GAUD SAHAKARI SABHA MARYADIT v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
1998-09-08
DEEPAK VERMA
body1998
DigiLaw.ai
DEEPAK VERMA, J. ( 1 ) IN this matter show cause notice against admission was issued by this Court on 13. 5. 1998. On the said date it was further directed that respondent No. 6 herein, will not take any financial decision without prior permission of the Registrar who will decide such a request after hearing the petitioners. ( 2 ) IT appears that an order has been passed by the Assistant Registrar, co-operative Societies. Indore purporting to have exercised his powers under section 53 (13) of the M. P. Co- operative Societies Act, 1960 (for short the Act ). Petitioners are aggrieved by the said order by which the Managing Committee of petitioner No. 1 Society stands superseded petitioners No. 2 to 6 are claiming to be Directors. the said Managing Committee Respondent No. 6. who has been appointed as an Officer in-charge to take over the charge of the managing Committee until the elections are held, has filed an application under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India. for vacating the interim order of stay passed by this Court. Reply to the same has been filed by the petitioners opposing the said prayer. At the time of hearing arguments of this application, it was felt by this Court that matter can be disposed of. Thus. the hearing was deferred. Learned Government Advocate was directed to keep the records, available for perusal. The matter has, therefore, been taken up for hearing on merits to day. ( 3 ) GOVERNMENT Advocate has submitted for perusal of this Court, the dak Book maintained by the Office of the Deputy Registrar and Despatch register of the same office, to show that notices were sent to all the petitioners on 11. 3. 1998 and 12. 3. 1998. However. learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners have challenged the correctness and genuineness of the said two registers and according to them these two registers have been manufactured with an intention to show to this Court. that notices, prior to taking any action under Section 53 (13) of the Act, were issued. However, at this stage it is not necessary to enter into further controversy in this regard. ( 4 ) IT has already been mentioned that petitioner No. 1 is duly registered society under the provisions of the Act.
that notices, prior to taking any action under Section 53 (13) of the Act, were issued. However, at this stage it is not necessary to enter into further controversy in this regard. ( 4 ) IT has already been mentioned that petitioner No. 1 is duly registered society under the provisions of the Act. Petitioners No. 2 to 6 were elected as directors of the Managing Committee of the said Society. From the impugned order passed by the Assistant Registrar, it appears that they had committed default in appearing for three consecutive meetings resulting in their ouster/disqualification from the Managing Committee. It has further been directed that action under Section 53 (13) of the Act. has been taken and fresh elections be held. Until fresh elections are held respondent No. 6 being officer-in-Charge shall look into, the day-to-day affairs of the petitioner No. 1 Society. Respondent No. 6 has specifically mentioned in the application being LA. No. 4329/98 that petitioners have an alternative and efficacious remedy of appeal /revision under Sections 77/80 of the Act. Not having exhausted the said remedy available to them under the Act. they cannot approach this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, requesting for invocation of the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred on this court. Looking to these preliminary objections, raised by learned Counsel for the respondents, it was thought fit to take up this matter and dispose it of accordingly. ( 5 ) SHRI Vinay Zelawat, learned Government Advocate also made a categorical statement that this order passed by Assistant Registrar is not going to continue for an indefinite period. According to him within a period of four months hereof, respondents would take appropriate steps for holding fresh elections to the Managing Committee. He has submitted that four months would be necessary as 90 days notice, is required to be given as contemplated under Rule 41 of the M. P. Co-operative Societies Rules. 1962. ( 6 ) HOWEVER, to these submissions, learned Counsellor the petitioners, has submitted that the impugned order has been passed behind their back, without giving them any opportunity of hearing, therefore, the same has to be quashed and dislodged. It has also been contended that availability of an alternative and efficacious remedy does not create any bar in entertaining a petition. more so, if it is apparent from the order impugned.
It has also been contended that availability of an alternative and efficacious remedy does not create any bar in entertaining a petition. more so, if it is apparent from the order impugned. that the same has been passed arbitrarily, capriciously and without jurisdiction. ( 7 ) TO advance contention in this regard reliance has been placed on a full Bench decision of this Court reported in 1976 MPLJ 376 , Ramswarup ramcharan Gupta v. M. P. Co- operative Marketing Federation Ltd. . In the said f. B. decision, this was not the question which was required to be answered by it. The question which was precisely put before the Full Bench was with regard to maintainability of a petitioner Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, against a Co- operative Society, keeping in mind the provisions of article 12 of the Constitution. Thus, the question which actually arises in the case in hand, was not at all considered by the Full Bench of this Court. Therefore, the ratio of the said F. B. judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. ( 8 ) PETITIONERS have also placed reliance on a judgment of this Court reported in 1968 MPLJ 327, Suresh Seth v. State of M. P. . In this matter the db was dealing with the principles of natural justice and provisions of Section 422 (1) of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act. Since prima facie it appears that petitioners were noticed on 12. 3. 1998 with regard to the action which was required to be taken against them, therefore it cannot be said that principles of natural justice were not followed. This fact is further corroborated from the order passed on 29. 4. 98 (Annexure P-9), before the impugned order dated 2. 5. 98, came to be passed. Perusal of this letter dated 29. 4. 98 shows that letters were issued to the petitioners on 12. 3. 1998, the details of which have been given by the learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 to 5 in the Dak Book and the Despatch Register. The letter further mentions that despite grant of time the petitioners had been seeking for further time to file an appropriate reply and were only interested to protract, passing of any order on the subject matter.
The letter further mentions that despite grant of time the petitioners had been seeking for further time to file an appropriate reply and were only interested to protract, passing of any order on the subject matter. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioners had no knowledge of the proceedings Full Bench judgment of this Court deals with the provisions of section 55 of the Act, and the Rules framed thereunder. The question which is germane to this petition has not been dealt with in the said judgment; (iii)lastly reliance has been placed on a Single Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1986 MPLJ 203 Ward No. 4, Primary Consumer Co-operatives Stores ltd. v. State of M. P. and others. Learned Single Judge has held that order of supersession must give reasons on which conclusion have been arrived. In this case also Annexure P-9, which is a notice sent to the petitioners, assigned the reasons for the disqualification, earned by the petitioners No. 2 to 6. The same has also been considered in the impugned order. Thus, it cannot be said that no reasons have been assigned. In fact on account of the legal position, as it existed, this action has been taken. ( 9 ) HOWEVER, after having given my anxious consideration to the whole matter, I find that the aforesaid judgments cannot be said to be applicable to the petitioners' case, nor do they help the petitioner's case. in any manner. It may also be mentioned here that while taking action against the Managing committee under sub-section (13) of Section 53 of the Act. the Registrar has ample power, on the grounds, which he may find just and proper, to supersede working of such Society unless fresh elections are held. The word "otherwise" would take care of any such contingency that may arise. in the working of the managing Committee. For ready reference relevant provision of Section 53 (13)of the Act is reproduced hereinbelow :"53. Supersession of Committee. (13) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, or rules made thereunder or bye-laws of Society, if the Committee of Society c eases to function due to order of any Court or otherwise, the Registrar may appoint a person or committee of persons temporarily till the Court order is vacated or the new elections are hold and the committee takes charge. " ( 10 ) NOW.
" ( 10 ) NOW. coming to the provisions of Section 77 of the Act. a bare reading of the same would show that an appeal would lie against an order passed by any Subordinate Officer to the Registrar, to the Additional registrar or to the Registrar. Further a second appeal is also provided under the aforesaid provision. Section 80 also gives power to an aggrieved party to agitate the matter by filing a revision before the Board of Revenue, so delegated by the State Government. Thus, I find that petitioners have an alternative and efficacious remedy which they have admittedly not exhausted so far. Therefore, it would not be proper to enter into the merits of the matter, instead the petition has to be disposed of on this ground alone. ( 11 ) I have already mentioned above that learned Government Advocate shri Vinay Zelawat has made a categorical statement that respondent No. 5 is going to start election process in right earnest to elect Directors of the managing Committee of petitioner No. 1 Society within a period of four months hereof. For this reason also, no case for any interference against the impugned order Annexure P-9, dated 2. 5. 1998 is made out. On account of the foregoing discussion, I find that there is no merit or substance in this petition, which is disposed of on the grounds mentioned above. The interim order of stay granted earlier stands vacated. Racking to the facts and circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their own costs. Order accordingly. .