Honble SHETHNA, J.–The petitioner was appointed as Constable in Mewar Bhil Kore of the respondent Police Department. He belongs to Scheduled Tribue of Meena. Under their personal law, second marriage is permissible. However, Rule 25A of the Rajasthan Civil Service Conduct Rules, 1971 (for short ``the Rules) provides that no Govt. Servant who has wife living shall contact another marriage without first obtaining the permission of the Govt., notwithstanding that such subsequent marriage is permissible under the personal law for the time being applicable to him. (2). The petitioner was served with a charge sheet on 29.3.1990 (Annex. 1) issued by the Commandant, Mewar Bhil Kore, Kherwara, respondent no. 3 under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1958 (for short ``the appeal Rules) alongwith the allegations/charges (Annex. 2 and 3). Annex. 1 states that the petitioner was appointed on 2.2.1982, at that time he had wife Mariyam @ Champa Devi. However, while in service without giving divorce to the first wife he contacted second marriage with Lalita D/o Lala Ram Meena. Thus, to contact second marriage in presence of first wife while in service is against the Rules. In Annex. 2 also similar things have been stated that the petitioner contacted second marriage with Lalita in the year 1985 and he got two children out of the second marriage. The act of the petitioner is a mis-conduct under Rule 25(1) of the Rules, 1971. In Annex. 3, the petitioner was called upon to state as to whether he wants personal hearing in the matter or not. He was also asked to disclose the names of the witnesses, if any, to be examined by him. He was also asked to produce any document which he wants to produce alongwith reply. He was also asked to have inspection of the Govt. record. He was further informed that if he will not submit the reply within time then ex-parte departmental enquiry will be initiated against him. The petitioner replied the said charge sheet by his reply Annex. 4, wherein, he has stated that he got married with his first wife Mariyam @ Champa Devi as per the custom in the year 1979 and they were living as husband and wife. The petitioner replied the said charge sheet by his reply Annex. 4, wherein, he has stated that he got married with his first wife Mariyam @ Champa Devi as per the custom in the year 1979 and they were living as husband and wife. But, after the birth of one daughter no other child born to their place and after the lapse of time any hope of second child was vanished and because of that the entire family members were frustrated. In that view of the matter, with the consent of his first wife, he contacted second marriage in 1985 with Lalita D/o Lala Ram. In para no. 3 of the reply, he has clearly stated that knowingly he has not committed any breach of Rules and contacted second marriage, but he had contacted marriage under compulsion. In para no. 4 of the reply he has further stated that he joined the service on 2.2.1982 and he was not aware of the Rules, therefore, due to ignorance of law he contacted second marriage, therefore, notice be discharged. (3). The disciplinary authority by its order dated 25.4.1990 (Annex. 5) terminated the services of the petitioner by discharging him from service by holding that the explanation offered by the delinquent that because he could not have second child from his first wife therefore, he contacted second marriage cannot be accepted and that the delinquent admitted his mis-conduct, therefore, no detail enquiry was necessary. But, said order of termination was challenged in appeal before the appellate authority by the delinquent, wherein, he came out with a case that his admission in reply was made under threat and coercion. The appellate authority did not accept it and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the order of termination passed by the disciplinary authority, which is confirmed in appeal by the appellate authority, the petitioner has filed this petition before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (4). Learned counsel Shri Vyas for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the impugned order of termination from service, which is confirmed in appeal by the appellate authority, is bad in law and illegal and liable to be set aside. He submitted that without holding any enquiry against the petitioner the disciplinary authority has passed the order of termination on the so called admission made by the delinquent in his reply. He submitted that without holding any enquiry against the petitioner the disciplinary authority has passed the order of termination on the so called admission made by the delinquent in his reply. He submitted that he has only stated in the reply that he has contacted second marriage, but that was not sufficient to prove that the second marriage was duly solemnised. Relying upon the Supreme Court Judgment in case of P. Satya Narayana & Anr. vs. P. Mallaiah & Ors. (1) he submitted that the plea of the delinquent to the charge of bigamy that he had contacted second marr- iage does not absolve the department from proving that the marriage in question was performed in regular way so as to visit him with penal consequences. (5). Learned counsel Shri Chhangani for the respondents, however, submitted that the said judgment was delivered in a criminal case where the burden of proof is high on the prosecution. He submits that in domestic enquiry the yardstick is to- tally different. The Department has not to prove the carebeyond reasonable doubt. He submitted that the disciplinary authority was fully justified in accepting and relying upon the reply submitted by the delinquent, wherein, in unequivocal terms he has stated that he contacted second marriage. He, therefore, submitted that once there is a clear admission on the part of the delinquent there was no need for the disciplinary authority to hold any enquiry which would otherwise an exercise futility. (6). Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that in case this Court does not accept his first submission then also the penalty of dismissal from service is highly disproportionate as this is not such a serious misconduct which would visit him with penalty of dismissal. He submitted that in the charge sheet the petitioner was not informed that the charge is of such a serious nature, if proved would result in the maximum penalty of dismissal from service. He submitted that after reply to the charge sheet the disciplinary authority should have issued atleast show cause notice to the petitioner to show cause as to why the maximum penalty of dismissal should not be imposed. In any case, he submitted that looking to the family back ground and the strata of the petitioner from which he is coming the punishment of stoppage of one increment was sufficient. In any case, he submitted that looking to the family back ground and the strata of the petitioner from which he is coming the punishment of stoppage of one increment was sufficient. He submitted that this Court can impose penalty of stoppage of one increment without future effect for his mis- conduct, if at all this Court comes to the conclusion that the charge levelled against the petitioner was duly proved and the disciplinary authority had not committed any error in holding that the petitioner had contacted second marriage. He also submitted that the petitioner is more concerned with his service as he is out of job since 1990 and it is very difficult for him to maintain his family members in this hard days. He stated that alongwith the order of stoppage of increment the back wages if denied would be sufficient punishment to him. However, learned counsel Shri Chhangani for the respondent submitted that in such cases the Court should not exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as it is not open for this Court to interfere with the order of penalty. (7). It is true that the petitioner in his reply, Annex. 4 has stated that he had contacted second marriage with Lalita D/o Lala Ram, but there is no admission on his behalf that he had two children from the second marriage which he contacted with Lalita. Mere admission of the delinquent that he contacted second marriage would not be sufficient for the disciplinary authority to pass an order of penalty by holding that the charge is proved against the delinquent. It is true that standard of proof in departmental enquiry is different than the standard of proof required in criminal trial. In criminal case the prosecution has to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whereas, in departmental enquiry the disciplinary authority has to come to the conclusion on the broad probability as to whether the mis-conduct alleged against the delinquent is proved or not. Reply of the petitioner has to be read as a whole and not in a piece. The disciplinary authority should not have picked up only one sentence from his reply that he had contacted second marriage. Reply of the petitioner has to be read as a whole and not in a piece. The disciplinary authority should not have picked up only one sentence from his reply that he had contacted second marriage. In case of P. Satya Narains case (Supra) the Apex Court has clearly held that the plea of the accused to the charge of bigamy that he had contac- ted second marriage does not absolve the department from proving that the marriage in question was performed in regular way so as to visit him with penal consequences. (8). In my considered view, in the departmental enquiry it has to be proved that the so called second marriage of the petitioner in question was performed in regular way and it was duly solemnised. That finding does not find place in the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority. In any case, the disciplinary authority had to atleast issue a show cause notice to the petitioner after receiving his reply and to call upon him to show cause as to why the maximum penalty of dismissal should not be imposed against him on the admission made by him in his reply. If that was done, then perhaps the petitioner would have immediately come out with a case that he had not contacted any second marriage or the marriage was not duly solemnised. From the facts of this case it appears that the reply was submitted by the petitioner under the hope that the minor penalty of stoppage of one increment without future effect will be imposed and on such impression being created in his mind, he must have submitted such reply, wherein, he had stated that he had contacted second marriage. In any case, the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority (Annex. 5) is in clear violation of principles of natural justice as no show cause notice was issued to the petitioner before passing the impugned order of penalty. Therefore, this petition is required to be allowed and the impugned order of penalty and the order passed in appeal by the appellate authority are required to be set aside. (9). I may make it clear that if the submission of Mr. Therefore, this petition is required to be allowed and the impugned order of penalty and the order passed in appeal by the appellate authority are required to be set aside. (9). I may make it clear that if the submission of Mr. Vyas that the order passed by the disciplinary authority was in violation of principles of natural justice and bad in law was not accepted by me then too I would have definitely interfered with the order of penalty in this case. Because, the mis-conduct alleged against the petitioner is not so serious which calls for the maximum penalty of dismissal. In fact, while passing the impugned order of termination, the authority had not taken into consideration any other aspect of the matter or the question of imposing any other penalty other than the penalty of dismissal. In my considered opinion, while imposing the punishment the disciplinary authority has to apply its mind to the facts of the case and it has to come to the conclusion that what should be the proper penalty for the mis-conduct which is committed by the delinquent. For that the disciplinary authority had also to consider the other circumstances namely clean record of the petitioner, long tenure of service, family back ground and the social strata etc. There was no such consideration on the part of the disciplinary authority and it appears that mechanically without applying mind the disciplinary authority has straight away terminated the services of the petitioner. (10). If the disciplinary authority had properly applied its mind on the aspect of punishment then it would have certainly passed minor penalty of stoppage of one increment, which would be just order. (11). In view of the above discussion, this petition is allowed. The impugned order of penalty Annex. 5 passed by the disciplinary authority and the order passed in appeal at Annex. 7 by the appellate authority are hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith with 50% back wages. (12). If the petitioner is not reinstated and paid back wages within three months from today then the respondents shall pay interest at the rate of 18% p.a. on the arrears of back wages.