Judgment :- 1. The defendant is the appellant. The respondent Wakf Board represented by its secretary filed suit O.S. No. 163/76 before the Principal Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirappalli for a declaration that the suit property was a Wakf property and for possession alleging inter alia as follows: The suit Wakf was known as “T.K. Ebramsn Rowther Charity Wakf” and the property was situate at Pappakurichi Village, which had been dedicated by the wakif for performing pious, religious and charitable purposes under a deed of dedication dated 19.4.1940. The properties constituted a public wakf, the administration of which was governed by Central Act 29 of 1954. The suit property had been alienated to the appellant by a sale deed dated 17.11.1905 (Ex.B-1) for Rs. 12,000/- by one E.N. Basheer Ahmed and the alienee was in unlawful possession. The alienation was beyond the powers of the alienor and it could not bind the wakf. The sale deed was not valid and the suit property in nature was inalienable. The appellant entered into possession of the suit property only pursuant to the impugned sale and he was continuing in unlawful occupation of the suit property. In the course of scrutiny of unauthorised alienations, the respondent traced the present occupation and filed the suit. The suit was in time. 2. The appellant resisted the suit contending inter alia as follows: The suit property was not wakf property. No valid wakf had been created. The suit wakf was invalid under Mohamadan Law. Ebramsa Rowther was very old and infirm. His son Kader Batcha by fraud, coercion and undue influence brought about the alleged dedication deed while Ebramsa Rowther was completely under his control. Ebramsa Rowther was not the absolute owner of the property and he had no absolute power of disposal. The properties were joint acquisitions. They were never transferred to the wakf, nor any of the sons held the properties as manager. The properties always had a private character and there was no divesting of ownership. It had inherent invalidity. The owners by common agreement requested arbitrators to allot some properties to charity and this was done. The wakf, if any, had been repudiated even at the inception and the properties were divided and allotted among the co-owners. The appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value without any notice of wakf. It had inherent invalidity. The owners by common agreement requested arbitrators to allot some properties to charity and this was done. The wakf, if any, had been repudiated even at the inception and the properties were divided and allotted among the co-owners. The appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value without any notice of wakf. The plaint was barred by limitation, the appellant and his predecessors-in-title having prescribed title by adverse possession for well over the statutory period. 3. The trial court framed the necessary issues and on the basis of the documentary and oral evidence, held that there was a valid wakf created, that the suit property was a wakf property, that the suit was in time and that the title of the respondent had not been lost by adverse possession. So holding by his judgment and decree dated 30.11.1978 the learned Principal Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. 4. Aggrieved, the appellant herein filed appeal A.S. No. 22/80 before the Second Additional District Judge, Tiruchirappalli, who, by his judgment and decree dated 19.11.1982, confirmed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, the present second appeal has been filed. 5. At the time of admission the following two substantial questions of law were raised for decision in the second appeal. (1) Whether the suit wakf known as T.K. Ebramsa Rowther charity is a wakf as defined in the Wakf Act? and (2) Whether the suit is barred under Section 96 of the Limitation Act? 6. Mr. Hajee P.K. Jamal Mohamed, learned Counsel for the appellant, strenuously contended that the very frame of the suit was wrong. He drew pointed attention to several paragraphs in the plaint, which had been scored out. Only the registration copy of the Wakf deed had been filed. None of the attestors had been examined. Nobodv connected with the Wakf deed had been examined. In the submission of the learned Counsel, Ex.A-1 Wakf deed was invalid. The evidence of P.W.1 was useless. A reading of the alleged Wakf deed, Ex.A-1, would show that only the income was dedicated and not the entire properties. The learned Counsel referred to the definition of Wakf in Section 2(1) of the Wakf Act, 1954 and submitted that the instant Wakf deed did not satisfy the definition. The evidence of P.W.1 was useless. A reading of the alleged Wakf deed, Ex.A-1, would show that only the income was dedicated and not the entire properties. The learned Counsel referred to the definition of Wakf in Section 2(1) of the Wakf Act, 1954 and submitted that the instant Wakf deed did not satisfy the definition. The learned Counsel also relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions: (1) The MadrasState Wakf Board represented by the Secretary, Madras v. V. Mohamed Mahim (84 L.W. 261) and (2) The Tamil Nadu Wakf Board v. Ebrahim Musuee Muthavalli, Bayan Bais Wakf and others (92 L.W. 355) The learned Counsel submitted that the plaintiff/respondent Wakf Board had not established its case of dedication and the suit ought to have been dismissed. 7. On the question of limitation, the learned Counsel relied on the evidence of P.W.1 to the effect that the descendants of the original founder had been treating the property as their own property. He also submitted that the reliance placed by the courts below in Tamil Nadu Wakf Board by its Secretary v. Sannsasi Munayathiriyan (1981 11 MLJ 176 = 94 L.W. 511) was wrong as the Wakf deed in that case was not disputed and the vendor and the vendee were entirely different. In the present case, no connection with the Muthavalli had been established. 8. The learned Counsel for the respondent Wakf Board submitted that in respect of the same Wakf deed, it had been held by this Court in Tamil Nadu Wakf Board by its Secretary v. Sannasi Munavathiriyan (1981 11 MLJ 176 = 94 L.W. 511) that a Wakf had been created and following that decision the present second appeal has to fail. The learned Counsel also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sahu Madho Das and others v. Mukand Ram and another ( AIR 1955 SC 481 ). 9. Indeed, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the infirmities in the plaint, in the oral and documentary evidence and the decision of the courts below are too numerous and it will be difficult to close ones eyes to them. But, then the whole problem is because of the decision of this Court in Tamil Nadu Wakf Board by its Secretary v. Sannasi Munayathirivan (1981 11 MLJ 176 = 94 L.W. 511). But, then the whole problem is because of the decision of this Court in Tamil Nadu Wakf Board by its Secretary v. Sannasi Munayathirivan (1981 11 MLJ 176 = 94 L.W. 511). In that decision in respect of the same wakf, it was held that the entire document had to be taken as creating a Wakf and the properties would come within the purview of the Wakf Act 1954. It was held in that case that the alienation had been made by a person, who was not entitled to alienate the property. There was a ban on alienation stipulated in the document. Whether the alienation was by a manager or by a stranger, the result was that the alienation would not be binding on any one and it would be invalid and illegal and would not pass any title. Ultimately, the learned single Judge held that the Wakf would be entitled to recover possession of property from the alienee under Ex.B-3. The learned Judge gave a declaration in favour of the Wakf Board as prayed for. 10. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Sahu Madho Das and others v. Mukand Ram and another ( AIR 1955 SC 481 ) that; “When the Privy Council has construed a particular document, namely, a Will, though the decision was not binding on a person not a party to that litigation, yet the decision would operate as a judicial precedent.” 11. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and others ( AIR 1954 SC 379 = 67 L.W. 515) that; “Even a judgment not inter parties was admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act and that a party could rely upon the said judgment to show its title in me suit property even though the other party was not party to the earlier suit.” See also Sital Das v. Sant Roa and others ( AIR 1954 SC 606 ) Dinamoni Chowdhrani v. Brojo Mohini Chowdhrani (ILR 29 Calcutta 187 P.C.) Collector of Gorakhpor v. Ram Sundar Mal and others (AIR 1934 PC. 157 = 40 L.W. 217) and Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah (JT 1998 (2) SC 231 = 1998 2 L.W. 316. 157 = 40 L.W. 217) and Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah (JT 1998 (2) SC 231 = 1998 2 L.W. 316. In view of this overwhelming legal position, it is very difficult to enter a finding in respect of the deed of dedication in the present case contrary to what has been stated by Sethuraman, J. In Tamil Nadu Wakf Board v. Sonnasi Manayathiriyan (1981 11 MLJ 176 = 94 L.W. 511). The learned Counsel for the respondent Wakf drew pointed reference to paragraph 6 of the judgment of Sethuraman, J. where the learned Judge referred to a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in U.P. Sunni Central Board of Wakf and another v. Sat. Haoon Jabon Board and another (AIR 1977 Allahabad 18) and considering the present Wakf deed in the light of that judgment the learned Judge held that the property would have to be treated as a Wakf Property as there was no partial dedication. The entire property had been dedicated for the purposes recognised as religious, pious and charitable. 12. In the case relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant, viz. , Tamil Nadu Wakf Board represented by its Secretary v. Ebrahim Musuee Muthavalli (92 L.W. 355) that Wakf deed was for the benefit of the founders family and that is not the case with the subject matter of the present proceedings. In that case, it was held on facts that; “that was purely a Wakfalal-aulad in the sense that in presenti there was no dedication whatever of any part of the property or income for any purpose other than to support the wakif, the members of the family and the descendants and so long as some descendants of the wakif were alive, the property would be for the benefit of such descendants only and only when the entire line becomes extinct, the income from the property would be utilized for the benefit of the poor Muslims, preference would be given to Muslims orphans and widows. It was found that whoever might be the ultimate beneficiary, in presenti nothing was dedicated for any purpose recognized by Muslims Law as pious, religious or charitable.” This case will not in any way advance the stand of the appellant. 13. It was found that whoever might be the ultimate beneficiary, in presenti nothing was dedicated for any purpose recognized by Muslims Law as pious, religious or charitable.” This case will not in any way advance the stand of the appellant. 13. The other decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant is the judgment of this Court by S.S. Subramani, J. Enuvaneswari v. Murahari (Died) and another (1997 3 L.W. 497). The learned Judge has held that judgment not inter partes, unless it fulfills the condition of Section 43 of the Evidence Act, cannot be relevant under Section 13. In my view, this judgment will not in any way assist the appellants case. 14. The learned Counsel for the respondent also relied on an unreported judgment of this Court dated 12.4.1997 in S.A. No. 1620 and 1621 of 1983 - Susai Ammal and others v. Tamil Nadu Wakf Board - and submitted that the courts below have concurrently found that the suit property is wakf property and there is no substantial question of law involved in the Second Appeal. Though as already stated, there may be much that can be said in favour of the appellant, still having regard to the prior finding by this Court in Tamil Nadu Wakf Board v. Sonnasi Munayathiriyan (1981 11 MLJ 176 = 94 L.W. 511) which is a Binding Precedent, it has to be held that the finding reached by the courts below that the suit property is a Wakf Property and that the alienation in favour of the appellant was invalid and inoperative, has to be upheld. Several other points raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant on the question of limitation are also not necessary to be gone into. 15. Consequently, the substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant. The Second Appeal fails and it is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.