JUDGMENT - ASHOK AGARWAL, J.:---The order passed by the Joint Secretary, Industries, Energy and Labour Department of the State of Maharashtra on 24th June 1997 terminating the services of the petitioner as a Judge of the Labour Court is impugned in the present petition. 2.The petitioner was appointed as a Judge of the Labour Court by an order passed by the State Government on 4th January 1993. The appointment was on probation for a period of 2 years. The order provides that during the probation period, if the petitioner fails to attain the expected quality of work and if his work or conduct is found improper or unbecoming his services will be liable to be terminated. His appointment is of purely temporary nature and the same can be terminated without assigning any reason. The order of appointment further provides that on his completing the first year of the probation period, he will be sanctioned the first increment and on his completing the probation period satisfactorily, subsequent increment will be sanctioned. After a period of one year of service, the petitioner was granted the first increment. He has however not been granted the subsequent increment. No orders were issued in regard to satisfactory completion of the probation period. As already stated the impugned order terminating services of the petitioner has come to be issued on 24th June 1997. It is first contended on behalf of the petitioner that the State Government has no authority to pass the impugned order of termination. It is only the High Court which has the power. Reliance is placed on the case of (State Government v. Labour Law Practitioners Association)1, reported in 1998(1) C.L.R. 850. In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court has inter alia observed as under :-- Para 7 :---"Part VI, Chapter VI of the Constitution of India deals with courts subordinate to the High Court, Article 233 which is the first Article of this Chapter, deals with appointment of District Judges. Article 234 provides as follows:-- "234:--Recruitment of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service- Appointments of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State". Para 8 :---"Article 235 provides that the control over District Courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotions of, and the grant of leave to persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judges shall be vested in the High Court." "Article 236(a) defines the expression "District Judge" as including Judge of a City Civil Court, Additional District Judge, Joint District Judge, Assistant District Judge, Chief Judge of a Small Cause Court, Chief Presidency Magistrate, Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge and Assistant Sessions Judge. This is an extensive definition and does not cover every category of a District Judge. While considering the definition of a "District Judge", one can also bear in mind a similar definition of "District Judge" in section 3(17) of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1897 and section 3(15) of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. It is as follows:-- "District Judge" shall mean the Judge of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction." Para 10 "The District Judge, therefore, covers a Judge of any Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction. With an increase in the numbers of specialised courts and Tribunals which are being set up to deal with specific kinds of civil litigation which would otherwise have been dealt with by the ordinary civil courts, we now have a number of specialised courts exercising different categories of civil original jurisdiction. It can be specialised civil original jurisdiction pertaining to labour and industrial disputes specified in the relevant Act as in the case of Labour and Industrial Courts, or it could be pertaining to recovery of bank debts and so on. The structure of civil courts exercising original jurisdiction is no longer monolithic. The Judge of the Principal Civil Court heading the concerned set of courts under him and exercising that jurisdiction can also fall in the category of a "District Judge" by whatever name called. Learned Single Judge and learned Judges of the Division Bench have, therefore, held that an Industrial Court is a Civil Court exercising civil original jurisdiction, and the person presiding over it could well be termed as a District Judge. Learned Single Judge and learned Judges of the Division Bench have, therefore, held that an Industrial Court is a Civil Court exercising civil original jurisdiction, and the person presiding over it could well be termed as a District Judge. The term "District Judge" should not be confined only to the Judge of the Principal Civil Court in the hierarchy of general Civil Courts. The term would now have to include also the hierarchy of specialised Civil Courts such as hierarchy of Labour Courts and Industrial Courts. The fact that the Chief Presidency Magistrate and the Sessions Judge were also included in the definition of "District Judge" indicates that a wide interpretation is to be given to the expression "District Judge. The extensive definition of a District Judge under Article 236 is indicative of the same." 3.Based on the said decision it is contended that the Supreme Court has now clarified the law on the subject and hence the appointment as also the order of termination of Judges of the Labour Courts can only be issued by the High Court and the impugned order passed by the State Government, in the circumstances, stands vitiated. 4.The appointment of the petitioner, it is to be noted, has been made by orders passed by the State Government under Maharashtra Judges of the Labour Court (Recruitment) Rules, 1991. He has been terminated under the said Rules. The order impugned is passed by the State Government which is the appointing authority of the petitioner. The order impugned is passed on 24th June 1997 which is prior to the Supreme Court rendering the aforesaid decision. As far as the High Court is concerned, steps are being taken to frame rules consistent with the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. In our view, the impugned order of termination cannot be successfully assailed on the strength of the aforesaid decision merely on the ground that the same has been passed not by the High Court, but by the State Government. In the instant case, prior to the passing of the impugned order by the Government, the case of the petitioner in regard to his performance of service was considered by the High Court and all his papers including the concerned record and proceedings were submitted to the Government on 31st March 1997 for taking suitable action. In the instant case, prior to the passing of the impugned order by the Government, the case of the petitioner in regard to his performance of service was considered by the High Court and all his papers including the concerned record and proceedings were submitted to the Government on 31st March 1997 for taking suitable action. It is only thereafter that the impugned order of 24th June 1997 has been passed by the Government. The impugned order thus has been passed on the recommendation of the High Court. The petitioner on 29th July 1997 made a representation to the State Government against the order of termination and the same has been rejected by an order passed by the Government on 26th June 1998. In our view the first contention raised by the petitioner therefore deserves to be rejected. 5.It is next contended that the petitioner should be deemed to have been confirmed in service at the expiry of two years of the probation period. It was not therefore open to the Government to pass simple order of termination against the petitioner. According to the petitioner, the maximum period of probation is for a period of 2 years, at the end of which the petitioner is deemed to have been automatically confirmed. In this regard, reliance is placed on the case of (Dayaram Dayal v. State of M.P. another)2, reported in 1997(II) C.L.R. 687. In our view the aforesaid decision can be of no assistance to the petitioner as in that case, the rules therein prescribed for a maximum period of probation. Rule 24 of the M.P. Judicial Services (Classification, Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1955 prescribes extension of probation by not more than two years after initial period of probation of two years. Appellant completed his initial period of probation of two years and even more than two years thereafter. Later on his service was terminated as it was found that he was not fit for being confirmed. Supreme Court held that the provision for a maximum period of probation is an indication of an intention not to treat the officer as being under probation after the expiry of the maximum period of probation, that the officer must be deemed to have been confirmed on expiry of maximum period of probation and that as such the service of the appellant could not have been terminated. 6.Further reliance is placed on the case of (Wasim Beg v. State of Uttar Pradesh others)3, reported in 1998(II) C.L.R. 160, wherein it has been inter alia observed as under :- Para 17 "The other line of cases deals with Rules where there is no maximum period prescribed for probation and either there is a Rule providing for extension of probation or there is a Rule which requires a specific act on the part of the employer (either by issuing an order of confirmation or any similar act) which would result in confirmation of the employee. In these cases unless there is such an order of confirmation, the period of probation would continue and there would be no deemed confirmation at the end of the prescribed probationary period. In this line of cases one can put (Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab)4, 1963(I) L.L.J. 671 (S.C.), (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Akbar Ali Khan)5, 1967(I) L.L.J. 708 (S.C.), (Shri Kedar Nath Bahl v. The State of Punjab others)6, 1974(3) S.C.C. 21 , (Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai v. State of Gujarat)7, 1985(II) C.L.R. 253 (S.C.) and (Tarsem Lal Verma v. Union of India others)8, 1997(9) S.C.C. 243 , (Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra) (supra), and (State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh Khosla)9, 1996(II) C.L.R. 15, (S.C.) In the recent case of Dayaram Dayal v. State of M.P. another, 1998(I) L.L.J. 336 (S.C). (to which one of us was a party) all these cases have been analysed and it has been held that where the Rules provided that the period of probation cannot be extended beyond the maximum period there will be a deemed confirmation at the end of the maximum probationary period unless, there is anything to the contrary in the Rules." 7.In our view the aforesaid decision, far from assisting the petitioner, lends support to our observations earlier made that where there is no maximum period prescribed for probation an employee cannot be deemed to have been confirmed at the end of the initial period of probation. The period of probation would continue and there would be no deemed confirmation at the end of the prescribed probationary period. 8.As far as the petitioners services are concerned, there is no provision laying down the maximum period of probation. Similarly there is no provision in respect of automatic confirmation of service after the initial period of probation. The period of probation would continue and there would be no deemed confirmation at the end of the prescribed probationary period. 8.As far as the petitioners services are concerned, there is no provision laying down the maximum period of probation. Similarly there is no provision in respect of automatic confirmation of service after the initial period of probation. The order of appointment places the petitioner on probation for a period of 2 years from the date of appointment i.e. from 4th January 1993. After petitioner had completed one year's probation he had been sanctioned the first increment. The petitioner was however not granted the second increment after he had completed two years of probation, which is an indication of his services not having been found to have been satisfactory. Merely because the probationary period was not extended by a specific order, the same would not bring about automatic confirmation of service of the petitioner. The order of appointment clearly lays down that the appointment is of purely temporary nature and the same can be terminated without assigning any reason. We have perused the service record of the petitioner and we are more than satisfied that his services were far from being satisfactory. In the circumstances, the impugned order which is a simple order of termination without casting any stigma or aspertions on the petitioner cannot be successfully assailed. 9.In the result, we find that the present petition is devoid of merit and the same is summarily rejected. Petition dismissed. *****