S. NARAYAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS being a second appeal, it may be first pointed out that there are concurrent findings of facts by both the courts below that the defendant/ appellant was licensee and the plaintiff/respondent was entitled to a decree of khas possession over the demised premises on revocation of the licence. In the instant appeal the defendant/appellant endeavours to make out a substantial question of law on the plea that there was non-consideration of material evidence on the record by both the courts below. ( 2 ) ADMITTEDLY, the appellant entered into occupation of the demised premises on the strength of an agreement dated January 9,1989 (Ext. 1) on payment of a sum of Rs. 35,000 per month as also a lumpsum amount of Rs. 50,000 by way of advance. The controversy between the parties was as simple as that could be. According to the plaintiff/respondent, the agreement between the parties was to create a licence whereas, the defendant/appellant asserted to have been inducted as a monthly tenant to be governed by the provision of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Therefore, the deed of agreement dated 9. 1. 1989, which was an agreed document between the parties, was simply to be construed. True, it was that when a controversy arises between the parties as to the averments in a deed, a court of law is required to go into the intention as also the conduct of the parties so as to construe the real impute of the deed/agreement. ( 3 ) WHAT I find in the instant case is that both the courts below have examined the agreement dated 9. 1. 1989 (Ext. 1) and have also taken notice of the attending facts and circumstance on the record i. e. to say the evidence so as to determine whether the occupation of the appellant was by way of licensee or by way of a monthly tenant. On a total consideration of the entire evidence on the record both the courts below have arrived at a definite conclusion that the agreement between the parties was by way of creating a licence on payment of a licence fee @ Rs. On a total consideration of the entire evidence on the record both the courts below have arrived at a definite conclusion that the agreement between the parties was by way of creating a licence on payment of a licence fee @ Rs. 3,500 per month and the plaintiff was entitled to revoke the licence after once having granted extension to it on the ground of some marriage ceremony, in the family of the appellant and, therefore, a decree for khas possession was passed by the learned trial court and the same was confirmed by the first appellate court. ( 4 ) HERE was a case where no question was raised as to any ambiguity in the deed of agreement (Ext. 1 ). It was as explicit as it could be and the learned First Appellate Court has extracted the relevant portions of the agreement in the judgment so as to arrive at a correct conclusion in the matter. Even though the agreement did not leave any scope for interpretation of the truth beyond the scope of the recording in the document in itself, the courts below have most certainly examined the oral evidence and other documents as well besides the deed of agreement (Ext. 1 ). I have very carefully gone through the reasoning expressed in both the judgments but not to find any perverse finding so as to invite any sort of interference by this court. Since, there was a concurrent finding of facts by both the courts I find it difficult in trenching upon the appreciation of evidence under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and recording reverse finding of fact. This, in my considered opinion, would be impermissible in law, more so, when no perversity in the finding could be pointed out. The finding of fact as available on the record were not vulnerable in the instant second appeal. This view taken by me would, of course, be strengthened by the decision of the Supreme Court in Secretary, Talipa Amba Education Society v. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M. N. and Others reported in 1997 (4) SCC 484 as also the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Sri Vachaspati Misra v. Sri Jayanta Kumar Bhowmik and Others, reported in 1997 (Vol. 1) Calcutta High Court Notes. 288. 1) Calcutta High Court Notes. 288. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has, of course, drawn my attention to an isolated statement of the plaintiff's son (PW-1) wherein, during the course of his cross examination, he was voluntered that the plaintiff's mother let out the suit premises as a tenant and not as a licence. He, however, further submitted that his mother i. e. the plaintiff had given instruction to the advocate to prepare the agreement for licence. ( 6 ) THE voluntered statement of the Plaintiff's son (PW-1) does go by way of admission of the case of the defendant/appellant but here was a point whether it was really by way of acceptance or simply that the statement has fallen by way of inadvertence or ignorance of the witness. I was made to go through the entire evidence of the witness (PW-1 ). I have been convinced with the argument advance on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent that the witness (PW-1) did not really mean to accept the contention of the other side. The statement as noted above was by way of inadvertence or it might have occurred because of error in typing. In any view of the matter, the evidence of any witness has to be taken into account in its entirity and one should not go by an isolated or solitary statement. The witness (PW-1) really meant to submit that as per the agreement arrived at between the parties the defendant/appellant was liable to vacate and give khas possession over the demised premises on the expiry of the term of the agreement i. e. to say on revocation of the licence. Therefore, on the basis of the above solitary statement of PW-1, I do not think, it would be possible to reverse the concurrent finding of fact by both the courts below. ( 7 ) NOW, coming to the intention of the parties with regard to the occupation of the defendant/appellant, my attention has been rightly drawn to para-12 of the Agreement which has abundantly made it clear that the licensee shall not at any time during the subsistence of the agreement put any claim of tenancy or sub-tenancy or any other right or title in the licenced premises. It has been, further, made clear in the agreement that it was clearly understood of the parties that it was not the intention of the licensor to create any tenancy in the premises. Here, it may be added that the agreement was arrived at by the defendant/appellant with his signature attested by two witnesses and that his being a literate person with sufficient experience and understanding there arose no question of coercion or being duped which was also not the connection raised on his behalf. If the deed of agreement was valid as found by both the courts below, there could be no manner of doubt as to the intention of the parties with regard to the licence. ( 8 ) THERE was admittedly an advance of Rs. 50,000 made by the defendant/appellant in favour of the plaintiff/respondent at the initial stage of the agreement. That in itself will not indicate intention of the parties otherwise then that of a licence. I have been convinced on the point with the plea that the amount of advance was necessitated because of the furnishing and fittings available in the demised premises. ( 9 ) LASTLY, it was urged by the learned Counsel appearing in favour of the appeal that there was a decree passed for damages @ Rs. 5000/- per month from 1. 1. 1992 till the date of getting khas possession of the suit property by the plaintiff for which there was no relief sought for in the plaint. I, however, find that there was in fact no decree for mense profit or for damages either sought for or granted by the Trial Court. What was done by the Trial Court is that the liberty was given to the plaintiff to go for recovery of damages by filling a separate suit. Obviously, therefore, there was no decree for damages. I do not propose to consider here and now whether separate suit for recovery of damages would lie in accordance with law or not because no decision is required on the point in the instant appeal. ( 10 ) IN the light of the discussions above, I arrive at a definite conclusion that this appeal has no merit and, accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. There shall be, however, no order for costs in this appeal. Appeal dismissed