JUDGMENT 1. - The present appeal has been filed by the plaintiff-appellants against the order of the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur dated 11.12.1996 whereby the injunction prayed for by the appellant was not granted. 2. The plaintiff-appellants filed a suit in the Court of Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur on 24.1.1996 alleging inter alia that the plaintiff-appellants are doctors and they intended to start a hospital in the premises of the defendant-respondents. In June 1995 a proposal was put forward. At that time according to the plaintiff-appellants the suit premises was open land. The defendant-respondents agreed to construct the premises there according to the map given by the plaintiff-respondents. An oral agreement was entered into between the parties. The terms of the oral agreement have been reproduced in the plaint with precision. However, the plaintiff-appellants have not mentioned as to what exactly was the date on which this oral agreement was entered into. According to the plaintiff-appellants, in part performance of the aforesaid oral agreement, on 1.7.1996 the plaintiff-appellants were given possession of the vacant plot. This was done because the quality of the construction was to be supervised by the plaintiff-appellants. The defendant-respondents were only to do the construction and make investment. Even the plaintiff-appellants were to make some investment and in fact, the plaintiff-appellants did make investment in the construction of the premises to the tune of Rs. 1,90,000/- as detailed in the plaint. Apart from the investment made for construction the plaintiff-appellants had also invested other amounts in purchasing equipments which were more than Rs. 2 Lacs. In all more than 4 Lacs of rupees have been invested by the plaintiff-appellants. The plaintiff-appellants in paragraph 6 of the plaint have made mention that on 29.6.1995 a written agreement was also entered into in between the parties but the plaintiff-appellants have qualified the use of this agreement and have stated that there was no purpose of this agreement, other than for seeking loan from the Bank. The plaintiff-appellants have taken a loan of Rs. 7,50,000/- from the Rajasthan Bank. According to the plaintiff-appellants, after giving possession to the plaintiff-appellants on 1.7.1995, the construction was started, in terms of the oral agreement contained in paras 1 & 2 of the plaint. The plaintiff-appellants have taken a loan of Rs. 7,50,000/- from the Rajasthan Bank. According to the plaintiff-appellants, after giving possession to the plaintiff-appellants on 1.7.1995, the construction was started, in terms of the oral agreement contained in paras 1 & 2 of the plaint. Around one month before the fling of the suit, the defendant-respondents stopped the construction work and are not permitting the plaintiffs to get the remaining construction work done and are intending to dispossess the plaintiff-appellants. The plaintiff-appellants have claimed that the defendant-respondents have in part performance of the contract as contained in the plaint, gave possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff-appellants. This has been claimed in the suit that they should, now, be restrained from dispossessing and interfering with the possession of the plaintiff-appellants. Along with the suit an injunction application was also filed by the plaintiff-appellants. 3. The defendant-respondents contested the suit. It is averred by the respondents that the contention of the plaintiff-appellants, that there was an oral agreement between the parties, is without any foundation. The only agreement in between the parties was a written-agreement. The date of the written agreement is 29.6.1995. If the statement of the plaintiff-appellants are treated to be correct then they were given possession 1.7.1995, pursuant to the oral agreement. The oral agreement could have either preceded the written agreement or was written after it. The question of the oral agreement coming into being after the written agreement is out of question because the time lag suggests that it could only be prior to 29.6.1995. If the oral agreement was prior to 29.6.1995 then there was no question of the written agreement reciting "NAV NIRMIT PARISAR KA KIRAYA". The written agreement shows that on the date when this agreement was written, the construction was in existence but according to the case of the plaintiff-appellants until the oral agreement there was no construction. Thus, the existence of the oral agreement is per se an imagination of the plaintiff-appellants. Another aspect which is very important is that the plaintiff-appellants have quoted this oral agreement in their plaint with precision but without specifying the date of agreement. The absence of date is very material because the agreement had specified that the plaintiff-appellants were given possession on 1.7.1995. The agreement could be contemporaneous to the start of the construction. Another aspect which is very important is that the plaintiff-appellants have quoted this oral agreement in their plaint with precision but without specifying the date of agreement. The absence of date is very material because the agreement had specified that the plaintiff-appellants were given possession on 1.7.1995. The agreement could be contemporaneous to the start of the construction. If an agreement dated 29.6.1995 is there then what can be the date of alleged oral agreement ? The rights of the plaintiff-appellants are based on this. The absence of the date shows that no such agreement was ever entered into between the parties. The defendant-respondents have contended that according to the oral agreement the lease was to be for a period of 7 years. In terms of the Transfer of Property Act the registration of the lease for more than one year is compulsory. The contention of the plaintiff-appellants that in part performance of the contract the possession was given to them and therefore, they are entitled to protect the same is without any foundation because for establishing the part performance of the contract, the terms of the contract have to be ascertainable. The plaintiff-appellants have quoted the terms of the agreement with precision but have missed to specify the date of the contract because specifying the date of the contract could have been inconvenient for them. 4. The construction was started by the defendant respondents way back in the year 1994. There was a litigation in between the defendant-respondents and the Urban Improvement Trust and in that litigation an injunction was granted against the Urban Improvement Trust. Those proceedings have been brought on the record by the defendant-respondents to establish that it is wrong to contend that the construction was started in June, 1995 whereas the construction has been started way back in the year 1994 itself. Further the defendant-respondents have contended that the map produced by the plaintiff-appellants and the map annexed with the Written-statement are in terms identical except some cosmetic changes made by the plaintiff-appellants in the map produced by them. 5. The plaintiff-appellants in rejoinder have submitted the affidavit of a personnel from the company which has to install X-ray machine in the proposed hospital. He says that x-ray channel has been installed by him in the disputed premises. 5. The plaintiff-appellants in rejoinder have submitted the affidavit of a personnel from the company which has to install X-ray machine in the proposed hospital. He says that x-ray channel has been installed by him in the disputed premises. The Commissioner's report is also to the effect that it establishes that the plaintiff-appellants are in possession of the premises. 6. The learned trial Court after considering the material on the record came to the conclusion that the plaintiff-appellants have no case for grant of injunction in their favour. However, on some terms orders for payment of an amount have been made. 7. Aggrieved thereof the plaintiff-appellants have filed the present appeal and have contended that the learned trial Court in rejecting the injunction had not adhered to the fundamentals of granting an injunction. The prima facie case was established by the plaintiff-appellants by establishing the contract in the shape as contained in the plaint and the oral contract as contained in the plaint gives sufficient details of its existence in between the parties. The part performance has been alleged. Once the part performance of the agreement is alleged then during the pendency of the suit the plaintiffs are entitled to protect their possession. The written contract was only for a limited purpose of getting the loan and, therefore, it cannot dilute the original contract which is an oral contract in between the parties. The plaintiffs being in possession and having invested sufficient amount are entitled to protect the same and the defendants cannot oust the plaintiffs. The case of the defendant-respondents that the amounts were not paid to them is falsified as the fact that cheque was encashed by the defendant respondents as is evident by the certificate of the bank. The conduct of the defendant respondents in denying the payment shows that they want to wriggle out of the contract entered between the parties. 8. Counsel for the respondents have contended that the learned trial Court has committed no illegality in passing the order impugned in the appeal. It has rightly found that it is only the payment for which the plaintiffs could be entitled. 8. Counsel for the respondents have contended that the learned trial Court has committed no illegality in passing the order impugned in the appeal. It has rightly found that it is only the payment for which the plaintiffs could be entitled. In fact the learned trial Court was right in showing that the written contract is the contract which can be said to be the only contract entered in between the parties and it cannot be said that there was any oral agreement entered in between the parties. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. 10. The first and foremost question relevant in the matter is as to what kind of contract was entered into between the parties. According to the plaintiff-appellants it was the oral agreement and the written-agreement pressed into service by the defendant-respondents was only for the purpose of seeking loan from the Bank. The plaintiffs in their plaint or any where in the affidavit have not averred that the agreement was in fact used by submitting it to the bank for the purposes of taking the loan from the Bank. The actual use of the agreement established by the plaintiffs could have corroborated their story that it was only for taking loan from the bank but there is no averment either in the plaint or in the injunction application or in the affidavit filed that the agreement was ever filed before the bank. Therefore, the only use of this document, which has been averred by the plaintiffs, has not been established by the plaintiffs. The written agreement could not be used for taking loan, because the original was with the defendants. Without the original, could it be used for the alleged purpose? This question the plaintiffs were required to answer. The plaintiffs have not taken any steps to dilate on this point, except by making an allegation in the plaint that it was meant for taking loan only. The use for which the written contract according to the plaintiffs has been entered into between the parties has not been established to have been put to that use. Therefore, the existence of the written contract cannot be accepted to be only for the purpose of taking loan. 11. According to the written contract the premises has come into being. The use for which the written contract according to the plaintiffs has been entered into between the parties has not been established to have been put to that use. Therefore, the existence of the written contract cannot be accepted to be only for the purpose of taking loan. 11. According to the written contract the premises has come into being. It does not use the expression that the construction is yet to.commence. The terms used are "NAV NIRMIT PARISAR" whereas in the oral agreement as alleged in the plaint the expression used is that the construction will be made according to this map. It is a irreconcilable state as to why the plaintiffs agreed to sign a document which contains that the building is in existence when it was yet to commence after 1.7.1995. This shows that the agreement as averred in the plaint is not an agreement which can be said to be prima facie in existence between the parties. 12. Once this Court comes to the conclusion that the existence of the oral agreement, regarding which no date has been specified, is doubtful then the whole case of the plaintiffs falls to the ground and none of the other aspects put forward by the plaintiffs deserve any consideration because if there was no oral agreement then the only agreement which can be said to be in existence in between the parties is the written agreement. It precedes the date 1.7.1995 on which date the plaintiffs claim that they were put into possession. In this agreement only an expectancy has been expressed. No definite rights by this agreement have been assigned to the plaintiffs. If there was no assignment of any rights in favour of the plaintiffs then there was nothing which this Court can protect in their favour. In this view of the matter no indulgence can be granted in favour of the plaintiff-appellants. The learned trial Court has not committed any illegality in refusing the injunction. 13. In the result, this appeal has no force and the same is dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******