Abdulhusen Salehbhai Saherwala v. UNION OF INDIA — 1998 DIGILAW 624 (GUJ)

M. R. CALLA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has come with the case that he was granted mining lease by the State of Gujarat by order dated 12. 12. 1970 for excavation of graphite deposits in respect of land bearing S. No. 145a situated at village Muthai of Pavi Jetpur Taluka of vadodara District admeasuring about 11 Acres. The period of this mining lease commenced on 29. 11. 1971 and was to last upto 10 years thereafter. It is also the case of petitioner that in between the period of 1978-79 a Project came into force and it was decided to construct Sukhi Dam in Baroda district. For this purpose, the State of Gujarat, through Revenue Department, issued Notification dated 26. 10. 1978 under Sub-sec (2) of sec. 52-A of the Land Acquisition Act and thereby the Addl. Collector (Irrigation), baroda was authorised and appointed as Special Land Acquisition Officer, Sukhi Project, unit -2. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Sukhi Project, Unit -2 informed the assistant Director of Geology and Mining Department in 1982 that S. No. 145 A of Muthai village would be sub-merged. The petitioner has alleged that during the subsisting mining lease, a show cause notice dt. 26. 12. 1984 was issued malafide and with ulterior motive by the Mining Department against the petitioner to show-cause as to why the subsisting mining lease should not be terminated on the grounds alleged therein and ultimately the mining Department of the State of Gujarat determined the said mining lease of the petitioner on 21. 6. 1986. While the proceedings for determining the mining lease in pursuance of the show-cause notice dt. 26. 12. 1984 were going on, Notification was issued under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on 30. 1. 1985 in respet of the land under the lease and the Notification dated 15. 3. 1986 had also been issued under Sec. 6. It is also the case of the petitioner that on 26. 3. 1985 the acquiring authority had issued a notice to the petitioner in compensation Case No. 1/84 whereas the petitioners mining lease had been determined at a latter point of time by the Mining Department on 21. 6. 1986. The petitioner approached the Central Government by way of revision but this Revision application No. 1/6/28/86-MIV was rejected" by the Central Government by final order no. 772 of 1988 on 31. 10. 1988 (14. 6. 1986. The petitioner approached the Central Government by way of revision but this Revision application No. 1/6/28/86-MIV was rejected" by the Central Government by final order no. 772 of 1988 on 31. 10. 1988 (14. 12. 1988 ). The copy of this order has not been placed on record, but Mr. Solanki, the learned counsel for the petitioner, passed on a xerox copy of this order for the perusal of the Court and the contents of this order are reporduced as under: "order" (Under Sec. 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 and rule 55 of Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 ). This revision application has been filed by the petitioner against the order of State gove. of Gujarat bearing No. MCR-1584 (S-99)-2787-CHH dated 21. 6. 1986, determining the mining lease of the petitioner and forfeiting the security deposit on the ground that in spite of notice, the petitioner had failed to remedy the breaches within the stipulated period. The petitioners case is that he had taken steps to remedy the breaches in time and had in fact informed the State Govt. about this before his mining lease was terminated by the impugned order. The facts of the case are as follows : the petitioner was granted mining lease for graphite over an area of 11 acres on 29. 3. 1971 for a period of 20 years. According to him, he had worked this mine regularly till 1979 when the construction of SUKHI DAM started in the vicinity. The construction activity dislocated his mining operation as he had no access to the lease-hold area because of which there was no production in the mine from 1981. The State Govt. issued a preliminary notification under Sec. 4 of Land Acquisition Act on 30th January, 1985 for acquiring lands for the Sukhi Dam including the lands held under mining lease by him. Finally, the State Govt. issued the notification under Sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act on 15th April, 1986 and acquired the area. When the State Govt. issued a preliminary notification under Sec. 4 of Land Acquisition Act on 30th January, 1985 for acquiring lands for the Sukhi Dam including the lands held under mining lease by him. Finally, the State Govt. issued the notification under Sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act on 15th April, 1986 and acquired the area. When the State Govt. issued him the 60 days show-cause notice dated 26th December, 1984, pointing out the breaches that he was not mining since a number of years, he was not submitting section plans, that he had not paid dead rent since 1982 and 1984 and he was not submitting l forms from September, 1981 to June, 1984 he had submitted in reply on 19th February, 1985 that he had paid dead rent for the years 1982-83 and 1983-84 alongwith interest on 9th August, 1984, he had already furnished l forms by January, 1985 in the office of the Asstt. Geologist, mining Department, Baroda, that since Sukhi Dam construction was going on and the roads had been damaged because of which the mining area was not accessible, it was not possible for him to work the mine and the working of the mine will restart after the dam construction was completed and that since the pits get filled up every year by sand during the rainy season, it was not possible to take up section plans. The State Govt. , however, was not satisfied with this reply and issued another notice of 30 days on 19. 3. 1986 calling upon the petitioner to show-cause why the mining lease should not be determined for the aforesaid breaches which had not been rectified. The petitioner submitted his reply on 23rd April, 1986 reiterating that it was not possible for him to work the mine because of construction of Sukhi Dam as he was not able to reach the mine site. The State Govt. were not satisfied with the reply and determined the mining lease under the impugned order dated 21. 6. 1986. The petitioner has alleged that the State Government determined the mining lease to avoid payment of compensation for acquisition of land for construction of Sukhi dam. He has also alleged that because of the notification dated 30th January, 1985, under Sec. 4 of Land Acquisition Act, he was prevented from working the mine. We will like to take up these issues first. He has also alleged that because of the notification dated 30th January, 1985, under Sec. 4 of Land Acquisition Act, he was prevented from working the mine. We will like to take up these issues first. When a preliminary notification under Sec. 4 of Land acquisition Act is issued, it only shows the intention of the Government to acquire land for public purpose. The valuation of land and building etc. is done as they exist on the date of such notification. If any construction taken up subsequently is not assessed for purposes of valuation. A preliminary notification under Sec. 4 of Land Acquisition Act does not deny a lessee the right to take up mining, or prevent him from taking up mining operation. The petitioner has hot produced any evidence that he was actually prevented by the Govt. Officials from taking up mining operation. Therefore, his plea that because of a notification under Sec. 4 of Land Acquisition Act, he was prevented by the collector from taking up mining operation is not acceptable. The petitioner has also not produced any evidence to show any malafide intention on the part of the State Govt. in determining the lease so as to deny payment of compensation to him. The compensation is payable to land-owners for acquisition of private land and structures, etc. thereon. If the lessee was also the owner of the land held under mining lease he would be entitled to such compensation and it cannot be denied. From the submissions made, it has been admitted by the petitioner that the dead rent for the years 1982-83 and 1983-84 was paid in August, 1984. Form l (monthly return for Mining) was not submitted for the period from Sept. , 1981 to July, 1984. Therefore, the petitioner again stopped sending lforms for the subsequent months. He submitted these forms for Febuary, 1985 to June, 1985 in July, 1985. The dead rent for the period 1984-85 and 1985-86 was paid on 7th October, 1986, after the lease was determined by the State Government on 21. 6. 1986. This clearly shows that the petitioner was not regular in sending monthly returns in Form l and paying dead rent. Such breaches continued even during the period between the two notices issued in december, 1984 and March,1986. 6. 1986. This clearly shows that the petitioner was not regular in sending monthly returns in Form l and paying dead rent. Such breaches continued even during the period between the two notices issued in december, 1984 and March,1986. The petitioner has taken the plea that after Sukhi Dam construction started in 1979, he could not continue his mining operation as the mining area became in-accessible. That is why there was no production of minerals from 1981 onwards. It was open to the petitioner to present these facts before the State Govt. in time requesting for remedial action or to surrender the lease in case he was of the view that it was not possible to continue mining operation because of construction of the Dam. He did neither. He only took this plea when the State Govt. issued him 60 days notice under mineral Concession Rules. He has not produced any evidence in support of his contention that it was not possible for him to continue mining operation. In absence of any such evidence and any timely representation from his to State Government in this regard, it is difficult for us to accept this plea. In view of the above, we come to the conclusion that the petitioner has not been able to substantiate that the State Govt. has wrongly determined his lease or was guided by malafide intention for passing the impugned order. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the order of the State Govt. The revision petition is accordingly rejected. " ( 2 ) THE petitioner then preferred Special Civil Application No. 2328 of 1989 before this Court and this Special Civil Application was rejected by the Single Bench of this court on 30. 3. 1992 and the contents of this order are reported as under:"the petitioner is aggrieved by the inaction on the part of the authorities under the Land Acquisition Act for hot considering his claim for compensation in respect of parcel of land over which he has rights flowing from the mining lease. Admittedly, the said mining lease is prematurely determined and revision preferred to the Central Government against the said order of termination of mining lease is also dismissed. Admittedly, the said mining lease is prematurely determined and revision preferred to the Central Government against the said order of termination of mining lease is also dismissed. In that view of the matter, the only approrprite remedy which the petitioner can have for appropriate compensation, if he has any claim, can be before the authorities under the Land Acquisition Act and petition for that purpose under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be entertained. It will be open to the petitioner to take appropriate proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act for compensation and the authorities acting under the said Act shall decide such claim as and when made in accordance with law. The petition, therefore, fails and fee same is rejected with no order as to costs. " ( 3 ) IT is given out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the rejection of this special Civil Application, as aforesaid, vide order dt. 30. 3. 1992 was challenged by way of filing a Letters Patent Appeal but the Letters Patent Appeal was not entertained and dismissed as time barred. Thus the order passed by the Central Government with regard to the determination of the lease attained finality and thus the determination of the mining lease vide order dated 21. 6. 1986 also become final. After the rejection of the Special Civil application on 30. 3. 1992, the petitioner preferred a Claim Application dt. 29. 6. 1992 before the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Sukhi Project, Unit -2. The Special Land acquisition Officer sent a communication dated 29. 12. 1992 to the petitioner in the matter of the petitioners claim for compensation informing him that the Government land in question under Sec. No. 145a had already sub-merged in the water of Sukhi Dam and during the pendency of the acquisition proceedings the lease had been determined and for that reason the claim for compensation is refused. Now that the High Court had passed the order on 30. 3. 1992, the guidelines were being sought from the higher authorities to take up the matter for further action. Thereafter, on 2. 1. 1995 with reference to the petitioners letter dt. 6. 12. 1994 the Special Land Acquisition Officer sent a letter to the petitioner informing him that whereas the lease had been determined by the Industry and Energy department on 21. 6. Thereafter, on 2. 1. 1995 with reference to the petitioners letter dt. 6. 12. 1994 the Special Land Acquisition Officer sent a letter to the petitioner informing him that whereas the lease had been determined by the Industry and Energy department on 21. 6. 1986, there is no question of giving compensation for lease and to that effect a letter dt. 18. 8. 1986 had already been sent to the petitioner and, therefore, now nothing remains to be done in this regard and, therefore, the claim for compensation is rejected. After the aforesaid communication dt. 2. 1. 1995 the preset Special Civil application was preferred in March 1995. On 22. 10. 1996 notice returnable on 5. 11. 1996 was issued by the Division Bench. The petitioner then sought an amendment, which was granted on 2. 2. 1998 and, thereafter, Rule was issued in this Special Civil Application on 2. 3. 1998. While no one has appeared on behalf of the Union of India i. e. respondent No. 1, respondents Nos. 2 and 3 have not filed any return whatsoever either at the stage of notice or after the issued of the Rule. Therefore, in the form of pleadings all that we have before us is the Special Civil Application filed by the petitioner. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has argued the matter at length with vehemence and has submitted that once the acquisition proceedings had commenced there is no question of determination of the mining lease by the Mining Department and that the determination of the mining lease was malafide and that the petitioner is entitled to compensation in respect of his lease hold rights and in any case of the proceedings, which had been commenced under the Land Acquisition Act, should have been taken to its logical end and the Special Land Acquisition Officer was obliged and bound to pass the award in accordance with law with regard to the compensation notwithstanding the determination of lease vide order dt. 21. 6. 1986 and he has also submitted that even if the order dt. 21. 6. 21. 6. 1986 and he has also submitted that even if the order dt. 21. 6. 1986 with regard to the determination of the lease has become final, in view of the rejection of his Revision Application by the Central Government, the validity, correctness and propriety of the determination of the lease can still be gone into for the limited purpose of the consideration of his claim with regard to compensation in lieu of his lease hold rights. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of this submissions, has cited in the case of Special LA. and R. Officer vs. M. S. Seshagiri Rao, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1045 . This was a case in which the Supreme Court considered that the grant of land by the government was subject to the condition that the grantee will surrender the land whenever required by the Government without claiming compensation. However the government did not chose to act upon this condition on which the land was granted but proceeded for the acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act. The Supreme court, therefore, took the view that once the Government had given up its right under the condition on which the land was granted for the purpose of taking the land back and had chose the course of action under the Land Acquisition Act and the land was in fact taken not under the conditions of its grant but the same was acquired under the Land acquisition Act, the compensation could not be refused. The case of Spl. L. A. Officer, hosanagar vs. K. S. R. Rao, reported in AIR 1972 SC 2224 ) which has also been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, has been decided on the same lines following the earlier decision in the case of Spl. L. A. and R. Officer vs. M. S. Seshagiri Rao, (Supra ). The case of Spl. L. A. Officer, hosanagar vs. K. S. R. Rao, reported in AIR 1972 SC 2224 ) which has also been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, has been decided on the same lines following the earlier decision in the case of Spl. L. A. and R. Officer vs. M. S. Seshagiri Rao, (Supra ). These two decisions are the authorities on the point that when the Government had option for getting back the land under the conditions on which it was granted and yet it did not act upon those conditions, did not exercise that right, which was available to it under conditions of grant and it opted to acquire the land under the Land Acquisition Act, the claim with regard to the compensation could not be refused and the same should have been adjudicated under the Land Acquisition Act. In the present case, when the government Department, which had granted the mining lease, had issued the show-cause notice way back in December 1984 i. e. even prior to the issue of the Notification dt. 30. 1. 1985 under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and the mining lease had also been determined by the concerned Department of the Government of Gujarat on 21. 6. 1986, it cannot be said that State of Gujarat through the concerned Department, which had granted the mining lease, did not act or did not chose to proceed against the petitioner under the terms on which the lease was granted. The lease in. fact had been determined on 21. 6. 1986 and, therefore, the aforesaid decisions are of no avail to the petitioner in the facts of the present case. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon the case of Nautambhai vs. Addl. Sp. L. A. , Acq. Offi. , reported in 1979 GLR 689 . In this case, the Division Bench of this Court has held that once Sec. 4 Notification is followed by Sec. 6 Notification under the Land Acquisition Act and once the proceedings under Sec. 9 are initiated, the Land acquisition Officer is duty bound to proceed further and to declare the award and take the possession of the land unless in the meantime the State decides to release the land from acquisition in exercise of its powers under Sec. 48 of the Act. Once the machinery under the Act has been set in motion, the Government is bound to carry on with that machinery and to have the award made so that the rights of the parties may be finalised. On this very aspect of the matter, reliance was also placed on the decision of Ramniklal N. Bhutta vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1997 SC 1236 , in which also an argument was raised that once a Notification under Sec. 4 (1) of the Act was issued, the Land Acquisition officer was bound to pass an award with respect to both the pieces of the land, he had no jurisdiction or authority not to pass the award in respect of one piece of land on the ground of alleged settlement reported to him by the person for whose benefit it was being acquired, until and unless a Notification was issued under Sec. 48 of the Act, the Land acquisition Officer had no option but to pass an award with respect to both the lands notified. The illegality committed by the Land Acquisition Officer in not passing the award with regard to one piece of the land vitiated the award as a whole and the same was liable to be struck down even with regard to the other piece of the land, because the notification under Sec. 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act had been issued with respect to both the pieces. While delaing with this contention, the Supreme Court agreed with the proposition of law that once a Notification under Sec. 4 and a declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act is made, the Land Acquisition Officer has no power to decline to pass the award in respect of the lands notified either partly or wholly and unless and untill the lands are denotified under and in accordance with Sec. 48, the Land Acquisition Officer has to pass an award with respect to the lands notified and the Land Acquisition Officer had no jurisdiction to take notice of a private settlement and making it a basis for not passing award. After stating the said proposition of law, the Court examined the facts of the case before it so as to find as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, could it be said that the acquisition was liable to be quashed on that ground and ultimately the contention in this regard was rejected and the acquisition was not quashed. The proposition of law, which has been laid down by the Division Bench of this court in the case of Nautambhai vs. Addl. Sp. L. A. Acq. Offi. , (Supra) and Ramniklal N. Bhutta vs. State of Maharashtra, (Supra) as aforesaid, can not be of any help to the petitioner in the facts of the present case; firstly because the land in respect of which the notification under Sec. 4 and Sec. 6 had been issued was itself a Government land and so far as the lease hold rights held by the petitioner in respect of this land are concerned, the same stood determined on 21. 6. 1986. Here is a case in which the lease hold rights held by the petitioner in respect of the land came to an end under a different law i. e. Mines and minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 and Rule 55 of Mineral Concession rules, 1960 by a Department other than the Department concerned with the land acquisition. The petitioners lease hold rights have not come to an end on the basis of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and it is also clear by the reading of the order passed by the Central Government in revision that the lease had been determined not on the ground that it was required for the Sukhi Dam Project but because of the failure on the part of the petitioner to adhere to the conditions of the lease. It has been noticed clearly in the order dt. 31. 10. 1988 passed by the Central Government that 60 days notice had been issued to the petitioner on 26. 12. 1984 pointing out the breaches committed by the petitioner, that he was not submitting the section plans, that he had not paid dead rent since 1982 to 1984 and he was not submitting l Forms from September, 1981 to June 1984. It was also noticed that the petitioner had submitted in his reply dt. 19. 2. 1985 to the aforesaid show-cause notice dt. 26. 12. It was also noticed that the petitioner had submitted in his reply dt. 19. 2. 1985 to the aforesaid show-cause notice dt. 26. 12. 1984 issued by the Mining Department that he had paid the dead rent for years 1982-83 and 1983-84 alongwith interest on 9. 8. 1984 and that he had already furnished l Forms by January, 1985 in the office of the Assistant geologist, Mining Department, Baroda. The State Government did not feel satisfied with this reply of the petitioner and, therefore, a 30 days notice was issued on 19. 3. 1986 calling upon the petitioner to show-cause as to why the mining lease should not be determined for the aforesaid breaches, which had not been rectified. The petitioner submitted his reply dt. 23. 4. 1986 reiterating his stand and the State Government being not satisfied with this reply determined his mining lease by order dated 21. 6. 1986. Thus, the petitioners rights, if any, as lease hold right under the lease were determined not under the Land Acquisition act, but under a different law altogether and whereas the petitioner did not even have a semblance of right either with regard to the land or with regard to the so called lease hold rights after 21. 6. 1986, there was no question of continuing the proceedings under the land Acquisition Act, even if the Notifications under Secs. 4 and 6 had been issued on 30. 1. 1985 and 15. 3. 1986, for the simple reason that the land in question was with the petitioner till 21. 6. 1986 and it was open to him to enjoy his lease hold rights of this land upto 21. 3. 1986 and after 21. 6. 1986 he had no lease hold rights to enforce. The land in fact belonged to the Government through-out and right from the inception it was a Government land and all that was given to the petitioner under the lease was the right of excavation of minerals from this land. The proceedings initiated under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, therefore, did not effect the petitioners lease hold rights in any manner whatsoever. The compensation is payable in lieu of something. The authorities under the Land Acquisition Act did not divest the petitioner either of his lease hold rights or of the land. The proceedings initiated under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, therefore, did not effect the petitioners lease hold rights in any manner whatsoever. The compensation is payable in lieu of something. The authorities under the Land Acquisition Act did not divest the petitioner either of his lease hold rights or of the land. It is the other wing of the State of Gujarat i. e. Mines Department, which gave the show-cause notice dt. 26. 12. 1984 (even before the date of Notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act dt 30. 1. 1985) to determine the lease and the petitioners lease hold rights on account of the breach of the conditions on which the lease was granted. Such order determining the lease could be passed by the Mining Department notwithstanding the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In such a peculiar fact situation it is clear that the proceedings were started under the Land Acquisition Act only because the petitioner held the lease hold rights in respect of this land at that time. Moment the lease was determined by the Mining Department, there remained nothing to be done under the land Acquisition Act so as to determine even the compensation. The order dated 21. 6. 1986 intervened the acquisition proceedings which had commenced on 30. 1. 1985 i. e. after the Mining Departments show-cause notice dt. 26. 12. 1984 and with the passing of the order dt. 21. 6. 1986 the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act virtually became infructouous and the same could not have been continued by the special Land Acquisition Officer as an empty formality or an exercise in futility. The cases, which have been cited by the learned counsel in this regard, and the proposition, which has been laid down in those two cases, that once the Land Acquisition proceedings are started, they must be taken to their logical end, have no bearing in the fact situation available in the present case and whereas we find that the petitioner was not divested of any of his rights on the basis of the proceedings initiated under Sec. 4 and if at all he has felt hurt, it is the order dt. 21. 6. 21. 6. 1986 passed by the Mining Department and that order had also become final with the rejection of the petitioners revision application by the Central Government and thus the grievance, that the land acquisition proceedings should have been continued even after 21. 6. 1986 for the purpose of passing an Award for compensation, appears to be misconceived in the facts of this case and the same is hereby rejected. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the Land Acquisition officer did not give any opportunity to him whatsoever. No personal hearing was offered to him for the purpose of Sec. 5a of the Land Acquisition Act and in fact he was not dispossessed of this land at any point of time and was never heard at any stage. He has also referred to the requirements of notice under Sec. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. In this regard, reliance is placed by the learned counsel on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Farid Ahmed vs. Ahmedabad Municipality, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2095 . It may be straightaway observed that so far as the personal hearing under Sec. 5a is concerned, it is to be given to those who file objection and there is nothing on record to show that any such objection under Sec. 5a was filed so as to claim entitlement for a personal hearing. There cannot be any dispute with the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case that heart of Sec. 5 A of the Land Acquisition Act is the hearing of objections and under Sub-sec. (2) of that section a personal hearing is mandatorily provided for and further that Sec. 5-A does not rest on a persons demand for personal hearing. The fact remains that there was no objection and in absence of such an objection, the opportunity of being heard personally could not be made available as sub-sec. (2) speaks of the opportunity of personal hearing in respect of objections. The opportunity is, therefore, contemplated to be given in the matter of hearing of the objections filed, if any, and in absence of such objection, there is no question of raising a grievance with regard to the personal hearing. (2) speaks of the opportunity of personal hearing in respect of objections. The opportunity is, therefore, contemplated to be given in the matter of hearing of the objections filed, if any, and in absence of such objection, there is no question of raising a grievance with regard to the personal hearing. In this background and in the facts of the present case, even if such opportunity could be given to the petitioner under Sec. 5a, the same could not have advanced the case of the petitioner for the purpose of compensation at any stage, thereafter, for the simple reason that the lease itself stood determined after the issue of the Notification under Sec. 6 and the petitioner did not suffer any injury on account of the initiation of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, but his real grievance is against the Mining Department which determined his lease on 21. 6. 1986 with which the authorities under the Land Acquisition Act had nothing to do. In this context, the grievance that the possession was not taken from him at any point of time and that he was never heard at any paint of time are of no consequence. All these grievances become illusory and do not yield anything in favour of the petitioner. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has placed strong reliance in the case of union of India vs. A. Ajit Singh, reported in AIR 1997 SC 2669 . In the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, the respondent had been granted a lease of the Government land for 30 years with a right to further renewal upto a maximum period of 99 years. The land was required for acquisition. Notice was issued on July 23, 1960 terminating the tenancy of the respondent. The respondent preferred Appeal before the Addl. District judge, who held that the lease still subsisted and, therefore, the respondent could not be evicted. Notification under Sec. 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act was then published on 17. 2. 1967 acquiring the land for planned development of the City of Delhi. The Land acquisition Officer gave his award on 6. 6. 1967 determining the compensation and on reference, the Additional District Judge passed the award enhancing the compensation. Notification under Sec. 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act was then published on 17. 2. 1967 acquiring the land for planned development of the City of Delhi. The Land acquisition Officer gave his award on 6. 6. 1967 determining the compensation and on reference, the Additional District Judge passed the award enhancing the compensation. The claimant as well as the State preferred Appeal before the High Court and the High court while confirming the apportionment of 75% to the tenant and 25% to the landlord, enhanced the rate of compensation per bigha. In this case, the Supreme Court considered that the dispute with regard to the compensation was to be decided between the landlord and the tenant infer se on account of the proceedings which had been taken under the land acquisition Act and the Union of India had initiated the acquisition under the Land acquisition Act though the covenant in the lease deed provided the right of dispossession and for taking possession for public purpose. Thus, the rights provided in the covenant in the lease deed for dispossession was not acted upon and the acquisition was initiated under the Land Acquisition Act to take the land for public purposes. The possession was not taken pursuant to the termination of tenancy and respondent was, therefore, held entitled to the payment of compensation, in view of the initiation of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. The Supreme Court has noticed that the right of tenancy is a right under which a tenant is entitled to enjoy the possessory title and enjoyment of the leased land subject to covenants relating to eviction after due determination of tenancy. The lease was granted in 1949 and it was terminated in 1960 and the acquisition was initiated in 1967 on which date he continued to be in possession of the property and, therefore, the Court had to consider the apportionment of the compensation on that basis. Thus, before the Supreme Court, even if it was a Government land, in respect of which the lease was granted, as is the fact situation available in the case before us, the distinguishing feature is that the right of dispossession under the covenant was there and the of tenancy, which was terminated in 1960, was restored in Appeal and, therefore, the possession continued and the eviction proceedings could not be taken. The Supreme Court has observed in para 9 that in a case where the Government in spite of the covenant contained in the sale deed, chooses to acquire the land, necessarily the tenancy right of a tenant is required to be assessed and the compensation has to be awarded suitably. In the case before us, the Mining Department, which had granted the lease, had acted upon the conditions on which the lease was granted, had given the show cause notice way back in December 1984 even before the issue of the Notification under Sec. 4 on 30. 1. 1985 and the proceedings for passing the final order took some time and the final order determining the lease was passed on 21. 6. 1986 and in the meantime the Notification under Sec. 6 had also been issued, the basic distinguishing fact remains inasmuch as the mining Department had acted on the conditions of the lease, it started the acquisition proceedings thereafter. Further that there was no question of the continuance of the petitioners possesson or the continuance of any lease hold right in favour of the petitioner after 21. 6. 1986 and for all these reasons, so far as the claim of compensation is concerned, it was not even available to the petitioner because the petitioner was not effectively deprived of any thing on account of the Land Acquisition proceedings. In the facts of this case, it is very clear that on account of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, the petitioners lease hold rights have not even been touched tangentially to his prejudice. Had the petitioners lease not been determined for any breach of the conditions of the lease by the Mining Department and had the petitioner suffered the deprivation of the lease hold rights on account of the acquisition of this land by the Government under the land Acquisition Act, then and then alone the question of compensation could have arisen. It is settled law that the compensation has to be paid in lieu of either the deprivation of the possession of a land of the deprivation of any right arising out at the products or out of the produce or anything which is contained in that land. In the present case, the basic lis was between the Mining Department and the petitioner and in those proceedings, the order was passed on 21. 6. In the present case, the basic lis was between the Mining Department and the petitioner and in those proceedings, the order was passed on 21. 6. 1986 by which the petitioner stood deprived of the lease hold rights for the period beyond 21. 6. 1986 and, therefore, neither the petitioner has any claim for compensation in respect of the land nor in respect of the lease hold rights, of which he has not been deprived of on account of any action or order passed in the Land Acquisition proceedings. ( 9 ) EVEN otherwise if we go through the Scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, after the issue of the Notification under Sec. 6, stage for issue of notices to the interested persons under Sec. 9 comes thereafter, which in the present case could not be there prior to 15. 3. 1986. Now the Notification under Sec. 6 was issued on 15. 3. 1986 and it is given out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the notice under Sec. 6 had already been published on 15. 4. 1986. Even if it is assumed that the Notification under Sec. 6 was published on 15. 4. 1986, the stage with regard to the issue of the notices under Sec. 9 to the interested persons including the petitioner could not be there prior to 15. 4. 1986 and after 2 months i. e. on 21. 6. 1986 the lease stood determined and after the determination of the lease on 21. 6. 1986 there was no question of any notice under Sec. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in accordance with Sec. 11 value of the land is to be considered as on the date of the publication of the Notification under Sec. 4 (1) and if the value of the land is to be seen as on the date of the publication of the Notification under Sec. 4 (1), the value of the lease hold rights has also to be seen as on that date. So far as the legal position under Sec. 11 goes, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner may be right, but the question of assesing such value as on the date of the notification under Sec. 4 (1) arises only for the purpose of computing the compensation. So far as the legal position under Sec. 11 goes, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner may be right, but the question of assesing such value as on the date of the notification under Sec. 4 (1) arises only for the purpose of computing the compensation. In a case when it is found that there is no case for compensation either in lieu of the land or in lieu of the lease hold rights, such arguments based on Sec. 11 is not available and, therefore, the argument raised with reference to Sec. 11 also is of no consequence in the facts of this case before us. ( 10 ) WE would have been inclined to consider the validity, correctness and propriety of the order dated 21. 6. 1986 passed by the Mining Department notwithstanding the rejection of the petitioners Revision Application by the Central Government had we found that the petitioner was. deprived of any of his lease hold rights or the land for any period on account of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, which commenced in the instant case with the issue of the Notification under Sec. 4 on 30. 1. 1985 and before the matter could reach beyond the stage under Sec. 6 the lease was determined. Thus even for that limited purpose, the validity of the order dt. 21. 6. 1986 is not required to be gone into as we do not find a legally tenable claim for any compensation as such on account of the proceedings, which were initiated under the Land Acquisition Act and thus, this contention raised on behalf of the petitioner also fails. True it is that in Special Civil application No. 2328 of 1989 a Single Bench of this Court observed that the only appropriate remedy which the petitioner can have for appropriate compensation, if he has any claim, can be before the authorities under the Land Acquisition Act, but petition for that purpose under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be entertaind and further that it will be open for the petitioner to take appropriate proceedings under the Land acquisition Act for compensation and the authorities acting under the said Act shall decide such claim as and when made in accordance with law and after passing of this order when the petitioner placed his claim vide letter dt. 29. 6. 29. 6. 1992, he was sent a letter dt. 29. 12. 1992 and ultimately on 2. 1. 1995 he was conveyed that since the lease had been determined on 21. 6. 1986 nothing remains to be done and the claim with regard to the compensation is rejected. On going through the contents of the letter dt. 29. 12. 1992 and 2. 1. 1995 it cannot be said that the authorities did not address themselves to the order dated 30. 3. 1992 passed by this Court. In the letter dt. 29. 12. 1992 there is a clear reference to the High Courts order dt. 30. 3. 1992. In the order, the Court had only stated that if the petitioner had any claim, appropriate remedy may be for him was for appropriate compensation and that it was open for him to take the proceedings under the Land acquisition Act for compensation in accordance with law. In the facts of this case, we have not been able to persuade ourselves to agree that on the basis of the provisions, as are contained in the Land Acquisition Act, the petitioner has any case for any compensation and, therefore, the rejection of his claim for compensation, as has been conveyed to him by the order dt. 29. 12. 1992 by the Land Acquisition Officer, cannot be said to be against law. Since the claim for compensation under the Land Acquisition act was itself misconceived by the petitioner, the same has been rightly rejected. ( 11 ) HOWEVER, we are finding that the petitioners claim for compensation was misconceived and he could not claim any compensation whatsoever on account of the initiation of the Land Acquisition proceedings under Sec. 4 against him is not the end of the matter. The fact remains that the land was given for mining operation under a lease for a period of 20 years to the petitioner in 1971. The petitioner has come with a definite case, as has been stated by him in para 3, that during the period 1978-79 the Project came into force known as Sukhi Dam Project followed by Notification dt. 26. 10. 1978 under Sec. 52a (2) whereby the Special Land Acquisition Officer had been appointed for the aforesaid Scheme. The petitioner has come with a definite case, as has been stated by him in para 3, that during the period 1978-79 the Project came into force known as Sukhi Dam Project followed by Notification dt. 26. 10. 1978 under Sec. 52a (2) whereby the Special Land Acquisition Officer had been appointed for the aforesaid Scheme. In the end of this para 3, the petitioner has averred as under :- "that the said activity of the Project dislocated the mining operation and the petitioner has no access to the lease hold area and as such the mine could not be worked out and no production was there from the year 1981. " in para 4, he has further averred that in the year 1982, the Addl. Collector (Irrigation) as Special Land Acquisition Officer, Sukhi Project, Unit-2, had infromed the Asst. Director, Geology and Mining that the S. No. 145 A of the village would be submerged. In para 11 of the petition it has been averred that the mining operation from the disputed land could not be continued nearly after working out the mines for a period of 8 years because of the proposed construction of the Dam and the Notifications issued under the land Acquisition Act. These categorical averments made in the petition have not been controverted or denied by the State Government by filing any affidavit or otherwise and on behalf of the Government even no document has been shown or produced before us. The very fact that the Notification under Sec. 52a (2) of the Land Acquisition Act had been issued on 26. 10. 1978 and the very fact that in the year 1982 the Addl. Collector (Irrigation) as Special Land Acquisition Officer, Sukhi Project, Unit-2, had informed the asst. Director, Geology and Mining that the land of S. No. 145a of the Muthai village would be sub merged go to show that the activity with regard to the Project may have made adverse impact on the working of the mining operation by the petitioner in the lease hold area and, therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner in these proceedings had not been able to show that he had raised any such grievence at that time in the year 1981 itself, we do feel that keeping in view the. entirety of the facts with regard to the commencement of the Irrigation Project in the light of the Notification under Sec. 52a (2) and the Addl. Collector (Irrigation)s letter sent to the Assistant Director, geology and Mining in the year 1982 that the land in question would be sub merged, it may have affected the petitioners lease hold rights to carry on the mining operation and, therefore, even if his lease is found to be validly determined on 21. 6. 1986 by the mining Department, he must have suffered certain loss on account of the irrigation project concerned with this land in question in respect of which he held the lease hold right. In this background, we find that the only relevant provision of law, under which the petitioner could get some relief, is Sec. 5 of the Land Acquisition Act, which provides for payment of damages. While considring this question with regard to the damages, we are alive to the fact that in this petition, the petitioner has only talked about compensation and has not said anything specific about the damages, but that by itself should not be allowed to come in the way of the petitioner as the Court can always mould the relief according to the requirements of a case, if it is found that the substantial justice requires the relief to be moulded. Sec. 5 of the Land Acquisition Act is reproduced as under:"5. Payment for damage. The officer so authorised shall at the time of such entry pay or tender payment for all necessary damage to be done as aforesaid, and, in case of dispute as to the sufficiency of the amount so paid or tendered, he shall at once refer the dispute to the decision of the Collector or Chief Revenue officer of the District, and such decision shall be final. "accordingly we find that the Officer concerned under Sec. 5 of the Land Acquisition act ought to have considered the question with regard to the damages to be paid to the petitioner and for that purpose the petitioner should have been called upon to produce the necessary material and data to make out a case as to what are the damages suffered or likely to be suffered by him or whatever amount he considered appropriate as damages should have been paid sou motu, so that if dissatisfied, the petitioner would have approached the Collector or Chief Revenue Officer of the District for a further sum as provided in Sec. 5. At the time the concerned Officer could not have anticipated that the lease itself will be determined and, therefore, he may have contemplated that the petitioner shall be compensted in the land acquisition proceedings and, therefore, he may not have taken steps to tender any damages and rightly so. But keeping in view the entirety of the matter, we deem it appropriate to direct that in case the petitioner even now puts up his claim for damages with documentary evidence or otherwise, which may be available with him, before the concerned Collector, the Collector shall decide such claim for damages in accordance with law after hearing the petitioner or his representative within a period of three months from the date on which such claim for damages is now placed before him by the petitioner. ( 12 ) THIS Special Civil Application, therefore, succeeds in part only to the limited extent as above and the Rule is also made absolute to that extent only. No order as to costs. .