J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) AT the commencement of our judgment, we are constrained to observe out of factual scenario emerging from the record of the present case and evaluation of the impugned acquittal judgment whereby the respondent-original accused came to be acquitted from the charge of offence of murder, that sensitisation to the issue of gender equality is not the relic of the past but the living force of the day. ( 2 ) THE manner and mode in which gruesome and cruel offence in question, is committed in the broad, daylight in a public street, putting a helpless lady to fire after openly and boldly pouring kerosene on her anatomy and the manner and mode in which evaluation and analysis of the testimonial collections and documentary evidence is made by the learned Trial Judge, unfortunately, led us to raise the aforesaid question. ( 3 ) A short but relevant and material spectrum and conspectus of the facts giving rise to this appeal under Sec. 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code) at the instance of the appellant-State against the order of acquittal recorded by the learned additional Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No. 37 of 1989, on 8. 1. 1991 may be articulated, at this stage, with a view to appreciating the merits of the appeal, on hand, and challenge against it. ( 4 ) THE prosecution case has been that on 21. 10. 1988 at about 10 a. m. deceased Asha who was in the prime of her youth and wife of PW. 5, Vinod Manilal was going to leave minor baby mital aged about 4, at Bombay Metal school as per the schedule, on the day of the incident, unmindful of the approaching crual and adverse fate that she would become a victim of violent offence. When reached near Sidhraj Nagar, on way opposite to madhukunj Society, the respondent-accused Patel Hiralal going on scooter No. GAW 3040 met her on road and he stopped her and scolded her as to why she was unnecessarily, talking about his illicit relationship with her sister Sharda? When reached near Sidhraj Nagar, on way opposite to madhukunj Society, the respondent-accused Patel Hiralal going on scooter No. GAW 3040 met her on road and he stopped her and scolded her as to why she was unnecessarily, talking about his illicit relationship with her sister Sharda? The accused got excited and thereafter he poured some inflammable liquid from tin pot taken out from the trunk of the scooter on deceased Asha and thereafter burnt her clothes by throwing a, lighted lighter, as a result of which the clothes started burning and she got engulfed in the fire, as a result of which she started running towards the water column (big water supply arrangement infrastructure for locomotives) in the railway station area with the solace and hope to get herself extinguished with water and as such, made-valiant effort by putting herself under the water tank which helped her to extinguish fire. The fire of revenge or vengeance lighted by the accused by putting the deceased helpless victim. Asha on fire was got extinguished by her with the help of water, as a result of which her clothes were burnt and rags of clothes were spread and she was pitifully, painfully deploring for covering her naked body by demanding some cover or cloth from persons who collected there, and she was provided a piece of cloth by a lady Sugrabibi PW. No. 4, Exh. 19 a daughter of railway grateman. 12. 10. 1998 ( 5 ) SHE was questioned by some Sadhus, who had collected near the water column as to what had happened to her. 4 to 5 Sadhus also helped her extinguishing the fire on her body. She was specifically and pointedly asked by the Sadhus as to who had burnt her to which she replied that she was burnt by Hiralal. Unfortunately, the people who had collected there did not come to her rescue though she was undergoing excruciating pain due to fire on her body. What a great pity ? Whereas the Sadhus who had relinquished the wordly things, not only felt pity for her but in real sense acting as Sadhus extinguished the fire on her body and specifically inquired about the author and cause of the injuries to which she replied as stated above, Hiralal who is accused before us. What a great pity ? Whereas the Sadhus who had relinquished the wordly things, not only felt pity for her but in real sense acting as Sadhus extinguished the fire on her body and specifically inquired about the author and cause of the injuries to which she replied as stated above, Hiralal who is accused before us. ( 6 ) AS the ill luck would have been, instead of shifting her straightaway to hospital for treatment, she was taken in a very painful condition and practically naked situation in a rickshaw at the place of her husband. The minor daughter of the landlady informed the unfortunate husband that some unknown persons had brought Asha Maushi in a rickshaw which prompted the husband to go running down and saw his wife with extensive burns and profusely weeping while lying in the rickshaw. Landlady Valiben, one neighbour kokilaben and her husband Vinod started taking her to the hospital in the same rickshaw. ( 7 ) IN the meantime, before the autorickshaw reached hospital, enroute, the husband inquired as to who had put her to fire and why, to which, deceased Asha replied that hiralal Patel living in their society had burnt her. She also described what had preceded prior to the incident. She stated that while she was going to leave baby Mittal from the school, at that time, accused Hiralal came from the opposite direction on a scooter. The accused, thereafter, told her as to why she was disintegrating his image and reputation by taking about his illicit relationship with her sister Sharda? Deceased Asha replied that it was not correct and she was not interested in defaming him. Thereafter, she started walking towards the school. Subsequently, the accused followed her, if not chased, and sprinkled inflammable liquid in a tin weighing about 500 M. Lts. on the body of the deceased. Thus, liquid which was contained in a tin container which was taken out from the trunk of the scooter came to be sprinkled on her body. Thereafter, tin container was thrown by the accused. She was put to fire with the help of a lighter as a result of which, she started running here and there and finally went to a big water tape essentially designed and meant for filling up water in railway locomotives. Thereafter, tin container was thrown by the accused. She was put to fire with the help of a lighter as a result of which, she started running here and there and finally went to a big water tape essentially designed and meant for filling up water in railway locomotives. ( 8 ) SHE was shifted to Patan Government hospital where she was given primary treatment, and in view of seriousness of the injuries, she came to be shifted to the Hospital at Ahmedabad and before she succumbed to the said injuries on 5. 11. 1988, she made as many as five dying declarations which are unfortunately not properly evaluated and examined by the Trial Court. ( 9 ) THUS, life of a young -lady with no fault of hers, was cut short in the spring years by cruel and gruesome culpability of the accused which is the pith and substance of the prosecution story. ( 10 ) THE learned Addl. P. P. Mr. Desai, has, vehemently, criticised the impugned judgment of acquittal inter alia contending that (i) five dying declarations which have remained consistent with the main prosecution story should not have been lightly discarded by the Trial Court. (ii) There was no question of identity of the accused as there was voluminous evidence on record to connect the accused with the complicity he was charged with. (iii) That evidence of witnesses whose presence near the. railway station was quite natural should have been relied on. (iv) That nature and number of burn injuries sustained by the deceased as per the medical evidence on record undoubtedly ruled out suicidal or accidental burns, more so when the history narrated before the doctor clearly speaks of homicidal burns. (v) That deceased Asha had no reason to falsely implicate the accused who entertained a belief that she was responsible for degenerating his image and prestige by taking about his illicit relationship with her sister Sharda in public. Therefore, though motive is not necessary to prove the complicity, it was present and proved. ( 11 ) LEARNED advocate Mr. Shethna, while appearing for the respondent-accused has forcefully supported the reasons and ultimate conclusion reached by the Trial Court. He has also vehemently raised the following contentions, as well, in course of his submissions before us: (i) That identity of the accused has not been proved to the hilt. ( 11 ) LEARNED advocate Mr. Shethna, while appearing for the respondent-accused has forcefully supported the reasons and ultimate conclusion reached by the Trial Court. He has also vehemently raised the following contentions, as well, in course of his submissions before us: (i) That identity of the accused has not been proved to the hilt. (ii) That the evidence relied on by the prosecution is doubtful and, therefore, benefit of doubt should go to the accused. (iii) That it is unbelievable and unnatural that independent eye witnesses would not be available since the incident happened in a broad daylight in a public street during busy hours. (iv) Further statement recorded by the investigating officer after the FIR which came to be converted into dying declaration is nothing but innovation of the investigation. (v) That the burn injuries cannot be connected with the act of the accused. He, therefore, stated that nexus between complicity alleged and the accused has not been established. (vi) That dying declarations of the deceased cannot be said to be consistent, compatible, cohesive legal material in the vicinity of complicity of the accused. He also placed reliance on further statement under Sec. 313 of the Code in which he has denied to have given application Exh. 49 before the Court for custody of Scooter No. GAW 3040. That prosecution has not been able to prove the motive to the hilt, as alleged. (vii) That jurisdictional scope of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal judgment is very much circumscribed and, therefore, this Court should not interfere with the impugned judgment of acquittal. (viii) That the venue of offence is certainly uncertain. It is shifted to other place which also generates cloud of doubt about the prosecution story and, therefore, benefit of doubt should go to the accused. (ix) That the manner and mode in which investigation is carried out is also condemnable. ( 12 ) BEFORE we propose to deal with the aforesaid submissions in light of testimonial collections relied on by the prosecution in the Trial Court, we would like to highlight the grounds and reasons which substantially and materially weighed with the Trial Court for reaching acquittal conclusion: (i) In Para 7 of the impugned judgment, it is stated that the rickshaw driver in whose rickshaw Asha was shifted to the hospital viz. Hasmukhbhai Rajput, pw. No. 8, Exh. Hasmukhbhai Rajput, pw. No. 8, Exh. 31 who has turned hostile to the prosecution case, is a witness of truth and he has not supported the prosecution case, as great as a missing link. (ii) In Para 18 of the judgment, it is observed that evidence of landlady of the deceased, Valiben, PW. No. 4, Exh. 32 also does not support the prosecution case though it may be possible that she has turned hostile because of the fact that she is neighbour of the accused and she has tried to save the accused. Nonetheless, this is second missing link in the prosecution case, as per the observations made by the Trial Court. (iii) In Para 19, it is mentioned that dying declaration, Exh. 11 recorded by the executive Magistrate and the FIR turned dying declaration exhibiting items are self-contradictory and unreliable. (iv) That the prosecution story is unnatural and improbable. Merely because the allegation that the accused threw the lighted lighter on the body of the deceased, the Trial Court presumed that all lighters can be kept burning only by pressing with the help of the thumb. It was, therefore, held that it was impossible that Sari could catch fire if lighter is thrown at her. (v) That dying declarations cannot be relied upon because there were grave suspicious circumstances. ( 13 ) AFTER having dispassionately, examined the viva voce and documentary evidence recorded by Trial Court and the evaluation of the factual scenario emerging from the record of the present case, while viewed in light of latest position of law on the issue of dying declaration, we respectfully but dutifully must state that the reasons and the ultimate conclusion reached by the Trial Court in the impugned acquittal judgment are not only unreasonable, unjust, unbelievable, unsustainable but are quite illegal based on assumptions and presumptions and on misreading of evidence, requiring our interference in exercise of our powers under Sec. 378 of the Code. It is ture that what Mr. Shethna contended before us that the jurisdictional scope of the appellate Court under Sec. 378 of the Code is very much circumscribed. It is ture that what Mr. Shethna contended before us that the jurisdictional scope of the appellate Court under Sec. 378 of the Code is very much circumscribed. However, we make it clear that even in case of acquittal appeal under Sec. 378, it becomes obligatory for the Court to put the impugned judgment of acquittal in a correct legal shape if (i) it is manifestly perverse; (ii) palpably wrong leading to miscarriage of justice; (iii) if radiates an imprint of misreading of evidence; (iv) the factors which should not have been relied on have been rtlied on and factors which ought to have been relied, on have been discarded and (v) the conclusion is founded upon misconception of legal proposition on the point. ( 14 ) IN our opinion, the aforesaid aspects are enumerative and not exhaustive insofar as right to interfere with acquittal exercising our power under Sec. 378, is concerned. Nonetheless, insofar as the merits of the present case are concerned, we have not the slightest hesitation that they are covered under more than one category, being devoid of merits and the reasons being founded upon unreliable premise and unjust on account of misreading of evidence and magnifying micro level aspects not only macro level, but we are constrained to say, mega level. Giving benefit of doubt to an accused if doubtful circumstances arise from the evidence is one of the cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence. However, this benefit of doubt can be recorded to the accused provided it affects the main substratum and core of the prosecution case. Again, a doubt should be of a reasonable person, not of meek and weak, not of a man afraid of legal consequences. ( 15 ) THE observations made by the Trial Court in the impugned judgment in support of acquittal conclusion and the reasons and observations made in-Paras 17, 18, 19, and 20 in the impugned judgment are, in our opinion, unsustainable being revolting against the might of evidence and legal proposition on the score. ( 15 ) THE observations made by the Trial Court in the impugned judgment in support of acquittal conclusion and the reasons and observations made in-Paras 17, 18, 19, and 20 in the impugned judgment are, in our opinion, unsustainable being revolting against the might of evidence and legal proposition on the score. ( 16 ) APART from sensitisation to the general quality, when capital crime of murder and that too by pouring kerosene followed by lighting a lighter in a broad daylight in busy hours in busy locality by a mighty man, despite five dying declarations by the deceased going unpunished on aforesaid grounds and reasons which we have enumerated above, the impugned judgment speaks volumes about the approach of the Trial Court and it is not only starting but heart-stealing to which the learned advocate for the defence Mr. Shethna despite his valiant and strong efforts to support it, has not been also to persuade us to agree with him. We. are left with no alternative but to put wrong order, illegal reasons and misreading of evidence in a correct, appropriate legal format with legal reasons. ( 17 ) INSOFAR as proposition of law on the question of dying declaration is concerned, it has been settled by catena of judicial, pronouncements. Statement of the deceased as to the cause of death without being subjected to cross examination is given exception from hearsay evidence in view of provisions of Sec. 32 (1) of the Evidence Act. It provides cases in which statement of relevant facts by an person who is dead or who cannot be found is relevant. Thus, it provides a provision wherein statement of a person who cannot be called as a witness can be relied on. Statement of such person who is dead or who is not found or who is rendered incapable of giving evidence when it relates to the cause of death, is quite relevant and it becomes admissible dying declaration. Thus, Sec. 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible a statement of person who dies, whether the death of homicidal or suicidal, provided that the statement relates to the cause of death or exhibits circumstances leading to death. Thus, Sec. 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible a statement of person who dies, whether the death of homicidal or suicidal, provided that the statement relates to the cause of death or exhibits circumstances leading to death. We may say that there is purpose and policy designed in making" the statement as to the cause of death given by the deceased admissible and reliable, relevant under Sec. 32. Though it is untested by cross- examination, it assumes same status of the tested one as it is made by a person who is in teeth of death. It is made by a person who is leaving earthly world. Ordinarily, a fast approaching death lends authenticity to such a statement unless otherwise established. This fundamental principle of law relating to statement of deceased which is relevant and admissible under the provision of Sec. 32 has not been properly appreciated by the learned Trial Judge, with due respect to him. No person can be presumed to falsely implicate an innocent in the last statement when the voyage of life is seemingly ending and that too in place of real culprit. In case on hand, it has been clearly established from the medical evidence that nature and number of burn injuries sustained by Asha were not of suicidal or accidental. The injuries were homicidal. Therefore, it cannot be said that the deceased was interested in involving the accused in place of the real offender. ( 18 ) RELEVANT material proposition relatable to law of dying declaration has been settled by host of judicial pronouncements. However, we would like to refer to the division Bench decision of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 243 of 1992 to which both of us were party. The material proposition of law propounded therein are directly and squarely, attracted to the facts of the present case. ( 19 ) OF course, in order to base conviction or place reliance on dying declaration, there are certain tests through which dying, declaration must pass through. The main anxiety of the Court in a case like the one on hand will be to see that dying declaration made by the deceased passes through successfully the following tests and conditions. ( 19 ) OF course, in order to base conviction or place reliance on dying declaration, there are certain tests through which dying, declaration must pass through. The main anxiety of the Court in a case like the one on hand will be to see that dying declaration made by the deceased passes through successfully the following tests and conditions. It would, therefore, be appropriate to highlight some of the important points: (i) Whether the dying declaration is outcome to tutoring; (ii) Whether the declarant was mentally fit and balanced to make a rational statement; (iii) Whether there was sufficient opportunity for the dying man for observation. (iv) Whether the dying declaration made by the deceased had been impaired with malice or mala fide; (v) Whether the capacity of the person to remember the facts stated had not been impaired at the time when he was making the statement; (vi) Whether the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties. (vii) Whether the statement has been consistent throughout if there was sufficient opportunity of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it. In short, if the statement of the deceased which is branded and characterised as dying declaration under Sec. 32 passed through the aforesaid tests, it becomes not only admissible but relevant and sufficient to base conviction. It cannot be gainsaid that in view of latest position, that conviction can be founded upon sole dying declaration if the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration was quite natural, voluntary, unprompted, untutored representing true facts by a person who had opportunity to identify the accused and he or she, as the case may be, was in mental and physical fit state to make a rational statement. Thus, if the Court is satisfied about the genuineness and voluntary statement of the deceased as to the cause of death, it becomes relevant and admissible under Sec. 32 and the Court is bound to base conviction upon such reliable dying declaration. ( 20 ) IN light of the aforesaid proposition of law, let us examine the factual scenario relatable to dying declarations. In fact, there are five dying declarations in the present case. Out of five, two dying declarations are oral and three are written. It may be mmentioned that dying declaration may be oral or written. ( 20 ) IN light of the aforesaid proposition of law, let us examine the factual scenario relatable to dying declarations. In fact, there are five dying declarations in the present case. Out of five, two dying declarations are oral and three are written. It may be mmentioned that dying declaration may be oral or written. Dying declaration though is not tested on the anvil of cross- examination, assumes wider sanctity and high dependability on account of approaching and impending death which is rightly said is the only facet of life which scares every leaving person and on seeing the fast approaching death, person making a statement and that too relatable to the cause of death, ordinarily should be given due weight and credence. Be that as it may, we would highlight the five dying declarations in a tabular chart : S. No. Before whom Description Date and time 1 2 3 4 1. Sadhus, as On being questioned by Sadhus, deceased replied "i 21. 10. 1988 within 10 deposed by PW. am burnt by Hiralal". minutes after the 3, Sadaji accident. , 2. Husband- Vinod On being questioned, she replied that she was burnt 21. 10. 1988 within 12 Manilal, PW. 5 by Hiralal, residing in their society. She was going to 15 minutes after the Exh. 20 to call daughter Mittala. At that time, Hiralal came accidnet. from opposite direction on scooter and told deceased as to why she was defaming him on the ground of his illicit relationship with her sister Sharda, to which deceased replied that she was not talking like that and then started walking further. Thereafter, accused Hiralal came from behind with a tin containing highly inflammable liquid like diesel and poured on her body and then put her to fire by lighting a lighter. The tin container of liquid weighing about 500 M. lts. was thrown on road. After she was put on fire, she ran towards water column of railway meant for filling water for locomotives. 3. Dr. Vikram On being questioned by doctor deceased replied that 21. 10. 1988 at 10. 30 Gadhvi PW. 2, she was burnt. Medical examination papers also a. m. Exh. 13 contained history of homicidal burns. 4. Executive Mag. On being questioned by the Exe Mag. the deceased 21. 10. 1988 Laxmanbhai replied- "on the day of incident at about 10 a. m. I between 11. 10. 1988 at 10. 30 Gadhvi PW. 2, she was burnt. Medical examination papers also a. m. Exh. 13 contained history of homicidal burns. 4. Executive Mag. On being questioned by the Exe Mag. the deceased 21. 10. 1988 Laxmanbhai replied- "on the day of incident at about 10 a. m. I between 11. 15 Barot PW. 1, was going to call my daughter Mittal from Bombay and 11. 30a. m. Exh. 10 Mettal School where she was studying. When I reached near railway Station, near Sidhraj Nagar, at that time, accused Hiralal met me. His scooter No. is GAW 3040. He asked me as to why I am making false talks against him and thereafter he got excited and sprinkled on my body, inflammable liquid weighing about 500 M. Lts. contained in tin container and thereafter than lighted lighter as a result of which, my clothes, started burning and thereafter I ran near water tank of railway. Some other people collected there extinguished the fire and thereinafter was shifted to hospital". She further stated that "accused had illicit relations with my sister Sharda and I had, as such, witnessed such relationship on one or two occasions and in order to harass me, I was put to fire. At that time, my husband was at my residence. Hiralal is son-in-law of Nanavati". 5. Baldevbhai She had given detailed FIR at Exh. which 11. 30 a. m. 21. 10. 1988 Revabhai PW. was recorded by constable Baldevbhai as narrated 11. 30a. m. 10, by her involving the accused. Exh. 38 produced . ( 21 ) FROM mere glance or even a peep into the aforesaid five dying declarations, it cannot be contended even for moment that there is inconsistency. Insofar as involvement of the accused is concerned, there is no infirmity. We have found that the prosecution has successfully proved that the aforesaid dying declarations were quite voluntary and made by the deceased in a fit mental state. The deceased was in a position to make a rational statement though she had sustained serious burn injuries on her body to the extent of 35 degrees. In fact, she was, throughout, conscious when taken to the hospital in a rickshaw, after the fire was extinguished by the Sadhus. The evidence ofpws. Sadaji Thakore, Vinod Manilal, Executive Magistrate and Dr. Vikram gadhviand constable Baldevbhai Revabhai is found quite dependable and trustworthy. In fact, she was, throughout, conscious when taken to the hospital in a rickshaw, after the fire was extinguished by the Sadhus. The evidence ofpws. Sadaji Thakore, Vinod Manilal, Executive Magistrate and Dr. Vikram gadhviand constable Baldevbhai Revabhai is found quite dependable and trustworthy. ( 22 ) AFTER having examined the evidence of these witnesses, we find it very clear that the prosecution has succeeded in showing that the dying declarations made by the deceased were truthful version of the deceased and she made voluntary statements without any prompting or tutoring and she was in mentally fit condition to make rational statements. Therefore, the approach of the Trial Court in discarding these llying declarations is totally not only misconceived but illegal. Nothing has been successfully established from the evidence of PWs Sadjaji Thakore, Vinod Manilal, executive Magistrate Barot Dr. Vikram, Gadhviand Baldevbhai Revabhai which would remotely indicate inconsistency or unreliability of the statements made by the deceased before them. It is not necessary that invariably, the medical Officer should certify fitness of the deceased to make, a rational statement. If the person who records tttftement of a person before whom the statement is made by the deceased is shown to kave been satisfied or has ascertained that such person is fit, then in that case, unless otherwise established, the evidence of such person cannot be rejected. There is no rule of law or rule of prudence that unless and until the Medical Officer certifies the state of mmd, the statement made by the deceased before any other witness, oral or writing, tjamot be relied on. The observations made by the Trial Court in Paras 17 to 20 are itometrically opposite to the proposition of law and factual situation emerging from the record of the present case. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the feasons, observations and ultimate conclusion recorded by the Trial Court in the fftsent impugned order are not only unjust, unreliable, unsustainable but perverse fulminating into miscarriage of justice. ( 23 ) ALTHOUGH the settled proposition of law evidently speaks volumes that reliable, luntary, representing, truthful version of the deceased in a dying declaration without jsttwroboration can form the basis of conviction, in-the present case, corroboration to the fbjying declaration is in abanance. The medical evidence of Dr. Vikram Gadhvi at Exh. ( 23 ) ALTHOUGH the settled proposition of law evidently speaks volumes that reliable, luntary, representing, truthful version of the deceased in a dying declaration without jsttwroboration can form the basis of conviction, in-the present case, corroboration to the fbjying declaration is in abanance. The medical evidence of Dr. Vikram Gadhvi at Exh. 13, and medical case papers and the nature and number of injuries also unequivocally, go to biggest that the burns sustained by the deceased were in the nature of homicidal and not mnggestive of suicidal or accidental. Thus, the medical evidence lends material ppbtforcement to the dying, declarations of the deceased, it is also very clear from the ipedical evidence that deceased when questioned by Dr. Gadhvi, in clear terms stated that pie was burnt. It is also clearly testified by Dr. Gadhvi that the deceased was inn fit state hpf mind to make her rational statement, at the time of two oral dying declarations before yjtt was examined by him and even at the time when Executive Magistrate recorded her jjtatement. The Executive Magistrate had also met Dr. Gadhvi and clarified that the deceased was able to giver her rational version and she was conscious. ( 24 ) AGAIN, PW. 3 Sadaji Exh. 18 fully supports the prosecution case who is an htdependent witness whose presence near the place of incident was quite natural. He was working in the railway department as a Khalasi and on hearing shouts of the deceased, mm) she was burnt, he found 4 to 5 Sadhus near the water column where he was doing iptour work extracting coal dust from the railway tracks. He heard the deceased making the first dying declaration before the Sadhus who had questioned her. Sadhus extinguished the fire and since clothes of the deceased were burnt, a piece of cloth was covered on her body by one lady who was staying in the railway quarters and the venue of the incident was near the railway station. ( 25 ) PW 4 Sugrabibi examined at Exh. 19 has clearly stated in her evidence that she saw the deceased shouting for help as she was burnt. Though her clothes turned into ashes and rags, nobody helped her to cover her body as she was in naked condition. ( 25 ) PW 4 Sugrabibi examined at Exh. 19 has clearly stated in her evidence that she saw the deceased shouting for help as she was burnt. Though her clothes turned into ashes and rags, nobody helped her to cover her body as she was in naked condition. At that time, this witness, out of humanitarian approach, gave one pink colour DUPATTA taking it from her body and put on the body of the deceased. Her evidence is quite natural and supports the prosecution case and reinforces the dying declarations. So, corroboration is also received from the evidence of PW. 3. Sadaji Thakore examind at Exh. 18 as well as pw. 4 Sugrabibi,-Exh. 19. Obviously husband of the deceased Vinod Manilal PW. 5, Exh. 20 has also fully supported the case of prosecution and his evidence is found quite natural, spontaneous and reliable. The Trial Court has committed serious error in not placing reliance on his evidence. So, the dying declarations are also materially corroborated by the evidence of PW. 5, Vinod Manilal. ( 26 ) APART from that, one another important aspect may be noted that evidence of hostile witness cannot be thrown over board in its entirely only because the witness has turned hostile to the prosecution case. It is true that dependability and trustworthiness of evidence of such hostile may become weak. Therefore, greater scrutiny and high analysis would be warranted. Nonetheless, if material truth during the course of search of truth by the Court is successfully spent out of noticed from the evidence of the hostile witness, it can be relied upon and if corroborated by other particulars can form basis of conviction. This proposition of law is extensively explored and very well settled. ( 27 ) IN this context, let us have a look into the testimony of hostile witnesses PW 6-Sunilkumar Virprasad Exh. 24 turned hostile to the prosecution case. He is a panch witness. He has admitted his signature in the panchnama. . produced at Exh. 25. However, he has pleaded his ignorance about the contents. But it is found in the course of his cross examination as well as contents of the panchnama that the deceased had sustained serious burn injuries and number of burn injuries alongwith rags and burnt clothes lying were collected by the police and die panchnama was prepared. produced at Exh. 25. However, he has pleaded his ignorance about the contents. But it is found in the course of his cross examination as well as contents of the panchnama that the deceased had sustained serious burn injuries and number of burn injuries alongwith rags and burnt clothes lying were collected by the police and die panchnama was prepared. One thing becomes very clear from his evidence that he is having his Pan Shop near the venue of offence and near the railway station at Patan from railway quarters and at a little distance, there is one garden known as Mahila Udyan. ( 28 ) PW. 8 Hasmukhbhai Rajput, Exh. 31 was the driver of the Rickshaw No. GTH 369. In his rickshaw, deceased Asha in burnt condition was taken from the venue of offence to the house of husband of the deceased from where she was shifted to Civil hospital at Patan. He has clearly admitted in his evidence that the deceased was placed in his rickshaw from the venue of offence near Madhukunj society while he was going towards marketing yard from the the station between 10 and 10. 30 a. m. on the day of the incident. Other two to three persons were also allowed to sit in the rickshaw. The lady who was lying in the rickshaw had sustained serious burn injuries. The rickshaw was initially taken from the venue of offence to Dattatraya society where residential house of husband of the deceased. Keeping the deceased in burnt condition in the rickshaw, the husband was called and thereafter all left for Civil Hospital from the society. No doubt, he has denied the suggestion that dying declaration was made by the deceased to her husband while in rickshaw. He is also turned hostile. But it is very clear from his evidence that the accused had sustained burn injuries and she was suffering from and she was required to be immediately shifted to hospital and she was kept in rickshaw from the venue of offence via Dattatraya society from where the husband boarded the rickshaw. So material corroboration is also received from the evidence of this witness. The learned Trial Judge has observed in para 17 of the impugned judgment that this witness had tried to oblige the accused and it constitutes the first missing link in bringing out prosecution case about location of place of offence. So material corroboration is also received from the evidence of this witness. The learned Trial Judge has observed in para 17 of the impugned judgment that this witness had tried to oblige the accused and it constitutes the first missing link in bringing out prosecution case about location of place of offence. In fact, the view of the Trial Court on this score is patently wrong and manifestly perverse. As a matter of fact, the broad spectrum emerging from the evidence of this witness ought to have been considered by him. There is no difference about the venue of offence as such. What would have happened as such can safely and legitimately be inferred from the set of facts on record. The accused came on scooter. He must have parked the same. He must have taken tin container containing kerosene as per report of forensic science laboratory and thereafter, he followed Asha after questioning her as to why she was disintegrating his prestige by talking about his illicit relationship with her sister Sharda. It is clear from the dying declarations and other facts on record that thereafter Asha started walking going to the school because she wanted to take her baby mittal from the school. As per rule, she had to go to call minor Mittal. It cannot be said precisely at what point of time of what was the exact location near the railway station where the occurrence took place. Since the accused followed the deceased for some distance and since the deceased favourably responded, the accused sprinkled kerosene from the tin container and thereafter put her to fire with lighted lighter. We do not find any substantial difference insofar as venue of Offence is concerned in light of the ficts of the case. Irrespective of that, assuming that there is some difference, then also, can it be said that it would adversely affect the dying declarations and that too five dying claractions made by the deceased voluntarily and truthfully in a fit state of mind on different occasions with different persons ? The positive answer would be in the negative. This aspect is unfortunately lost sight of by the learned Trial Judge. The positive answer would be in the negative. This aspect is unfortunately lost sight of by the learned Trial Judge. It cannot be said that some difference in the exact location of the offence would constitute the first important missing link in case of burning of a lady in the Bazaar in heinous and cruel manner after taking to her by the accused. We, therefore, respectfully disagree with the observations made by the Trial Court. ( 29 ) THEN comes to the evidence of PW. 9 Valiben Patel, Exh. 32 who was the landlady of deceased Asha. On the day of the incident, on hearing shouts of vinod, the husband of trie deceased, she found that Asha had sustained burn injuries and she accompanied alongwith Vinod and one Kokilaben in the rickshaw for taking Asha to the civil Hospital at Patan. It is also very clear from her evidence that accused Hiralal owned a scooter and in laws of the accused are known as Nanayatis. She has admitted in her evidence that the accused has Ice factory. The accuseds father-in-law is manufacturing soap popularly known as Nanavati Soap. It is also clearly admitted by her that the father-in-law of the accused is known as Nanavati Sabuwala as his father-in-law is manufacturing soap in the name and style of Nanavati soap. The accused is husband of pasiben and she belonged to Nanavati family which is engaged in manufacturing nanavati soap and the in-laws of the accused are known as Nanavati Sabuwala being known soap of Patan. Not only this witness corroborates the dying declarations but her testimony establishes without doubt the missing link, if at all it is, between the author of the incident and the accused. ( 30 ) SERIOUS attempt was made to convince us that identity of the accused is not established to the hilt and therefore, benefit would go to the accused. This contention, howsoever may, at the first sight, seem to be ingenious but not valid and sustainable when one gets into the reality of the facts of the present case. The accuseds name is Hiralal patel. His name is repeatedly taken in the dying declarations. He is neighbour and resident of the same society and there was no reason for the deceased to falsely involve the accused in her dying declarations. The accuseds name is Hiralal patel. His name is repeatedly taken in the dying declarations. He is neighbour and resident of the same society and there was no reason for the deceased to falsely involve the accused in her dying declarations. It is not disputed that the in laws of the accused are famous manufacturers of Nanavati soap. Pasiben is the wife of the accused. The accused had also a scooter. Not only he has not denied with regard to the ownership of the said scooter but he has clearly admitted in his statement that it was purchased by him but his son was using it who was studying at Baroda. However, he has admitted under what circumstances and where his scooter was seized by the police from the custody of his son. No doubt, he further submitted in his statement that he himself owned Maruti car and therefore, the scooter was given to his son at Baroda. The accused is dealing in selling tea. The evidence of Valiben that the accused had a scooter and the evidence of prosecution that the accused is owner of the Scooter No. GAW 3040 is admitted by him in his further statement under Sec. 313 of the Code. ( 31 ) APART from that, it is not disputed that the same scooter was taken into custody by the police during the course of investigation and application, Exh. 49 was given before the trial Court for interim custody of the scooter which subsequently in his further statement, he pleaded igorance to have given application, Exh. 49. However, from the record of the present case, it becomes quite transparent that the said scooter which was seized by the police during the course of investigation being a vehicle used by the accused was given to the accused during the pendency of the trial and obviously, it must have been given upon his request made vide application, Exh. 49 though the accused has attempted to saying his statement that he did not give such application. Further, the final order of the learned trial Judge unequivocally states with regard to muddamal scooter that the same was returned to the accused shall be retained by him. 49 though the accused has attempted to saying his statement that he did not give such application. Further, the final order of the learned trial Judge unequivocally states with regard to muddamal scooter that the same was returned to the accused shall be retained by him. So the final order also clearly certifies that the scooter was returned to the accused during the pendency of the trial and was directed to be retained by him at the end of the trial. Notwithstanding that the accused, like any other drowning man who will try to catch a straw to save oneself, did deny in his statement under Sec. 313 that he had as such not given application, Exh. 49 for return of the scooter during the pendency of the trial. Regardless of his bold, wrong, self-contradictory statement, it becomes explicit from the record of the present case that the accused was the owner of the said scooter. It was seized by the police and it was returned to him pursuant an order recorded below exh. 49, the application given by the accused through an advocate and finally, the scooter was directed to be retained in the custody of the accused as he came to be acquitted from the charge levelled against him. Is this not substatially corroborated by the dying declarations given by the deceased ? What more is required ? The Trial Court, with due respect, ought to have considered the material source of corroboration from different quarters and the testimony of above prosecution witnesses. The Dying declaration, which as such, under laws, neds no corroboration and without which, even conviction can be based upon such dying declaration. Even the sole dying declaration of the deceased if it is truthful, voluntary in fit state of mind made by the deceased can constitute a valid base for conviction under sec. 302, whereas, in the present case, the deceased made five consistent dying declarations immediately within spell of an hour at different places before five persons who have no to grind against anybody, who are totally independent and reliable persons. Not only that, these five dying declarations are sufficiently reinforced and corroborated by the material circumstances and evidence on record. 302, whereas, in the present case, the deceased made five consistent dying declarations immediately within spell of an hour at different places before five persons who have no to grind against anybody, who are totally independent and reliable persons. Not only that, these five dying declarations are sufficiently reinforced and corroborated by the material circumstances and evidence on record. Deposit this, on trivial grounds, the Trial Court has accorded acquittal which is, in our opinion, palpably wrong unjust, unreasonable and contrary to principles of setttled proposition of law relatable to the law of dying declaration. In view of the entire factual scenario emerging from the record of the present case and relevant proposition of law, the submissions raised by learned advocate Mr. Shetna for the respondent accused in defence and the reasons and ultimate conclusion recorded by the Trial Court in reaching the verdict of acquittal, are unustainable. ( 32 ) THE learned advocate for the respondent contended that the appellate Court while dealing with merits of acquittal appeal will not interfere only on the ground that upon assessment of evidence, a different view is possible. There cannot be any dispute with this proposition. However, it is equally true and settled proposition of law that while dealing with appeal against acquittal, under Sec. 378 of the Code, the Court has to interfere if the acquittal is perverse or manifestly illegal, or grossly unjust or devoid of proper reading of evidence. This proposition is extensively explored in catena of judicial pronouncements. We would like to highlight the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in State of U. P. vs. Anil Singh, AIR 1988 SC 1998 wherein the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in state of U. P. vs. Jashoda Nandan Gupta, AIR 1974 SC 753 and State of A. P. vs. P. Anjaneyulu, AIR 1982 SC 1598 were also referred to. It has been clearly laid down that the appellate Court should not hesitate to interfere if the acquital is perverse in the sense that no reasonable person would have come to that conclusion or if the acquittal is manifestly illegal or grossly unjust. In Anil Singhs case (Supra) principles of appreciation of acquittal appeal are very well propounded and the observations made in Paras 13 and 15 are very pertinent and relevant. In Anil Singhs case (Supra) principles of appreciation of acquittal appeal are very well propounded and the observations made in Paras 13 and 15 are very pertinent and relevant. It has been clearly held that in an appeal against acquittal, in the great majority of cases, the prosecution version is rejected either for want of corroboration by independent witnesses, or for some falsehood stated or embroidery added by witnesses. , In some cases, the entire prosecution case is doubted for not examining all witnesses to the occurrence. The indifferent attitude of the public in the investigation of crimes could also be pointed. The public are generally reluctant to come forward to depose before the Court. It is, therefore, not correct to reject the prosecution version only on ground that all witnesses to occurrence have not been examined. It is also not proper to reject the case for want of corroboration by independent witnesses if the case made out is otherwise true and acceptable. With regard to falsehood stated or embellishments added by the prosecution witnesses, it is well to remember that there is a tendency amongst witnesses in our country to back up a good case by false or exaggerated version. It is also experienced that invariably the witnesses add embroidery to prosecution story, perhaps for the fear of being disbelieved. But that is no grounds to throw the case overboard, if true, in the main. If there is a ring of truth in the main, the case should not be rejected. It is the duty of the Court to cull out the nuggets of truth from the evidence unless there is reason to believe that the inconsistencies of falsehood are so glaring as utterly to destroy confidence in the witnesses. It is necessary to remember that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. One is as important as the other. Both are public duties which the Judge has to perform. In our opinion, the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court are clear, direct and pertinent and is an answer to various contentions raised by the learned advocate for the respondents accused. One is as important as the other. Both are public duties which the Judge has to perform. In our opinion, the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court are clear, direct and pertinent and is an answer to various contentions raised by the learned advocate for the respondents accused. For example, his submission that the doctor who first examined the deceased in the Civil hospital is not examined; the incident occured in the broad day light in a public street and must have been witnessed by independent witnesses and non-examination of such witnesses and examination of independent persons not supporting the prosecution case are some of the submissions which merit no further consideration in view of our earlier discussion and the aforesaid observations highlighting the duties of criminal Court. ( 33 ) IT was also seriously contended that in light of the evidence on record, various circumstances which atleast would create cloud of doubt and, therefore, benefit should be conferred on the accused. We may painfully observe that the version of the accused that he owns Maruti car and he was moving only in Maruti car and was not using the scooter which was given to his son who was studying at Baroda though Scooter was found and seized by the police in connection with the offence in question, is some of the submissions on the basis of which cloud of doubt was sought to be created, which otherwise has dispelled even slightest doubt even if there was any, by the observations of the Honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. Undoubtedly, benefit of doubt is one of the cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence available to the accused if there were any doubt of reasonable prudent man. Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act is time and again interpreted and highlighted in number of decisions and it has been held that doubt must be of a reasonable person of degree which would permit reaching a particular conclusion. If doubt is shown to be reasonable of just and reasonable person, needless to state that benefit must go to the accused. But the main anxiety of the Court in such situation is to see as to whether benefit of doubt sought to be raised is of common, reasonable, prudent person. If doubt is shown to be reasonable of just and reasonable person, needless to state that benefit must go to the accused. But the main anxiety of the Court in such situation is to see as to whether benefit of doubt sought to be raised is of common, reasonable, prudent person. Benefit of doubt weapon or rule of benefit of doubt must not be fanciful and it cannot be allowed to be used to strive upon vetripotent reliable evidence, direct or circumstantial. In this connection, we would like to refer to a recent decision of this Court in State of Gujarat vs. Gambhirsinh Narubha Jadeja, XXXIX (3) GLR 2043 (in which one of us-J. N. Bhatt, J. was a party) in which we have highlighted important principles and aspects which must be reflected in the mental Radar before otherwise meritorious case of prosecution governing heinous and gruesome culpability being thwarted on the doctrine of benefit of doubt. In that case, we had occasion to point out as many as 16 circumstances and the principles while dealing with doctrine of benefit of doubt. In Para 22, while highlighting 16 such aspects, it had been observed that if these aspects are not presnt in the mind of the learned Trial Judge on the Court had remained oblivious to the aforesaid principles and facts of doctrine of benefit of doubt, the decision of the Court is not only rendered misconceived but manifestly preverse. The Division Bench decision and its observations supply a clear answer to the said submission of Mr. Shethna who probably advanced the plea at that time in an attempt to polish the brass when the whole ship is sinking. ( 34 ) BEFORE parting, we are also constrained to mention the known and celebrated practice and precedent ought be strictly observed by the criminal Court with regard to visiting venue of offence, ordinarily, visit to such place is a matter of time. If at all it were imperative, it must be reflected in a live report on record so that the appellate Court can examine the mental image gathered by the Judge upon such visit. If at all it were imperative, it must be reflected in a live report on record so that the appellate Court can examine the mental image gathered by the Judge upon such visit. We would like to mention that though Sec. 310 of the Code provides for local inspection by Judges of criminal Courts, the said Section commands and demands that such visit should be subject to (i) due notice to the parties; (2) it must reveal the purpose of such visit; (iii) without loss of time, memorandum of relevant facts observed at the time of inspection shall be articulated in black and white and a copy of such report shall be furnished to the party concerned or to the concerned advocates. This provision in Sec. 310 of the Code is corresponding to the provision of Sec. 539-B of the Code of 1898 and the ratio decidendi is that normally a Court is not entitled to make local inspection and secondly even if such inspection is made, it can never take place of proof or evidence but is really meant for appreciating the position at spot. In order to see that there is free and fair trial, it becomes incumbent upon the Judge visiting the place of occurrence or any other such inspection on spot must be followed by a memorandum of facts relevant found by the Judge observed in course of inspection. Unfortunately, the material or memorandum as mandated by provisions of Sec. 310 (1) of the Code does not appear to have been placed on record. However, we have found from the record pursuant to an order recorded below Exh. 63 that the Trial Judge did visit the venue of offence on 6. 1. 1991. We are sorry to say that this procedural lapse in not plating the memorandum or report on record as mandated by law cannot be said to be insignificant and w,e do not know whether the observed facts by the learned Trial Judge in course of inspection in any way coloured the vision or influenced his mind or not in reaching the impugned judgment, in absence of such memorandum or report brought on record. We are of the opinion that we all strive much less criminal Court at search of truth. We are of the opinion that we all strive much less criminal Court at search of truth. As observed by the Honourable Supreme Court in anil Singhs case (Supra), a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. One is as important as the other. Both are public duties which the Judge has to perform. However, a capital crime like murder and that too of a young lady in her 30 is done away for a motive in a broad day light in a public street by sprinkling kerosene on her anatomy and then to put her to fire and issue of such serious culpability under consideration and for determination and adjudication, the criminal Court much less additional Sessions Court could fall in the trap of procedural lapse. It would be, therefore, expedient and desirable to highlight and point out of our subordinate judiciary, where such provisions are mandated in Sec. 310 and the said provisions are interpreted by the honourable Apex Court in (1985) 3 SCC, 376. We therefore, deem it necessary to direct the registry to circulate to all Courts this decision which we hope, will not turn our cry in the wilderness and will subserve its purpose so that the basic principles of criminal jurisprudence that trial should be fair and free could be achieved in its high order of degree. ( 35 ) LAST but not the least, we would be failing in our duty if we do not record the contention raised by learned Addl. P. P. Mr. Desai. He drew our attention to the panchnama Exh. 27 in which the injuries sustained by the accused when arrest panchnama had been recorded, in view of the arrest panchnama, Exh. 27, the following injuries were noticed on the person of the accused: (i) a wound on the light leg knee; (ii) abrasions on both the hands. Panchas were called by the investigating officer in Janta Ice factory compound situated in Dattatraya society where the accused was arrested and Scooter No. GAW 3040 was seized. The following observations "injuries to the accused and damage to the vehicle" are material, to be stated at this juncture. The accused was found to have sustained injuries on right ankle and knee and abrasions on both hands. The following observations "injuries to the accused and damage to the vehicle" are material, to be stated at this juncture. The accused was found to have sustained injuries on right ankle and knee and abrasions on both hands. Therefore, on being questioned by the investigating officer for treatment, he declined for the same. ( 36 ) LIKEWISE, Scooter No. GAW 3040 of sky colour of Vespa company was found to have been broken. Since this contention was raised before us in Support of the appeal alpngwith other aspects, we have referred to the same. In reply to this contention raised by mr. Desai, learned advocate for defence Mr. Shethna contended that such injuries are not explained by the prosecution and therefore, benefit should go to the accused True, injuries sustained by the accused in view of the panchnama are not explained. Is it proposition of law that non-explanation of injuries on the person of the accused should invariably culminate into acquittal of the accused? It is a settled proposition of law that though ordinarily prosecution is obliged to explain the injuries sustained by the accused on his anatomy, it is not a straitjacket formula or invariable proposition that in all cases, regardless of strength and power of the evidence of prosecution, it would lead to fatality. On the contrary, in our opinion, it would not be obligatory for prosecution to explain the injuries when injuries are superfluous as in the present case. Even in case of serious injuries when the case is based on poor and simple circumstances, explanation of injuries on the person of the accused becomes important and more relevant. It loses its total significance when it is a case based on dying declaration. A dying declaration is not supposed to include nature and number of injuries, if any, sustained by the accused. Apart from that, there cannot be a general principle or rule of prudence even, that in all cases, injuries on the person of the accused must be explained by the prosecution or else, it would prove fatal. In our opinion, even in case of serious injuries when culpability of the accused person in established to the hilt, with reliable, dependable, trustworthy, direct or circumstantial evidence, mere fact of non-explanation of injuries would not come in the way of prosecution. 13. 10. 1998 ( 37 ) BACK to the main stream of sentencing. In our opinion, even in case of serious injuries when culpability of the accused person in established to the hilt, with reliable, dependable, trustworthy, direct or circumstantial evidence, mere fact of non-explanation of injuries would not come in the way of prosecution. 13. 10. 1998 ( 37 ) BACK to the main stream of sentencing. Since the accused is found guilty for the offence under Sec. 302, IPC which perscribes that whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. The area and scope of sentencing is in a very narrow compass. On the question of sentence, we have heard learned advocate for the accused and learned Addl. P. P. for the State. ( 38 ) DURING the course of submissions on the question of sentencing the following aspects emerge unquestionably: (i) that the State has not submitted for extreme penalty of death; (ii) Therefore, the only alternative left with this Court is to impose minimum punishment of imprisonment for life and to direct to pay fine; (iii) The accused is a businessman having agency of selling tea leaves of C. Somabhai Brand which is reported to be famous in tea world. (iv) The accuseds family is also engaged in ice manufacturing factory. The accused is owner of Maruti car. It, therefore, transpires that the accused is coming from effluent class of society. (v) Scooter No. GAW 3040 was used by the accused for committing curel and heinous crime of murder of a lady who was in the grime of her youth and that too in abroad day light in a public street. The tin container containing kerosene was also taken out from the trunk of the scooter. The scooter was, therefore, seized by the police during the course of investigation being incriminating vehicle. (vi) Custody of muddamal scooter during the pendency of trial was demanded by the Trial Court and the Trial Court prima facie found him entitled to possess it and interim coustody during the trial was handed over to him pursuant to his demand for return of the scooter made under Exh. 49. (vii) It is not disputed that muddamal scooter is in the custody of the accused and it becomes apparent from the observations made in the final order that muddamal scooter shall be retained by the accused. 49. (vii) It is not disputed that muddamal scooter is in the custody of the accused and it becomes apparent from the observations made in the final order that muddamal scooter shall be retained by the accused. ( 39 ) WE are also obliged to consider one more aspect before concluding process of sentencing. Deceased Asha died leaving two minor children one daughter Mittal aged about 4 at that time and one son Bhargav aged about 1 and half years. As the ill luck would have been for the children, they were deprived of motherly care, affection and warmth when they needed the most. It is in this context that we are prompted to mention that there is one important aspect of criminal jurisprudence i. e. victimology. It is in this cpntext that the legislature in its wisdom provided that in appropriate cases, victims of crime can be paid the amount of compensation. Even in case of imposition of fine amount, fine can also be directed to be paid to the victims of such serious offences. This is precisely the rationale and design of the provisions of Sec. 357 of the Code which empowers the Court imposing sentence to direct the party to pay compensation to the victims of the crime. Sec. 357 has purpose and policy behind it. Since, so far so the realm of victimology has remained neglected, provisions came to be incorporated in Sec. 357 of the Code. In order to claim truthful and legitimate claim for compensation, it is incumbent to show that the victims of offence were not in any way contributory in the happening of the crime; whereas, in case of criminal victims of crime, like children are ipso facto entitled to compensation, without entering into further meticulous discussion and niceties of classes of victims of crime. We are therefore, inclined to grant compensation to the children who are minors. Of course, loss of mother and that too for minors is always irreparable and irretrievable. What are aim to magnify the sufferings as victims of crime is to pay reasonable amount of compensation with a view to eliminate to an extent as far as possible, in terms of money. Of course, loss of mother and that too for minors is always irreparable and irretrievable. What are aim to magnify the sufferings as victims of crime is to pay reasonable amount of compensation with a view to eliminate to an extent as far as possible, in terms of money. Before concluding this part of verdict, we cannot resist the temptation of saying that victimology is not only an important facet of criminal jurisprudence abul unfortunately has remained neglected for a long spell and any further neglect of such crime victims and that too in case of widows or minors will in all probability run diametrically opposite to the provisions of Sec. 357 of the Code. ( 40 ) OF course, while considering the amount of compensation to be awarded either out of the amount or time or otherwise, the Court is obliged to consider the financial status and position of the wrong doer of the crime as also financial position of the victims of crime. The very expression compensation denotes to recompensate and to make resultant harm and injury on account of crime in question good, as far as possible in terms of money. . ( 41 ) KEEPING in mind the aforesaid broad facts and principles of law, we propose to pass the following final order reversing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal of the Trial Court. ( 42 ) RESPONDENT-ORIGINAL accused Hiralal Joitaram Patel is held guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 302 IPC and is directed to undergo R. I. for life and to pay fine of Rs. 20,000/- and in default, to undergo further R. I. for two years. ( 43 ) THE amount of fine, if deposited, shall be divided equally, like that, Rs. 10,000/- each, and shall be paid to the guardian of minors for their upkeepment and welfare and therefore, we direct that the amount of Rs. 10,000/- coming to the share of each minor shall be invested in a nationalised bank for a period of not less than ten years and the interest which shall accrue due thereon periodically shall be paid to the guardian until minors attain majority, for, expending the same for welfare of the minors. Interest thereon shall be paid to the children on their attaining majority. Interest thereon shall be paid to the children on their attaining majority. In the event of any withdrawal from the said amount of deposit, it will be open for the concerned parties to approach the Trial Court for passing appropriate orders. ( 44 ) NOW, the question would arise with regard to disposal of offending scooter. Since the muddamal scooter was used for commission of the heinous crime, it will be totally expedient and necessary to forfeit the scooter to Government. The Trial Court has handed over possession of the muddamal scooter to the accused during the pendency of the trial and in the final order, has directed to be retained by him, as he was found not guilty. Since we have found him guilty for capital crime under Sec. 302 for burning deceased Asha by using scooter, the same is directed to be forfeited to the State and the accused shall produce the muddamal scooter within a period of one month from today, failing which requisite necessary action shall be initiated. The accused is on bail during the pendency of appeal. Therefore, learned advocate for the accused has requested to grant reasonable time to the accused to surrender, to serve out the sentence imposed by us. Learned Addl. P. P. is also heard. In the circumstances of the case, since the accused is enlarged on bail during the pendency of appeal, the bail bonds obviously shall stand cancelled. However, twelve weeks time is granted to surrender so as to serve out the sentence imposed by us hereinabove. .