32. If a later Act merely makes a reference to the earlier Act or existing law, it is only by way of reference and all amendments, repeals, new law subsequently made will have effect unless its operation is saved by Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act or void under Article 254 of the Constitution." 51. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhatinda Improvement Trust v. Balwant Singh, (supra) was considered by the apex Court in this case. 52. As stated above, the same question cropped up before Full Bench of this Court in Doctor's Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Limited v. Avas Avam Vikas Parishad (supra). The same view has been expressed by the Full Bench of this Court. 53. In the said judgment the Full Bench of this Court observed: "what the legislature intended to do was to lay down a special procedure for acquisition of Sand for purposes of the scheme formulated under the Adhiniyam and that procedure has to be spelled out by perusing the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended in its applications to Uttar Pradesh in the year 1995 together with the modification indicated in the schedule. Certainly the legislature did not intend that any future amendment in the Act should, whether or not it be in consonance with the modified provision for acquisition of property contemplated by the Adhiniyam, also become applicable to such acquisitions. Certainly the legislature did not intend that any future amendment in the Act should, whether or not it be in consonance with the modified provision for acquisition of property contemplated by the Adhiniyam, also become applicable to such acquisitions. Viewed in this light, it becomes absolutely clear that what the legislature did was nothing more than incorporating with modification and amendment certain provisions existing in the Act or the Adhiniyam and for convenience of drafting it did so by reference to that Act instead of setting out for itself at length the provisions which it wanted to adopt. It is now well settled that where a statute is incorporated by reference into a draft statute, the repeal or amendment of the first statute does not affect the second. Accordingly any amendment made in the incorporated provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in the year 1967 will have no bearing whatsoever on the question of acquisition of property in connection with as scheme formulated under the Adhiniyam which acquisition has to be carried out in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Act as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh in the year 1965, i.e., the year in which the Adhiniyam was enacted. (Case law discussed)." 54. As seen above, the provisions of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam and U.P. Avas Avam Vikas Parishad are inpari materia. Though there is no direct case of this Court or of the Hon'ble Supreme Court earlier on the applicability of the Amending Act 68 of 1984 of the L.A. Act to the acquisitions made under the Nagar Mahapalika Act, but since the provisions under the two Acts are similar, the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Full Bench of this Court earlier in the cases cited above have full application. Since the amendment of the Nagar Mahapalika Act is not by reference but by incorporation, the provisions of the Amended Act 68 of 1984 and Act No. 1 of 1967 would not apply, and the claimant respondents would not be entitled to the benefits under the Amended Section 23(2), Sections 28, 34, of L.A. Act and Section 4(3) of the Act No. 13 of 1967. The decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the claimant-respondents, do not help the claimant-respondents. The decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the claimant-respondents, do not help the claimant-respondents. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhatinda Improvement Trust v. Balwant Singh (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gauri Shanker's case (supra). The other decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the claimant-respondents also do not help the claimant-respondents. The result is the following: (1) The claimant-respondents are not entitled to solatium @ 30% under Section 23 (2) of the L.A. Act, but are entitled to solatium @ 15% as per provisions existing prior to the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. (2) The claimant-respondents are entitled to interest @ 6% per annum under Section 28 of the L.A. Act as per provisions of the Section before the Amending Act 58 of 1984, they are not entitled to any interest @ 15% under the proviso to the said section added by the Amendment Act No. 68 of 1984. (3) The claimant-respondents are not entitled to any interest under Section 3(4) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967. (4) The claimant-respondents are entitled to interest under Section 34 @ 6% only instead of 9% awarded by the Tribunal under the main paragraph of the Section 34 as it existed prior to the amendment by Act No. 68 of 1984 and are not entitled to any interest under the Proviso to Section 34 added by Act No. 68 of 1984. 55. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also argued that the claimant-respondents are not entitled to interest on the solatium awarded under Section 23(1-A) of the L.A. Act, as the solatium is not part of the compensation. The learned Counsel in support of his contention relied upon the decision of the apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar, 1995(3) S.C.C. 316 and in State of Punjab and Ors. v. Mohinder Singh Randhawa and Am, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 473. The learned Counsel for the claimant- respondents urged that the solatium is a part of compensation, interest thereon is awardable under Sections 28 and 34 of the L.A. Act. The learned Counsel in support of his contention relied upon an earlier decision of the apex Court in Narain Das Jain v. Agra Nagar Mahapalika, 1991(4) S.C.C. 212 . The learned Counsel for the claimant- respondents urged that the solatium is a part of compensation, interest thereon is awardable under Sections 28 and 34 of the L.A. Act. The learned Counsel in support of his contention relied upon an earlier decision of the apex Court in Narain Das Jain v. Agra Nagar Mahapalika, 1991(4) S.C.C. 212 . In State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus: "it would thus be seen that the additional amounts envisaged under sub-sections (1-A) and (2) of Section 23 are not part of the component of the compensation awarded under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. They are only in addition to the market value of the land. The payment of interest also in only consequential to the enhancement of the compensation. In a case where the Court has not enhanced the compensation on reference, the Court is devoid of power to award any interest for one year from the date of taking possession at 9 percent and 15 percent thereafter till date of payment into the Court as envisaged under the proviso." 56. In State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh Randhawa (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed: "5. Reading the two provisions together it follows that the amount referred to in Section 23 (1-A) is not a part of the market value and, therefore, calculation of solatium would not take into account that amount. 6. Similarly in calculating interest under Section 34 of the Act, for the first year 9 per cent and for subsequent years 15 per cent is payable on the amount awarded as compensation. Interest runs on the sum payable as compensation excluding the interest component. Thus, when interest for the 2nd year of default is to be calculated at 15 per cent, the interest of 9 per cent for the amount would not be added to the compensation for calculating the interest." 57. It is true that in Narain Das Jain v. Agra Nagar Mahapalika (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that solatium in the scheme of Section 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act is part of the compensation and Sections 28 and 34 of the said Act provided payment of interest on the amount of compensation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Solatium being part of the compensation must fetch statutory interest from the date of dispossession of the land owner till date of payment. 58. But in the later two decisions, namely, State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that additional amounts envisaged under sub-section (1-A) and sub- section (2) of Section 23 are not part of the component of compensation awarded under Section 231(1). Consequently the claimants are not entitled to any interest on the said amount. In Section 23(1-A) and sub-section (2) of Section 23 the word "compensation" has not been used. Under Section 28 and Section 34 of the L.A. Act, the interest is to be awarded on the amount of compensation, which ought not to have been allowed by the Land Acquisition Officer. Following the two later decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner we also hold that on the amount of solatium awarded under Section 23(2), the claimant-respondents are not entitled to any interest, the learned Tribunal was not justified in awarding the interest. 59. Coming to the question of award of compensation on account of delay in the conclusion of the proceedings under Section 48-A of the Mahapalika Act, the learned lower Court has found the market value of acquired land on the date of the notification under Section 357 (Section 4 of the L.A. Act) as Rs. 18 and Rs. 30 per sq. yd. at the time of the passing of the award and on the principles laid down by a Division Bench of this Court earlier in Prabhu Dayal v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 1973 A.L.J. 656, awarded compensation @ Rs. 18 per sq. yd. The total amount of compensation awarded under Section 48-A is Rs. 9,47,593.73. 30 per sq. yd. at the time of the passing of the award and on the principles laid down by a Division Bench of this Court earlier in Prabhu Dayal v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 1973 A.L.J. 656, awarded compensation @ Rs. 18 per sq. yd. The total amount of compensation awarded under Section 48-A is Rs. 9,47,593.73. Section 48-A inserted in Schedule II to the Mahapalika Adhiniyam, provides as follows : "48-A. Compensation to be awarded when land not acquired within two years.- (1) Where the collector has not made an a ward under Section 11 in respect of any land within a period of two years from the date of the publication of, the declaration under Section 6 or of the issue of a notice under clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 40 of the Madras City Improvement Trust Act, 1950, or of the publication of a notification Under Section 53 of that Act as the case may be, the owner of the land shall, unless he has been responsible for the delay to a material extent be entitled to receive compensation for the damage suffered by him in consequence of the delay. (2). The proviso of Pan III of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to the determination of the compensation payable under this section." 60. A perusal of the provisions of Section 48-A shows that where the Collector has not made the award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the declaration under Section 363 of Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam (Section 6 of the L.A. Act), the owner of the land shall unless he has been responsible for the delay to a material extent", be entitled to receive compensation for the damage suffered by him in consequence of the delay. The award of compensation under Section 48-A is not automatic, the owner has to satisfy that he has suffered damage on account of the delay in passing of the award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act. In the present case, the claimant-respondents No. 1 and 2 got by sale deed, the right to receive the enhanced compensation in the year 1981, for a sum of Rs. 90,000 only. Before that, the property had already vested in the State, the award under Section 11 of the Act was passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 24-11-1972. In the present case, the claimant-respondents No. 1 and 2 got by sale deed, the right to receive the enhanced compensation in the year 1981, for a sum of Rs. 90,000 only. Before that, the property had already vested in the State, the award under Section 11 of the Act was passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 24-11-1972. On the said day, the claimant- respondents were not the owner of the land. The claimant-respondents therefore, cannot be said to have suffered damage on account of the delay in the pronouncement of the award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act. The learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court earlier in Prabhu Dayal v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra), the facts of that case was entirely different, and decision in that case does not help the claimant-respondents. The result is that the claimant-respondents are not entitled to receive compensation Rs. 9,47,593.73 under Section 48-A of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. The learned Tribunal committed error in awarding the compensation under that Section. 61. In view of the foregoing discussions, the result is as under: (1) the claimant-respondents are entitled to Rs. 90,000 compensation market value of the land acquired, Rs. 10,000 price towards two wells, and Rs. 3,000 towards trees only; (2) the claimant-respondents No. 1 and 2 are not entitled to recover the amount of 12% under Section 23(1-A) of the L.A. Act ; (3) the claimant-respondents No. 1 and 2 are entitled to receive solatium @ 15% only and not @ 30% under Section 23(2) of the L.A. Act. 3,000 towards trees only; (2) the claimant-respondents No. 1 and 2 are not entitled to recover the amount of 12% under Section 23(1-A) of the L.A. Act ; (3) the claimant-respondents No. 1 and 2 are entitled to receive solatium @ 15% only and not @ 30% under Section 23(2) of the L.A. Act. Further the claimant-respondents are not entitled to any interest on the solatium awarded under Section 23(2) of the L.A. Act; (4) the claimant-respondents No. 1 and 2 are entitled to the interest @ 6% per annum under the main para of Section 28, they are not entitled to any interest @ 15% per annum under the proviso to Section 28; (5) the claimant-respondents are not entitled to any interest under Section 3 (4) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act 13 of 1967; (6) the claimant-respondents are entitled to interest @ 6% only and not @ 9% under the main paragraph of Section 34, they are not entitled to any interest under the proviso to Section 34 of the L.A. Act; (7) the claimant-respondents are not entitled to any compensation under Section 48-A of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. The award dated 24 May, 1993 under challenge is modified accordingly. 62. In the result, First Appeal No. 549 of 1994, U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Smt. Kanak and Ors., is hereby dismissed as not maintainable. The Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11625 of 1996, U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Smt. Kanak and Ors., is allowed in part, the award dated 24 May, 1993, passed by the Presiding Officer, Nagar Mahapalika Tribunal, Agra, under challengers modified as above. Costs of the First Appeal and the Civil Misc. Writ Petition are made easy.