Madan Singh Rawat v. Ajmer Central Co-operative Bank
1998-05-12
J.S.SIDHU, RAJENDRA SAXENA
body1998
DigiLaw.ai
Honble SAXENA, J.–This special appeal has been directed against the order dated 23.4.97 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3973/93, whereby appellants writ petition was dismissed. (2). Succinctly stated, relevant facts are that the appellant was initially appointed as a Class IV servant in services of the respondent Bank w.e.f. 20.11.90 against sanctioned post on a consolidated monthly pay of Rs. 600/- in pursuance of the decision taken in meeting of Board of Directors of the Bank held on 17.8.91 (Ann. 1). However, the respondent No. 1 vide order dated 16.3.92 (Ann. 2) terminated services of the appellant without affording him an opportunity of hearing and without serving him any notice. The appellant challenged his termination order Ann. 2 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2488/92, which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 22.3.93 Ann. 3 and his termination order dated 16.3.92 was quashed and the appellant was directed to be reinstated in service. However, it was made clear that the respondent Bank was free to terminate service of the appellant in accordance with law. Consequent upon the order (Ann. 3), the appellant was reinstated. However, the respondent Bank vide its order dated 13.5.93 (Ann. 4) again terminated services of the appellant under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act w.e.f. 13.5.93. Being aggrieved by the impugned order of termination (Ann. 4) the petitioner filed writ petition before this Court. However, the learned Single Bench by its order dated 23.4.97 held that no case for interference was made out and dismissed the writ petition. Hence this special appeal. (3). We have heard Shri B.L. Samdaria, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri R.K. Pahwa, the learned counsel for the respondents at length and carefully perused the relevant record. (4). The main contention of Shri Samdaria is that the respondents while terminating the services of the appellant have again violated the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1949 inasmuch that since appellant earlier termination order (Ann.
(4). The main contention of Shri Samdaria is that the respondents while terminating the services of the appellant have again violated the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1949 inasmuch that since appellant earlier termination order (Ann. 2) was quashed by this Court and he was reinstated in service with continuity of service, he shall be deemed to have been in continuous service from 20.11.90 till 13.5.93, i.e. for a period about two years, five months and twenty three days, but the respondents have given him retrenchment compensation of 15 days pay, which is inadequate and not in accordance with the mandatory provisions contained in Sec. 25-F (b) of the Act and, therefore, termination of the appellant is non-est, null and void, and the same deserves to be set aside. (5). Shri R.K. Pahwa has vehemently contended that there is no violation of provisions of S. 25-F (b) of the Act, because the appellant was reinstated in service on 12.3.93 that he was not in service of the bank from 16.3.92 to 11.3.93 and that his services were validly retrenched on 13.5.93 and, therefore, retrenchment compensation for 15 days pay to the appellant is adequate and in accordance with provisions of Sec. 25-F(b) of the Act. (6). We are not at all impressed by this argument of Shri Pahwa. The appellant was initially appointed as Class IV servant in the respondent Bank on 20.11.90 and his services were illegally terminated from 16.3.92 and his termination order Ann. 2 was held to be illegal and the same was set aside by this Court vide Ann. 3 and he was ordered to be reinstated in service. In such circumstances, it shall be deemed that the appellant was in continuous service of the respondent Bank since 20.11.90, even though he was reinstated on 2.3.93. His services were again terminated from 13.5.93. Thus the appellant was in continuous service of the respondent Bank for a period of two years, 5 months and 23 days. In view of this, the retrenchment compensation for 15 days pay given to appellant is positively inadequate and not in accordance with mandatory provisions of Sec. 25-F(b) of the Act.
His services were again terminated from 13.5.93. Thus the appellant was in continuous service of the respondent Bank for a period of two years, 5 months and 23 days. In view of this, the retrenchment compensation for 15 days pay given to appellant is positively inadequate and not in accordance with mandatory provisions of Sec. 25-F(b) of the Act. It is really a sad state of affairs that the respondent Bank despite this courts specific direction that the appellants services may be terminated in accordance with law afresh, did not follow the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. In such circumstances, the impugned order dated 13.5.93 Ann. 4 terminating the services of the appellant is illegal & non est and the same cannot be sustained. The learned Single Judge however has not given any reason while dismissing the appellants writ petition except that no case for interference was made out. The learned Single Benchs order dated 23.4.97, therefore, deserves to be set aside. (7). In the result, this special appeal is allowed and impugned order dated 23.4.97 passed by the learned Single Judge as also the impugned order of termination dated 13.5.93 (Ann. 4) are hereby set aside and the respondent Bank is directed to reinstate the appellant Babulal in service with all back wages from the date of his illegal termination i.e. w.e.f. 13.5.93. The respondent-Bank shall be at liberty to retrench the appellant de novo in accordance with law. No order as to costs.