Judgment S.P. Srivastava, J. 1. The petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioners for quashing the order dated 7-10-95 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the order dated 12-12-97 passed by the appellate Court. 2. The relevant facts for the purposes of the present writ petition are that the father of petitioner No. 1 and husband of petitioner No. 2 Nathu Mai Agarwal was tenant of the shop situate on the ground floor of building No. 220, Ganj Bazar, Meerut Cantt, hereinafter referred to as the shop in dispute only. The tenancy started in 1940. After the death of Nath Mai Agarwal, the petitioners became tenant of the shop in dispute. Respondent No. 3 Smt. Swadesh Ahluwalia is the landlady. The landlady applied under Section 21(l)(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The need shown in the application was that her son Sanjeev Walia is aged 25 years. He has become invalid in an accident and the shop in dispute is required for his use and occupation. It was also stated that second son is also unemployed and his establishment is also necessary during the life time of the landlady. It was admitted in the application that Tarun Walia is partly employed in partnership firm of her husband, namely, Satyakam and was getting only Rs. 1500 per month as salary. 3. The petitioners contested the application under Section 21 on a number of grounds. It was denied that Sanjeev Walia is a disabled person, rather it was stated that he is already working alongwith his father and doing business. The petitioners are carrying on business in the accommodation in question. They have no source of income except from the shop in dispute. It was also stated that the Prescribed Authority Case No. 31 of 1980 was filed by the landlady before the Prescribed Authority on similar ground which was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority and the appeal filed by the landlady was also dismissed. Therefore, the present application is barred by principle of resjudicata. It was further stated that the landlady had filed P.A. Case No. 32 of 1980 against Shital Prasad on similar ground but that petition was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority and appeal filed by the landlady against that judgment was also dismissed. Therefore, the present application is barred by principle of resjudicata. It was further stated that the landlady had filed P.A. Case No. 32 of 1980 against Shital Prasad on similar ground but that petition was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority and appeal filed by the landlady against that judgment was also dismissed. It is stated that husband of the landlady is also in occupation of shop No. 300, Kaisar Ganj, Meerut City and the major portion of the shop is in possession of the husband. Sanjeev Walia is also working in M/s. Satyakam Firm with his father and the family of the landlady is having several business i.e. the business of scooter agency, Agricultural implement, Agents of B.M.C. Engines, Distributors of Tractor geers for whole of U.P. and Rajasthan State, Agency of Auto parts of Ford Tractors and all the family members are invoked in all these business. They require no further accommodation. It was also stated that there was a workshop in accommodation No. 240, South End Road, Meerut which is in possession of the husband of the landlady. 4. The parties filed evidence before the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority on 7-10-95 allowed the application of the landlady. The petitioners filed an appeal against the judgment of the Prescribed Authority. It is stated that the petitioners filed an affidavit before the appellate Court that the landlady has concealed the real fact regarding the availability of shops with her and in the affidavit it was also brought to the notice of the Court that respondent No. 2 got pos session of other shop in P.A. Case No. 142 of 1989 which was in possession of Shitla Prasad, therefore, the need of the landlady has been fulfilled. It is also stated that a Writ Petition No. 27187 of 1996 was filed against an interlocutory order which was allowed on 26-8-96. The matter was remanded to the appellate Court to decide the same in the light of the observations made by the High Court. The petitioners have filed that judgment as Annexure-9 to the writ petition. It is stated that the petitioners have filed an application for inspection. They have also filed an affidavit before the District Judge and documents to prove that Sanjeev Walia, and Tarun Walia are connected with number of family Firms. The appeal was dismissed on 12-12-97. The petitioners have challenged these two orders. 5. It is stated that the petitioners have filed an application for inspection. They have also filed an affidavit before the District Judge and documents to prove that Sanjeev Walia, and Tarun Walia are connected with number of family Firms. The appeal was dismissed on 12-12-97. The petitioners have challenged these two orders. 5. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties, therefore, the matter was finally heard. 6. Heard learned Counsel for the par ties and perused the record. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the appellate Court has carved out a new case that the landlady requires the premises for opening a show-room when there was no pleading to this effect. His contention was that in her application she had only said in para 8 of the application that she wants the accommodation in question for establishing her two sons by opening shop of general merchandise, kerana and food products but the finding of the appellate Court is that the shop in dispute is needed for opening a show room and sale of auto-filters which they are manufacturing. The argument of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that from this finding it is clear that the need shown by the landlady in the application was not found to be there. His further submission is that the shop in question is the only source of livelihood of the petitioners, therefore, the judgment of the Courts below are against the record and evidence. In reply learned Counsel for the respondents has urged that it is not necessary in the application under Section 21 of the Act to give any business. It is enough to say that the landlord requires the accommodation in question. His contention is that when the appellate Court considered that the landlady is manufacturing some auto parts and she has no place to sell those products and her sons want to establish themselves by selling those products which they are manufacturing and they need the shop, the need is genuine. 7. From the judgment of the Prescribed Authority it is clear that the applicant has proved that the tenant has alternative accommodation available, with him and the need of Sanjeev Walia and Tarun Walia are genuine and bonafide. The comparative need has also been decided against the petitioner. 7. From the judgment of the Prescribed Authority it is clear that the applicant has proved that the tenant has alternative accommodation available, with him and the need of Sanjeev Walia and Tarun Walia are genuine and bonafide. The comparative need has also been decided against the petitioner. From the judgment of the Prescribed Authority it is also clear that he has considered the change circumstances of the landlady that originally they wanted to start general merchandise, kerana and food product business but now they have installed a factory and want to open a show-room. So it is clear that the changed position was placed before the Prescribed Authority it self. This change position would like a subsequent event. 8. From the judgment of the appellate Court it is also clear that he has considered every aspect of the case even the need for sending a commission to make enquiry and held that as both the parties have accepted the opening of business premises and industries of each other, therefore, there was no need to send a commission which will unnecessarily linger the proceedings. On merit the appellate Court has considered that instead of opening a business of general merchandise and food products, the landlady wants to open a show-room which can be done and there will be no illegality merely by changing the nature of the business. Apart from the factual controversy which was from the very beginning before the Prescribed Authority, one legal question which was to be determined in this case, was as to whether there can be a change in the nature of purposes by the landlord of landlady or the purposes once shown in the application can only be looked into for assessing the genuine and bona fide need of the landlord and the second question was whether the sub sequent event should have been taken into consideration by the appellate Court and if the landlady got another accommodation occupied by Shitla Prasad who was tenant, her need stood satisfied or not. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that in view of provisions contained in Section 38, the provisions of Rule 22 of the Act are applicable to this case. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that in view of provisions contained in Section 38, the provisions of Rule 22 of the Act are applicable to this case. There fore, unless the pleading is amended by the landlord changing the purpose, the application should not have been allowed as there was no pleading that her sons wanted to open a show-room in the application. He has placed reliance on 1930 Privy Council 57 Siddik Mohamed Shah v. Mr. Saran and Ors. his further contention is that bona fide need has to be adjudged on the date of occupation when the cause of action accrues and no new case be carved out. For that purpose he has placed reliance on A.R.C. 1997 (1) 627, Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal. He has also placed reliance on a case A.R.C. 1994 (2) 11 Rajendra Kumar and Ors. v. Gopal Krishna and Ors., and has urged that if it was proved from the evidence that two sons were carrying on business of manufacturing auto-filters then the landlady has no bona fide need for running general merchandise or food products; Learned Counsel for the respondents has urged that in the application under Section 21 only need is to be shown and purpose is insignificant and no one can compel the landlord to start a particular business or even the business which has been disclosed in the application and the landlord need not specify the business or the purpose in the application. He has placed reliance on 1995 Supreme Court 576, Raj Kumar Khaitan and Ors. v. Bibi Subaida Khatun and another. In this case Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (4 of 1983) was considered. Section 11 of that Act appears to be equivalent to Section 21 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The Supreme Court took a view that it was not necessary for the landlord to indicate the precise nature of the business which they intended to start in the premises. Even if the nature of business would have been indicated nobody could bind the landlord to start the same business in the premises after it was vacate. 9. The relevant portion of Section 21 of Act No. 13 of 1972 is quoted herein below: "21. Even if the nature of business would have been indicated nobody could bind the landlord to start the same business in the premises after it was vacate. 9. The relevant portion of Section 21 of Act No. 13 of 1972 is quoted herein below: "21. Proceedings for release of building -under occupation of tenant- (V) The Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists; (a) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust for the objects of the trust; (b). . . . . . . . . 10. The learned Counsel for the respondents has urged that words "for purposes of any profession, trade or calling" have been used, therefore, it is not necessary that a particular purpose should be mentioned. He has also placed reliance on 1989 (1) A.R.C. 290, Dr. Ved Prakash v. VIth Addl. District Judge, Moradabad and Ors. In this case also the initial requirement was to start Arhat business but that stand was subsequently changed when Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam was made applicable to Sambhal in the district of Moradabad where the disputed property is situated. The Court took a view that merely on the ground that some variation has been done in regard to the nature of business which the landlord wishes to carry on in the shop cannot be sufficient ground for rejecting the application. In the instant case also the landlady wanted to establish his two sons by opening general merchandise shop but subsequently when the sons started manufacturing business they wanted to open show room for the sale of articles manufactured by them. Idea was changed because of development made subsequently in the business of the sons of the landlady, therefore, when the law permits subsequent event to be taken into consideration and that will amount to a subsequent event, the Court must consider it. The two Courts have considered it. Idea was changed because of development made subsequently in the business of the sons of the landlady, therefore, when the law permits subsequent event to be taken into consideration and that will amount to a subsequent event, the Court must consider it. The two Courts have considered it. Reliance has also been placed on 1996 (1) A.R.C. 399 Jagdish Chandra Chawla v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Allahabad and Ors; In this case Rule 15 framed under the Act was interpreted and it was held that the Court can accept the evidence in support of the grounds already mentioned in the application without asking for amendment in the pleading. Learned Counsel for the respondent has urged that since the purpose was to run a business and because of change circumstances the landlady wanted to open a show-room for the sale of auto-filters which they were manufacturing, therefore, even if that was not mentioned in the application which was a sub sequent development in the family, the Court can consider this change circumstance. He has placed reliance on 1995 (2) A.R.C. 45, Ram Prakash v. IIIrd Addl. Civil Judge, Bareilfy. This case related to subsequent event. His contention is that even if the pleading was not there, sub sequent event can be brought on record by filing an affidavit and as the affidavit was filed that the landlord wants to open a show-room the Court has rightly seen the subsequent event. He has placed reliance on 1993 (1) A.R.C. 314, Shanti Swarup v. 1st Addl. District Judge, Ghaziabad and Ors. This is also on the point of subsequent event. In reply to the arguments of learned Counsel for the respondents, Sri Tandan has urged that the burden is on the landlord to prove the bonafide need and further that the Court is required to make reasonable approach to such problem. It must adjudge itself about the genuineness of the need set forth by the landlord in the application and the Court must decide that the same is reasonable and bona fide. He has placed reliance on a case 1979 A.W.C. 3, Nand Kishore Sharraf v. The District Judge, Mathura and Ors. His contention is that when the application was filed for the commission, the Court should have considered as to whether the landlady has got another accommodation at her disposal which was vacated by Shitla Prasad. He has placed reliance on a case 1979 A.W.C. 3, Nand Kishore Sharraf v. The District Judge, Mathura and Ors. His contention is that when the application was filed for the commission, the Court should have considered as to whether the landlady has got another accommodation at her disposal which was vacated by Shitla Prasad. For that purpose he has placed reliance on 1996 (1) A.R.C. 545, Dwarika Nath Soni v. Prescribed Authority Shikohabad and Ors. 11. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties at length and seeing the decisions cited by them, I am of the view that as Section 21 of the Act, a portion of which has been quoted above only says that the application can be filed that the building is bonafide required for the purpose of any profession, trade or calling, it is not necessary that any specific purpose must be mentioned in the application. It is significant to mention here that if on the date of application, the landlord or landlady had only need to open a small shop and it was mentioned in the application but the subsequent event which happened in the family a manufacturing business was established for the sons themselves and they wanted to change the business and instead of selling the food products as mentioned in the application they wanted to sell their own manufacturing auto filters, they can not be compelled to start the same business for which the application was filed. If this will be the idea behind moving the application then the building once released if not utilised for the purpose mentioned in the application would be said to have been wrongly released. The intention of the legislature appears to be that if the landlord is in the bonafide need of the premises in occupation of the tenant for any purpose, an application can be filed and when the law permits the tenant to bring on record the subsequent event and to prove that the landlord's need has stood satisfied, the landlord has also a right to bring the subsequent event on record that the need still subsists but for a different purpose. The only thing which is to be done for the Court is to give opportunity to the parties to rebut the fact stated byway of subsequent event either on behalf of the applicant or on behalf of the tenant. The only thing which is to be done for the Court is to give opportunity to the parties to rebut the fact stated byway of subsequent event either on behalf of the applicant or on behalf of the tenant. From the perusal of the judgment of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as well as of the Appellate Authority it is apparent that the facts in detail have been considered from very beginning and the applicant has come with clean hands and expressed intention at the earliest opportunity and the findings of fact have been recorded by the two authorities that the need of the landlady is bona fide and genuine. Therefore, mere change of the purpose of business will not be enough to reject the application under Section 21 of the Act. 12. The finding of facts requires no interference, therefore, the writ petition has no merit. It is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.