ORDER Dipak Misra, J. 1. 'Puranas' may propagate with religious aura of sacrifice, universal morality and enormity of human greatness that Dadhichi sat in 'Samadhi' to extinguish the life spark at the behest of the gods so that the weapon made of his bones could be utilised to put an end to the life of Brutrausur, but in actual fact of life he who abets in the commission of suicide makes himself liable for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. The keywords being 'abet' and for 'commission of offence' the question that falls for determination is which acts can be regarded as abetting so as to attract the culpability to constitute the offence. In the case at hand the factual scenario precisely calls for consideration whether individual escapism and concretisation of pessimistic proclivity or incapacity to suffer the brunt of a stranger or a fraction of society can make the accused-petitioner liable for the alleged offence so as to compel him to face the trial for the same. 2. The facts on which the prosecution is founded are that in the summer of 1994 an election for Gram Panchayat of village Chandwad was held. The fight was between Sudhir Gour and Ashok Kumar Gour. Ashok Kumar Gour lost the election and, two days thereafter Rambai a supporter of Ashok Kumar lodged an FIR alleging that Golu alias Ajit had forcibly ravished her. On the basis of the aforesaid FIR a crime was registered at the concerned police station. As the prosecution story proceeds on 1.6.94 said Rambai sent a letter to the S.P. Hoshangabad stating that after she was raped efforts were being made by the accused Golu and other persons namely, Om Prakash, Shyamsundar and A.P. Tiwari to coerce her to withdraw the FIR. It is also alleged by the prosecution that on 9.7.94 these accused persons went to the house of complainant Rambai and procured an affidavit which reflected that there has been a compromise between Golu and her, Unable to bear the constant threat and illtreatment meted to her, she extinguished her lifespark on 10.7.94. 3. The aforesaid factual matrix gave rise to crime No. 244/94 instituted for an offence punishable under Section 306 and 306/120-B of IPC against the present petitioner and 3 other accused persons. 3. The aforesaid factual matrix gave rise to crime No. 244/94 instituted for an offence punishable under Section 306 and 306/120-B of IPC against the present petitioner and 3 other accused persons. The investigating agency recorded statements of number of witnesses under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and taking into consideration the letter sent by Rambai and after completing other formalities laid the chargesheet before the competent court which in turn, committed the case to the Court of Session. Eventually the matter came to the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Hoshangabad forming subject-matter of S.T. No. 48/96m who framed the charges against the accused persons under Section 306 and 306/120-B, IPC. The petitioner prayed for discharge on the ground that the materials even if accepted in entirety did not form the bedrock of justification to compel them to face the trial. The learned trial Judge negatived the prayer on the ground that there are materials in the case diary against the accused and the circumstances did not warrant for passing of an order of discharge. The said order is the case of grievance of the present revisionist. 4. Impugning the aforesaid order it is contended by Mr. Datt learned counsel for the petitioner that letter written by Rambai and the statements of the witnesses named Durga Prasad, Arun Kumar, Bhagwati Prasad, Raghubir Prasad and' also other witness Subhash do not any way indicate that the petitioner had abeted in the commission of suicide. The basic ingredients of section 306, IPC are not satisfied. It is also canvassed by him that the only allegation against the petitioner is that he prepared an affidavit which was sworn to by Rambai and such an act was accomplished under duress. He has referred to the statements to highlight that there was enmity between the complainant and Golu alias Raghunand Deewan and in noway the petitioner has been implicated by any of the witnesses. He has also referred to Section 107 of the IPC to highlight that by no stretch of imagination it can be construed that the allegations as alleged would constitute the offence in question. To buttress his submissions he has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Vedprakash V. State of M.P., 1994 JLL 758; Swamy Prahaladdas V. State of M.P. and another, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 438; Nand Kishore Vishwannath Neware Vs. To buttress his submissions he has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Vedprakash V. State of M.P., 1994 JLL 758; Swamy Prahaladdas V. State of M.P. and another, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 438; Nand Kishore Vishwannath Neware Vs. State of Maharashtra, II (1993) DMC 195 and Brij Lal and another V. State (Delhi Administration), 1984 Crimes (2) 987. 5. Learned Government Advocate Mr. B.P. Athya, per contra, has contended that the petitioner has been ascribed a specific role in the alleged crime and the factual matrix does not warrant his discharge. He has also built up his argument by canvassing that the reasons ascribed by the learned trial Judge framing charge against the petitioner cannot be found fault with as his action was one of the casual factors which compelled the said Rambai to take recourse to the extreme path. 6. To appreciate the rival contentions raised at the Bar, it is essential to peruse the letter written by the complainant and the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. On a perusal of the letter and the aforesaid statements it is perceptible that except the allegations which have already been indicated nothing else is reflected. No specific role has been ascribed to the petitioner to indicate that he was responsible in instigating or doing any act which could be regarded as a step in abetment for commission of suicide. This Court in the case of Vedprakash (supra) has held that the person to be involved in an offence relating to abetment for suicide, the ingredients as envisaged under Section 107 of IPC are to be satisfied. I may usefully reproduce the observation of this court which reads as under- A person is said to 'instigate' another to an act, when he actively suggests or stimulates him to the act by any means of language, direct or indirect, whether it takes the form of express solicitation, or of hints, insinuation or encouragement. The word 'instigate' means to goad or urge forward or to provoke, incite, urge or encourage to do an act. In the present case none of the accused goaded or urged forward, provoked, incited or urged or encouraged the deceased to commit suicide. They merely goaded him to refund or repay the amount advanced by there to him. They never intended that the deceased should commit suicide. In the present case none of the accused goaded or urged forward, provoked, incited or urged or encouraged the deceased to commit suicide. They merely goaded him to refund or repay the amount advanced by there to him. They never intended that the deceased should commit suicide. On the other hand they wanted the loan advanced by them to the deceased to be repaid by him. For the said purpose it was atleast needed, if not essential, that Ramesh Kumar Sadholia should live. In the same decision this Court has also considered the concept of presumption as enjoined under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act and has observed that the same is not applicable when the person concerned is neither the husband nor related to the deceased in any manner. Whatsoever, similar view has been expressed in the decisions rendered in the cases of Pr. R.K. Malviya and others Vs. The State of M.P., MCrC No. 4588/95; Komal Chand and others Vs. The State of M.P., MCrC No. 3891/93; G.K. Shrivastava and others Vs. The State of M.P., MCrC No. 5195/92, Harnam Singh Peepre and others Vs. State of M.P., MCrC No. 5745/94 and Ram Singh and another Vs. State of M.P., Cr. Rev. No. 1149/97. At this juncture I may further refer to the case of Swamy Prahladdas Vs. State of M.P. and another, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 438 wherein their Lordships of the Apex Court held as follows: At the time of framing of charge, the trial Court thought it appropriate to associate the appellant herein as accused because of the words he uttered to the deceased. We think that just on the basis of that utterance the Court of Session was in error in summoning the appellant to face trial. In the first place it is difficult, in the facts and circumstances, to come to even a prima facie view that what was uttered by the appellant was enough to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Those words are casual in nature which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarrelling people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. The said act does not reflect the requisite mens rea on the assumption that these words would be carried out in all events. Those words are casual in nature which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarrelling people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. The said act does not reflect the requisite mens rea on the assumption that these words would be carried out in all events. Besides the deceased had plenty of time to weigh the pros and cons of the act by which he ultimately ended his life. It cannot be said that the suicide by the deceased was the direct result of the word uttered by the appellant. Keeping the aforesaid principles in view, it is graphically clear that the allegations in the present case do not attract the culpability of the offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC. From the factual matrix it is absolutely clear that by no stretch of imagination it can be held that the petitioner had any role in forcing or compelling or instigating for taking part in the suicidal act of the deceased. He has not done any act in furtherance of commission of the said crime and, therefore, the concept of abetment as contemplated under Section 107 of IPC does not arise. In absence of any presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act the petitioner cannot be roped in the alleged offence. Hence, I am of the considered view that the order of framing of charge by the learned trial Judge is vulnerable and does not deserve the stamp of approval of this Court. Accordingly, the same is set aside and the petitioner is discharged. 7. Consequently the revision is allowed. Petition allowed