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1998 DIGILAW 642 (MAD)

Chhaganlal Jain v. T. K. Hamid Sultan

1998-04-21

S.S.SUBRAMANI

body1998
Judgment :- 1. This revision is filed by the defendant in O.S. No. 3877 of 1987, on the file of V Assistant City Civil Court, Madras. 2. The respondent herein filed a suit for mandatory injunction directing the petitioner to remove all the new constructions put up in the suit property described in the schedule and to restore the same to its original condition by replacing all the fittings removed by him from the suit property, for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant, his men and agents from proceeding with the construction or altering the superstrcutre or additions to the suit property and further to direct the defendant to pay damages of Rs. 19,000/- caused by him together with interest at 12% p.a., from the date of plaint till date of payment, and for costs. 3. In the body of the plaint, it is stated that the plaintiff is the owner of the premises at No. 127, Audiappa Naickan Street, Madras-1 and the petitioner is the tenant of the shop measuring 25 40 in the ground floor portion, on a monthly rent of Rs. 750/-. It is said that the petitioner is carrying on the kirana business under the name and style of ‘Jeep Traders’. When the plaintiff was away from Madras for 15 days, the petitioner demolished the portion occupied by him. It is also said that the petitioner removed the iron shutter, teak wood and glass show case and teak wood rafters, the value of which is estimated to Rs. 10,000/-. He has further demolished several portions of the said shop and put up new constructions. In spite of objection raised, the petitioner is proceeding with the construction, without the permission of the plaintiff. It is under the above circumstances, the plaintiff filed the suit for mandatory injunction to remove the new constructions and to restore the shop to its original condition and for recovery of the damages. 4. An application was filed as I.A. No. 3668 of 1997, by the petitioner to reject the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. In the affidavit filed in support of the said interlocutory application, it is stated that the plaint has not stated the cause of action and the plaint is barred by the provisions of the Rent Control Act, which over-rides the right of a Civil remedy under the Transfer of Property Act. It is further said that when the Rent Control Act is in operation, the General Law of Landlord and Tenant has to give way to the Special Act on that behalf. It is also said that detailed particulars have not been given and the plaintiff has also not filed any document under Order 7, Rule 14(1) or 14(2) C.P.C. It is also stated that there is no material alteration, which gives him a cause of action. 5. For the said application, the respondent filed a detailed counter, stating that this is an attempt on the part of the petitioner to drag on the proceedings. It is stated that ex parte decree was passed earlier and set aside on payment of cost, and again when the petitioner was declared ex parte and when the case was posted for ex parte evidence, an application was again filed to set aside the ex parte order and it is now more than ten years since the suit is filed, and no ground has been made out under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to reject the plaint. It is further said that the suit filed is perfectly correct and is not barred by the provisions of Rent Control Act, and the reliefs sought for in the suit cannot be granted by a Rent controller. 6. After hearing the arguments, the Lower Court dismissed the said application. It is against the said order; this revision is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 7. I do not find any merit in the revision. It cannot be said that the lower Court has acted illegally in passing the impugned order. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the averments made in the plaint can at the most be a ground for eviction and therefore, the Rent Control Act alone has to be taken into consideration, and the Civil Suit cannot be maintained. I do not think that the said submission is based on any legal foundation. 8. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, enables the respondent in filing a Civil Suit, unless the same is impliedly or expressly barred. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Rent Control Act is the law, whereby the Civil Suit is barred. I do not think that the said submission is based on any legal foundation. 8. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, enables the respondent in filing a Civil Suit, unless the same is impliedly or expressly barred. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Rent Control Act is the law, whereby the Civil Suit is barred. On going by the provisions of the Rent Control Act, only suit for eviction or proceedings to which relief under the Rent Control Act could be granted are barred. Nowhere in the Rent Control Act, it is stated that no suit between landlord and tenant is maintainable under any circumstances. Under the Rent Control Act, eviction of a tenant is barred unless grounds are made out under the provisions of that Act. In this case, the respondent is not seeking for eviction. According to the respondent, the tenant has made certain structural changes and he wanted to restore the building to its original position. That relief could not be granted by the Rent Controller under the Rent Control Act. If a suit for eviction is filed on the ground that the tenant has committed a material alteration, probably the contention of the counsel may be correct. In this case, the petitioner does not want eviction. What he wanted was that the building must be restored to its original position. That is a common law relief, and provided under the Special Relief Act. That right is not taken away by any provisions of the Rent Control Act. 9. Even if it is not a material alteration so as to give a cause of action for eviction, the landlord is entitled to retain the building in its original condition. Even if the landlord does not want eviction, the tenant cannot contend that he will be in possession only after effects changes in the building. The landlord can prevent that action of the tenant on the ground that waste has been committed. He can prevent the tenant for committing the act of waste and also can claim damages for committing waste in the building. That relief also could not be granted by a Rent Controller. The reliefs sought for in this proceedings are coming within the scope of a common law remedy and are fully governed by Specific Relief Act. The suit is therefore, not barred. 10. That relief also could not be granted by a Rent Controller. The reliefs sought for in this proceedings are coming within the scope of a common law remedy and are fully governed by Specific Relief Act. The suit is therefore, not barred. 10. The conduct of the petitioner also requires consideration in this connection. Even though the suit was filed in the year 1987, till date, the respondent is not in a position to get a finality. It is also stated in the impugned order itself that similar applications have already been filed earlier and subsequently, the petitioner did not prosecute the matter to a successful end. The same have to be dismissed for the default of the petitioner. Thereafter, the evidence of P.W.1 was also completed. It is at this stage, the present application has been filed. The Lower Court has rightly held that the present application has been filed without any bona fides and only intended to drag on the proceedings. 11. In this connection, a reading of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, makes it clear that the Court can take into consideration the long delay in filing the application as a ground to reject the same. In a decision of the Delhi High Court reported in 1987 (1) R.C.J. 262 ( Arya Samaj v. Shri Sat Parkash ), where the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure was made applicable to the Delhi Rent Control Act, learned Judge of the Delhi High Court, held thus:— “ The Rent Controller gets a jurisdiction only if landlord-tenant relationship is accepted by both the parties. If the finding of the Tribunal that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the Rent Controllers order will suffer from arrogating jurisdiction, which law does not confer on him. This is not a case of nondisclosure of cause of action; this is a case of want of jurisdiction. But, assuming that no cause of action was disclosed, no such objection was raised before the Rent Controller and the suit was contested on merits after both the parties lead their evidence . This is not a case of nondisclosure of cause of action; this is a case of want of jurisdiction. But, assuming that no cause of action was disclosed, no such objection was raised before the Rent Controller and the suit was contested on merits after both the parties lead their evidence . The impugned order dismissing the suit under Order 7 Rule 11 was erroneous.” Similar is the case reported in A.I.R. 1985 Delhi 248 ( Arvind Berry v. Rear Admiral A.P.S. Bindra ), which is also a case under the Delhi Rent Control Act, wherein a learned Judge of Delhi High Court said that “if the plea of non-disclosure of cause of action is not raised at the earliest stage, the same must be deemed to have been waived.” 12. It is settled law that for the purpose of looking into the cause of action, Court is expected only to look into the plaint and not the contentions of the defendant. The wording that is used in Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C., is “where the plaint does not disclose the cause of action”; that means, the Court is expected to look into the plaint, whether it disclosed the cause of action. If the contention of the petitioner is that the plaintiff has no cause of action, that will not be a ground to reject the plain t. The correctness of the said contention can be gone into only when the suit is finally disposed of. 13. In this case, the plaintiff alleges that he is the landlord and the petitioner is the tenant, and against the contract of tenancy, some structural changes have been made by the tenant and the said act being unlawful, he wanted to restore the building to its original position and required damages for the waste committed. I do not think that the contention of the petitioner that the plaint does not disclose the cause of action could be accepted. In this case P.W.1 has also been examined and it is at this stage, making use of his evidence also he wanted to get the plaint rejected, that means the petitioner wanted the lower Court to look into the evidence and thereafter to reject the plaint. The scope of Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C., was not properly understood, when such an application was filed. 14. The scope of Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C., was not properly understood, when such an application was filed. 14. I do not find that there is any error of jurisdiction or that the lower Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in rejecting the application. No ground has been made to interfere with the impunged order under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Consequently, the revision is dismissed. The connected C.M.P. is also dismissed.