JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner is a co-operative society registered under the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act. It had an agency of liquid petroleum gas pertaining to Indian Oil Corporation. It engaged Shankerlal respondent No. 2 as casual workman w.e.f. 5-10-93 for checking gas cylinders of the consumers for 58 days. His term was extended from time to time after giving some breaks and ultimately his services were discontinued after 2nd April, 1994. Respondent Shankerlal therefore filed a complaint under S. 28-A of the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishment Act, 1958 (for short the Act of 1958) before the Prescribed Authority under the Act. The petitioner-society who was given notice appeared before the Prescribed Authority but reply was not filed and thereafter nobody appeared on its behalf. Ex parte proceedings were held on the complaint. After recording the evidence of Shanker Lal, the Authority passed award on 24-10-94 directing the petitioner society to reinstate Shankerlal in service and pay him back wages. Thereafter the petitioner society filed an application before the Prescribed Authority on 24-11-94 to set aside the ex parte award. The same was dismissed. The petitioner society has challenged the orders Anx. 4 and 5 in this writ petition. 2. It has been averred that Shankerlal respondent had not completed six months service and therefore no orders could be passed under S. 28-A of the Act of 1958. It has been stated that the Prescribed Authority has committed an error in rejecting the application dated 24-11-94 on the ground of limitation. It has been prayed that the order dated 24-10-94 be quashed. 3. Reply has not been filed by the respondent No. 2. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the document placed on record. 5. Mr. Mathur contended that even according to the averments made in the complaint filed under S. 28-A of the Act by respondent No. 2, his services were dispensed with on 2-4-94 and thus he had not completed six months in the employment of the petitioner and therefore the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by him and make the award. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. Parihar contended that artificial breaks were given in the appointment orders of the respondent and the last order being of dated 4-2-94, two months had completed on 3-4-94 and it is on 3-4-94 that the respondent was informed about his discharge from service and thus the period of six months had completed. He further contended that the petitioner did not care to appear before the Prescribed Authority and did not file reply and therefore the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority cannot be assailed in this writ petition. 7. I have carefully considered the above arguments. Section 28-A of the Act of 1958 reads as follows. "28-A Notice of dismissal or discharge by employer - (1) No employer shall dismiss or discharge from his employment any employee who has been in such employment continuously for a period of not less than 6 months except for a reasonable cause and after giving such employee at least one month's prior notice or paying him one month's wages in lieu of such notice; Provided that such notice shall not be necessary where the services of such employee are dispensed with for such misconduct, as may be defined in the rules made by the State Government in this behalf, and supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for the purpose in the prescribed manner. Every employee so dismissed or discharged may make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to a Prescribed Authority within 30 days of the receipt of the order of dismissal or discharge on one or more of the following grounds namely- xxxxxxxx 8. A reading of sub-section (1) of Section 28A making it clear that an employer is not permitted to discharge or dismiss his employee if he was in employment continuously for a period of six months without giving one month's notice of one month's wages in lieu of such notice. It has been further provided that notice shall not be necessary where the services of the employee are dispensed with for some misconduct. 9. In the instant case it is not in dispute that the respondent No. 2 was in the employment of the petitioner society and that he was appointed initially for 58 days but his term was extended time to time for a period of 58 days by giving breaks of 2-3 days. A perusal of the orders Anx. 9. In the instant case it is not in dispute that the respondent No. 2 was in the employment of the petitioner society and that he was appointed initially for 58 days but his term was extended time to time for a period of 58 days by giving breaks of 2-3 days. A perusal of the orders Anx. 1 and 2 shows that in order to deprive, the respondent No. 2, of the benefit of continuous service artificial breaks, were given in his extensions. When respondent No. 2 was appointed for 58 days it clearly means that he was appointed for two months on 5-10-1993 vide Anx. 1. The last order of his appointment was order dated 4-2-1994 whereby he was appointed for 58 days which means that he was given appointment for two months. This appointment of two months was to expire on 3-4-1994. It is obvious that when the respondent No. 2 went to the office on 3-4-1994 he was not taken on duty and was informed of the discharge order. In these circumstances the service period of respondent No. 2 shall be counted upto 3-4-1994. If the artificial breaks given in the extension are ignored, it cannot be held that the respondent No. 2 had not completed six months service as on 3-4-1994. That being so, the plea of the petitioner society that complaint under Section 28-A of the Act was not entertain-able, is without merit. 10. It is not disputed that no notice as required under sub-section (1) of Section 28-A of the Act was given to the respondent before discharging him from his employment, nor one month's wages in lieu of notice, were given to him. 11. In the writ petition an attempt has been made to show that the respondent was discharged from the employment because he was not discharging his duties efficiently. However, it is nowhere the case of the petitioner that an enquiry was held regarding the misconduct of the respondent. The respondent could not be discharged from his employment without following the procedure of sub-section (1) of Section 28-A of the Act. Since there was non compliance of sub-section (I) of Section 28-A of the Act the Prescribed Authority was perfectly justified in passing the impugned award. 12. The respondent could not be discharged from his employment without following the procedure of sub-section (1) of Section 28-A of the Act. Since there was non compliance of sub-section (I) of Section 28-A of the Act the Prescribed Authority was perfectly justified in passing the impugned award. 12. It is significant to point out that the petitioner did not file reply before the Prescribed Authority, though it appeared in pursuance of the notice given to it. On 19-9-1994 nobody appeared on its behalf, and hence the matter proceeded ex-parte. Thereafter on the same day i.e. on 19-9-1994 power was filed by the counsel for the petitioner but no application was filed for recalling the order of proceeding ex-parte. No documentary evidence was produced on that day. The Prescribed Authority, thereafter, on the basis of the evidence led by the respondent passed the award. If the petitioner chose to allow the proceedings to proceed ex-parte, no interference can be made in the writ of certiorari when it is not averred that there was misreading of the evidence by the Prescribed Authority or that the proceedings were illegal, 13. It is well settled that the writs, which are referred to in Art. 226 are intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies-or officers act wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record and such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. In the instant case it cannot be said that the Prescribed Authority the impugned order wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice. There is also no error apparent on the face of the record and therefore there is no cause to interfere in the impugned orders. 14. Consequently, there is no merit in the writ petition which is hereby dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******