Judgment : This revision is against the concurrent findings of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, in Cr. Appeal No.97 of 1992 confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras in E.O.C.C.No.812 of 1985. for the offences under Sec.9 (1)(b) and 9(1) (d) read with Sec.56 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, hereinafter to be referred to as the Act, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for each of the offences. 2. The facts in brief are as follows: The revision petitioner is resident of Madras and he is running a grocery shop at No.89,Arunachala Naicken Street,Chintadripet.Chennai, and a video cassette shop in No.37,Meeran Sahib Street,Chennai. On 11.7.1983, the officers of the Enforcement Directorate viz., P.W.1 and one Viswanathan conducted search simultaneously in the house as well as the grocery shop of the accused/revision petitioner. P.W.1 who conducted the search in the house of the revision petitioner, was able to seize certain documents and letter in the presence of the witnesses under the mahazar Ex.P-2. The other Officer who conducted the search in the shop was able to seize certain documents including a diary under Ex.P-1 mahazar in the presence of the witnesses. The revision petitioner was absent on the date of the search and he was called to explain as to the contents of the documents seized from his house and the shop. On 17.9.1983. the revision petitioner appeared before the Enforcement Directorate and gave the statement by his own hand under Ex.P-4 explaining the contents of the documents seized from his house. Again, for clarification, he was asked to appear on 19.9.1983. On 19.9.1983 also he appeared before P.W.1, the Enforcement Officer and gave the statement Ex.P-6. The Department, from his statement as well as from the documents seized from the house of the accused, was able to find out that the revision petitioner had violated the provisions of the Act by receiving money from the foreign countries namely from Malayasia and Singapore without proper authorisation. Therefore, the Assistant Director of Enforcement filed the complaint under the above provisions before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offences) for trial of the accused for violation of the provisions of law. Therefore, the Assistant Director of Enforcement filed the complaint under the above provisions before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offences) for trial of the accused for violation of the provisions of law. P.W.1 was examined to prove the searches conducted in the shop as well as the residence of the revision petitioner and also to prove the statements Exs.P-2 to P-5 made by the revision petitioner. 3. Both the courts below have found that from the materials placed before the court, the revision petitioner has committed the offences under the provisions of law and therefore, inflicted the sentences which I mentioned earlier. As against this finding of the courts below, the revision petitioner has come forward with this revision. 4. Mr.Ayyadurai, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, submitted that there are numerous flaws in the prosecution case and the courts below have not taken into consideration of the inadequate evidence to substantiate the contention of the prosecution and therefore, the conviction is illegal. The learned counsel has referred to so many aspects, which, according to him, are the noncompliance of the provisions of law by the prosecution and I shall refer to the points he raised now one by one. 5. The first point raised by him is that the very complaint itself has not been lodged as contemplated under the Act viz.Sec.61(2) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, under Sec.61(2) (ii) of the Act, the complaint is maintainable for the offences punishable under Sec.56 and 57 of the Act only on the complaint in writing by the Director of Enforcement or any Authorised Officer in writing in this behalf by the Director of Enforcement or the Central Government or any Officer of the Reserve Bank authorised by the Reserve Bank by general or special order, that in this case even though the Assistant Director has filed the complaint, he has not mentioned how he was empowered to file this complaint though in paragraph 9, he has simply mentioned that he is empowered to file this complaint by virtue of the order No.F.1/72/ E.C./73 -14 dated 1.1.1974. Ministry of Finance, without producing the said order and therefore, the complaint is not according to law. Ministry of Finance, without producing the said order and therefore, the complaint is not according to law. The learned counsel further contended that either the very order empowering the Assistant Director of Enforcement, who has been authorised to file the complaint or the Government Order should have been produced before the court to accept his power to file the complaint and as no such order was produced in evidence, the complaint was not maintainable. The learned counsel referred to certain decisions also in support of his contention that without the proof of such power of the Officer concerned, the general averment in the complaint cannot be accepted. He relies on referred to a decision of this Court in State v. Muthu Gounder State v. Muthu Gounder 1984 MLJ. (Crl.J 85; wherein this Court, while dealing with the offences under Sec.21(d) (e) and (f) of the Tamil Nadu Forest Act, has held that to accept that the offence was committed within the Reserve Forest, there should be proof by the notification in the Gazette that the particular area was declared as the Reserve Forest. The other decision relied upon by the learned counsel is Parrys Confectionery Ltd. v. Food Inspector Parrys Confectionery Ltd. v. Food Inspector , 1988 L.W. (Crl.) 319 wherein this Court has observed that though the accused had produced along with his petition before the court, a document namely an invoice from M/s.Parry Confectionery Limited, the same was not proved as required under law and therefore, the production of the document by itself will not be a proof before the court. In this case, the order referred to in paragraph 9 of the complaint has been produced before the court, which I find tagged in pages 183 and 185 of the original records. The order reads as follows: “In pursuance of Sub-Clause (b) of Clause (ii) of sub-Sec.(2) of Sec.61 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (46 of 1973) and in supersession of the order of the Government of India in the Cabinet Secretariat, Department of Personnel, No.275/105/70(2)-AVD I dated the 19th March, 1971, the Central Government hereby authorises the following Officers to make complaints in writing to any court in respect of any offence punishable namely (i) Additional Director of Enforcement, (ii) All the Deputy Director of Enforcement, (iii) All Assistant Directors of Enforcement. 6. 6. When Mr.K. Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor, appearing for the respondent, referred to this order of the Central Government, empowering the Assistant Director of Enforcement also to file the complaint and this order has been already produced before the court by the prosecution, it was argued for the learned counsel for the petitioner that the mere production of this order before the court is not sufficient unless the same is received in evidence and only for this purpose, in support of his argument, he relied upon the above decision of this Court in Parrys Confectionery Ltd. v. Food Inspector Parrys Confectionery Ltd. v. Food Inspector , 1986 L.W. Crl. 319. But the said decision relates to the private documents, which are distinct from the public documents referred to under the Evidence Act and the private document cannot be received in evidence or cannot be looked into unless it is proved in the mode known to law. But the said order of the Central Government dated 1.1.1974 is a public document falling within the category of Sec.78 of the Evidence Act and such documents do not require any proof and the mere production of the document itself will be sufficient proof. It was argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that as this notification was made under Sec.61 of the Act, it has the statutory force courses and no proof is required for such a notification. Even assuming that this order of the Central Government is treated only as a mere order in the executive forum, it is a public document and such documents do not require any specific proof and therefore when this documents has been already produced before the court, certainly, it can be looked into. The Apex Court in Union of India v. Nihar Kanta Union of India v. Nihar Kanta , A.I.R. 1987 S.C.1713 has taken the view that the publication of the notifications relating to acquisition of Intermediarys estate under Sec.4 of West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act in gazette need not be proved and the court should take judicial notice of such notifications. The Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State v. Ramcharan State v. Ramcharan , A.I.R. 1977 MP.68 has held that notification of the Central Government or the State Governments or statutory order or the notification under Sec.7(1) of Telegraph Wires (Unlawful Possession) Act by the Central Government. The Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State v. Ramcharan State v. Ramcharan , A.I.R. 1977 MP.68 has held that notification of the Central Government or the State Governments or statutory order or the notification under Sec.7(1) of Telegraph Wires (Unlawful Possession) Act by the Central Government. Is a law and the court can take judicial notice of the same. Therefore, when the order of the Central Government passed under Sec.61 of the Act has been produced before the Court, the court is certainly entitled to take judicial notice of the same and therefore, it is futile to argue that the officer, who lodged the complaint was not authorised by the statute to file the complaint. As the Assistant Director himself has filed the complaint and the abovesaid order of the Central Government has empowered him to lodge such complaints under Sec.56 of the Act, the complaint-has been filed as per law. 7. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner took up the next contention with regard to the search made by P.W.1 under Sec.37 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the two conditions are that the Officer authorised alone shall conduct the search and before such search, the concerned Officer, who authorised to conduct the search, must have the reason to believe that it would be useful or relevant for investigation or any proceedings to conduct such a search and unless these conditions are satisfied, the search will be illegal and the court cannot act upon it. With regard to the second requirement. Which he referred to viz., the reason to believe for conducting the search, the learned counsel would submit that P.W.1 has not stated anywhere that what were the grounds, which the Assistant Director had thought fit to conduct the search and even though such reasons have not been recorded in the search list, at least P.W.1 could have mentioned on what basis, the Assistant Director had the reason for ordering such search and this has not been satisfied by the prosecution in the evidence. The learned counsel has cited a serious of decisions in support of his argument that without satisfying this requirement as to the reason for conducting the search, the search becomes illegal. The learned counsel has cited a serious of decisions in support of his argument that without satisfying this requirement as to the reason for conducting the search, the search becomes illegal. He relies upon a decision of this Court in Appavu Gounder v. Collector of South Arcot Appavu Gounder v. Collector of South Arcot , 1981 L.W. (Crl) 223 arising under the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice Regulation of Trade Order, 1974, wherein the Assistant Collector had not stated in his report the requirement as laid down in clause 25 of the order that he had reason to believe that any contravention of the order had been committed or was being committed or was about to be committed and without satisfying that he inspected the books of account and this Court has held that he had not satisfied the requirement of law viz. the reason to believe as aforesaid, and therefore, the inspection was illegal. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner refers to another decision of the Apex Court in K.L.Subhayya v. State of Karnataka K.L.Subhayya v. State of Karnataka , A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 711 which relates to the search under Sec.57 of the Mysore Excise Act. The Apex Court has observed, when the Sec.53 and 54 of that Act have introduced as a valuable safeguard for the liberty of the citizens in order to protect them from illfounded or frivolous prosecution or harassment, the Inspector, who had searched the car of the accused, had not made any record of any ground on the basis of which he had reasonable belief that any offence under Act was being committed before proceeding to search the car and therefore, in that case also, it was found that the search was illegal. In another decision of the Calcutta High Court in Assistant Customs Controller v. N.C.Jute Mills Assistant Customs Controller v. N.C.Jute Mills , A.I.R 1973 Cal. 91 the Bench of the Calcutta High Court has observed that when the words “the Officer has reasons to believe” suggest that the belief must be that of an honest and reasonable person based upon relevant materials and circumstances and although it is not necessary for the Assistant Collector to state the reason for his belief, he must disclose the materials upon which the belief was formed. It is true, such a view has been taken by the Apex Court and also the other High Courts in the last decade but some of the Benches of the Apex Court have taken a different view and the latest view of the Apex Court is that even if the search was illegal, when the materials have been seized by the prosecuting agency, the same cannot be shut out in the evidence. 8. I shall refer to the contra views of the Apex Court. In Gopikisan v. Assistant Collector, Customs, Ruipur Gopikisan v. Assistant Collector, Customs, Ruipur , A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1298 a larger Bench of the Apex Court consisting of five Judges, has held that reason to believe need not be recorded by the Assistant Collector in writing and it is enough if the sense is apparent from the tenor of the order. It observes in paragraph 7, as follows: “…Though he cannot make a search or authorise any officer to make a search unless he has reason to believe the existence of the facts mentioned in the section, the section does not compel him to give reasons. While it may be advisable and indeed proper for him to give reasons, the non-mention of reasons in itself does not vitiate the order. Nor can we agree with the appellate that the particulars of the nature of the goods and of the documents should be given in the authorisation…..” In the later decision of the Apex Court, consisting of five Honourable Judges, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection , A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 348 has held that even if the search was illegal, no writ of prohibition in restraint of such use can be granted and unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law, the evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out. The Bench adds, the relevant evidence cannot be excluded merely on the ground that it is obtained by illegal search or sizure. The Bench adds, the relevant evidence cannot be excluded merely on the ground that it is obtained by illegal search or sizure. In Radha Kishan v. State of U.P. Radha Kishan v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 822 also, the earlier view of the Apex Court is that even a search in contravention of Sec.103 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and seizure of the articles, is not vitiated. In State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlala State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlala , A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 593 also, it would observe that assuming for arguments that the search was illegal, then also it will not affect the validity of the seizure and further investigation by the Customs Authorities or the validity of the trial, which followed on the complaint of the Assistant Collector of Customs. In Customs & Central Excise Department v. Veerabhadreswara Weaving Factory Customs & Central Excise Department v. Veerabhadreswara Weaving Factory , (1983)2 Crime 514 the Bench of the Karnataka High Court has held that contravention of Sec.103 and 165. Code of Criminal Procedure does not vitiate the search and seizure and further investigation and conduct of the trial. Recently, the same Karnataka High Court has taken the view in Paramjit Singh v. Chief Enforcement Officer Paramjit Singh v. Chief Enforcement Officer , 1998 Crl.L.J. 915 that when the reasons for belief are not mentioned to maintain the secrecy, it will not amount to nay violation of Sec.37 and 38 of the Act in conducting the search and seizure of the documents and such a seizure will not become illegal. Therefore, in the light of those decisions of various High Courts and the Apex Court, even the reason to conduct the search need not been mentioned in the order for the search and at the most ever if it is treated that the failure to give reason its illegal, the materials gathered by such search are admissible in evidence and the court cannot shut its eyes when valuable piece of evidence has been gathered by the search made by the Enforcement Officers. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be contended that by reason of the illegal search, the evidence gathered by P.W.1 cannot be looked into. 9. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be contended that by reason of the illegal search, the evidence gathered by P.W.1 cannot be looked into. 9. Then coming to the next requirement for conducting the search, it is true that under Sec.37 of the Act, the Officers not below the rank of an Assistant Director of Enforcement or the person authorised by such officer alone are entitled to conduct the search. It is also true that P.W.1, who is only an Enforcement Officer, has not specifically mentioned in his evidence that he was authorised by the Officer in the rank of the Assistant Director of Enforcement or superior to him to conduct the search. It is only on this lacuna, it was argued by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that P.W.1, who was not authorised to conduct the search, was not empowered to seize the records and therefore, the documents seized cannot be looked into as the search itself is illegal. Even if the decisions, which I referred to are applicable to hold that the evidence gathered by illegal search can be looked into by the court, in this case, it cannot be stated that P.W.1 had no powers to conduct the search in view of the materials available in the search lists Exs. P-l and P-2. In Ex.P-1, the mahazar for search, it is mentioned that the Assistant Director of Enforcement by his warrant dated 11.7.1983 had authorised the officer namely P.Viswanathan to conduct the search and this warrant was shown to the attestors to this mahazar, who had signed this warrant acknowledging the perusal of the warrant. Similarly in Ex.P.2 also, the same fact is given namely that the Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, by his warrant dated 11.7.1983 had authorised P.W.1 to conduct the search and this warrant was shown to the attestors namely Mohammed Usman and Bakhriddin Ali, who had signed the warrant acknowledging the perusal of the warrant by them. Therefore, Exs.P-l and P-2 mahazara mention the authorisation issued by the Assistant Director of Enforcement to P.W.1 and the other Officer Mr.Viswanathan to conduct the search. Therefore, Exs.P-l and P-2 mahazara mention the authorisation issued by the Assistant Director of Enforcement to P.W.1 and the other Officer Mr.Viswanathan to conduct the search. But the learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that there is no evidence that the attestors had perused the warrant as they were not examined before the court and the mere description in Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 mahazar that the warrants were issued by the Assistant Director, by itself, is not a proof for the authorisation in favour of P.W.1 and the other officer and therefore, there is no evidence for such authorisation. The learned counsel referred to certain decisions in this connection also with regard to the search in compliance with the provisions of law. He would refer to the decision in State of Rajasthan v. Rehman State of Rajasthan v. Rehman , A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 210 wherein the Apex Court would observe that when the provisions were not strictly followed, it cannot be said that the search was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it would be search made in contravention of the provisions of the Code. In Board of Revenue, Madras v. R.S. Jhaver Board of Revenue, Madras v. R.S. Jhaver , A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 59 the Apex Court has observed that there must be powers for entering the Officers and for conducting the inspections of the accounts. In K.M.Kanavi v. State of Mysore K.M.Kanavi v. State of Mysore , A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1339the observation of the Apex Court is that for contravention of any provision of the Act, the proceedings must be instituted in the manner laid down in the Act and if the same was not followed, it will not amount to the compliance of the provisions of the Act. These decisions are relied upon to support his argument that when the law namely Sec.37 of the Act requires the authorisation for any officer other than the Assistant Director of Enforcement to conduct the search and when P.W.1 not being an Assistant Director had not powers to conduct the search and when P.W.1 has not complied with the provisions of law, the court cannot act upon his evidence. As mentioned above already, Exs.P-l and P-2 referred to the warrant issued by the Assistant Director of Enforcement and though P.W.1 has not specifically mentioned in his evidence about the warrant issued by the Assistant Director on 11.7.1983, Exs.P-l and P-2 are part of the evidence placed before the court and the only question is whether weight can be given to this piece of evidence found in Exs.P-l and P-2. It is pertinent to mention here that at no point of time during the trial of the case before the trial court, the accused herein questioned P.W.1 as to his power to conduct the search in his house. When no such question was put to P.W.1 and it appears form the judgment of the trial court, no argument also was raised on question of the powers of P.W.1, I feel that at this stage, this aspect cannot be gone into when especially, there is a piece of evidence in EXs.P-1, and P-2 as to the authorisation given to P.W.1 and the other officer Mr.Viswanathan. No doubt, the compliance of the provision can be taken up at any time by the aggrieved party and if there is absolutely no evidence for compliance, certainly, this Court has to give the finding in favour of the accused for the non-compliance of the provisions of the Act. But in this case, when there is a piece of evidence by way of Exs P-1 and P-2 for such authorisation in favour of P.W.1 and this part of the evidence has not been challenged by the revision petitioner/accused before the trial court, there is no reason to discard or eschew this part of the evidence for the authorisation in favour of P.W.1 and the other Officer Viswanathan. Therefore, I hold that Exs.P-1 and P-2 are sufficient proofs for the power of P.W.1 and the other officer to conduct the search by, P.W.1 and the other officer and the search, therefore, is according law. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner commented for the non-examination of the other Officer Mr.Viswanathan, the Enforcement Officer to prove the search in the shop. According to the learned counsel, it is stated that a diary was seized from the shop of the revision petitioner and without examining the said Viswanathan, the court cannot rely upon the materials seized from his shop. According to the learned counsel, it is stated that a diary was seized from the shop of the revision petitioner and without examining the said Viswanathan, the court cannot rely upon the materials seized from his shop. But I find from the evidence that the said diary has not been marked as Exhibit even though it has been spoken in his evidence about the seizure of the diary. Anyhow, Ex.P-1 is the mahazar prepared by an Officer of the Enforcement Directorate during the discharge of his duties as Enforcement Officer under Sec.74 of the Evidence Act and it is a public document, which does not require any specific proof for the contents of the mahazar. Therefore, it cannot be stated that this document ought to have been proved only through the officer, who conducted the search. P. W. 1 has spoken about this search also and has mentioned above even though Ex.P-1 proves the search conducted in the shop of the revision petitioner, as the materials seized from the shop have not been exhibited before the court, there is no much value for that seizure. 11. The prosecution mainly relies upon Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-6, the statements of the revision petitioner proving the transaction of receiving the money from the foreign countries in violation of the Act and also payment of the said money to different parties as directed by same persons in foreign country. According to the learned Special Public Prosecutor, Exs.P-4 and P-6 make a narration as to the mode in which the amounts were received and how they were distributed in India, that Exs.P-4 and P-6 statements are admissible is evidence, that as the materials seized viz. Exs.P-12 to P-14 from the house of the revision petitioner give the full corroboration as to the statements under Exs.P-4 and P-6, the offence is made out against the revision petitioner and therefore, the conviction of the revision petitioner by the court below is justified. 12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the revision ‘petitioner contended that Exs.P-4 and P6 are not voluntary statements and they were prepared according to the direction of the Enforcement Officers and therefore, they cannot be given any weight. 12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the revision ‘petitioner contended that Exs.P-4 and P6 are not voluntary statements and they were prepared according to the direction of the Enforcement Officers and therefore, they cannot be given any weight. He would further state that from the statement Exs.P-4 and P-6 alone, the revision petitioner cannot be convicted because there is no other independent witness to corroborate the above statements and he would further argument that two persons, who case said to be the persons, who have received the payment from the revision petitioner, were not examined in the court by the prosecution though such witnesses were available in the court and therefore it is not sage to act upon Exs.P-4 and P-6 statements alone to warrant a conviction against the revision petitioner/accused. The learned counsel also pointed out the manner in which Ex.P-6 has been prepared and he would point out certain suspicious circumstances in support of his argument that they were prepared at the dictation of the Enforcement Officer. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner pointed out that in Ex.P-4 at page, 5, the signature of the revision petitioner is obtained in two places, one in the middle of the page and the other at the bottom and at page 7, the sizes of the letters are different because upto the centre of the page, the letters are big size whereas after the middle, the letters are very small in size and this would suggest that the matters written in Ex.P-4 should have been filled up after some time though the signature were obtained from the revision petitioner some time before they were filled up. The revision petitioner/accused would admit in his statement under Sec.313, Code of Criminal Procedure that these statements were written by him though he would say. according to the dictation of the officer. So admittedly these statements are in the handwriting of the revision petitioner. It is also not denied by the revision petitioner that the documents seized viz. Exs.P-12 and P-13 are in his hands and no question also was put to P.W.1 that Exs.P-12 and P-13 are not in the handwriting of the revision petitioner/accused. The search conducted by the Enforcement Officer on 11.7.1983 also is not disputed. Nearly two months after the search, these statements Exs.P-4. and P-6 had been recorded. Exs.P-12 and P-13 are in his hands and no question also was put to P.W.1 that Exs.P-12 and P-13 are not in the handwriting of the revision petitioner/accused. The search conducted by the Enforcement Officer on 11.7.1983 also is not disputed. Nearly two months after the search, these statements Exs.P-4. and P-6 had been recorded. It is true that in page 5 of Ex.P-4. the signature of the revision petitioner is found in two places, one in the middle and other at the bottom. For that reason alone, we cannot conclude that this must have been fabricated making use of the signature of the revision petitioner when especially it is admitted by the revision petitioner himself that these are in his own handwriting. As it is the prosecution case that this statement was given by the revision petitioner himself, probably the revision petitioner might have given the statement upto the first signature in page 5 of Ex.P-4 and for further clarification asked for by he Enforcement Officers, he might have added some thing more which was recorded further down below the signature in page 5 The continuation after the signature in the middle of the page 5 also is an explanation relating to the item (c) given in the mahazar Ex.P- 2. Therefore, after the further explanation recorded in page 5, the signature of the revision petitioner seems to have been obtained. With regard to the different size of the letters in page 7, the writing upto the middle page is no doubt in the big letters and upto this writing, they are also explanatory to the contents of Exs.P-12 to P-14. Therefore, almost the explanation relating to Exs.P-12 to P-13 was over and thereafter, in the small size letters the matters relate to the native place and the address of the revision petitioner. The details given down below at page 7 are not relevant for the offence alleged against him but it simply reads that he was having a passport issued on 19.6.1975 and he owns some properties in his native place in Ramnad District. As this appears to be an appendage relating to his personal property, it appears this has been written in small letters. As this appears to be an appendage relating to his personal property, it appears this has been written in small letters. When the revision petitioner himself was present in the office of the Enforcement Directorate and he himself has written these statements, there was no necessity for the officers concerned to obtain the signature of the revision petitioner in blank sheets and thereafter to fill them. When it is case of the accused/revision petitioner that he was compelled to write these statements and out of fear, he wrote statements, there was no necessity for the fabrication in the preparation of these statements. The contents of the statements may be either true or false, is a different matter. For the reason that there are two signature of the accused at one page and the hand-writing are in difference size, it does not indicate any fabrication in the preparation of his statements. When the revision petitioner would say that he wrote these statements according to the dictation of the officers, there was no necessity for the officers to direct the revision petitioner to write the last page upto the middle with big letters and thereafter in small letters. Therefore, the argument that these statements have been fabricated with the blank signature, cannot be accepted. 13. Then coming to the question whether the revision petitioner/accused was under the control of the officers of the Enforcement Directorate, making him to simply write as dictated by them, on a thorough consideration of the entire circumstances and the background. 1 think that there could not have been any occassion for such compulsion and coercion on the part of the accused when especially he was called upon to the office to explain the document seized by the Enforcement Directorate. The statements Exs.P4 and P-6 are explanations to the contents of Exs.P12 to P-14. The revision petitioner has not disputed his visit to Malaysia and Singapore and in his statement Ex.P-4. he has stated that on the request of his brother Farooq. who is in Malaysia with his father, he went to Malaysia and returned back to India only on 12.5.1983. He has not stated in his statement under Sec.313. Code of Criminal Procedure that he did not visit Malaysia as stated in Ex.P-4. On a perusal of Exs.P-12 and P-13. he has stated that on the request of his brother Farooq. who is in Malaysia with his father, he went to Malaysia and returned back to India only on 12.5.1983. He has not stated in his statement under Sec.313. Code of Criminal Procedure that he did not visit Malaysia as stated in Ex.P-4. On a perusal of Exs.P-12 and P-13. it will not be possible for a person to explain the hidden meaning of the writings therein except by the author of the writing himself. On a comparison of the hand-writing found in Ex.P-12 with that of Ex.P-4, especially with regard to the payment to one Meena on 8/8 and 9/8 they are quite identical with Exs.P-4 and also Ex.P12. Further the amount Rs.872.94 written on the top of Ex.P-12 has been explained to be Rs.87,294. Similarly, the other figure mentioned down below this figure is stated to be in thousands, though the last two digits have been shown in decimals as a secret code though the actual amount would refer to in thousands and lakhs, the first mentioned figure 872.94. according to the explanation in Ex.P-4, is for Rs.87,294 and the revision petitioner has explained that he received Rs.1 lakh from the carrier of the amount by name Mustafa Khader and as he has spent about Rs.22,000 for starting his video shop, he retained the balance Rs.87,294 in which he paid Rs.53,794 to one Sam and the balance amount was with him. In Ex.P-12, there is another figure Rs.3,000 and in Ex.P-4. it is explained that this was actually Rs.3 lakhs which he received from Mustafa Khader and he paid Rs.2 lakhs to Meena at one instance and some time later, he paid another Rs.1,30,000 and after receiving another Rs.1,50,000 which is shown as Rs.1,500 in Ex.P-12, he made a payment of Rs.1.50.000 to Meena. Unless, the revision petitioner himself is the author of Ex.P-12, it would not have been possible for him to give such a clear explanation in Ex.P-4 as to the receipt of amounts mentioned in Ex.P-12 and the payments to those persons referred to in Ex.P-12. Unless, the revision petitioner himself is the author of Ex.P-12, it would not have been possible for him to give such a clear explanation in Ex.P-4 as to the receipt of amounts mentioned in Ex.P-12 and the payments to those persons referred to in Ex.P-12. If the same was in the course of a normal transaction not in violation of law, there would not have been any necessity for such a secret description and this circumstances also would suggest that the transaction was not according to the law of the land and therefore, such a mode was adopted by the revision petitioner to describe the receipts and payments as though they were small amounts. When Exs.P-12, and P-13 are in the hand-writing of the revision petitioner himself for the reason I have mentioned above after comparison and they were seized from the premises of the accused, it is clear that the explanation in Exs.P4 and P-6 must have been voluntary by the petitioner himself, when he was confronted with the writings in the documents seized from his house by the Officers of the Enforcement Directorate and he could not evade in his answers to them as his explanation must tally with the writings in the document and unless the correct explanation was given by him, the officers would not have been satisfied and subjected to further questioning. Therefore, it appears that he had to make proper explanation in his own hand-writing for the documents seized from his premises. 14. Mr.K.Kumar, the learned Special Public Prosecutor contended that when Ex.P-4 is recorded on 17.9.1983 and if the same was under threat and coercion, the revision petitioner would have immediately sent a complaint to the higher authorities for such compulsion on him but in this case, after two days, again he appeared on 19.9.1993 and once again has given the statement Ex.P-6 in continuation of his previous statement explaining certain other features and therefore Exs.P-4 and P6 could not be the statements obtained by compulsion or force from the revision petitioner. The revision petitioner sent a telegram to the Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate Ex.P-7 only on 21.9.1983 stating that his statements dated 17th and 19th September. 1983 were not voluntary but by force. When he was about to sent such a telegram on 21.9.1983. he would have sent a telegram immediately on 17.9.1983 itself when Ex.P-4 statement was recorded from him. The revision petitioner sent a telegram to the Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate Ex.P-7 only on 21.9.1983 stating that his statements dated 17th and 19th September. 1983 were not voluntary but by force. When he was about to sent such a telegram on 21.9.1983. he would have sent a telegram immediately on 17.9.1983 itself when Ex.P-4 statement was recorded from him. But he did not send any protest even after Ex.P-4 but he gave another statement also on 19.9.1983 and only after two days, Ex.P-7 telegram was sent by him denying the voluntary nature of Exs.P-4 and P-6. From this conduct of the revision petitioner, I feel that this was only an after thought to escape from the liability for the violation of the provisions of the Act as he has given full details explaining the transaction with a persons, from whom he was receiving the amount from the foreign country and was disbursing the same to certain others in India. Therefore, the contention that they are not voluntary, cannot be accepted. 15. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the payees have not been examined though their phone numbers and addresses have been furnished in the chit Ex.P-13 and unless the payees would admit the payments, it cannot be accepted that the revision petitioner has made payments to those persons. No doubt, the payees mentioned in these documents could have been examined and it would have been only a further corroboration for the statements under these documents. For the non-examination of the payees, it cannot be viewed that the violation of the law has not been proved the prosecution. It must be borne in mind that the receivers of the amount also are offenders and therefore, once if they accept the payments, they are also liable to be punished under the Act. Therefore, naturally, they might not have agreed to depose supporting the prosecution case afraid of a separate prosecution against them. Irrespective of the question whether the payees were examined or not, the question is whether the evidence placed before the court is sufficient to establish the violation of law under Sec.9 (1) (b) and 9(1) (d) of the Act. 16. Therefore, naturally, they might not have agreed to depose supporting the prosecution case afraid of a separate prosecution against them. Irrespective of the question whether the payees were examined or not, the question is whether the evidence placed before the court is sufficient to establish the violation of law under Sec.9 (1) (b) and 9(1) (d) of the Act. 16. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that Exs.P-12 and P-13 are not admissible in evidence as held by the Delhi High Court in L.K. Advani v. Central Bureau of Investigation L.K. Advani v. Central Bureau of Investigation , 1997 Crl. L.J. 2559. In that case, a diary seized from the accused containing certain entries, was relied upon as the Books of account maintained under Sec.34 of the Evidence Act. But the Delhi High Court has found that if a diary seized was treated as a book of account maintained in the usual eourse of transaction, that itself is not sufficient to convict a person and that will not become a substantive piece of evidence. The charge against the accused therein was under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The entries in the diary had proved only some payments from a person unless it was proved that the payments mentioned in the diary was the illegal gratification for the purpose of doing certain thing, the mere payment by itself will not prove the offence. Therefore, the Delhi High Court in paragraph 72, would observe, “…Entries only suggest receipt of money from persons, entities on one side and its payments to other set of persons/entities on the other side. The purpose and nature of receipt and its subsequent payment is not revealed from these entries. No source or details of opening balance in 2/88 or closing balance in April, 1991 have been appearing in commercial manner…..” Further, in paragraph 74, it is observed that the entries in the books of account, by themselves are not sufficient enough to fasten the liability on the head of persons against whom they are produced. Thus the alleged entries in the books of account themselves were of no avail to the prosecution. It is only for these reasons, the Delhi High Court did not accept the entries in the diary as a substantive piece of evidence to accept the liability of the accused. Thus the alleged entries in the books of account themselves were of no avail to the prosecution. It is only for these reasons, the Delhi High Court did not accept the entries in the diary as a substantive piece of evidence to accept the liability of the accused. But in this case, the revision petitioner is facing the charge under Sec.9(1) (b) and 9(1) (d) of the Act for receipt of money from a foreign country without the authorisation and the payment of such money to certain person in India. The mere receipt of such money from a foreign country, by itself, will amount to the violation of the Act. Similarly, the payment also will constitute an offence. Now, the seizure of the chit has been explained as mentioned above in Exs.P-4 and P-6. Therefore, these documents cannot be compared with the diaries seized in the case cited in L K. Advani v. C.B.I. L K. Advani v. C.B.I. , 1997 Crl.L.J. 2559 and these documents are totally different unconnected with Sec.34 of the Indian Evidence Act. 17. The Supreme Court in K.I. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector (HO). Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin K.I. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector (HO). Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin , 1997 S.C.C. (Crl.) 444 has held that even the retracted confession can be the sole basis of conviction when there is assurance from other facts and circumstances corroborating the statement of the accused. It also added that the Excise Officer is not the police officer nor is he empowered to file charge sheet under Sec.173, Code of Criminal Procedure though he conducts enquiry akin to investigation under some of the provisions of the Code and his acts are in the nature of civil proceedings for collecting evidence to take further action for adjunction of the infringement of the Act and for imposition of the penalty prescribed therein and his statement made to the said officer though retracted can be acted upon. In Surjit Singh Chhabra v. Union of India Surjit Singh Chhabra v. Union of India , J.T. (1996) 10 S.C. 239 the Supreme Court has held that the customs officers are not police officers and the confession of the accused though retracted is admissible and binds the accused even if the chance witnesses were not called to prove the confession and there is no contravention of principles of natural justice in such matters. 18. 18. Bearing these principles in mind, the statements of the revision petitioner Exs.P-4 and P-6, which are in the nature of confession, are fully corroborated from the materials found in Exs.P-12, P-13 and P-14 in addition to the fact that the revision petitioner had visited Malaysia and Singapore in the month of May, 1983. Ex.P-14 is an inland letter. This also was seized from the residence of the revision petitioner by P. W. 1 and this is addressed to one Mohammed Rahim residing at 89,Arunachala Naicken Street,Chennai. In Ex.P-4, it is stated by the revision petitioner that though this letter is addressed to Mohammed Rahim, actually it was addressed to him by the carrier of the amount Mustafa Khader. It is also explained in Ex.P-4 that as the said Mustafa Khader is a resident of Malaysia but used to come to India frequently for the purpose of disbursing the money through him (the revision petitioner), he used to give his phone number to him to contact him there was any necessity and during his visit to India, this letter was written by him from Madurai, where he was staying at that time. In this letter, it is written that, "Tamil" then down below, it is mentioned as "Tamil". In Ex.P-4, it is explained that "Tamil" is meant for the payment of Rs. 1,50,000 to the revision petitioner, According to the revision petitioner, this amount is already shown in Ex.P-12. From the detailed explanation in Ex.P-4 with regard to the contents of Ex.P-12, I am satisfied that this statement must have been voluntary as he might have been insisted by the Enforcement Directorate Officers to explain the writings in Exs.P-12 to P-14. In Ex.P-4, the revision petitioner has specifically admitted the receiving of money from Mustafa khader on different occasions and he also would say, in total he received Rs. 5,50,000 and this figure also is mentioned in Ex.P-14 letter. It is specifically mentioned in Ex.P-4 that the revision petitioner had paid Rs.53,794 to one Sam and Rs.3,30,000 on two occasions to Meena and another Rs.1,50,000 to the same person Meena. Therefore, these documents clearly establish the receipt of money from the foreign country and disbursement of that money to the persons in India, without proper authorisation by the Government. It is specifically mentioned in Ex.P-4 that the revision petitioner had paid Rs.53,794 to one Sam and Rs.3,30,000 on two occasions to Meena and another Rs.1,50,000 to the same person Meena. Therefore, these documents clearly establish the receipt of money from the foreign country and disbursement of that money to the persons in India, without proper authorisation by the Government. Hence both the courts below, relying upon these documents have accepted the violation of Sec.9(1)(b) and 9(1)(d) read with Sec.56 of the Act by the revision petitioner. 1 find that the reasons given by the courts below for convicting the revision petitioner accused are well founded and therefore, I find no reasons for any interference by this Court. 19. Mr.Ayyadurai, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, contended that the revision petitioner has not committed any offence prior to this incident, that there is nothing to show that he is involved in the commission of the same offence subsequently also, that he has lost his wife some time ago and has to maintain his two children and therefore, leniency might be shown to reduce the period of sentence in view of the abovementioned special circumstances. The Act does not show any leniency for the first offender and the Act requires a special circumstance if the minimum sentence of six months cannot be awarded. For the reason that the accused had not committed the offence subsequently, I feel that it cannot be treated as a special reason to impose a lesser sentence on the accused. Further, his liability to maintain his children also, in my opinion, cannot be a special circumstances when especially the minimum sentence under the Act is six months. Therefore, I find no reasons to reduce the sentence awarded by the courts below. 20. In the result, confirming the conviction and sentences imposed by the courts below, the revision is dismissed. Bail bond is cancelled.