Honble SINGH, J.–Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor. (2). These three petitions are directed against the order dated 30th November, 90 passed by the Special Judge, Anti Corruption Cases, Bikaner in Anti Corruption Case No. 1/87. It is therefore, proper that all the three petitions should be disposed of together. (3). By his order dated 30th November, 90, after hearing the arguments on charge and considering the evidence collected by the prosecution, the learned Special Judge, Anti Corruption Cases, found prima facie cases for framing charges against the accused petitioners as mentioned below :- (1) Accused Shyam Sunder Mathur - Charges u/ss. 120B, 409, 218, 477-A IPC and 5(1)(c) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. (2) Accused Nathu Ram Bhaskar and Om Prakash :- Charge u/Ss. 120-B, 218, IPC and 5(1)(d) read with Sec. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. (4). The learned counsels for the petitioners have submitted that there are no sufficient grounds to frame charges against the accused petitioners, and therefore, the order dated 30th November, 90 passed by the Special Judge, Anti Corruption Cases, Bikaner amounts to abuse of the process of the court, because if the trial is allowed to proceed, the accused persons would be unnecessarily harassed. It is therefore, prayed that the impugned order dt. 30th November, 90 be quashed and the accused petitioners should be discharged. (5). The learned Public Prosecutor has opposed this petition and submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Special Judge is in accordance with law as there were sufficient ground to frame charges against the petitioners and it would be in the interest of justice that the trial should be allowed to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (6). According to FIR No. 79/84, during the year 1977-78 Shri S.S. Mathur was posted as Junior Engineer in Sub-division No. 2 of Div. 2 of Poogal Branch of Rajas- than Canal Project. In August, 1977, he had in his possession 633 bags of cement. On 1st October, 1977 total number of cement bags in his possession was 664. He had received 165 bags from Sub-division 3 of Division 2 of Poogal Branch and he issued them on the same day. In the month of June, 1978 physical verification of stock was to be done. On 1st October, 1977 total number of cement bags in his possession was 664. He had received 165 bags from Sub-division 3 of Division 2 of Poogal Branch and he issued them on the same day. In the month of June, 1978 physical verification of stock was to be done. In the register, the number of cement bags was shown to be nil and 664 bags of cement were shown to have been issued. 100 bags were shown to have been issued to Shri N.R. Bhaskar, Jr. Engineer in December, 1977. 200 bags were shown to have been issued to Shri N.R. Bhaskar in January, 1978. 306 bags were shown to have been issued for Khushalwala Minor on 25th February, 1978 and 58 bags were shown to have been issued to Shri Om Prakash, Junior Engineer on 21st May, 1978. (7). It was alleged in the first information report that Shri N.R. Bhaskar and Om Prakash, prepared false record relating to issue of cement bags in order to protect Shri S.S. Mathur for punishment. (8). After investigation the charge-sheet was submitted against all the three accused persons. It was alleged in the charge-sheet that a lose to the tune of Rs. 20,000/- was caused to the State Government by misappropriating 664 bags of cement, which were not produced at the time of physical verification of the stock. It was also alleged that Shri S.S. Mathur was transferred to Sub-Division Ist in March, 1978 and he joined his duties in Sub- Division I without handing over the charge of Sub-Division II. It was further alleged in the charge-sheet that in order to save Shri S.S. Mathur from punishment, Shri N.R. Bhaskar made entry in the stock register on 1st January, 1978 showing the receipt of 200 bags of cement and this entry was false, because Shri N.R. Bhaskar had been transferred on 5th December, 1977 and he had handed over the charge of his office to Shri Devilal, Junior Engineer on 15th December, 1977 and that Shri N.R. Bhaskar prepared a false record with a view to save Shri S.S. Mathur. It was also alleged that Shri Om Prakash, Junior Engineer, made false entries in the stock register on 21st May, 1978 showing the receipt of 88 bags of cement and this entry was false, because on 21st May, 78 Shri Om Prakash had in his possession 972 bags and he did not require more cement bags. In short, the prosecution case is that 664 bags of cement were in charge of Shri S.S. Mathur and these bags had been misappropriated and false entries relating to issue of 300 bags to Shri N.R. Bhaskar and 58 bags to Shri Om Prakash were prepared with a view to save Shri S.S. Mathur from punishment and Shri N.R. Bhaskar and Om Prakash were parties to the preparation of false record. (9). It was contended before the learned Special Judge that a departmental inquiry was conducted in respect of the allegations relating to misappropriation of 664 bags of cement and in that inquiry, Shri S.S. Mathur had pleaded that he had in his possession 849 bags of cement; out of which 250 bags were issued on 10th August, 1978 on the basis of an indent and the price thereof had been received by cheque and 120 bags of cement were issued to Gurdeep Singh and 100 bags of cement were utilised for construction work and 350 bags of cement were issued to Shri N.R. Bhaskar and Om Prakash and in the departmental inquiry, Shri S.S. Mathur was exonerated, and therefore, there was no ground to frame charges against the accused Shri S.S. Mathur. On behalf of Shri Om Prakash, it was submitted before the learned Special Judge that Shri Om Prakash had in fact received 58 bags of cement. On behalf of Nathu Ram Bhaskar, it was submitted that the delay which was caused in handing over the charge by Shri Nathu Ram Bhaskar was not unreasonable and that 300 bags of cement had been issued. (10). The learned Special Judge, after considering the evidence collected by the prosecution and hearing the arguments came to the conclusion that in the circumstances of the case, it was proper to infer that no cement bags had been delivered to Shri N.R. Bhaskar and Om Prakash by Shri S.S. Mathur and that false record had been prepared in order to save Shri S.S. Mathur from punishment. (11). (11). The learned counsel for the petitioner Shri S.S. Mathur has submitted that in the departmental inquiry, Shri S.S. Mathur was exonerated by the Disciplinary Authority and therefore, it should be held that there are no sufficient grounds to frame charge against Shri S.S. Mathur. On behalf of Shri N.R. Bhaskar and OmPrakash, it has been submitted that if the prosecution case against Shri S.S. Mathur fails, the prosecution case against Shri N.R. Bhaskar and Om Prakash would also fail. In support of the submission that the findings given in the departmental inquiry are sufficient to hold that no prima facie case for framing charges is made out, reliance has been placed on the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in P.S. Rajya vs. State of Bihar (1). In that case it was submitted by the appellant that the result of departmental inquiry must be taken as preliminary inquiry and in view of the exoneration order, further proceedings in the criminal charge should be dropped. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the very same Engineers who had given the report earlier to the Income Tax Department, were given different valuation presumably on pressure and at the instance of the C.B.I. and there were over writings and alterations in several places. At page 500 of the report, their lordships of the Honble Supreme Court observed :- ``At the outset we may point out that the learned counsel for the respondent could not but accept the position that the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is far higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings. He also accepted that in the present case, the charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal proceedings is one and the same, he did not dispute the findings rendered in the departmental proceedings and the ultimate result of it. On those premises, if we proceed further then there is no difficulty in accepting the case of the appellant. For if the charge which is iden- tical could not be established in a departmental proceedings and in view of the admitted discrepancies in the reports submitted by the valuers one wonders what is there further to proceed against the appellant in criminal proceedings. For if the charge which is iden- tical could not be established in a departmental proceedings and in view of the admitted discrepancies in the reports submitted by the valuers one wonders what is there further to proceed against the appellant in criminal proceedings. In this context, we can usefully extract certain relevant portions from the report of the Central Vigi- lance Commission on this aspect. (12). Their lordships then discussed the report submitted by the Central Vigilance Commission and the note given by the Executive Engineer and observed:- ``It is clear from the above discussions that though the document cited in Annexure-III is a joint report of two Engineers what has been brought on record is a document signed by three Engineers the same set of Engineers evaluated the property for income tax purpose and there is a vast difference in the Specifications and the rates adopted for calculating the cost in Ex. S/20 have been increased without any explanation and none of these Engineers were produced during the course of enquiry to clarify the position. Hence the authenticity of Ex. S/20 is doubtful as claimed by the defence. Their Lordships further observed :- ``Even though all these facts including the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took a view that the issues raised had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant of the same charge in departmental proceedings would not conclude the criminal case against the appellant. We have already held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case, the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not agree with the view taken by the High Court as stated above. (13). The first question that arises for decision is whether the findings given by the disciplinary authority in the disciplinary inquiry conducted against the accused Shyam Sunder are relevant under any provision of the Evidence Act. The proviso given in Section 165 of the Evidence Act reads :– ``Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act to be relevant, and duly proved. (14). The proviso given in Section 165 of the Evidence Act reads :– ``Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act to be relevant, and duly proved. (14). In other words, any fact which is not relevant under any provision of the Evidence Act, cannot be used for the purpose of arriving at any conclusion. This rule of exclusion is well established by the observations of their lordships of the Privy Council in Sris Chandra Nandy & Anr. vs. Rakhalananda Thakur & Ors. (2). In that case, the High Court had observed :- ``It must be recognised however, that the principle of exclusion adopted by the Evidence Act should not be applied so as to exclude matters which may be essential for the ascertainment of truth. (15). Their lordships of the Judicial Committee disproved the observations made by the High Court and observed :- ``It seems to their Lordships essential in the interests of the administration of justice in India that this mode of regarding the law of evidence should emphatically be stated to be unsound. What matters should be given in evidence as essential for the ascertainment of truth it is the purpose of the law of evidence whether at common law or by statute to define. Once a statute is passed which purports to con- tain the whole law it is imperative. It is not open to any Judge to exer- cise a dispensing power, and admit evidence not admissible by the statute because to him it appears that the irregular evidence would th- row light upon the issue. The rules of evidence, whether contained in a statute or not, are the result of long experience choosing no doubt to confine evidence to particular forms, and therefore eliminating others which it is conceivable might assist in arriving at truth. But that which has been eliminated has been considered to be of such doubt- ful value as on the whole to be more likely to disguise truth than disco- ver it. It is therefore discarded for all purposes and in all circumstances. To allow a Judge to introduce it at his own discretion would be to destroy the whole object of the general rule. There is therefore no such principle as is suggested in the passage now under discussion. (16). It is therefore discarded for all purposes and in all circumstances. To allow a Judge to introduce it at his own discretion would be to destroy the whole object of the general rule. There is therefore no such principle as is suggested in the passage now under discussion. (16). It is thus well established by the observations of their lordships of the Judicial Committee that unless a certain fact is relevant under any provision of the Evidence Act, such fact must be deemed to be irrelevant and cannot be made the basis of any judgment or order. (17). Section 3 of the Evidence Act gives the definition of the expression ``rele- vant in the following words :– ``Relevant.-One fact is said to be relevant to another when the one is connected with the other in any of the ways referred to in the provisions of this Act relating to the relevancy of facts. (18). Since only relevant facts can be considered for the purpose of arriving at any conclusion by a Court conducting any inquiry or trial, it is necessary to consider whether the order passed by the disciplinary authority in the disciplinary inquiry conducted against the accused Shyam Sunder is relevant under any provision of the Evidence Act so far as the trial which is being conducted in this case by a criminal court, is concerned. (19). Findings contained in any order or judgment are in the nature of opinions expressed by the officer, who conducted the inquiry or trial and passed the order or judgment. Such judgments and orders are dealt with in Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act. Section 43 reads of the Evidence Act reads :- ``43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in Sections 40 to 42, when relevant-Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of this Act. (20). The provisions of Section 43 were considered by their lordships of the Honble Supreme Court in State of Bihar vs. Radha Kishan Singh & Anr. (3). (20). The provisions of Section 43 were considered by their lordships of the Honble Supreme Court in State of Bihar vs. Radha Kishan Singh & Anr. (3). At page 164 of the report, their lordships of the Honble Supreme Court observed :- ``Taking the first head, it is well settled that judgments of courts are admissible in evidence under the provisions of Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Evidence Act. Section 43, which is extracted below, clearly provides that those judgments which do not fall within the four corners of Sections 40 to 42 are inadmissible unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree is itself a fact in issue or a relevant fact under some other provisions of the Evidence Act: ``43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in Sections 40 to 42, when relevant Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of this Act. Some courts have used Section 13 to prove the admissibility of a judgment as coming under the provisions of Section 43, referred to above. We are, however, of the opinion that where there is a specific provision covering the admissibility of a document, it is not open to the court to call into aid other general provisions in order to make a particular document admissible. In other words, if a judgment is not admissible as not falling within the ambit of Sections 40 to 42, it must fulfil the conditions of Section 43 otherwise it cannot be relevant under Section 13 of the Evidence Act. The words ``other provisions of this Act cannot cover Section 13 because this section does not deal with judgments at all. It is also well settled that a judgment in rem like judgments passed in probate, insolvency, matrimonial or guardianship or other similar proceedings, is admissible in all cases whether such judgments are inter parties or not. In the instant case, however, all the documents, consisting of judgments filed are not judgments in rem and therefore, the question of their admissibility on that basis does not arise. In the instant case, however, all the documents, consisting of judgments filed are not judgments in rem and therefore, the question of their admissibility on that basis does not arise. As mentioned earlier, the judgments filed as Exhibits in the instant case, are judgments in personam and, therefore, they do not fulfil the conditions mentioned in Section 41 of the Evidence Act. (21). In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Honble Supreme Court unless the judgment or order is relevant u/ss. 40 to 42 of the Evidence Act, such judgment or order must be regarded as irrelevant in view of the provisions contained in Section 40 of the Evidence Act. (22). The order passed by the disciplinary authority in the departmental inqui- ry, which was conducted against the accused Shyam Sunder is not relevant u/ss. 40 to 42 of the Evidence Act, and therefore, on account of the provisions contained in Section 43 of the Evidence Act. It must be regarded as irrelevant. (23). The decision given in P.S. Rajya vs. State of Bihar (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not indicate that their lordships of the Honble Supreme Court intended to over rule the law laid down by the Privy Council in Sris Chandra Nandy vs. Rakhalananda (supra) and the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in State of Bihar vs. Radha Kishan Singh (supra). Therefore, it must be said that the decision in P.S. Rajya vs. State of Bihar does not lay down the law that the findings given by the disciplinary authority in the departmental inquiry are relevant under any provision of the Evidence Act so far as the trial by a criminal court is concerned. In fact, a careful perusal of the decision of the Honble Supreme Court shows that the decision was based on consideration of the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case and the admis- sion made by the counsel for the respondent that the findings rendered in the departmental inquiry and the ultimate result thereof could not be disputed. So far as the admissions made by the parties are concerned, the admissions are defined in Section 17 of the Evidence Act and they are relevant in the circumstances mentioned in Sections 19 to 23 of the Evidence Act. So far as the admissions made by the parties are concerned, the admissions are defined in Section 17 of the Evidence Act and they are relevant in the circumstances mentioned in Sections 19 to 23 of the Evidence Act. Section 18 of the Evidence Act provides Statements made by a party to the proceeding, or by an agent to any such party, whom the Court regards, under the circumstances of the case, as expressly or impliedly authorised by him to make them, are admissions. (24). Section 58 of the Evidence Act provides that in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings, provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions. (25). Thus in view of the provisions contained in Section 58 of the Evidence Act, a fact, which is admitted by their parties or their agents, need not be proved unless the Court in special circumstances of the case considers it necessary that the fact should be proved otherwise than by admission. (26). Under Sec. 21 of the Evidence Act admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them, or his representative in interest; but they cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person who makes them or by his representative in interest, except in the clauses mentioned in cl. (1) to (3) of Sec.21. (27). In view of Sections 21 and 58 of the Evidence Act, the admission made by the counsel for the respondent before the Honble Supreme Court that the findings given by the disciplinary authority in departmental proceedings and the ultimate result of the same were not disputed, the allegations could be held to be not proved, it thus obvious that the decision in the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner was based on : (1) the admission made by the counsel for the respondent; and (2) the consideration of the peculiar facts and circumstances by the Honble Supreme Court and not on the findings given by the discipli- nary authority in the departmental inquiry conducted against the appellants. (28). (28). For the reasons mentioned above, it must be held that the findings given by the disciplinary authority in the departmental inquiry against the accused petitioner Shyam Sunder is irrelevant u/s. 43 of the Evidence Act and it cannot be used for any purpose by the Court conducting the trial. In view of this legal position, the learned Special Judge could not have discharged the accused persons on the ground that in the departmental inquiry, which was conducted against Shyam Sunder. Shyam Sunder was exonerated of the charges framed against him. (29). The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the instant case, there was no ground to frame charges against the petitioners. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the grounds on which charges may be framed against the accused in a session trial. (30). Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code reads :– ``227. Discharge-. If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submiss- ions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. (31). In Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr. (4) the Honble Supreme Court considered the provisions relevant to framing of charges against the accused persons. After referring to a provision contained in Section 227 Cr.P.C., their Lordships observed :– ``The words `not sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. (32). Their lordships considered the decision given by the Honble Supreme Court in State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh (5), in which it was observed :- ``Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor pro- poses to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. (33). Their Lordships further observed in Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal (supra) : ``This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge in order to frame a charge against the accused. (34). In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya & Ors. (34). In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya & Ors. (6), their lordships of Honble Supreme Court against considered the provisions of Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C. After considering the provisions of Section 227 Cr.P.C., their lordships observed :- ``The next question is what is the scope and ambit of the `consideration by the trial court at that stage. Can he marshal the evidence found on the record of the case and in the documents placed before him as he would do on the conclusion of the evidence adduced by the prosecution after the charge is framed ? It is obvious that since he is at the stage of deciding whether or not there exists sufficient grounds for framing the charge, his enquiry must necessarily be limited to deciding if the facts emerging from the record and documents constitute the offence with which the accused is charged. At that stage he may sift the evidence for that limited purpose but he is not required to marshal the evidence with a view to separating the grain from the chaff. All that he is called upon to consider is whether there is sufficient ground to frame the charge and for this limited purpose he must weigh the material on record as well as the documents relied on by the prosecution. In the State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh this Court observed that at the initial stage of the framing of a charge if there is a strong suspicion-evidence which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If the evi- dence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. If the evi- dence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. In Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal, this Court after considering the scope of Section 227 observed that the words `no sufficient ground for proceeding against the ground clearly show that the Judge is not merely a post office to frame charge at the behest of the prosecution but he has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine that a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities but he may evaluate the material to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value establish the ingredients constituting the said offence. (35). It is not necessary to multiply the citations in which principles relating to the exercise of judicial discretion u/ss. 227 and 228 Cr.P.C. are laid down. Suffice it to say that at the stage of framing charge, even if, there is a strong suspicion based on evidence collected by the prosecution that the accused has committed an offence, a charge will have to be