JUDGMENT - A.C. AGARWAL, J.:---The present petition in so far as it seeks to impugn the virus of sub-section (2) of section 28 of the Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board Act, 1969 and sub-section (2) of section 83 of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 will no longer survive in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai)1, reported in 1986(3) Bom.C.R. 243 wherein the virus of the entire Act has been upheld. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision in para 13 has observed as follows (Page 256 Bom.C.R) : "13. Even granting for purposes of argument that sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 44 are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, we are of the view that the said provisions receive the protection of Article 31-C of the Constitution. We shall proceed to test the validity of the argument keeping aside for the time being the observations in (Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.)2, 1983(1) S.C.R. 1000 Let us proceed on the basis that after (Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala)3, 1973 Supp. S.C.R. 1 and (Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India)4, 1981(1) S.C.R. 206 . Article 31-C reads as notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Clause (b) or Clause (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19. Clause (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution which is relevant for our purpose states that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve common good. The High Court rightly observed at the end of paragraph 14 of its judgment following Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company's case (supra) that the expression material resources of the community would cover the lands held by private owners also. The High Court rightly observed at the end of paragraph 14 of its judgment following Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company's case (supra) that the expression material resources of the community would cover the lands held by private owners also. But it however erred thereafter in reaching the conclusion that Article 31-C was not applicable to the case for the reason that (i) the Act did not contain a declaration that it was enacted to give effect to Article 39(b), (ii) by undertaking development of commercial centres while providing housing accommodation, the Authority was expected to make profits and hence followed that the power to acquire was not conferred with a view to achieving the directive principles in Article 39(b), and (iii) the object of enacting the legislation was obviously to provide wholesome civic life to the citizens and not distribution of material resources. We are of the view that each one of these reasons is invalid and erroneous. First, Article 31-C does not say that in an Act there should be a declaration by the appropriate legislature to the effect that it is being enacted to achieve the object contained in Article 39(b). In order to ascertain whether it is protected by Article 31-C the Court has to satisfy itself about the character of the legislation by studying all parts of it. The question whether an Act is intended to secure the objects contained in Article 39(b) or not does not depend upon the declaration by the legislature but depends on its contents. We have already dealt with the objects of the Act with which we are concerned in this case. In it inter alia makes provisions for acquisition of private lands for providing sites for building houses or housing accommodation to the community. The title to the lands of the private holders which are acquired first vests in the State Government. Later on the land is developed and then distributed amongst the people as house sites. It also provides for reserving land for providing public amenities without which people cannot live there. Community centres, shopping complexes, parks, roads, drains, play grounds, are all necessary for civic life and these amenities are enjoyed by all. That is also a kind of distribution. Later on the land is developed and then distributed amongst the people as house sites. It also provides for reserving land for providing public amenities without which people cannot live there. Community centres, shopping complexes, parks, roads, drains, play grounds, are all necessary for civic life and these amenities are enjoyed by all. That is also a kind of distribution. In (State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy)5, 1978(1) S.C.R. 641 at p. 690 dealing with the question whether nationalisation of bus transport was covered by Article 39(b) Justice Krishna Iyer has observed thus : "The next question is whether nationalisation can have nexus with distribution. Should we assign a narrow or spacious sense to this concept? Doubtless, the latter, for reasons so apparent and eloquent. To distribute even in its simple dictionary meaning, is to allot, to divide into classes or into groups and distribution embraces arrangement, classification, placement, disposition, apportionment, the way in which items, a quantity, or the like, is divided or apportioned; the system of dispersing goods throughout a community (See Random House Dictionary). To classify and allocate certain industries or services or utilities or articles between the private and the public sectors of the national economy is to distribute those resources. Socially conscious economists will find little difficulty in treating nationalisation of transport as a distributive process for the goods of community. You cannot condemn the concept of nationalisation in our plan on the score that Article 39(b) does not envelope it. It is a matter of public policy left to legislative wisdom whether a particular scheme of takeover should be undertaken." Two conclusions strike as quite essential. Part IV, especially Article 39(b) and (c), is a futuristic mandate to the State with a message of transformation of the economic and social order. Firstly, such change calls for collaborative effort from all the legal institutions of the system; the legislature, the judiciary and the administrative machinery. Secondly and consequentially, loyalty to the high purpose of the Constitution, viz. Social and economic justice in the context of material want and utter inequalities on a massive scale, compels the Court to ascribe expansive meaning to the pregnant words used with hopeful foresight, not to circumscribe their connotation into contradiction of the objectives inspiring the provision. Secondly and consequentially, loyalty to the high purpose of the Constitution, viz. Social and economic justice in the context of material want and utter inequalities on a massive scale, compels the Court to ascribe expansive meaning to the pregnant words used with hopeful foresight, not to circumscribe their connotation into contradiction of the objectives inspiring the provision. To be pharisaic towards the Constitution through ritualistic construction is to weaken the social-spiritual thrust of the founding fathers dynamic faith." 2.As far as the merits in regard to the levy of repair cess which is impugned in the present petition is concerned the building Bennet House prior to January 1973 was partly used for residence and partly for business and hence was liable to repair cess under section 27 of the Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board Act, 1969. In about August, September 1972 1st respondent carried out repairs to the said building by spending a sum of about Rs. 85,000/-. Building cess was recovered upto January, 1973. In January, 1973 petitioner No. 1 started using the building exclusively for non-residential purposes. Hence under section 28 of the Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board Act, 1969, as then prevailing, the building was exempted from levy of cess. Section 28(1)(1) in so far as is relevant provided as under : "28(1) The following buildings and lands shall be exempt from payment of the cess, that is to say, - ............... (i) buildings exclusively used for non-residential purposes." The aforesaid provisions of section 28 came to be amended and was brought into force on 25th October 1975 when sub-section (2) was inserted which provided as under : "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if a building, in respect of which the cess is levied, is or is deemed to be structurally repaired at any time by the Board under this Act, then that building, after such repairs, shall not be exempt or entitled to be exempt from payment of the cess under any of Clauses (g), (h), (i), (j), or (ja) of that sub-section." 3.1st respondent thereafter sought to levy the cess which is impugned in the present petition. Aforesaid Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board Act, 1969 was repealed in 1977 and the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 was enacted. Aforesaid Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board Act, 1969 was repealed in 1977 and the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 was enacted. Provisions similar to the ones contained in section 28 of the repealed Act were enacted by section 83 of the Maharashtra Act. Section 83(1)(j) in so far as is relevant provides as under : "83. (1) The following lands and buildings shall be exempted from payment of the cess, that is to say, - ............ (j) buildings exclusively used for non-residential purposes." Sub-section (2) of section 83 provides as under : "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if a building is deemed to be structurally repaired at any time by the Board under this Act, then that building, after such repairs shall not be exempted or entitled to be exempted from payment of the cess under any of Clause (i), (j), (k) or (l) of that sub-section." (Emphasis supplied) 4.It is first contended on behalf of the petitioners that sub-section (2) of section 28 of the Bombay Act can only operate prospectively. The repairs which had been carried out to the building was prior to the amendment. The said repairs, therefore, cannot operate so as to withdraw the exemption already granted under the unamended provision. Sub-section (2) however encompasses the buildings which are deemed to be structurally repaired "at any time". Hence under the aforesaid provision once the building has been repaired by the Board the same will not be entitled to exemption, whether the repairs have been carried out after or prior to the amendment. In view of this provision, we find that the present petition is devoid of merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. Rule is accordingly discharged. There shall however be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. *****