JUDGMENT - R.K. BATTA, J.:---The petitioner was appointed on purely temporary basis on the recommendation of the Departmental Selection Committee to the post of Lower Division Clerk vide order dated 22nd April, 1991. The appointment was made subject to Memorandum dated 21st March, 1991, which inter alia provides that the terms of appointment include the condition that the appointment is temporary and will not confer any title to permanent employment and that the appointment may be terminated by giving one month's notice on either side, without assigning any reasons and the Appointing Authority may terminate the services forthwith by tendering notice pay. By intimation dated 3rd June, 1991, the petitioner was posted for invigilation duty on 30th June, 1991. The petitioner had to report at 2.00 p.m. but she reported at 2.32 p.m., the petitioner instead of giving the answer papers to a candidate supplied a bunch of supplements to the candidate which resulted in confusion over the identity of the candidate and besides, that, two candidates had written the same roll number in their respective answer papers, which the petitioner did not check at the time of collecting the answer sheets. The petitioner was also irregular in her duties. Show Cause Notice dated 3rd July, 1991, was issued to the petitioner and the petitioner in here reply dated 9th July, 1991, admitted certain lapses on her part. Subsequently, the petitioner received a Memo dated 27th January 1992, in which it was averred that inspite of several verbal instructions and Show Cause Notice issued to the petitioner regarding her irregular attendance and lack of interest in work, she had not shown any improvement till date. In this Memo some examples of late coming and abstention from duty without intimation were quoted. According to the petitioner, except for the instances quoted in the Memo she was punctual, and she remained absent on two days as she was sick. By order dated 31st January, 1992, the services of the petitioner were terminated in accordance with the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, hereinafter called the "said Rules". The said order provided that the petitioner shall be entitled to claim pay plus allowances for the period of notice. By order dated 31st January, 1992, the services of the petitioner were terminated in accordance with the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, hereinafter called the "said Rules". The said order provided that the petitioner shall be entitled to claim pay plus allowances for the period of notice. The petitioner challenges this order on several grounds, namely, that the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct; the order is directly referable to Memo issued on 27th January, 1992; that her services have been terminated for extraneous reasons which are unconnected with the performance of her job; that no Memo was issued to her to suggest that she had shown lack of interest in work; that her termination is basically on account of the absence of the petitioner without leave which constitutes misconduct, for which departmental enquiry is required to be conducted and that the impugned order is not in conformity with the said Rules. 2.No return has been filed on behalf of the respondents. However, learned advocate Shri A.N.S. Nadkarni, appearing on behalf of the respondents No. 1 and 2 has placed before us Show Cause Notice dated 3rd July, 1991 and the reply dated 9th July, 1991, given by the petitioner which had not been placed on record by the petitioner. 3.We have heard learned advocates on either side, learned advocate Shri M.S. Sonak, argued on behalf of the petitioner; learned advocate Shri A.N.S. Nadkarni argued on behalf of the respondents No. 1 and 2 and learned Government Advocate Shri Bharne argued on behalf of the respondent No. 3. 4.The learned advocate Shri M.S. Sonak after placing reliance on a number of rulings of the Apex Court submitted before us that the impugned order in question is a mere camouflage which, in fact, directly relates to the Memo issued to the petitioner on 27th January, 1992, that the Court has to lift the veil and ascertain the reasons behind dismissal which has evil consequences. He also urged that the Court should look into the attendant circumstances which will clearly reflect that Memo dated 27th January, 1992, is the foundation for the dismissal order which cannot be sustained in the absence of any departmental enquiry. He also urged that the Court should look into the attendant circumstances which will clearly reflect that Memo dated 27th January, 1992, is the foundation for the dismissal order which cannot be sustained in the absence of any departmental enquiry. 5.On the other hand, learned Advocate Shri A.N.S. Nadkarni has submitted on behalf of the respondents No. 1 and 2 that the petitioner was not found suitable for the job and her services were terminated under the said Rules in accordance with the terms and conditions of the appointment order. He also pointed out that the petitioner had joined as L.D.C. on 1st April, 1991, but it was found that she had also mismanaged the invigilation duty entrusted to her on 30th June, 1991, as a result of which Show Cause Notice dated 3rd July, 1991 was issued. The petitioner in her reply dated 9th July, 1991, admitted all the faults referred to in the Show Cause Notice and assured that she would come in time to the office and be more responsible and careful in her work in future. Subsequently again, it was found that inspite of several verbal instructions and Show Cause Notice, the petitioner continued to be irregular in her attendance and showed lack of interest for which a Memo was issued on 27th January, 1992. Ultimately, the services of the petitioner were terminated under the said Rules on 31st January, 1992, in the interest of not only maintenance of discipline in the office, but also on account of irregular attendance and lack of interest in work by the petitioner. It is pointed out by him that there are no allegations of mala fides or that the services were terminated for any collateral purposes or motive and that the grounds on which the services of the petitioner were terminated do not amount to misconduct. It was further urged by him that the cases on which reliance has been placed by learned advocate for the petitioner relate to single and lone instances in the case of service of employees who were terminated and that the whole matter has to be examined in the light of various pronouncements of the Apex Court including two judgments of the Apex Court which are on the point in issue itself. He, therefore, submits that there is no merit in the petition and it is liable to be dismissed. He, therefore, submits that there is no merit in the petition and it is liable to be dismissed. 6.Learned Government Advocate, Shri Bharne, has endorsed the arguments advanced by Shri Nadkarni and he also placed reliance on the same judgments upon which reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate Shri Nadkarni. 7.Though a number of judgments were quoted before us, we do not find that it is necessary to make reference to all the judgments. Yet we shall briefly refer to the judgments which are on the point involved in this case. 8.The learned advocate, Shri Sonak, had placed heavy reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in (Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India and others)1, reported in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 636. In this case, before the Apex Court the appellant Anoop Jaiswal, who was selected by the U.P.S.C. for appointment to the Indian Police Service, was under going training as a probationer at the Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy, Hyderabad. On 22nd June, 1981, the said appellant alongwith other probationers reached the field where the ceremonial drill practice was to be conducted, twenty-two minutes late. The appellant was considered to be one of the ring leaders who was responsible for delay. The Director of the Academy after holding enquiry into the alleged mis-conduct, recommended to the Government of India that the appellant should be discharged from service and, on the basis of the said recommendation, the appellant was discharged by the Government of India vide order dated 9th November, 1991. The main contention advanced before the Apex Court was that the order of discharge though on the face of it appears to carry no stigma is, in reality, an order terminating the services on the ground of misconduct alleged to have been committed by him on 22nd June, 1981, in acting as one of the ring leaders who was responsible for reaching the field where the ceremonial drill was to take place, late. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government, it was pointed out that earlier also there were allegations of misconduct against the appellant, which were found prejudicial to good order and discipline and that the appellant had not shown any repentance. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government, it was pointed out that earlier also there were allegations of misconduct against the appellant, which were found prejudicial to good order and discipline and that the appellant had not shown any repentance. The Apex Court after referring to the judgments in (Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India)2, reported in A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36 and (Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab)3, reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2192, found that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for the incident the petitioner would not have been discharged and, as such, the order of discharge would fall if the employee was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. In coming to the said conclusion, the Apex Court had taken into consideration that the enquiries were made behind the back of the appellant; only the case of the appellant was dealt with seriously in the end and the cases of the other probationers, who were also considered to be ring leaders, were not seriously taken note of. It was also pointed out by the Apex Court that the only ground which ultimately prevailed upon the Director of the Academy was that the appellant had not shown any sign of repentance and that his case would be dealt with leniently if he showed any sign of repentance. It was noticed by the Apex Court that in the very first reply the appellant had filed before the Director of the Academy on being asked about the incident, the appellant had stated, "I sincerely regret the lapse". Taking into consideration all these factors, the Apex Court had set aside the order of discharge. However, it is pertinent to note that the Apex Court had relied upon the observations of the Apex Court in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), wherein it was observed :- "No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are terminated it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct or inefficiency, or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any Rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But in those cases the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the other hand, the probationer is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311(2) he can claim protection." 9.In the ruling of the Apex Court in (State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R. Saboji and others)4, reported in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 42, upon which reliance was placed by learned Advocate Shri Nadkarni, it has been laid down by the Apex Court :- "Ordinarily and generally the rule would be that you have to look to the order on the face of it and find whether it casts any stigma on the Government servant. In such a case there is no presumption that the order is arbitrary or mala fide unless a very strong case is made out and proved by the Government servant who challenges such an order. In such a case there is no presumption that the order is arbitrary or mala fide unless a very strong case is made out and proved by the Government servant who challenges such an order. Per Pathak, J.:- where the services of a temporary Government servant or a probationer Government servant are terminated by an order which does not ex facie disclose any stigma or penal consequences against the Government servant and is merely a termination order simpliciter, there is no case ordinarily for assuming that it is anything but what it purports to be. Where, however, the order discloses on the face of it that stigma is cast on the Government servant or that it visits him with penal consequences, then plainly the case is one of punishment. There may still be another kind of case where although the termination of services is intended by way of punishment, the order is framed as a termination simpliciter. In such a case, if the Government servant is able to establish by material on the record that the order is in fact passed by way of punishment, the innocence of the language in which the order is framed will not protect it if the procedural safeguards contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution have not been satisfied. In a given case, the Government servant may succeed in making out a prima facie case that the order was by way of punishment but an attempt to rebut the case by the authorities may necessitate sending for the official records for the purpose of determining the truth. It is in such a case generally that the official records may be called for by the Court. It is not open to the Court to send for the official records on a mere allegation by the Government servant that the order is by way of punishment. It is in such a case generally that the official records may be called for by the Court. It is not open to the Court to send for the official records on a mere allegation by the Government servant that the order is by way of punishment. For unless there is material on the record before the Court in support of that allegation, an attempt by the Court to find out from the record whether the termination of service is based on the unsuitability of the Government servant in relation to the post held by him or is in reality an order by way of punishment will in effect be an unwarranted attempt to delve into the official records for the purpose of determining the nature of the order on the basis of a mere allegation of the Government servant. On a sufficient case being made out on the merits before the Court by the Government servant it is open to the Court to resort to scrutiny of the official records for the purpose of verifying the truth. The Court should not decline to persue the official records in an appropriate case and where considerations of privilege and confidentiality do not suffer, the information set forth in the records should be made available to the Government servant. The mere possibility that the official records could confirm what the Government servant had set out to prove and prima facie had, indeed, proved should not shut out disclosure of the information." 10.The learned advocate for the petitioner had placed reliance on (Jarnail Singh others v. State of Punjab and others)5, reported in 1986(3) S.C.C. 277 , wherein the Apex Court has laid down that mere form of the order is not sufficient to hold that the order of termination was innocuous and it was a termination simpliciter, but it is the substance of the order, that is the attendant circumstances, as well as the basis of the order that have to be taken into consideration while deciding the question whether the termination is in the nature of termination simpliciter, or in the nature of punishment. It was further observed therein that it is incumbent on the Court to lift the veil and see the real circumstances as well as the basis and foundation of the circumstances complained of in order to determine whether the termination was made on the ground of misconduct or inefficiency or not. In this case, the State respondent in its several affidavits had alleged serious misconduct against the petitioners and also adverse entries in the service records of these petitioners but the impugned orders terminating the services of the petitioners were issued on the ground that the posts were no longer required while juniors were retained and regularised . It is in these circumstances that it was held that the termination was by way of punishment and the termination orders were liable to be set aside. 11.Reliance was then placed by the learned advocate Shri Nadkarni on (Ravindra Kumar Misra v. U.P. State Handloom Corporation Ltd. and another)6, reported in A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2408, wherein it was noticed that in several authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court, the concept of, "motive" and "foundation" has been brought in for finding out the effect of termination and it was observed :- "If the delinquency of the officer in temporary service is taken as the operating motive in terminating the service, the order is not considered as punitive while if the order of termination is founded upon it, the termination is considered to be a punitive action. This so on account of the fact that it is necessary for every employer to assess the service of the temporary incumbent in order to find out as to whether he should be confirmed in his appointment or his services should be terminated. It may also be necessary to find out whether the officer should be tried for some more time on temporary basis. Since both in regard to a temporary employee or an officiating employee in a higher post such an assessment would be necessary merely because the appropriate authority proceeds to make an assessment and leaves a record of its views the same would not be available to be utilised to make the order of termination following such assessment punitive in character. In a large democracy administration is bound to be impersonal and in regard to public officers whether in Government or Public Corporations, assessments have got to be in writing for purposes of record. In a large democracy administration is bound to be impersonal and in regard to public officers whether in Government or Public Corporations, assessments have got to be in writing for purposes of record. There is no justification in the contention of the appellant that once such an assessment is recorded the order of termination made soon thereafter must take the punitive character." The next ruling which was referred to by the learned advocates appearing on either side is (State of Uttar Pradesh another v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla)7, reported in 1991(1) S.C.C. 691 . In this ruling the Apex Court has reviewed the entire case law on the subject. It was noticed that in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra) two tests were laid down, namely (i) whether the temporary government servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (ii) whether he has been visited with evil consequences; and if either of the tests is satisfied, it must be held that the order of termination of a temporary government servant is by way of punishment. It was further pointed out that it must be borne in mind that the temporary government servant has no right to hold the post and termination of such government servant does not visit him with any evil consequences. The Apex Court thus pointed out that the evil consequences as held in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra) do not include the termination of services a temporary government servant in accordance with the terms and conditions of service. This view taken by the Constitution Bench in Dhingra's case has been reiterated and affirmed by the Constitution Bench decisions in (State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das)8, reported in A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 177, (R.C. Lacy v. State of Bihar), (which is quoted by the Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh another v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla (supra), (Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India)9, reported in A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1854, (Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India)10, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 449, (A.G. Benjamin v. Union of India)11, 1967(1) L.L.J. 718, Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (supra). The Apex Court also pointed out that the mere fact that prior to the issue of order of termination an enquiry against the respondent had been held does not change the order of termination into that of punishment as after the preliminary enquiry the competent authority did not take steps to punish the respondent and instead of holding departmental enquiry chose to terminate the services of the respondent in accordance with the contract of service and the rules. It was further noticed in this judgment by the Apex Court that in Jagdish Mitter's case (supra), the Constitution Bench had held that every order terminating the services of a temporary public servant does not amount to dismissal or removal from service merely because an enquiry was held before the order of termination was passed. The Apex Court therein observed that the appropriate authority has power to terminate a temporary public servant either by discharging him under the terms of the contract or the relevant rules or by holding departmental disciplinary enquiry and dismissing him from service. The Apex Court then quoted the observations from Champaklal Chimanlal Shah's case (supra) wherein it was said that : that is why the Apex Court had emphasized in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra) and (Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh)12, reported in A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 369, that the motive or the inducing factor which influences the government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific rule is irrelevant. 12.The two rulings upon which reliance has been placed by the learned advocate Shri A.N.S. Nadkarni which was exactly on the issue involved are (State of U.P. another v. Premlata Misra (Km) others)13, reported in 1994(4) S.C.C. 189 and (Kunwar Arun Kumar v. U.P. Electronics Corporation Ltd. and others)14, reported in 1997(2) S.C.C. 191 . In State of U.P. another v. Premlata Misra (Km) others (supra), the respondent therein was temporarily appointed as Assistant Project Officer and her appointment order postulated that her services shall be terminated at any time by giving one month's notice or one month's pay. In this case the superiors of the petitioner had made two reports stating that she was irregular in her duties, insubordinate and in the habit of leaving office during office hours without permission. In this case the superiors of the petitioner had made two reports stating that she was irregular in her duties, insubordinate and in the habit of leaving office during office hours without permission. On consideration thereof the competent authority found that the respondent was not fit to be continued in service and therefore, the services of the respondent were terminated by giving one month's pay and allowances. This order was challenged before the Allahabad High Court and the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court set aside the termination order. The Apex Court while allowing the State's appeal rejected the contention of the respondent that the termination order was punitive and that she ought to have been afforded a prior opportunity. It was pointed out by the Apex Court that the Court can lift the veil of the innocuous order to find whether it is the foundation or motive the offending order and if misconduct is the foundation to pass the order then an enquiry into misconduct should be conducted and action according to law should follow. However, if it is motive, it is not incumbent upon the competent officers to have the enquiry conducted and the services of the temporary employee could be terminated in terms of the order of appointment or rules giving one month's notice or pay/salary in lieu thereof. The Apex Court further observed that even if an enquiry was initiated it could be dropped mid way and action could be taken in terms of rules or order of appointment. In these circumstances, the Apex Court found that the termination of the respondent was on account of unsuitability or unfitness but not by way of punishment as punitive measure and is one in terms of the order of appointment and also the rules. The Apex Court had quoted the following passage from its judgment in Kaushal Kishore Shukla's case (supra), which is as under :- "A temporary government servant has no right to hold the post, his services are liable to be terminated by giving him one month's notice without assigning any reason either under the terms of the contract providing for such termination or under the relevant statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of temporary government servants. A temporary government servant can, however, be dismissed from service by way of punishment. A temporary government servant can, however, be dismissed from service by way of punishment. Whenever, the competent authority is satisfied that the work and conduct of a temporary government servant is not satisfactory or that his continuance in service is not in public interest on account of his unsuitability, misconduct or inefficiency, it may either terminate his services in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service or the relevant rules or it decide to take punitive action against the temporary government servant. If it decides to take punitive action it may hold a formal inquiry by framing charges and giving opportunity to the government servant in accordance with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Since, a temporary government servant is also entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) in the same manner as a permanent government servant, very often, the question arises whether an order of termination is in accordance with the contract of service and relevant rules regulating the temporary employment or it is by way of punishment." 13.In Kunwar Arun Kumar v. U.P. Electronics Corporation Ltd. others (supra), the services of the petitioner were terminated on the ground that the petitioner was not suitable to remain in service. The Apex Court held that during the period of probation, the authorities are entitled to assess the suitability of the candidates and if it is found that the candidate is not suitable to remain in service they are entitled to record a finding of unsatisfactory performance of work and duties. It was pointed out that under these circumstances necessarily the Appointing Authority has to look into the performance of work and duties during the period of probation and if they record a finding that during that period the work and performance of the duties were unsatisfactory, they are entitled to terminate the service in terms of letter of appointment without conducting any enquiry, which does not amount to any stigma. In the said case it was found that the authority had recorded a finding that the petitioner was regularly absent on one ground or the other and under these circumstances termination of the services of the petitioner did not amount to any illegality on the part of the respondents. The reason for termination was merely motive and not foundation. 14.In fact, the last two cases apply on all fours to the case under consideration. The reason for termination was merely motive and not foundation. 14.In fact, the last two cases apply on all fours to the case under consideration. The petitioner was appointed purely on temporary basis. The terms of appointment provided that the appointment is temporary and will not confer any title to the permanent employment and that the appointment may be terminated at any time by a month's notice on either side, or forthwith by the Appointing Authority, by payment of notice pay and allowances. The petitioner joined on 1st April, 1991 and she totally bungled the work of invigilation which was entrusted to her. She not only reached late by more than half an hour, but also supplied bunch of supplements to one candidate instead of giving answer papers to the candidate resulting in confusion of the identity of the candidate. She also did not verify the answer sheets of the candidates and it was noticed that two candidates wrote the same roll number in their respective answer sheets. Besides this, it was also found that the petitioner was irregular in attending office duties punctually and eventhough office timing was 9.30 a.m. she used to arrive at 9.45 a.m./10 a.m. and this irregularity in her office attendance continued notwithstanding verbal warnings given to her twice. In reply to the said Show Cause Notice the petitioner admitted all the allegations contained in the Show Cause Notice and assured that she will not repeat the same again, will come in time to the office and be more responsible and careful with her work in future. In case the respondent No. 1 wanted to terminate the services of the petitioner, with any oblique motive, it could have been done even at that stage but the respondent No. 1 did give her an opportunity to improve. However, it appears that the petitioner continued with her irregular attendance inspite of several verbal instructions, as a result of which the Commission gave a Memo to her on 27th January, 1992, stating that inspite of several verbal instructions and Show Cause Notice regarding her irregular attendance and lack of interest in the work, she had not shown any improvement till date. It was pointed out therein that the petitioner had come late on 21st January and remained absent from duty on 23rd and 24th January, 1992. It was pointed out therein that the petitioner had come late on 21st January and remained absent from duty on 23rd and 24th January, 1992. It appears that the petitioner had not applied for leave on 23rd and 24th January, 1992, nor she filed any application supported by medical certificate that she was sick on those days. It appears that the petitioner took things for granted. It is in these circumstances that after the overall assessment of the work and punctuality of the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 issued the impugned order terminating her service. The petitioner does not satisfy any of the two tests laid down by the Apex Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra) so as to challenge the order of termination. The petitioner being a purely temporary government servant had no right to the post and her services were terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of her appointment, which would not result in evil consequences. Even in Shamsher Singh's case (supra) the Apex Court had laid down that before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. The authority may come to the conclusion that on account of indequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude, the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence she must be discharged. It would not amount to punishment. One of the contentions raised by learned advocates Shri Sonak before us is that the main reason for termination of the services of the petitioner is the Memo issued to her a few days prior to the date of termination which is the foundation for the termination in question. In this respect the Apex Court in Ravindra Kumar Misra's case (supra) had rejected a similar contention advanced by the appellant therein that once such an assessment is recorded, the order of termination made soon thereafter must take the punitive character. Moreover, it has been emphasized in the cases of Parshotam Lal Dhingra (supra) and Champaklal Chimanlal Shah (supra), that the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or specific rule is irrelevant. Moreover, it has been emphasized in the cases of Parshotam Lal Dhingra (supra) and Champaklal Chimanlal Shah (supra), that the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or specific rule is irrelevant. In the case under consideration the termination of the services of the petitioner has been done in accordance with the service conditions, which does not amount to punishment, or evil consequences as such. 15.For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit whatsoever in this petition and the petition is liable to be dismissed. The petition is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances we would leave the parties to bear their costs. Rule is accordingly discharged. Petition dismissed. *****