JUDGMENT - R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.:--- The substantial question of law which arises for consideration in this case is whether a Municipal licensee who in consideration of agreeing to pay extra rent, is permitted to extend the leased premises on the adjoining area which is used by another person on payment of 'sopo' charges can such licensee on such extension being done, be allowed to occupy the extended area to total exclusion of such another person. 2. The facts in brief relevant for the decision are that the appellant, who is the original plaintiff in Special Civil Suit No. 46/84, filed the said suit claiming that he is a businessman having his shop at New Market in the Municipal building known as "Pavelhao Grande No. 1"; that the said shop was granted on lease to the appellant since 1936 and on southern side of the said shop there is a Margao Station Road whereas on the western side there is an open cemented space which forms part of Margao new Market; that the shop of the appellant has two doors, one opening on the station road and the other towards the western side; that the appellant had not been using regularly the door on the western side as there was no need to do so in view of the other door facing the station road; that in the open space many persons had been sitting for business purposes and they were paying 'sopo' charges to Margao Municipal Council for such temporary occupation; that on an application made by Haji Mohidin and other including the appellant, Margao Municipal Council granted permission to occupy the open space in the Margao Municipal Market as a matter of extension of their respective shops and permitted to raise the structure with doors and shutters and to occupy such area on payment of rent of Rs. 7/- per month; that as per the said permission the appellant raised the extension on the western side of his shop in the open space corresponding to the door on that side with a rolling shutter, that before such permission was granted and the said extension was made, the respondent had been sitting in the open space; that on 13th October, 1982 the respondent interfered with the extended portion and tried to forcibly occupy the same. The respondent on the other hand contended that Margao Municipal Council had permitted the occupants of the space inside the market to fix shutters to their sopos and to occupy the additional space in the market and the respondent is one of such occupants; that the open space on the western side occupied by the respondent was for running his retail business; that the respondent on an application moved by said Haji Mohidin, collectively put wooden frames in front of their sopos alongwith others and covered the roof with new corrugated sheets and fixed shutters towards the entrance in the said area; that the shutter of the sopo of the respondent was got fixed by one Suresh Sony from where the shutters were purchased and the payment thereof was made by the respondent; that the respondent was forcibly dispossessed from the said area on 5th November, 1982 by the appellant and thereafter pursuant to the order of the trial Court he was restored to the area. 3. The trial Court dismissed the suit by its Judgment and Decree dated 7th April 1986 and aggrieved by the same the appellant preferred an appeal before the District Court, Margao, which came to be heard by the Additional District Judge at Margao, who by his Judgment and Decree dated 18th July, 1994 dismissed the appeal. 4. This second appeal was admitted on 10th March, 1995, on the substantial questions of law as enumerated in the last portion of paragraph 6 of the Memo of Appeal. However, upon hearing the advocates for the parties and considering the facts on record, it was found necessary to reformulate the point of consideration in this matter and, therefore, with the consent of the advocates appearing for the parties it has been reformulated in the manner specified in the opening paragraph of this Judgment. 5. Shri Sudin Usgaonkar, the learned advocate appearing for the appellant, while assailing the impugned judgments, submitted that the judgments of both the Courts below clearly disclose non-application of mind to the matter in issue and the law applicable thereto. 5. Shri Sudin Usgaonkar, the learned advocate appearing for the appellant, while assailing the impugned judgments, submitted that the judgments of both the Courts below clearly disclose non-application of mind to the matter in issue and the law applicable thereto. According to the learned advocate the Courts below ought to have considered that the materials on record clearly disclose that it is undisputed that the appellant is the lessee in respect of the shop belonging to the Municipality and in the open area of the western side in front of the door of the shop the respondent had been occupying the same on temporary basis on sopo charges and as such there was no right created by the respondent to occupy the same and added to this the Municipality had clearly permitted the appellant alongwith other neighbouring shops to extend the premises on lease to them on the western side and to occupy the same on payment of consideration. This fact having been clearly established by documentary evidence on record which consists of licence and plan approved by the Municipality, both the Courts below having totally misread the same and having totally ignored the same, have acted with material irregularity. He further submitted that both the Courts below had not considered the material piece of evidence on record comprised of testimony of two officers of the Municipality who have clearly disclosed the fact on oath that the appellant had been permitted to extend the premises and to occupy the same and had accordingly extended the same and as such failure on the part of the both the Courts below to consider this material piece of evidence clearly amounts to breach of the same as well as material irregularity on the part of the Courts below while disposing the matter. It is the contention of the learned advocate for the appellant that the Courts below ought to have considered that payment of 'sopo' charges did not create any interest in the area supposed to be occupied on payment of 'sopo' charges and as such had not created any right in favour of a person paying sopo charges to claim any interest as such in any area occupied by him on payment of such charges. The Courts below having not considered this important aspect of the case, have failed to apply their minds to the issue in question rendering their judgments bad in law. According to the learned advocate for the appellant, the finding arrived at regarding failure on the part of the appellant to prove the issue as to whether the appellant could prove that he had extended the shop with due licence and permission of the Municipality is not only arbitrary and perverse but is directly contrary to the evidence on record. He tried to substantiate his submission firstly by taking me through the impugned order of the lower Appellate Court as well as of the trial Court and thereafter through the materials on record. Further drawing my attention to Exhibit D7, he submitted that the respondent himself had admitted that he was only having his box in the area in question for the purpose of his business and he was not actually in occupation of the area. He also drew my attention to the finding of the trial Court in its judgment that the space where the respondent was sitting had initially no construction on it. According to the learned advocate the Appellate Court without analysing the entire materials on record has merely confirmed the findings of the trial Court in a mechanical manner. 6. Shri M.S. Sonak, learned advocate appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the pleadings of the appellant in the plaint itself clearly disclose that the appellant had not been regularly using the door on the western side as it was not required for the appellant to use the same and his main entrance was from the southern side which faces the main road. According to Shri Sonak the main issue which was required for the Courts below to consider was whether the extension in question was done by the appellant or by the respondents and viewed from this angle no fault can be found with the judgment of the trial Court or of the appellate Court as both the Courts below have analysed the evidence in that regard and have correctly arrived at the findings on the said issue. According to the learned advocate, the materials on record clearly disclose that the extension was carried out by the respondent and not by the appellant. According to the learned advocate, the materials on record clearly disclose that the extension was carried out by the respondent and not by the appellant. The documentary evidence placed on record are not sufficient to establish the case of the appellant that the appellant was granted permission for extension or that the appellant has carried out the said extension by himself. He further submitted that the appellant had neither examined the person who fixed the shutter nor has examined the person through whom the labourers were employed for carrying out the extension. In view of the failure on the part of the appellant to examine the said witnesses, both the Courts below have drawn inferences and they were justified in doing so. According to Shri Sonak, neither the licence nor the plan approved by the Municipality proves that the same, was granted to the appellant although in the plan the name of the appellant is shown that itself is not sufficient to justify that licence was granted to the appellant. According to the learned advocate, the deposition of the two officers of the Municipality is of no assistance to the appellant to prove his case and, therefore, even assuming that there is failure on the part of the Courts below in not considering the said facts on record, and even considering those materials on record no fault can be found with the findings arrived by the two Courts below. Taking me through the impugned judgments as well as the materials on record, the learned Advocate submitted that the Courts below have arrived at concurrent findings and considering the law laid down by the Supreme Court and various High Courts, the High Court in exercise of power under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code has to be slow in disturbing the concurrent findings. The appellant is not entitled to seek the interference of the High Court in second appeal as regards the findings of facts. According to the learned Advocate, the appellant has not made out any case for interference and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. 7. The appellant is not entitled to seek the interference of the High Court in second appeal as regards the findings of facts. According to the learned Advocate, the appellant has not made out any case for interference and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. 7. Upon hearing the learned Advocates for the parties and on perusal of the records, it is seen that by civil suit the appellant had sought permanent injunction to restrain the respondent from interfering in the extended portion of the appellant's shop and further for restoration of the possession of the said extend area by evicting the respondent therefrom. The undisputed facts in the present case are that the appellant is a lessee of the shop of the Municipality since 1936 and its main entrance door is on the southern side but at the same time it has another door on the western side. In front of the western side door there is cemented area which was mainly utilized by other persons for the purposes of engaging themselves in business on payment of sopo charges to the Municipality. In fact this area is the subject matter of the suit and for the sake of brevity is hereinafter referred to as "the suit area." The suit area is enclosed with a roof of sheets and the front portion is covered with a shutter. What is in dispute is as to who was permitted to carry out the extension and who has actually carried out the extension. It was the case of the appellant that the said extension was carried out by the appellant herein pursuant to the permission obtained by the appellant from the Municipality under licence Exhibit P.W.I/K dated 6th August, 1982, and the plan Exhibit P.W.I/L whereas it is the case of the respondent that said document did not disclose any permission being granted to the appellant. As regards actual construction of the extended portion, it is the case of the appellant that the same was done by employing workers through one Mr. Kamat. As regards actual construction of the extended portion, it is the case of the appellant that the same was done by employing workers through one Mr. Kamat. Moreover, the expenditure for the same has been done by the appellant himself and has been duly acknowledged by the labourer by issuing certificate for the same which is exhibited as P.W.I/F and P.W.I/G. As far as the shutter is concerned, the appellant has produced the receipt, which is Exhibit P.W.I/E. On the other hand it is the case of the respondent that the shutter was fixed by one Suresh Sony but the payment thereof was made by the respondent. The respondent has not produced any receipt as regards such payment. However, it is the case of the respondent that the shutters were purchased from one M/s. Cleto and Engineering Works and has been fixed by one Suresh Sony. The respondent has also produced one bill in respect of the shutter issued by the said company. 8. On perusal of the judgment of the trial Court as well as the lower Appellate Court, it is seen that both the Courts have arrived at concurrent findings as to the failure on the part of the appellant to prove that the extension was carried out by him. The issues as to whether the appellant proves that he had carried out the suit construction as extension to his shop 'Pavelhao Grande No.I' with due licence and permission from the Municipality and whether the appellant proves that the licence has been granted to him by the Margao Municipal Council of the space in question, have been answered in negative. Added to this both the Courts below have also held that the respondent has proved that he has been occupying the suit area on payment of sopo charges. No doubt both the Courts below have not applied their mind as to whether sopo charges amount to rental charges or not and whether it creates any interest in favour of the respondent or not. The perusal of both the judgments also disclose that both the Courts below have not considered the evidence on record as regards the testimony of both the officers of the Municipal Council. The perusal of both the judgments also disclose that both the Courts below have not considered the evidence on record as regards the testimony of both the officers of the Municipal Council. Being so, merely because there are concurrent findings it will not prevent this Court from going through the evidence on record in view of the failure on the part of the Courts below to take into consideration the evidence of those two officers of the Municipal Council. Being so, merely because there are concurrent findings it will not prevent this Court from going through the evidence on record in view of the failure on the part of the Courts below to take into consideration the evidence of those two officers of the Municipality who is the owner of the land and the building. It cannot be said that their testimony could have been discarded by the trial Court as totally irrelevant when the relevant issue was pertaining to grant of licence for extension and the identity of the person to whom such licence was granted. In that regard it was the duty of the courts below to apply their mind after taking into consideration the testimony of the two officers, undoubtedly the officers cannot be considered as even partisan witnesses. They are public officers and directly connected to the office which issued the licence for the extension. Once it is not disputed that the identity of the person to whom the licence was issued was very much relevant for the decision in the matter, it was not improper for the courts below to ignore the testimony of those two officers. Being so, the courts below acted with material irregularity in ignoring the testimony of the two witnesses. It is, therefore, necessary to see the effect of their testimony on the findings arrived at by the courts below. 9. One of such Officer is P.W. 2, M.M. Paes and the other one is P.W. 3 Sashidhar S.K. Kamat. The former was Acting Chief Officer at the relevant time and the other was Chief Officer of the Margao Municipal Council. 9. One of such Officer is P.W. 2, M.M. Paes and the other one is P.W. 3 Sashidhar S.K. Kamat. The former was Acting Chief Officer at the relevant time and the other was Chief Officer of the Margao Municipal Council. The testimony of P.W. 2 discloses that after the licence for extension was granted to the appellant in the year 1964, the Municipality had granted permission in the year 1982 to 5 persons including the appellant to fix up rolling shutters on the western side of the shops in the building and the plan in respect of such approval was one which is found at Exhibit P.W. 1/L whereas the certificate is at Exhibit P.W. 1/K. According to the witness the said permission was granted to the shop holders for the purpose of extension of 1 metre. Moreover he has admitted in cross-examination that he had not personally seen as to who had put up the extension pursuant to the licence granted under the exhibit P.W. 1/K. He has also expressed ignorance about any electric installation being found on the western side door of the shop of the respondent. He has also admitted that he could not say whether the shutter on the extended area was fixed up by the respondent or not and whether the roof of the extension had been put up by the respondent or not. He has also stated that he did not know whether the entire area (extension) was a shop being run by the respondent since about last 12 years prior to his deposition. His deposition was recorded in May 1984. As regards P.W. 3 Sashidhar S.K. Kamat, he has stated in his statement that though the application submitted by Mussa did not bear the names and signatures of persons other than said Mussa, the names of such persons were shown in the plan approved by the Municipality alongwith the grant of licence. He has further deposed that he did not verify as to whether Mussa was authorised by or on behalf of other owners of the stalls to apply for permission to install the shutters. He has also admitted that the plan does not bear signatures of the occupants of other stalls. He has further deposed that he did not verify as to whether Mussa was authorised by or on behalf of other owners of the stalls to apply for permission to install the shutters. He has also admitted that the plan does not bear signatures of the occupants of other stalls. Plain reading of this testimony of the two witnesses discloses that Mussa and others had applied for licences for extension of their shops and such permission for extension was granted by the Municipality by resolution in the year 1992. In my considered opinion, apart from the fact that Mussa and others had applied for licence for extension of their shops and the same was granted by the Council, the testimony of the said two witnesses does not help the appellant in any manner to establish the fact that the licence was granted to the appellant himself. This fact is apparent not only from the analysis of the evidence on record by the courts below but also from the other materials on record particularly from Exhibit P.W. 1/K and Exhibit P.W. 1/L. Perusal of Exhibit P.W.1/K discloses that the said licence relates to only one shop and not shops. The entire reference therein is to a single shop and not more than one shop. The relevant clauses therein are Clauses Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 which read thus:-- "1. You shall pay to this office monthly rent of Rs. 7/- per square metre to the additional area that will be occupied by you. 2. You shall have no claim over the rolling shutter and the construction work carried out by you. 5. The said rolling shutter shall be the property of this Council and that you shall not have any right to the same. 6. You shall execute the contract with this Council regarding the additional space/area before occupying the same." The document, therefore, though addressed to 'Shri Haji Mohidin Moosa Stores Others', the subject thereof is clearly stated to be 'Permission to fix rolling shutter to the shop.' In other words, the subject matter of the document in question is the permission granted to Haji Mohidin Moosa Stores Others regarding the shutter to be fixed to "a shop." Neither of the witnesses has stated before the Court that similar such licence was granted to the appellant or that the same licence applied to more than one shop. The document on the face of it relates to one shop. The testimony of the officers of the concerned Council did not disclose that the term 'others' would also refer to other shops being similar licence granted to them. The licence on the face of it refers to Haji Mohidin Moosa and not to the appellant. Added to this the conditions of the licence clearly provides that for occupation of extended area the rent of Rs. 7/- per sq. metre would have to be paid to the office of the Municipality and the rolling shutter would be the property of the Council and both the said clauses relates to one unit or single shutter and not more than one shop. In fact, the testimony of both the witnesses do not disclose that more than one licence was granted. Therefore, in the absence of clear evidence on record to show that Haji Mohidin Moosa and others would necessarily include the appellant, there is no scope to draw any inference as such that same licence would also relate to the shop of the appellant. The plan Exhibit P.W. 1/L also is of no assistance to the appellant. No doubt the shops therein did disclose the names of some persons who are stated to be in occupation of those shops and admittedly one of such shop is with the appellant and in his name. However, the plan clearly shows that it is an approved plan under letter No. MMC/TAX/Roll. Shut/82-83/886 dated 6-8-1992. This number corresponds to Exhibit P.W. 1/K that is the licence granted in the name of Shri Haji Mohidin Moosa Stores Others. In other words, the plan is in relation to the construction approved under Exhibit P.W. 1/K. Once the plan is stated to be for the construction approved under Exhibit P.W. 1/K and the Exhibit P.W.1/K being related to only one shop, no assistance can be availed by the appellant from the Exhibit P.W.1/L. Being so, neither Exhibit P.W.1/K nor P.W.1/L proves the case of the appellant that the appellant was granted licence for extension of his shop on the western side. Similarly the testimonies of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 are also of no assistance to the appellant to establish his case that the licence was granted by the Municipality for extension of his shop on the western side. Similarly the testimonies of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 are also of no assistance to the appellant to establish his case that the licence was granted by the Municipality for extension of his shop on the western side. This evidence of both the witnesses alongwith the two relevant documents read with the other materials on record analysed by the courts below clearly show that failure on the part of the courts below in not considering the evidence of the two witnesses in no way affects the findings arrived at by the courts below. Once it is found that the evidence discarded by the courts below is of no assistance, the consideration thereof can no way disturb the findings arrived at by the courts below. Being so, the findings arrived at by the courts below cannot be considered to be perverse or arbitrary. 10. The perusal of the judgments of the courts below disclose that on analysis of the evidence on record both the courts below have held, and which is also borne out from the record, that it is admitted by the appellant himself that he does not know whether the Municipal space which is in the market has been leased to the appellant and that no new lease has been executed by the appellant with the municipality nor there is any other lease of the Municipal area in favour of the appellant. In other words the materials on record, disclose that apart from the lease granted to the appellant, there is no fresh lease granted to the appellant in respect of area in front of western door of the appellant's shop. In other words, the appellant has not been able to show any interest being created in favour of the appellant in respect of the area in front of western door of the suit shop by valid document or by some other material brought on record by the appellant. Once the appellant has not been able to show his right to the area in front of the western door and it is not disputed that the area belongs to the municipality, question of granting any equitable relief in the manner prayed for in favour of the appellant does not arise. Once the appellant has not been able to show his right to the area in front of the western door and it is not disputed that the area belongs to the municipality, question of granting any equitable relief in the manner prayed for in favour of the appellant does not arise. It was for the appellant to show that he has some semblance of right in his favour in respect of the suit area and the appellant having failed to establish the same, the appellant is not entitled to make any grievance about the occupation of the suit area by the respondents in case they have been occupying the same either legally or illegally and it would be for the Municipality to take steps in that regard. 11. The findings arrived at by both the courts below further disclose that the respondents have established with the material evidence on record that the shutter in question had been fixed by one Sony after having purchased the shutter from Cleto Engineering Works. No doubt the appellant has also produced the bill in respect of the shutter. However, the appellant has not been able to establish by producing convincing evidence that the shutter was fixed by the appellant. Apart from the findings arrived at by both the courts below, the evidence on record discloses that there was an electric installation at the place where the respondents were doing their business and there was also an electric meter standing in the name of the respondents. The appellant has admitted in his deposition that he does not know for how many years the respondents have been occupying the suit area. He has further admitted that the electric installation was fixed to the door of the shop of the appellant. He has further stated in his deposition that he had not seen whether the respondents had a cupboard at the place where they are conducting their business. It is really strange that the appellant who claims to be a lessee of the shop and wants to claim right over the suit area, does not know what materials the respondents had placed in the suit area for a number of years. The appellant has also admitted that he did not know for how many years the respondents were having electricity supply in the said area. The appellant has also admitted that he did not know for how many years the respondents were having electricity supply in the said area. The appellant has further admitted that he has been in construction line for last about 15 years and had contact with the said Cleto Engineering Works for about 2 years on account of his construction work. In these set of facts it was necessary for the appellant to establish by examining some Engineer of Cleto Engineering Works to show that the bill produced by the appellant was in relation to the purchase of the shutter in question. In the absence of any link being established by cogent evidence on record between the bill of the shutter and the shutter in question, it cannot be said that the appellant has established that the shutter in question had been fixed at his own costs. Added to this it is the case of the appellant that the shutter was fixed by Shantaram Chari. However, no witness by name Shantaram Chari has been examined by the appellant. On the other hand it was the case of the respondents that the shutter in question was fixed by one Suresh Sony and who has been examined as D.W. 4 and who has corroborated the said fact. 12. On analysis of the entire materials on record, therefore, I do not find any illegality committed by the courts below in arriving at the finding that the appellant has failed to establish that he had been granted licence by the Municipality for the extension in the suit area and that the extension was in fact carried out by the appellant. Both the courts below have arrived at concurrent findings in this regard and the materials on record clearly justify the same. In my considered opinion, the failure on the part of the courts below to consider the evidence of the two officers in no way affect the said findings. In this view of the matter, the substantial question of law formulated above is to be answered in the negative. As rightly submitted by the learned advocate for the respondents, the nature of the occupation and/or whether payment of sopo charges created any interest in the respondents or not is of no relevance in the matter as the appellant has failed to establish his right to occupy the suit area. 13. As rightly submitted by the learned advocate for the respondents, the nature of the occupation and/or whether payment of sopo charges created any interest in the respondents or not is of no relevance in the matter as the appellant has failed to establish his right to occupy the suit area. 13. In the result, therefore, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.